SANDERS v. COULEHAN

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GIOVANNI SANDERS, )

)

Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No. 23-737

)

v. ) District Judge W. Scott Hardy

) Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

D. COULEHAN et al., )

) Re: ECF No. 27

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. RECOMMENDATION

For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss, ECF

No. 27, be granted in part and denied in part.

II. REPORT

A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Giovanni Sanders (“Sanders”) is a prisoner in the custody of the Pennsylvania

Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and is incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at

Albion (“SCI-Albion”). He brings this action pro se for the alleged violation of his rights under

the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments during his incarceration at the State Correctional

Institution at Greene (“SCI-Greene”). ECF No. 25. The following allegations are taken from the

Amended Complaint and are accepted as true at this stage of the litigation.1

Sanders names as defendants sixteen SCI-Greene administrators, grievance officers, and

corrections officers and asserts that all participated in or acquiesced to retaliation for his complaints

related to alleged threats of physical and sexual violence by Defendants D. Lewis, C.O. Smith, D.

1 The Court acknowledges with appreciation Mr. Sanders’ neatly printed Amended Complaint. Id.

Thomas, and C.O. Schaeffer. Id. Sanders contends that he complained about the threats of violence

to Unit Manager Coulehan and Unit Counselor E. Hurd, but both failed to protect him from an

assault that occurred on July 10, 2022, when Defendant Lewis struck his head and Defendant

Thomas tripped him while he was handcuffed from behind and attached to a tether. This initial

incident was followed by the unjustified and excessive use of force against him by Defendants

C.O. Dice, C.O. Schaeffer, and C.O. Smith who arrived on the scene, “piled” on top of him and

with Lewis, punched Sanders while Thomas continued to pull on the tether. Id. at 5-10. Sanders

contends that Thomas, Lewis, Dice, Schaeffer, and Smith failed to protect him from the actions of

their co-defendants during the assault, and that Defendant Lieutenant Juarez failed to respond and

prevent further harm when he viewed the assault on a computer inside the facility. Id.

Sanders lodged verbal grievances related to the incident. In response, Sanders asserts that

he was issued a false misconduct and placed on “709 Restrictions.” Id. at 11. The restrictions

prevented him from attending weekly virtual visits, daily exercise period, showers, and law library

time. Sanders contends the restrictions were imposed without due process and were implemented

in a conspiracy to retaliate against him by SCI-Greene administrators and supervisory employees

Zaken, Hyntemeyer, Parker, Buzas, Juarez, and Coulehan. Id. at 11-13.

Defendant B. Rudzienski conducted Sanders’ misconduct hearing on July 13, 2022. During

the hearing, Rudzienski denied Sanders’ requests for inmate witness testimony and access to

review surveillance video. Rudzienski represented that Defendant Captain Hyntemeyer denied the

existence of video evidence. Sanders contends that Rudzienski impeded the fair adjudication of

the misconduct charge and participated in a conspiracy to cover up the malicious use of force by

finding Sanders guilty of the charges presented before him. Id. at 12-13. The guilty finding resulted

in the imposition of 120 days in Disciplinary Custody. Id.

On July 20, 2022, Defendant Unit Manager Coulehan informed Sanders that “a new set of

‘709 Restrictions’” were being imposed. Id. at 13. The restrictions mandated that Sanders be

shackled and recorded during all out-of-cell movement. Sanders asserts that this restriction was

approved of and imposed by Defendants Coulehan, Hurd, Hyntemeyer, Parker, Buzas, and Zaken

without due process and in a conspiracy to retaliate because Sanders sought “to redress” the July

10, 2022 assault. Id. at 14-15.

Sanders commenced this action with a Complaint and payment of applicable filing fees.

ECF No. 1. Defendants responded to the Complaint with a Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 18.

Sanders filed the operative Amended Complaint. ECF No. 25. Thereafter, Defendants filed the

pending Motion to Dismiss and brief in support. ECF Nos. 27 and 28. Sanders was granted two

extensions of time to respond and has now filed a response and brief in opposition to the pending

motion. ECF Nos. 31, 34, 38, and 39.

The Motion to Dismiss is ripe for consideration.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). The complaint

must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” by providing facts which “permit the court

to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct…,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79

(2009), and “raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In assessing the plaintiff’s claims, “the Court must accept all non-conclusory

allegations in the complaint as true, and the non-moving party ‘must be given the benefit of every

favorable inference.’” Mergl v. Wallace, No. 2:21-CV-1335, 2022 WL 4591394, at *3 (W.D. Pa.

Sept. 30, 2022) (quoting Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) and Kulwicki v.

Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1992)). “However, the Court ‘disregard[s] threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, legal conclusions, and conclusory statements.’” Mergl,

2022 WL 4591394, at *3 (quoting City of Cambridge Ret. Sys. v. Altisource Asset Mgmt. Corp.,

908 F.3d 872, 878–79 (3d Cir. 2018) and James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 681 (3d

Cir. 2012)).

Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the complaint must be

held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404

U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant’s pleadings to state a

valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant’s failure to cite

proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or

unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1962). “Yet ‘pro se

litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.’” Vogt v. Wetzel,

8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244-45

(3d Cir. 2013)).

C. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss this action against certain prison administrators and

supervisors for failure to state a claim because Sanders fails to set forth facts establishing their

personal involvement in the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. ECF No. 28 at 5-8.

Defendants also seek dismissal of Sanders’ claims against each of them in his or her official

capacity, and dismissal of his conspiracy claims for failure to state a claim. Id. at 3-5.

1. Personal Involvement

Because Sanders brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he “must allege the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that

the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Each named defendant “‘must have personal involvement in the alleged

wrongs to be liable and cannot be held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she

neither participated in nor approved.’” Mack v. Clark, No. 21-cv-00004, 2022 WL 2669510, at *5

(W.D. Pa. July 11, 2022) (quoting Saisi v. Murray, 822 F. App’x. 47, 48 (3d Cir. 2020) and Baraka

v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007)). “It is the plaintiff’s burden to allege facts to

‘show that each and every defendant was “personal[ly] involve[d]” in depriving him of his rights.’”

Id. (quoting Kirk v. Roan, 04-cv-1990, No. 2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2006)

and Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2006)). Such allegations must be made with

appropriate particularity with a description of the conduct at issue, the time, place, and person

responsible. Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354 (“For example, she does not allege when the Attorney

General Fisher made the decision to transfer her, what steps he took to effect the transfer, whom

he instructed to prepare the necessary transfer forms, or who signed those forms. Without

addressing any of these facets of her transfer in her amended complaint, Evancho’s allegation that

Attorney General Fisher himself and/or his “underlings” carried out her transfer is simply a “bald

assertion,” which a court is not required to credit in deciding a motion to dismiss.”).

As to supervisory personal, the doctrine of respondeat superior is not an acceptable basis

for liability under Section 1983. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.

1988). Rather, a Section 1983 plaintiff must establish that supervisory officials participated in or

had personal knowledge of and acquiesced in the actions which are alleged to have constituted a

constitutional deprivation. Miller v. Hoffman, No. 97-cv-7987, 1999 WL 415397, at *11 (E.D. Pa.

June 22, 1999).

Personal involvement cannot be based on review and disposition of grievances lodged after

the complained of conduct. See Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x 923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Our

review of the complaint reveals no facts alleging personal involvement on the part of … prison

officials and administrators. Although the complaint alleges that [they] responded inappropriately

to [plaintiff’s] later-filed grievances about his medical treatment, these allegations do not establish

[defendants’] involvement in the treatment itself. As a result, this claim was properly dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).”).

Here, Defendants contend that Sanders fails to allege facts sufficient to establish the

personal involvement of ten administrators and supervisors. Defendants do not address Sanders’

factual allegations as to many of the individual Defendants but broadly assert that dismissal is

warranted based solely the Defendant’s job description or title. ECF No. 28 at 8. Beyond Sanders’

conspiracy claim, the Court does not reach the pleading adequacy of any underlying claim, which

Defendants do not presently challenge.

As related to Lieutenant Juarez, Defendants state his “involvement was as a Supervisor in

the Intensive Management Unit,” and Sanders therefore fails to state a claim against him. Id. On

the contrary, Sanders alleges an Eighth Amendment claim based on Juarez’s alleged failure to

intervene in the alleged assault to prevent further harm after watching the altercation on his

computer screen. ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 56-58, 89. See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir.

2002) (“We hold that a corrections officer’s failure to intervene in a beating can be the basis of

liability for an Eighth Amendment violation under § 1983 if the corrections officer had a

reasonable opportunity to intervene and simply refused to do so.”).

Defendants contend that Unit Manager Coulehan and Unit Counselor Hurd “were involved

as grievance review officers.” ECF No. 28 at 8. However, Sanders alleges that Coulehan and Hurd

failed to protect him from a serious risk of harm presented by “threats of physical and sexual

violence levied at him by Defendants Lewis, Smith, Thomas, and Schaeffer in retaliation for

Plaintiff’s grievance activity.” ECF No. 25 ¶ 26. Sanders asserts he told Coulehan and Hurd of the

threats on June 25, 2022, July 26, 2022, and again on July 7, 2022 and July 8, 2022, and that he

asked to be protected from the involved corrections officers. Both told him that they would “look

into it,” but otherwise failed to act. Id. ¶¶ 26, 27, 29, 31, 32. At this initial stage of the litigation,

these allegations are sufficient to establish their personal involvement in a plausible Eighth

Amendment failure to protect claim. See Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012),

abrogated on other grounds by Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 79, 84 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[t]o state a claim

for damages against a prison official for failure to protect from inmate violence, an inmate must

plead facts that show (1) he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm, (2) the official was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk to his health and safety,

and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference caused him harm.”). Sanders also alleges that

Coulehan and Hurd participated in implementing restrictions on his movement in retaliation for

his complaints about the assault. Id. ¶ 75. Thus, Sanders also alleges Coulehan and Hurd’s personal

involvement in a scheme to retaliate against him in violation of the First Amendment.

Defendants argue that Zaken and Buzas’s “only involvement was reviewing grievance

appeals as Superintendent and Deputy Superintendents.” ECF No. 19 at 6. On the contrary,

Sanders alleges that Zaken and Buzas approved imposing movement restrictions without notice or

an opportunity to be heard, and thereby participated in retaliation against him for his complaints

about the assault. Sanders also alleges that Defendants Zaken, Buzas, Parker, and Hyntemeyer

denied him due process before imposing disciplinary measures. ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 75-79. Sanders

separately alleges that Hyntemeyer denied him access to video of the assault to deprive him of his

right to procedural due process in the course of disciplinary proceedings. Id. ¶¶ 70, 95. These

allegations, like those advanced against Zaken and Buzas, are sufficient to allege the requisite

personal involvement against Parker and Hyntemeyer.

Defendants contend that Defendant Rudzienski’s involvement as a hearing examiner for

Sanders’ misconduct hearing is insufficient to establish personal involvement. ECF No. 19 at 6.

Sanders alleges that Rudzienski arbitrarily denied him an opportunity to present witness testimony

and have access to material video evidence. Defendants do not address, and the Court therefore

does not reach whether movement restrictions invoke an atypical and significant hardship or

whether the alleged deprivations entitle Sanders to procedural protections. See Wolfe v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 463-67 (1974); Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472

U.S. 445, 454-457 (1985) (when a liberty interest is at stake, the inmate must receive an

opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and

present documentary evidence in his defense). Sanders’ allegations as to Rudzienski are thin.

However, he “has ostensibly pled a procedural due process violation to the extent he can present

facts to show that he was denied basic procedural protections in the course of his disciplinary

hearings.” Holden v. Wetzel, No. 1:18-CV-237, 2021 WL 1090638, at *16 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 22,

2021).

Defendants also move to dismiss Sanders’ claims against Defendants Switzer and

Pawlowski because their roles in the grievance process are insufficient to establish their personal

involvement in the underlying alleged misconduct. ECF No. 19 at 6. In the Amended Complaint,

Sanders states in conclusory fashion that these Defendants “conspiratorially acquiesced with the

retaliatory weaponization of the so-called 709 Restrictions by [co-Defendants],” “failed to

intervene,” and thereby violated his First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment procedural due

process rights. ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 93, 94. Upon review, the Court agrees that Sanders conclusory

allegations are not supported by any facts establishing Switzer and Pawlowski’s personal

involvement in the underlying conduct. To the extent that liability is based on participation in the

grievance process alone, Sanders does not state a claim. Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App’x at 925.

Thus, it is recommended that the Court grant the Motion to Dismiss as to Switzer and Pawlowski

for failure to state a claim.

2. Official Capacity Claims

Defendants do not distinguish between the nature of the relief requested in Sanders’

Amended Complaint but broadly assert that “all such [official capacity] claims should be

dismissed.” ECF No. 28 at 5. The Court agrees that Sanders’ claims for damages against the

individual Defendants in their official capacities are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity,

which protects a state or state agency from suit unless Congress has specifically abrogated the

state’s immunity, or the state has waived its immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 120-21) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against state

officials when the state is the real, substantial party in interest.”) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted); Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2023) (“States, and state officers,

if sued in their official capacities for retrospective relief, are not ‘persons’ subject to suit under

§ 1983”).

However, Sanders also brings claims for injunctive relief. ECF No. 25 at 1, 19-20. Prison

officials can be sued for prospective injunctive relief in either their individual or official capacities.

Durham v. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2023) (citing Rochester v. White, 503 F.2d 263, 266

(3d Cir. 1974)). Because Defendants do not provide a basis to dismiss the claims for injunctive

relief, it is recommended that the Court grant the Motion to Dismiss Sanders’ official capacity

claims for damages but deny the Motion to Dismiss his official capacity claims for injunctive

relief.

3. Conspiracy

It is recommended that the Court dismiss Sanders’ civil conspiracy claims because Sanders

asserts each claim in conclusory fashion, without relevant supporting facts. “To demonstrate a

conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that two or more conspirators reached an agreement

to deprive him or her of a constitutional right ‘under color of law.’” Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City

of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir. 1983), abrogated on other grounds by United Artists

Theatre Circuit Inc. v. Twp. of Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003). A plaintiff must plead an

actual agreement among the parties to the alleged conspiracy. See Watson v. Sec’y Pa. Dep't of

Corr., 436 Fed. Appx. 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). “Mere conclusory allegations that a

conspiracy existed will not survive a motion to dismiss.” Rogers v. Mount Union Borough ex rel.

Zook, 816 F. Supp. 308, 314 (M.D. Pa. 1993). “As ‘the linchpin for conspiracy is agreement,’

concerted action, without more, cannot suffice to state a conspiracy claim.” Watson, 436 F. App’x.

at 137 (internal citations omitted). “[O]nly allegations which are particularized, such as those

addressing the period of the conspiracy, the object of the conspiracy, and actions taken in

furtherance of the conspiracy, will be deemed sufficient.” Grigsby v. Kane, 250 F. Supp. 2d 453,

458 (M.D. Pa. 2003); see also Brown v. Camp Hill, No. 3:10-cv-2612, 2015 WL 5675575, at *5

(M.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2015) (“A conspiracy claim requires more than mere speculation as to an

agreement. Plaintiff must provide specific allegations of combination, agreement, or

understanding among all or between any of the defendants to plot, plan or conspire to carry out the

challenged conduct.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Tang v. State of R.I., Dep’t of Elderly

Affairs, 904 F. Supp. 55, 62 (D.R.I. 1995) (“[A]llegations of conspiracy [must] be supported by

material facts, not merely conclusory statements.”).

Sanders fails to allege any particularized facts from which the Court may reasonably infer

“a mutual understanding among the [alleged] conspirators to take action directed toward an

unconstitutional end.” Grigsby, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 458. Instead, Sanders alleges a conspiracy

among Defendants Zaken, Buzas, Hyntemeyer, Parker, Coulehan, and Hurd to impose security

and disciplinary measures that limited his movement without due process and in retaliation for

constitutionally protected activity. ECF No. 25 ¶¶ 66, 78. Sanders also alleges that Defendant

Rudzienski conspired to “cover-up” the use of force by Lewis, Thomas, Dice, Schaeffer, and

Smith. Id. ¶ 72. These assertions are legally insufficient to support a conspiracy claim because they

are mere conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. Grigsby, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 458. They

are also bald allegations against a broad group of Defendants with no delineation of individual

conduct and thus do not support the personal involvement of any Defendant. See Van Tassel, 608

Fed. Appx. at 69-70. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court dismiss Sanders’ conspiracy

claims for failure to state a claim.

4. Leave to Amend

Generally, a court should freely grant leave to amend the complaint when justice so

requires “unless it would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103,

108 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, “[n]either inequity nor futility of amendment is present” and there is no

indication that Sanders “lacks good faith or proper motives.” Id. Therefore, it is recommended that

the Court permit Sanders leave to file a Second Amended Complaint within thirty days to cure the

deficiencies identified in this Report.

D. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss, ECF

No. 27, be granted as to Defendants Switzer and Pawlowski, and granted as to Sanders’ claims for

damages against all Defendants in their official capacities and for all conspiracy claims. It is

recommended that Motion to Dismiss be denied as to all other claims and Defendants.

In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule

72.D.2, the parties may file written objections within fourteen days, or seventeen days for

unregistered ECF Users. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States

District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file

objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 Gd Cir.

2011). Any party opposing objections may respond to the objections within 14 days in accordance

with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.

Respectfully submitted,

LB. DP ky,

Caw” VIET ge oe he Be abt fom LEP Fp eee

OE MALL □ M AA

MAUREEN P:sKEELY “A

UNITEDSTATES MAGISTRATEJUDGE

Dated: August 12, 2024

cc: The Honorable W. Scott Hardy

United States District Judge

All counsel of record by Notice of Electronic Filing

Giovanni Sanders

LQ-6720

SCI Albion

10745 Route 18

Albion, PA 16475-0001

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