Aksyonov v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No. 23-cv-23203-BLOOM/TORRES

YEVGENYA AKSYONOV,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARTIN O’MALLEY, Acting Commissioner

of the Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

__________________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON THE PARTIES’

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This cause comes before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment filed

by Plaintiff, Yevgenya Aksyonov (“Plaintiff” or “Ms. Aksyonov”) [D.E. 13] and

Defendant, Martin O’Malley, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (“Defendant” or “Commissioner”) [D.E. 14] on whether the

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) properly weighed the evidence in reaching her

unfavorable decision. Under the limited standard of review governing this case, the

Court finds that the motions are ripe for disposition and that substantial evidence

supports the ALJ’s determination. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment [D.E. 13] should be DENIED, Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment [D.E. 14] should be GRANTED, and the decision of the ALJ should be

AFFIRMED.1

1 On November 30, 2023, the Honorable Beth Bloom referred these motions to the

Undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. [D.E. 10].

I. BACKGROUND

On July 2, 2020, Plaintiff filed a disability application relating to complaints

of: diabetes mellitus type II, peripheral neuropathy, obesity, cervical spondylosis, and

lumbar radiculopathy—which the ALJ deemed severe—and bilateral carpal tunnel

syndrome, osteoarthritis, polycystic ovarian syndrome, generalized anxiety disorder,

and major depressive disorder—which the ALJ deemed non-severe. The ALJ

concluded that Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) was such that Plaintiff

could perform her past relevant work as an audit clerk. Thus, the ALJ’s decision was

unfavorable to Plaintiff.

Subsequently, Plaintiff petitioned to the Appeals Council but was denied

review on July 27, 2023. This pending action followed, in which Plaintiff asserts that

numerous errors plague the ALJ’s unfavorable decision. Namely, Plaintiff argues

that (1) the ALJ failed to properly assess the medical opinion evidence; (2) the ALJ’s

RFC finding was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the ALJ failed to

properly consider Plaintiff’s subjective account of her symptoms and limitations.

Defendant, meanwhile, argues that, on each score, the ALJ’s analysis followed

the proper legal frameworks and that her opinion was supported by substantial

evidence.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of an ALJ’s final decision is limited to an inquiry into whether

there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s findings, and whether

the correct legal standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1212 (11th Cir. 1999).

“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. It is

such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing

Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401); see also Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir.

1996)).

In testing for substantial evidence, a court is not to “reweigh the evidence” or

“decide the facts anew.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th

Cir. 2011) (citing another case). Instead, so long as an ALJ’s findings are supported

by substantial evidence, a court must defer to the ALJ’s decision even if the evidence

may preponderate against it. See Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155,

1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Hunter v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 808 F.3d 818,

822 (11th Cir. 2015) (“In determining whether substantial evidence supports a

decision, we give great deference to the ALJ’s fact findings.”); Miles, 84 F.3d at 1400;

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). However, no presumption of validity attaches to the

Commissioner’s conclusions of law. See Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233, 1236 (11th

Cir. 1991). A court also reviews an ALJ’s decision to determine whether the correct

legal standards were applied. See Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422 (11th Cir.

1997). In this respect, “the ALJ has a basic obligation to develop a full and fair record,”

as a hearing before an ALJ is not an adversary proceeding. Id. (citing another source).

Ultimately, it is the function of the Commissioner to resolve conflicts in the

evidence and to assess the credibility of the witnesses. See Grant v. Richardson, 445

F.2d 656 (5th Cir. 1971). It is also the responsibility of the Commissioner to draw

inferences from the evidence, and those inferences cannot be overturned if they are

supported by substantial evidence. See Celebrezze v. O’Brient, 323 F.2d 989, 990 (5th

Cir. 1963). We cannot “decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our

judgment for that of the [ALJ].” Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245, 1257

(11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Instead, while “scrutiniz[ing] the record as a whole,” we must determine if the ALJ’s

findings were reasonable, Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239, and if the proper legal

standards were applied, Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 701 (11th Cir. 1988).

III. APPLICABLE LAW AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment

which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or is expected to last for

a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The

claimant bears the burden of producing evidence that proves he or she meets this

statutory definition. “The social security regulations establish a five-step evaluation

process, which is used to determine disability for both SSI and DIB claims” and

“[t]hese regulations place[] a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both

a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.” Moore v.

Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d

1090, 1093 (11th Cir. 1985)).

An ALJ must first determine whether the claimant is presently employed. If

so, a finding of non-disability is made, and the inquiry ends. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(b). In the second step, an ALJ must determine whether the claimant suffers

from a severe impairment or combination of impairments. If an ALJ does not make

such a finding, then the inquiry ends. See id. at § 404.1520(c). At step three, an ALJ

compares the claimant’s impairments with specific impairments under the

regulations that require a finding of disability without further inquiry into the

claimant’s ability to perform other work. See Gibson v. Heckler, 762 F.2d 1516, 1518

(11th Cir. 1985) (“Certain impairments are so severe either when considered alone or

in conjunction with other impairments that, if such impairments are proved, the

regulations require a finding of disability without further inquiry into the claimant’s

ability to work.”). If the claimant’s impairment meets or equals a listed impairment,

the claimant’s disability is presumed, and benefits are awarded. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(d).

Step four involves a determination of whether the impairments prevent the

claimant from performing past relevant work. If the claimant cannot perform past

relevant work, then a prima facie case of disability is established. An ALJ assesses a

claimant’s RFC prior to this stage, based on the other relevant evidence, to determine

the extent of a claimant’s ability to work despite the alleged impairments. See id. at

§ 416.945(a)(1). A claimant’s RFC is an administrative finding of fact concerning the

claimant’s maximum remaining capacity to perform work-related physical and

mental activities on a regular and continuing basis despite the functional limitations

and environmental restrictions imposed by his or her medically determinable

impairment(s).

When making this finding, an ALJ is required to identify the limitations and/or

restrictions imposed by the claimant’s impairments and then assess his or her work-

related abilities on a function-by-function basis. Only upon the conclusion of this

function-by-function analysis may an ALJ express the claimant’s RFC in terms of the

exertional levels of work (i.e., sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy).

This leads to step five—the final inquiry—where the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to show that there is other work available in the national economy

that the claimant can perform based on the claimant’s RFC, work experience,

education, and age. See id. at § 404.1520(e)-(f).

IV. ANALYSIS

We will address in turn Plaintiff’s three major arguments: (1) that the ALJ

erred in evaluating the medical opinion evidence; (2) that the ALJ erred in

determining Plaintiff’s RFC; and (3) that the ALJ improperly analyzed and/or

neglected to consider Plaintiff’s subjective account of her alleged disabilities.

A. Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not adequately assess the opinion of Susan

Lurie, M.D. (“Dr. Lurie”) before deeming it unpersuasive. Additionally, Plaintiff

argues that the ALJ did not provide proper analysis to support her finding that the

state agency reviews completed by Jeffrey Prickett, Psy. D (“Dr. Prickett”), and

Bevlon Sagon, Ph. D (“Dr. Sagon”), were persuasive.

We will address the ALJ’s analysis regarding Dr. Lurie’s opinion before

analyzing same for the state agency reviews.

1. Dr. Lurie’s Opinion

Plaintiff argues that, in finding Dr. Lurie’s opinion unpersuasive, the ALJ

relied on apparent inconsistencies within Dr. Lurie’s opinion, but did so in error. For

example, while the ALJ characterizes Dr. Lurie’s notes as describing Plaintiff’s

depression and anxiety as “mild” yet also “severe,” Plaintiff argues this is not an

inconsistency but rather an effort to explain that Plaintiff’s conditions have worsened

over time. Additionally, while Dr. Lurie notes that Plaintiff’s conditions have gotten

“better,” Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly amplified that note to mean that

Plaintiff’s condition has become mild or dissipated. Further, Plaintiff argues that the

ALJ’s apparent misgivings about Dr. Lurie’s lack of specialization should not have

been relevant to the analysis.

In response, Defendant argues that the ALJ “cited a litany of evidence” to

undermine the persuasiveness of Dr. Lurie’s opinion. [D.E. 14 at 6]. For example,

Defendant points out that Dr. Lurie characterized Plaintiff as having the most severe

range of limitations despite having no specialty in mental health. Additionally,

Defendant points out that Dr. Lurie’s mental assessment of Plaintiff included a

demonstration of normal memory and full orientation, which were corroborated by

Plaintiff’s neurologist, Dr. Gedblum.

We find that the ALJ properly engaged with Dr. Lurie’s opinion before finding

it to be unpersuasive. In her analysis, the ALJ noted that Dr. Lurie’s opinion stated

that Plaintiff’s depression and anxiety were “mild” until late 2021. But then, Plaintiff

began taking the maximum dose of Sertaline, which, as Dr. Lurie noted, helped

improve Plaintiff’s impairments. Indeed, even though at that time Dr. Lurie

recommended Plaintiff see a psychologist and psychiatrist and noted that Plaintiff

was seeing a psychologist weekly, Plaintiff denied at the disability hearing that she

ever saw a psychologist, let alone weekly (nor were any treatment notes presented).

Further, the ALJ juxtaposed Dr. Lurie’s analysis with that of neurologist Dr.

Jonathan Cross, who noted that Plaintiff had been taking sertraline for quite some

time and it “ha[d] been effective.” [D.E. 8 at 18–19]. Further, the ALJ relied on Dr.

Cross’s findings that Plaintiff’s mental status examinations were “overwhelmingly

normal.” [Id.]. The ALJ paired this evidence with the agency reviews’ conclusions that

Plaintiff’s mental impairments were not severe.

Moreover, the ALJ supplemented this finding with the analysis of the four

broad functional areas (i.e., Plaintiff’s “paragraph B” criteria). In doing so, the ALJ

highlighted evidence that supported Plaintiff having normal comprehension, normal

attention span and concentration, and a normal ability to adapt and manage herself.

This furthered the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s mental limitations ranged from

non-existent to mild.

Thus, we find that despite Plaintiff’s objections, the ALJ properly considered

Dr. Lurie’s opinion, and substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Dr.

Lurie’s opinion was unpersuasive. Where the ALJ reasonably weighs a medical

opinion against the other evidence of record and draws a reasonable conclusion that

the opinion is not persuasive, it is not proper for this Court to re-weigh the evidence

or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ. See Bloodsworth, 703 F.2d at 1239

(noting that we must “scrutinize the record as a whole” and “[e]ven if we find that the

evidence preponderates against the Secretary's decision, we must affirm if the

decision is supported by substantial evidence”); Bardge v. Berryhill, 746 F. App'x 907,

909 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that ALJ did not err in finding the opinions of the

plaintiff’s treating physician to be unpersuasive where the ALJ “relied most heavily

on the doctors’ opinions which best aligned with the significant evidence in the

record”); Rodriguez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-CV-1674-MRM, 2022 WL 807443,

at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 17, 2022) (finding no error in the ALJ’s persuasiveness

determination where the ALJ relied on “the medical record[s] documenting largely

normal and stable physical functioning,” “effective treatment,” and evidence that the

physician’s findings were inconsistent with the plaintiff’s daily activities); Michael A.

v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:20-CV-1184-MLB-CCB, 2021 WL 4234964, at *8

(N.D. Ga. July 30, 2021), report and recommendation adopted sub nom., 2021 WL

3732853 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2021) (“The ALJ considered Ms. Stevens's opinion in

detail, expressly afforded weight to those opinions, and explained why she gave them

the weight that she did—essentially, that there were numerous findings in the

treatment notes inconsistent with both the extreme limitations Stevens suggested

and her ultimate opinion that Plaintiff could not work. Nothing more was required.”).

2. The State Agency Reviews

Plaintiff next asserts that in finding the state agency reviews to be persuasive,

the ALJ offered “no rationale in support thereof,” and therefore “the ALJ’s finding is

nothing more than an impermissible conclusory statement.” [D.E. 13 at 8]. Further,

Plaintiff argues that, while the ALJ stated that the opinions are “consistent” with

presented medical records, the ALJ did not explain that apparent consistency.

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ neglected to engage in a “supportability”

analysis because she merely summarized the state agency’s opinions.

Defendant, conversely, argues that, when assessing the state agency’s opinion,

the ALJ considered numerous mental status examinations and other evidence. Thus,

Defendant argues, the ALJ adequately considered both the supportability and

consistency of the state agency reviews by considering them against the record as a

whole.

As an initial matter, we agree with Plaintiff that the ALJ’s analysis of the state

agency reviews was indeed conclusory. In step 3 of the decision, after explaining much

of the medical evidence and other medical opinions, the ALJ deemed that “[t]he

opinions of the DDS psychological advisors are persuasive, as they are consistent with

records of Drs. Lurie and Cross.” [D.E. 8 at 19]. No other explanation followed. Thus,

Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ made no meaningful effort to explain how the agency

reviews were consistent with the medical evidence of record and/or what evidence

supported the persuasiveness of those reviews. See Pierson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

2020 WL 1957597, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2020), report and recommendation

adopted, 2020 WL 1955341 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2020) (reversing and remanding the

decision by the ALJ in part because the ALJ articulated only a few declaratory

sentences as to why a medical opinion only received little weight).

But here, that error was harmless because substantial evidence in the record

still existed to support the ALJ’s unfavorable decision. Indeed, as explained in our

review of the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Lurie’s opinion, a litany of evidence—or at least,

substantial evidence—supported the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s mental

impairments were non-severe. This included: evidence that Plaintiff had been

successfully taking treatment; evidence that Plaintiff’s condition was improving with

treatment; evidence that Plaintiff did not see a psychologist or psychiatrist despite

her physician’s ostensible suggestion; a neurologist’s (Dr. Cross) opinion that

Plaintiff’s treatment was effective; Plaintiff’s mental status examinations which

featured “overwhelmingly normal” results; and the analysis of Plaintiff’s four broad

functional areas which supported a finding of non-severe impairment.

So, even excluding the state agency reviews that were hardly mentioned in the

analysis, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s

mental impairments ranged from nonexistent to minor. Accordingly, even if the ALJ

adequately explained why she found the state agency reviews to be persuasive

(which, to be clear, the ALJ should have done under the regulations), that analysis

would have merely been cumulative to the substantial evidence already presented. A

proper analysis would have thus done nothing to sway the ALJ’s unfavorable

decision, but rather would have provided it with even more support.

Therefore, any error committed by the ALJ on this score was harmless because

it would not have “contradict[ed] the ALJ’s ultimate findings.” Denomme v. Comm'r,

Soc. Sec. Admin., 518 F. App'x 875, 877 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Diorio v. Heckler, 721

F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983)) (“When, however, an incorrect application of the

regulations results in harmless error because the correct application would not

contradict the ALJ's ultimate findings, the ALJ's decision will stand.”); see also East

v. Barnhart, 197 F. App'x 899, 901 (11th Cir. 2006) (“East also argues that the ALJ

erred in failing to consider the consulting psychologist's report by Dr. Priscilla Wilson.

Ph.D. However, any error in failing to address this report explicitly in the ALJ's

determination was harmless given that Dr. Wilson's observations in the report were

consistent with the ALJ's determination.”); Jackson v. Saul, No. 8:19-CV-2780-T-

TGW, 2020 WL 6867408, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2020) (“The plaintiff contends that

the law judge erred because he failed to consider the opinions of two examining

sources, Dr. Lynn Gulick and John Kivler, However … neither Dr. Gulick nor Kivler

‘found that Plaintiff had greater work restrictions than the ALJ's decision suggests’.

Consequently, the law judge's error was harmless.”); Whitten v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,

Comm'r, 778 F. App'x 791, 793 (11th Cir. 2019) (noting that “[i]f the ALJ commits an

error that does not affect the outcome, it's harmless and doesn't require reversal or

remand” and concluding that an error by the ALJ to fail to consider a piece of evidence

in discounting a medical opinion was harmless, because the ALJ relied on “other

reasons—all supported by substantial evidence—for discounting” that medical

opinion); Wray v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20CV156-AW-HTC, 2021 WL 7967592, at *7 (N.D.

Fla. Dec. 3, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 1028932 (N.D. Fla.

Apr. 6, 2022) (“Moreover, the 2018 DBQ supported rather than contradicted the ALJ's

determination, furthering making any error by the ALJ harmless.”).

B. RFC Analysis

Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred when she did not include Plaintiff’s

non-severe mental impairments in the RFC analysis. Defendant, meanwhile, argues

that no error was committed because the ALJ was not required to incorporate “mild”

limitations into the RFC.

We agree with Defendant. The ALJ’s step 2 analysis indicated that Plaintiff’s

mental limitations ranged from “no limitation” to “mild limitation.” This conclusion

is legally significant. In Garcia v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., the Eleventh Circuit

made clear that after the ALJ meaningfully and sufficiently determined that the

plaintiff’s mental limitations were no “more than a minimal limitation in the

claimant's ability to do basic work activities,” the ALJ “was not required to continue

his assessment of Garcia's mental impairments after that point.” No. 23-11184, 2023

WL 7404856, at *5 (11th Cir. Nov. 9, 2023). The court thus found that “the ALJ was

not required to incorporate Garcia's mental impairments that he determined at step

two in the rest of his RFC assessment because he found any impairments to be only

mild, not moderate.” Id.; see also Williams v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 661 F. App'x 977, 980

(11th Cir. 2016) (ALJ did not err in his decision to omit claimant's depression from

the RFC assessment where it caused no more than mild limitations).

Further, district courts in this Circuit, including this District, have followed

suit. See Chestang v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 8:21-CV-482-MRM, 2022 WL 4354849,

at *8 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2022) (noting that “the persuasive precedent demonstrates

that ALJs are not obligated to include mental limitations in the RFC even when they

find ‘mild’ limitations while completing a PRTF”); Medwit v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No.

2:20-cv-143-JLB-NPM, 2021 WL 1341390, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2021) (“Since the

ALJ only assessed ‘mild’ limitations in the four areas of mental functioning, the ALJ

did not err by not providing a mental RFC.”); Eutsay v. Kijakazi, No. 21-21164-CV,

2022 WL 1609088, at *9 (S.D. Fla. May 4, 2022), report and recommendation adopted

sub nom., 2022 WL 1605318 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 2022) (“Based on his analysis of these

four broad functional areas, ALJ Burock determined at steps 2 and 3 of the sequential

evaluation process that Claimant's medically determinable mental impairments did

not limit Claimant's ability to perform basic work activities, thus, her mental

impairments were non-severe. Thus, ALJ Burock was not obligated to include mental

limitations in his RFC finding of Claimant.”); Bryant v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-

cv-294-JLB-NPM, 2021 WL 4067464, at *11 (M.D. Fla. July 29, 2021) (“[T]he ALJ

found mild limitations in all four functional areas[, but] did not err in failing to

include [functional] limitations in the RFC related to [the plaintiff's] depression,

anxiety, bipolar disorder, or insomnia.”).

Thus, to the extent that the ALJ failed to explicitly incorporate Plaintiff’s mild

mental limitations into the RFC portion of the analysis, we cannot say the ALJ

committed reversible error.

C. Plaintiff’s Subjective Allegations

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to adequately consider Plaintiff’s

subjective allegations of pain. Essentially, relying on her own complaints, Plaintiff

disagrees with the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s self-reported disabilities were “not

entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.”

[D.E. 13 at 17].

We find that the ALJ committed no error on this score. To reiterate, the ALJ

considered the whole of the record, including hearing testimony, the reports of

numerous medical professionals, Plaintiff’s representations, and other presented

evidence. In considering each of those categories of evidence, the ALJ made a

finding—again, supported by substantial evidence—that Plaintiff’s subjective

complaints of disability did not entitle her to relief when weighed against the other

evidence in the record.

Thus, the ALJ did not commit error when she was left unconvinced by

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, as the ALJ relied on sufficient evidence in reaching

her unfavorable decision contrary to Plaintiff’s complaints. See Dyer v. Barnhart, 395

F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005) (“In sum, the ALJ considered Dyer's activities of

daily living, the frequency of his symptoms, and the types and dosages of his

medications, and concluded that Dyer's subjective complaints were inconsistent with

his testimony and the medical record. The ALJ thus adequately explained his reasons

and it was reversible error for the district court to hold otherwise.”); Wilson v.

Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1226 (11th Cir. 2002) (“In short, we find that the ALJ made

a reasonable decision to reject Wilson's subjective testimony, articulating, in detail,

the contrary evidence as his reasons for doing so.”).

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we recommend that Plaintiff’s motion [D.E.

13] be DENIED, Defendant’s motion [D.E. 14] be GRANTED, and the decision of

the ALJ be AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73, the parties have

fourteen (14) days from service of this Report and Recommendation within which to

file written objections, if any, with the District Judge. Failure to timely file objections

shall bar the parties from de novo determination by the District Judge of any factual

or legal issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from challenging on

appeal the District Judge’s Order based on any unobjected-to factual or legal

conclusions included in the Report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 11th Cir. Rule 3-1; see, e.g.,

Patton v. Rowell, 2017 WL 443634 (11th Cir. Feb. 2, 2017); Cooley v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 2016 WL 7321208 (11th Cir. Dec. 16, 2016).

DONE and SUBMITTED in Chambers in Miami, Florida, this 7th day of

August, 2024.

/s/ Edwin G. Torres

EDWIN G. TORRES

United States Magistrate Judge