“It has long been settled law that malicious prosecution requires proving the want of probable cause.”
How later courts described this case
- “It has long been settled law that malicious prosecution requires proving the want of probable cause.”
- probable cause exists when a prudent person would have concluded “that there was a fair probability that the suspect had committed a crime”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
DEC 23 2024
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CORRIE M. REHMS, a single person, No. 24-701
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:22-cv-00185-DCN
v.
MEMORANDUM*
POST FALLS POLICE
DEPARTMENT; CITY OF POST
FALLS; CITY OF COEUR D'
ALENE; COEUR D'ALENE POLICE
DEPARTMENT; PAT KNIGHT, Post Falls
Chief of Police, individually and in his
official capacity; CHRISTOFFER
CHRISTENSEN, Post Falls Police Officer,
individually and in their official
capacity; LAUREN PIERSON, Post Falls
Police Officer, individually and in their
official capacity; LEE WHITE, Coeur
d'Alene Chief of Police, individually and in
his official capacity; NICK KNOLL,
Officer, individually and in his official
capacity; COUNTY OF
KOOTENAI; KOOTENAI COUNTY
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; BEN
WOLFINGER, Kootenai County Sheriff,
individually and in his official
capacity; POST FALLS PROSECUTORS,
individually and in their official
capacity; BEN WHIPPLE, Deputy; JACK
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
TRAW, Deputy; SHANNON MALONE,
Deputy; RIVER CITY ANIMAL
HOSPITAL PLLC; JOHN DOES, 1-10
individually and in their official capacity;
11-13 individually and in their official
capacities; 14-15,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Idaho
David C. Nye, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 6, 2024**
Portland, Oregon
Before: CALLAHAN, NGUYEN, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.
When police officers found Ms. Rehms (Rehms) sitting in a running car with
pinpoint pupils and slurred speech, they questioned her competency to drive.
When she then did poorly on tests designed to assess her competency to drive, the
officers arrested her. Rehms filed this action in the District Court for Idaho
alleging that her arrest and subsequent treatment violated her rights under the
Constitution and Idaho law because her apparent impairments were caused by a
traumatic brain injury (TBI) she suffered a couple of years ago, and not by alcohol
or drugs. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Rehms appeals. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The district court properly granted summary judgment against Rehms on
her federal claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, denial
of due process and excessive force. Officers are entitled to qualified immunity
under § 1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and
(2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at the time. District
of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62-63 (2018). On summary judgment a court
usually adopts the plaintiff’s version of the facts unless they are contradicted by
video evidence. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Spencer v. Pew, 117
F.4th 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2024). The Ninth Circuit reviews de novo a grant of
summary judgment. W. Towboat Co. v. Vigor Marine, LLC, 85 F.4th 919, 925 (9th
Cir. 2023).
The district court found, and the officers’ bodycam videos confirm, that
there was probable cause to arrest Rehms. See United States v. Struckman, 603
F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2010) (probable cause exists when a prudent person would
have concluded “that there was a fair probability that the suspect had committed a
crime”) (cleaned up). Rehms was sitting in a running car, her pupils were pinpoint,
and her speech was slurred. When she got out of the car, she was unsteady on her
feet and had difficulty performing some of the routine field sobriety tests. Rehms’
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assertion that her conditions were caused by a TBI did not outweigh the evidence
suggesting that she was under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
The district court’s finding that the officers did not use excessive force is
supported by the officers’ videos. Rehms has not shown that there are any material
facts that undermine that determination, or that a reasonable officer would have
known that the conduct violated her constitutional rights.
2. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Rehms’ state
law claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The videos support
the grant of summary judgment on her claims of false arrest and false
imprisonment, and her claim of malicious prosecution is rebutted by the county
magistrate’s finding of probable cause, which Rehms does not challenge on appeal.
See Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 406 (2019) (“It has long been settled law that
malicious prosecution requires proving the want of probable cause.”) (cleaned up).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Rehms’ state law
claims of libel and slander. The district court determined, and Rehms accepts, that
under Idaho law, the officers are entitled to immunity unless they acted with
malice or criminal intent. See Idaho Code § 6-904(3). Moreover, statements made
to law enforcement during the course of an investigation are privileged and
generally cannot give rise to a claim of defamation. See Berian v. Berberian, 583
P.3d 937, 946-48 (Idaho 2020). Here, even if the district court’s determinations in
4 24-701
granting summary judgment for the officers on Rehms’ federal claims did not
preclude a finding of malice or criminal intent, a review of the videos reveals that
there is no objective evidence of either malice or criminal intent. See Spencer, 117
F.4th at 1133.
3. The district court also properly granted summary judgment on Rehms’
claims under the Americans with Disability Act and the Rehabilitation Act. First,
the videos show that the officers arresting Rehms did not mistreat her based on her
disability. Second, as to Rehms’ subsequent detention, Rehms does not challenge
the conditions of the first holding cell, does not deny that she was moved because
of her repeated banging on the cell door, and does not allege that she informed the
officers that the “safe” cell to which she was moved was inconsistent with her
physical limitations. Rehms has not demonstrated any genuine dispute as to any
material fact. See Zetwick v. County of Yolo, 850 F.3d 436, 440 ( 9th Cir. 2017).
4. Finally, as Rehms’ brief on appeal does not challenge the district court’s
grant of summary judgment for the River City Animal Hospital, she has forfeited
any objections she might have to the order. See Balser v. Dep’t. of Just., Off. of
U.S. Tr., 327 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2003).
The district court’s grant of summary judgment against Rehms and in favor
of the defendants is AFFIRMED.
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