Reeder v. Williams

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

KUANTAY REEDER CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO: 22-4614

JASON WILLIAMS, SECTION: "A" (1)

in his official capacity as Orleans

Parish District Attorney

ORDER AND REASONS

The following motion is before the Court: Motion in Limine to (1) Preclude Re-

Litigation of OPDA Brady Violations Recognized in Federal Court Rulings, and (2)

Admit Court Rulings Recognizing OPDA Brady Violations (Rec. Doc. 69) filed by

the plaintiff, Kuantay Reeder. The defendant, Jason R. Williams, in his official capacity

as Orleans Parish District Attorney, opposes the motion. The motion, submitted for

consideration on December 11, 2024, is before the Court on the briefs without oral

argument.1

I. Background

In this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Kuantay Reeder seeks damages

as a result of the violation of his rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by

the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office (“OPDA”) in conjunction with his

prosecution and conviction for murder in the 1990s. Although all of the tortious conduct

alleged against the OPDA occurred well before Jason Williams took office, as the

1 Mr. Reeder has requested oral argument but the Court is not persuaded that oral

argument is necessary in light of the excellent briefing submitted by both parties.

current district attorney, Williams, in his official capacity, is the proper defendant for the

§ 1983 claim.

In 1995, Kuantay Reeder, the plaintiff herein, was prosecuted by Orleans Parish

District Attorney Harry Connick, and convicted (following a prior mistrial based on a

hung jury) of second-degree murder in connection with the death of Mark Broxton. Earl

Price was the State’s sole testifying eyewitness. Reeder was sentenced to life

imprisonment.

Reeder’s conviction was affirmed on appeal but Reeder continued to challenge

the validity of his conviction through post-conviction proceedings. In 2009, Reeder’s

post-conviction counsel discovered that Earl Price had a prior criminal conviction and

that the OPDA had withheld that information from Reeder when he was tried. Extensive

litigation on this Brady2 issue ensued in the following years but Reeder was denied relief

in both the state and federal courts. See, e.g., Reeder v. Vannoy, 978 F.3d 272 (5th Cir.

2020). The various courts were persuaded that Price’s undisclosed conviction was

relatively minor when compared to Price’s other several disclosed convictions and

therefore cumulative; Brady‘s materiality requirement was not met. Id. at 279.

Jason Williams, the current district attorney for Orleans Parish, took office in 2021

and instituted a Civil Rights Division in his organization for the purpose of redressing

past harms and injustices that the OPDA had caused to defendants under prior regimes.

The staff set out to identify cases that involved State misconduct, particularly those

2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). A Brady violation requires proof of three elements:

(1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) that it was favorable to the defendant, and

(3) that it was material. United States v. Brown, 650 F.3d 581, 587–88 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing

United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 574 (5th Cir. 2008)).

involving wrongful convictions and extreme sentences. (Rec. Doc. 1, Complaint ¶ 59).

The Civil Rights Division reviewed the prosecution’s original file in Reeder’s case, which

revealed the existence of “significant exculpatory evidence” that had never been

disclosed to Reeder or his counsel.3 (Id. ¶ 60). Specifically, during its review of the

original criminal case file, the Civil Rights Division discovered two sets of handwritten

notes, detailing that on two separate occasions Earl Price had notified prosecutors that

he had identified alternate suspect Berzeracque “Byrd” Johnson as Broxton’s shooter.

(Id. ¶¶ 63-65). In June 2021, Williams, through the Civil Rights Division of his office,

produced the previously-withheld information to Reeder’s attorney. (Id.). Even beyond

withholding the potentially exculpatory material, Reeder contends that the prosecutors in

1995 knowingly misled the jury because at trial they portrayed Earl Price as unwavering

in his identification of Reeder as the shooter. (Id. ¶ 68).

In August 2021, Reeder supplemented his state application for post-conviction

relief with the newly-disclosed exculpatory evidence. In response, the OPDA filed

stipulations acknowledging inter alia that Reeder’s conviction and incarceration were in

violation of the Constitution. (Id. ¶ 98). At a hearing held on December 6, 2021, three

remarkable things occurred: a state criminal judge vacated Reeder’s conviction for

second-degree murder, the OPDA immediately declined all charges against Reeder,

and Reeder walked out of Angola Penitentiary after being incarcerated for over twenty-

eight years. (Id. ¶ 100).

3 Part of the impetus for the Civil Rights Division’s review of Reeder’s original case file was

that Reeder had sought review with the United States Supreme Court of the Fifth Circuit’s

decision affirming the district court’s rejection of his federal habeas petition. In connection

with that pending writ application the Supreme Court had ordered a response from the

Orleans Parish District Attorney.

Following his release, Reeder filed this civil action against Jason Williams, in his

official capacity, seeking to hold the OPDA liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the

injuries and damages that Reeder suffered for being unconstitutionally deprived of his

freedom for more than half of his life (Mr. Reeder was 50 years old when he filed this

lawsuit), that deprivation having been caused by violations of his rights guaranteed by

Brady v. Maryland, supra. Reeder alleges that the OPDA violated his constitutional

rights by withholding favorable evidence, that at all times relevant the OPDA maintained

an unconstitutional policy with respect to the obligation to disclose favorable information

to the defendants that it prosecuted, and that the OPDA failed to properly train and

supervise its prosecutors with respect to Brady obligations.

Williams responded to Reeder’s complaint with a motion to dismiss grounded on

the contention that the actions that form the basis of Reeder’s claims are attributable to

the State of Louisiana—which is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983—and not to the

OPDA as an independent local government entity. On April 4, 2023, the Court denied

that motion. (Rec. Doc. 25, Order and Reasons); Reeder v. Williams, No. 22-4614, 2023

WL 2771481 (E.D. La. Apr. 4, 2023). Williams then answered the complaint and a jury

trial was calendared for March 18, 2024. (Rec. Doc. 30, Scheduling Order). The Court

ultimately vacated the prior scheduling order and trial date at the unopposed request of

Reeder. (Rec. Doc. 47, Order). The parties then selected December 2, 2024, as the

new trial date. (Rec. Doc. 50, Scheduling Order).

Reeder moved for partial summary judgment in his favor on the element of his

claim under § 1983 that requires him to establish that he has been deprived of a right,

privilege, or immunity secured by the United States Constitution. (Rec. Doc. 31, Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment). More specifically, Reeder moved for partial summary

judgment on the claim that his Brady rights were violated because the OPDA failed to

disclose (prior to his trial) the exculpatory information pertaining to Earl Price’s

identification of alternate suspect Berzeracque “Byrd” Johnson as Broxton’s shooter. As

grounds for the motion, Reeder invoked the doctrine of res judicata (issue preclusion)

based upon the stipulations that Williams’s office filed in 2021 in response to Reeder’s

application for state post-conviction relief, and the judgment and findings of Judge

Rhonda Goode-Douglas, the criminal court judge who relied on those stipulations when

granting Reeder’s motion to vacate his conviction at the December 6, 2021 hearing. On

December 6, 2023, the Court denied that motion for partial summary judgment insofar

as Reeder sought to rely on nonparty res judicata to relieve him of his burden of proof in

this § 1983 case (Rec. Doc. 48, Order and Reasons); Reeder v. Williams, No. 22-4614,

2023 WL 8449261 (E.D. La. Dec. 6, 2023).

On November 14, 2024, over Reeder’s objection, the Court vacated the prior

scheduling order and entered a new Case Management Order in light of the complexity

of this case. (Rec. Doc. 78, Case Management Order). A jury trial has been scheduled

for September 15, 2025. (Id.).

II. Reeder’s Motion in Limine

To better appreciate the purpose and significance of the relief that Reeder is

seeking via his motion in limine, a brief review of the jurisprudence governing a § 1983

claim against a district attorney’s office based on a violation of Brady is appropriate.

Under Brady, a local government entity, including a district attorney's office,

deprives a criminal defendant of his right to due process when it suppresses or

withholds evidence that is both favorable to the defendant and material to his defense.

Truvia v. Connick, 577 Fed. App'x 317, 321–22 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Smith v. Cain, –––

U.S. ––––, 132 S. Ct. 627, 630 (2012)). Well-established law holds that local

governmental entities (like a district attorney’s office) are not susceptible to vicarious

liability for the acts of their employees. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385

(1989) (citing Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). Instead, a

municipality can be found liable under § 1983 only where the municipality itself causes

the constitutional violation at issue. Id. It is only when the execution of the entity’s policy

or custom causes the constitutional violation that the municipality may be liable under §

1983. Id. (citing Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,

dissenting)). In other words, municipalities cause constitutional violations only through

their policies and customs; the path to liability against a municipality under § 1983

necessarily begins with the search for a policy or custom.

In Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011), the Supreme Court recognized

that in limited circumstances, a local government’s decision not to train certain

employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of

an official government policy for purposes of § 1983, although a municipality’s culpability

for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.

A municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount to

“’deliberate indifference’ to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees]

come into contact.” Id. (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388). Only then “can such a

shortcoming be properly thought of as a [municipal] ‘policy or custom’ that is actionable

under § 1983.” Id. (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389).

Importantly, failure to train prosecutors in their Brady obligations does not allow

for single-incident liability. Thompson, 563 U.S. at 64. A pattern of similar constitutional

violations by untrained employees is “ordinarily necessary” to demonstrate deliberate

indifference for purposes of failure to train. Id. at 62 (citing Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397, 409 (1997)). Policymakers' “continued adherence to an approach that they

know or should know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish

the conscious disregard for the consequences of their action—the ‘deliberate

indifference’—necessary to trigger municipal liability.” Id. (quoting Bryan Cty., 520 U.S.

at 407). Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a particular respect,

decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately chosen a training program that

will cause violations of constitutional rights. Thompson, 563 U.S. at 62.

Thus, to prevail on his Brady claim against Williams, Reeder must establish that

the OPDA’s violation of his Brady rights was the direct and proximate result of an OPDA

policy, practice, or custom, and at least insofar as the failure to train claim is concerned,

that the OPDA was deliberately indifferent to the known or obvious consequence that

constitutional violations would result from its policy, practice, or custom not to train its

prosecutors.4 In order to meet that burden Reeder explains that he has marshalled

4 To be clear, failure to train is but one manner in which a plaintiff like Reeder may establish

that an official policy or custom of the government entity caused the violation of his

constitutional rights, and Reeder’s complaint is not limited solely to the failure to train. So for

instance, another manner of establishing a municipal policy is proof of “a widespread

practice that is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents

municipal policy.” Webb v. Town of St. Joseph, 925 F.3d 209, 214-15 (5th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 390 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc)). While

deliberate indifference is an element of the failure to train claim against the OPDA as

clarified by Connick v. Thompson, supra, Thompson dealt only with liability based on the

failure to train prosecutors and not with any other manner of establishing liability against a

district attorney’s office.

substantial evidence responsive to this standard. Specifically, he has identified at least

44 cases, in addition to his own, in which federal and state courts concluded that the

OPDA violated Brady. Reeder intends to offer these rulings as evidence of a pattern of

Brady violations by OPDA supporting a finding that OPDA had a longstanding policy,

practice, or custom of violating defendants’ Brady rights and that OPDA policy makers

were on notice of that policy, practice, or custom yet failed to act, demonstrating their

deliberate indifference to the risk to defendants’ Brady rights.

Via the instant motion Reeder seeks an in limine ruling that (1) the OPDA is

precluded as a matter of law under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, from relitigating

the 11 federal court rulings identified in Appendix A to his motion, in which federal courts

found that the OPDA committed Brady violations; alternatively, that the rulings are

admissible as proof of the Brady violations by OPDA, and (2) all of the court rulings

listed in both appendices are admissible as exceptions to the Federal Rule of Evidence

excluding hearsay, as proof of the Brady violations by the OPDA identified therein.

Reeder explains that if granted, this in limine ruling will significantly streamline

the discovery and trial proceedings in this case. It will avoid extraordinarily broad

discovery into dozens of previously litigated OPDA Brady violations, many of which

occurred decades ago and would be difficult if not impossible to prove de novo.

Granting this motion will allow for a more focused and efficient trial, by avoiding dozens

of “mini-trials” regarding the OPDA Brady violations that already have been adjudicated

by the courts. And it will provide the jury with the most probative, trustworthy evidence

available of the OPDA’s history of Brady violations.

III. Discussion

Appendix A – Federal Court Rulings Recognizing Brady Violations by

OPDA

Reeder’s Appendix A to his motion in limine consists of 11 rulings in which a

federal court has held that the OPDA violated Brady, including two such rulings by the

United States Supreme Court. Reeder contends that because the OPDA has already

unsuccessfully litigated the Brady issue in these federal cases, the OPDA is now barred

from relitigating the Brady violations in these cases, and their holdings and findings are

established as a matter of law through the federal doctrine of non-mutual collateral

estoppel. Reeder maintains that the federal court rulings in Appendix A satisfy each of

the conditions necessary under federal law to apply non-mutual collateral estoppel.

Williams’s position is that collateral estoppel is not appropriate because the

OPDA was not a party to the case, or in privity with a party. Additionally, in all but one of

the cases, the decision that Reeder seeks to use for preclusive purposes is a federal

habeas ruling that is inconsistent with one or more un-vacated state-court decisions on

the same issue. Because of these inconsistent judgments, and particularly in light of the

rule that allows a petitioner to repeatedly reassert previously rejected claims in an

habeas corpus action without regard to res judicata, it is fundamentally unjust to allow a

plaintiff to use habeas decisions offensively against the OPDA. Williams also argues

that Reeder’s invocation of non-mutual collateral estoppel also fails because that

doctrine cannot be used against a government entity such as the OPDA.

Each of the contested legal issues presented in Reeder’s motion in limine and

Williams’s opposition were addressed by Judge Milazzo in the case of Jones v.

Cannizzaro, No. 18-503, 2019 WL 2289470 (E.D. La. May 28, 2019), wherein she

rejected the same arguments that Williams is raising in opposition to Reeder’s motion.

This Court finds Judge Milazzo’s reasoning to be sound and adopts it herein. Therefore,

the Court grants Reeder’s motion in limine insofar as he seeks a ruling that Williams will

not be allowed to relitigate the 11 federal court rulings found in Appendix A to his

motion, in which federal courts found that the OPDA committed Brady violations.

Appendix B – Federal and State Court Rulings Recognizing Brady

Violations by OPDA

Similarly, for the reasons provided by Judge Milazzo in Jones v. Cannizzaro, the

Court finds that all of the court rulings listed in Appendix B to Reeder’s motion are not

rendered inadmissible due to hearsay problems, and may be used as proof of the Brady

violations by the OPDA identified therein.5

IV. Conclusion

In sum, Williams will not be allowed to relitigate the federal court determinations

contained in Appendix A to his motion, and the court rulings listed in Appendix B will not

be excluded on hearsay grounds. Ultimate admissibility at trial is not before the Court

today.

Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons;

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion in Limine to (1) Preclude Re-Litigation of

OPDA Brady Violations Recognized in Federal Court Rulings, and (2) Admit Court

5 Williams correctly observes that the evidentiary portion of Reeder’s motion seeks only to

adjudicate whether introduction of the documents is barred by the rules regarding hearsay

and so Williams limited his objections accordingly. (Rec. Doc. 79, Opposition at 1 n.1). The

Court’s ruling is likewise limited to the issue of whether the documents are excludable as

hearsay and not whether any specific document will actually be admissible at trial.

Rulings Recognizing OPDA Brady Violations (Rec. Doc. 69) filed by the plaintiff,

Kuantay Reeder, is GRANTED as explained above.

December 20, 2024 C | C

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ED STATES~BDISTRICT JUDGE

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