SMITH v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CURTIS SMITH, :

:

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION

:

v. :

:

COMMONWEALTH OF : NO. 24-925

PENNSYLVANIA, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM

Perez, J. December 20, 2024

Pro se plaintiff Curtis Smith (“Plaintiff”), a self-proclaimed sovereign citizen, brings this

civil action against an expansive list of state and local government entities and officials whom he

alleges have acted in concert to violate his rights under state and federal law. Plaintiff has sued

three groups of Defendants. The first group of Defendants, hereinafter referred to collectively as

“Middletown Township,” includes Middletown Township of Pennsylvania, Middletown Police

Department, Chief of Police Joe Bartorilla, Middletown’s Township Manager, Stephanie Teoli

Kuhls, and Township Director of Building and Zoning, Jim Ennis, in their official and private

capacity. The next group of Defendants, hereinafter referred to collectively as “Judicial

Defendants,” includes the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, the Magisterial District Court,

the Honorable Charles D. Jonas, the Honorable Raymond F. McHugh, the Honorable Robert J.

Mellon, the Honorable Wallace Bateman, and the Honorable Matthew D. Weintraub. The final

group of Defendants, hereinafter referred to as “Commonwealth Defendants,” includes the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Governor Josh Shapiro, and the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney

General. This memorandum will address the motion to dismiss filed by the Judicial Defendants,

to which Plaintiff has failed to file any opposition.1 For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will

grant Judicial Defendants’ motion and the case, as it pertains to these Defendants, will be dismissed

with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff’s complaint describes a protracted history of zoning and other disputes between

himself and Middletown Township and the related civil and criminal actions initiated against him

in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff’s allegations are sweeping and

largely difficult to follow, but they primarily center on his attempted installation of a swimming

pool, fence, and other alterations at his private residence in Langhorne, Pennsylvania. Id. at ¶¶ 49-

54, 57-58, 64-66. His complaint is largely predicated on the legal fictions embraced by sovereign

citizen litigants, including his assertion that his “private property, established in 1686, cannot be

annexed under Township control” without Plaintiff’s consent. Id. at ¶ 116. Plaintiff argues that

Middletown Township had no authority to require him to obtain permits to make modifications on

his property. Id. at ¶ 51, 53. It appears that Plaintiff was issued multiple citations and cease-work

orders, which he ignored. The fence that he installed was removed by the police on more than one

occasion. Id. at ¶ 61-66.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants subsequently “created a premeditated scheme”

intended to “have him perjure himself” into telling authorities that he had an unattended two-year-

old child inside his residence. Id. at ¶ 68. He claims that it was on this basis that police performed

a warrantless welfare check on the home, and despite no child being present, police proceeded to

1 Judicial Defendants filed the instant motion on April 4, 2024. See ECF No. 16. Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at

the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institute at Pine Grove (“SCI Pine Grove”). On August 29, 2024, Plaintiff

requested a status update from the Clerk of Courts. ECF No. 18. On September 5, 2024, the Clerk of Courts sent

copies of the docket to Plaintiff at SCI Pine Grove. ECF No. 19. On October 31, 2024, this Court issued an Order

allowing Plaintiff until November 21, 2024 to file a response to Judicial Defendants’ motion. ECF No. 31. No response

to Defendants’ motion has been filed to date.

confiscate his arsenal of firearms and other personal affects. Id. at ¶¶ 69-72. From what this Court

can gather, this led to his arrest and ultimate conviction for multiple felony gun offenses. Plaintiff

is presently incarcerated at SCI Pine Grove, serving a sentence of 28-56 years in prison. See

Commonwealth v. Curtis Gregory Smith, Jr., Docket Nos. CP-09-MD-0001643-2023; CP-09-CR-

0003478-2023.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants participated in a broad “tyrannical” scheme to harass,

racially discriminate, and violate his constitutional rights in an effort to generate revenue. Id. at ¶¶

48 and 84-87. His complaint focuses almost exclusively on allegations against the Middletown

and Judicial Defendants. The Judicial Defendants named by Plaintiff represent the courts and

judges who presided over the property disputes to which Plaintiff was a party. ECF No. 16 at 2. In

his complaint, Plaintiff makes vague references to various judgements issued and actions taken by

the individually named judges throughout his ongoing property dispute. See ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 55,

60, 63, 67, 72.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) requires the court to determine whether the

plaintiff’s complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted).

“[M]ere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Id. When evaluating such a motion, “courts accept

all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,

and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled

to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty.

of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). However, “[i]f the court determines at any time

that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

When a motion to dismiss is based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction in addition to other

defenses, “[a]n actual determination must be made whether subject matter jurisdiction exists before

a court may turn to the merits of the case.” Tagayun v. Stolzenberg, 239 F. App’x 708, 710 (3d

Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff's pro se complaint lacks the targeted and clear pleading that is expected of

pleadings drafted by attorneys. However, courts must liberally construe pleadings that are filed

pro se. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106,

(1976)). Thus, “a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But

while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in

their complaints to support a claim,” Owens v. Armstrong, 171 F. Supp. 3d 316, 328 (D.N.J. 2016)

(quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)), and pro se litigants

are not exempt from complying with federal pleading standards. See Thakar v. Tan, 372 F. App'x

325, 328 (3d Cir. 2010).

III. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

The Eleventh Amendment states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not

be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S.

Const. amend. XI. The Supreme Court “has long ‘understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand

not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.’” Kimel v. Fla. Bd.

of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000) (citations omitted) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.

Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)). This presupposition is that “the States entered the federal system

with their sovereignty intact [and] that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this

sovereignty.” Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak & Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (citing

Welch v. Tex. Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987)). “Accordingly, for

over a century now, [the Supreme Court has] made clear that the Constitution does not provide for

federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States.” Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 (citing Coll.

Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669-0 (1999)).

State actors working and sued in their official capacity are protected by this immunity

unless the plaintiff is seeking “prospective relief to end an ongoing violation of federal law.” Christ

the King Manor, Inc. v. Sec. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 730 F.3d 291, 318 (3d Cir.

2013). Accordingly, suits for damages or equitable retroactive relief are barred. Id.; Blanciak v.

Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 697 (3d Cir. 1996) (“[R]elief that essentially serves to

compensate a party injured in the past by the action of a state official, even though styled as

something else, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.”).

Courts of Common Pleas and Magisterial District Courts, which are a part of the

Pennsylvania Unified Judicial System, are considered state agencies entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Callahan v. City of Philadelphia, 207 F.3d 668, 672 (3d Cir. 2000).

Therefore, the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas, the Magisterial District Court, and the

Judicial Defendants who are individually named and presumably being sued in their official

capacity are all entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Additionally, Plaintiff is not seeking

the type of prospective relief for an ongoing violation which would negate this immunity. To the

extent this Court would even be able to articulate what ongoing violation of federal law Plaintiff

is alleging against the Judicial Defendants, the Court has already denied Plaintiff’s request for

injunctive relief. See ECF No. 8. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are based on discrete, past events—

the taking of and trespass on his personal property, destruction of his unpermitted property

modifications, the alleged conspiracy to violate his rights, and ultimately his criminal arrest and

conviction. These claims do not constitute the type of prospective relief for an ongoing violation

that would negate the Judicial Defendants’ immunity. As such, this Court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims against the Judicial Defendants.

IV. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

This Court also lacks jurisdiction over the individually named judges because they enjoy

absolute immunity from suit and the assessment of damages in their individual capacity. Mireles

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). There are only two situations where the doctrine of absolute

judicial immunity does not apply: actions not taken in their judicial capacity and/or actions taken

in “complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. Actions are considered to be within a judge’s

official capacity when the act itself is “a function normally performed by a judge.” Id. Actions

taken in the absence of all jurisdiction are those where the judge clearly had no jurisdiction over

the subject-matter—such as a probate judge with authority only over wills and estates presiding

over a criminal case. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 352 (1871). Legal errors by judges are not

sufficient to overcome this broad absolute immunity. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359

(1978) (“A judge is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of

authority is flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.”).

The Pennsylvania Courts of Common Pleas have “unlimited original jurisdiction of all

actions and proceedings” that are not otherwise vested in a different state court by statute. 42 Pa.

Cons. Stat. § 931(a). Judicial Defendants had jurisdiction to hear, rule upon, and enter orders in

the cases that were before them. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 931(a) ("courts of common pleas shall

have unlimited original jurisdiction of all actions and proceedings, including all actions and

proceedings heretofore cognizable by law or usage in the courts of common pleas."); 42 Pa. Cons.

Stat. § 1515 (laying out the jurisdictional parameters of Pennsylvania’s Magisterial District Courts,

including summary code violations). Plaintiff’s claims against Judicial Defendants concern the

license and inspection violations pursued by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via Middletown

Township against him in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas and the Magisterial District

Court. Judicial Defendants provide, as an exhibit to their motion, the Magisterial District Court

Docket Sheets pertaining to the permit and inspection violations of which Plaintiff was found

guilty. See ECF No. 16-2. While this Court does not have a full accounting of all the judgments

and other judicial actions taken by the judges in reference to Plaintiff’s property, it is clear that, at

least as it pertains to these code violations, that Judicial Defendants were acting both within their

jurisdiction and carrying out functions normally performed by a judge.

V. ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE

Judicial Defendants have asked this Court to dismiss all claims against them pursuant to

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which derives its name from the Supreme Court's decisions

in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Rooker and Feldman established the principle that federal

district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court

judgments. Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010).

The doctrine “preclude[s] lower federal court jurisdiction over claims that were actually litigated

or ‘inextricably intertwined’ with adjudication by a state's courts.” Parkview Assocs. P’ship v. City

of Leb., 225 F.3d 321, 325 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gulla v. North Strabane Twp., 146 F.3d 168,

171 (3d Cir. 1998)). A federal claim is “inextricably intertwined” with an issue adjudicated by a

state court when (1) the federal court must determine that the state court judgment was erroneously

entered in order to grant the requested relief, or (2) the federal court must take an action that would

negate the state court's judgment. In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 581 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Walker

v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321, 330 (3d Cir. 2004)).

The Third Circuit has announced four requirements that must be met for the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff “complain[s]

of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments[;]” (3) those judgments were rendered before the

federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state

judgments. Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 364 F.3d 102, 284 (3d Cir. 2004))

As previously discussed, this Court has somewhat limited information regarding the

underlying state court judgments Plaintiff references in his Complaint. Nevertheless, it is clear that

Plaintiff is complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments and that certain state-court

judgments were rendered before Plaintiff commenced this federal action. Pursuant to state law

and/or local ordinances, Judicial Defendants found Plaintiff guilty of license and permit violations

and imposed financial penalties. The present federal action complains of injuries sustained as a

result of those judicial determinations and seeks reversal by this Court. That is, the state-court

judgment itself is the source of his injury.

To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a conspiracy by state actors to violate his constitutional

rights, his Complaint fails to sufficiently articulate what involvement Judicial Defendants played

in this wider scheme. See Great W. Mining, 615 F.3d 159 at 172 (concluding that the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine was inapplicable where plaintiff was not complaining of injuries caused by the

state-court judgments and inviting the District Court to review those judgments, but was instead

asserting an independent claim that the alleged conspiracy between judges and other state actors

violated his due process right to be heard in an impartial forum).

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s requested relief

because the claims were both previously litigated in state court and are inextricably intertwined

with the previous adjudications. This Court cannot ignore that “the relief requested . . . requires

determining that the state court's decision is wrong or . . . void[ing] the state court's

ruling.” FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, 75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996).

VI. CONCLUSION

This Court will grant Judicial Defendants’ motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against

them with prejudice because amendment of those claims would not cure the aforementioned

deficiencies. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).