Opinion

Brown v. Lucifer

Court
District Court, N.D. Texas
Filed
Sep 16, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.4%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

MOCHA C. BROWN, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § No. 3:24-cv-2179-N (BT)

§

LUCIFER, CEO OF THE FEDERAL §

GOVERNMENT, §

§

Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Pro se plaintiff Mocha C. Brown—who claims to be the “Bride of Christ”—

filed a complaint against “Lucifer, the CEO of the Federal Government,” seeking

$3 million in punitive damages. ECF No. 3 at 2. She claims that, as a “loyal

consumer,” she has witnessed the United States engaging in deceptive business

practices including false advertising by promoting “homosexuality, fornication,

drugs, and killings”; charging hidden fees and interests; and being unresponsive to

customer service issues, all in violation of the Bill of Rights. ECF No. 3 at 2. She

claims that “Lucifer” must agree to terms that include enhanced regulation,

education and awareness, and transparency and accountability. ECF No. 3 at 3.

For the reasons below, the Court should dismiss this case with prejudice as

frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Legal Standards and Analysis

Because Brown proceeds in forma pauperis (IFP), her complaint is subject

to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under that statute, a district court

may summarily dismiss a complaint filed IFP if it concludes the action is: (1)

frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted;

or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a

plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face[,]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those

facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]”

Id. at 555. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A

complaint is frivolous when it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or

when the factual contentions are “clearly baseless.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.

25, 32 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The latter

category encompasses allegations that describe “fanciful, fantastic, and delusional”

scenarios, or that “rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible[.]” Id.

at 33 (citations omitted).

A review of Brown’s complaint shows that it fails to state a claim and is

legally and factually frivolous. Brown provides no substantive factual allegations

from which the Court could discern a plausible cause of action. Her allegations are

fanciful, fantastic, irrational, wholly incredible, and delusional. Accordingly, her

complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.

Leave to Amend

Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted leave to amend her complaint

before her case is dismissed, but leave is not required when she has already pleaded

her “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 767-68 (5th Cir. 2009). As

discussed, Brown’s allegations are patently frivolous. Based on the most

deferential review of her complaint it is unlikely that, given the opportunity, she

could allege plausible legal claims. Thus, granting leave to amend would be futile

and cause needless delay.

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice as frivolous under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

SO RECOMMENDED.

September 16, 2024.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and

recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being

served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). To be specific,

an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination

is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the

briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written

objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district

court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services

Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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