Ivy v. Lebanon Correctional Institute

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

CAMRON D. IVY,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 1:24-cv-691

Judge Matthew W. McFarland

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

LEBANON CORRECTIONAL

INSTITUTE, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Camron D. Ivy, an Ohio inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of

counsel, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Lebanon Correctional Institution

and two corrections officers employed there, alleging that the officers employed excessive force

in the form of pepper spray and strikes to Plaintiff’s face and head. This matter is before the

Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to

identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion

of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.

1997). Having performed the initial screen, Plaintiff MAY PROCEED on his individual-

capacity Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Carter and Coffee for

compensatory and punitive damages, but it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS

Plaintiff’s remaining claims for relief.

This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED. (ECF

No. 1.) Plaintiff is required to pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statement reveals that he has $4.79 in his prison

account, which is insufficient to pay the filing fee.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts

(Inmate ID Number 805101) at the Lebanon Correctional Institution is DIRECTED to submit to

the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial partial

payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust account or

the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six months immediately

preceding the filing of the Complaint.

After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the

inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the

account exceeds $10.00, until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks

should be sent to:

Prisoner Accounts Receivable

260 U.S. Courthouse

85 Marconi Boulevard

Columbus, Ohio 43215

The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.

It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without prepayment of

fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs

had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and

the prison cashier’s office.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e):

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See

also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action

in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion

of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted”).

Further, to properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must

satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

See also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under

Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that on March 10, 2024, Defendants Officer Carter and Officer Coffee

used excessive force in the form of pepper spray and strikes to Plaintiff’s face and head after

they stated that Plaintiff disobeyed a direct order to enter his cell, although Plaintiff alleges his

compliance was impossible because the cell was locked. Plaintiff was then placed in restrictive

housing. Plaintiff names as Defendants Officers Carter and Coffee, as well as Lebanon

Correctional Institution, and seeks compensatory and punitive damages and transfer to another

facility. (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1-1.)

Having performed the initial screen under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), Plaintiff may

proceed on his individual-capacity Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against

Defendants Carter and Coffee for compensatory and punitive damages. But Plaintiff’s remaining

claims must be dismissed.

Plaintiff does not specify whether he intends to sue Defendants Coffee and Carter in their

individual or official capacities. To the extent that he advances official-capacity claims for

money damages, those claims must be dismissed under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The

Eleventh Amendment operates as a bar to federal-court jurisdiction when a private citizen sues a

state or its instrumentalities unless the state has given express consent. Pennhurst St. Sch. &

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1983); Lawson v. Shelby Cty., 211 F.3d 331, 334 (6th

Cir. 2000). A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is “not a suit against the

official but rather is a suit against the official’s office,” and is therefore “no different from a suit

against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). “There are

three exceptions to sovereign immunity: (1) when the state has waived immunity by consenting

to the suit, (2) when Congress has expressly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity, and

(3) when the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714

(1908), applies.” Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 410 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). None of

these exceptions apply to Plaintiff’s Complaint. First, “Ohio has not waived sovereign immunity

in federal court.” Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999). Second, “Section

1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Boler, 865 F.3d at 410 (citing Will,

491 U.S. at 66). Third, the Ex Parte Young doctrine applies only when a plaintiff brings “claims

for prospective relief against state officials sued in their official capacity to prevent future federal

constitutional or statutory violations.” Boler, 865 F.3d at 412. Plaintiff’s claims for

compensatory and punitive damages fall outside the scope of Ex Parte Young. Accordingly, any

official-capacity claims that Plaintiff advances against Defendants Carter and Coffee for money

damages must be dismissed.

Defendant Lebanon Correctional Institution is an arm of the state of Ohio and is therefore

also generally shielded from suit by the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Clark v. Chillicothe

Corr. Inst., No. 2:19-CV-954, 2019 WL 3406432, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 29, 2019), report and

recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1227224 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 13, 2020); Garcia v. Lorain Cnty.

Ct. of Common Pleas, No. 1:18-CV-00944, 2019 WL 1755649, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2019)

(collecting cases). As a result, Plaintiff’s claims for money damages against Lebanon

Correctional Institution must also be dismissed.

Finally, Plaintiff also seeks transfer to another facility. Although a transfer constitutes

prospective injunctive relief, such that it might be encompassed under the Ex Parte Young

exception to sovereign immunity, Plaintiff has not alleged facts supporting a live case or

controversy warranting injunctive relief. “Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show

a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing,

present adverse effects.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (cleaned up).

Plaintiff’s allegations that he suffered excessive force in a discrete incident in March 2024 are by

themselves insufficient to raise a plausible inference that he is likely to continue suffering

excessive force such that transfer is necessary to prevent further violations of his constitutional

rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for transfer to another facility must also be dismissed.

III. DISPOSITION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED.

For the reasons above, Plaintiff MAY PROCEED on his individual-capacity Eighth

Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Carter and Coffee for compensatory and

punitive nominal damages, but it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s

remaining claims under §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

If Plaintiff wishes to have the United States Marshal effect service of the summons and

Complaint on Defendants Carter and Coffee, Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file a completed

summons form (Form AO-440) and a service of process by U.S. Marshal form (Form USM-285)

for each Defendant. If Plaintiff does do, the Clerk is DIRECTED to issue the summonses and

the United States Marshal is DIRECTED to serve by certified mail upon Defendants Carter and

Coffee the issued summons, a copy of the Complaint, and a copy of this Order and Report and

Recommendation.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE