FACER v. O'MALLEY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LORI JANE FACER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 23-281-J

)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )

)

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 19th day of December, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’

cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of

Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits

under Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., finds that the

Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and, accordingly, affirms.

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v.

Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs, 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing

Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F.

Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s

decision must be affirmed, as a federal court may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse,

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merely because it would have decided the claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642

F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1

1 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by failing to find

that she suffered from severe mental impairments at Step Two of the sequential process

and by failing to discuss the consistency of certain opinions in relation to one another.

(Doc. No. 13). Specifically, Plaintiff contends the ALJ committed reversible error when

she failed to discuss her Patient Health Questionnaire for Depression (“PHQ-9”), General

Anxiety Disorder Questionnaire (“GAD-7”), and posttraumtic stress disorder (“PTSD”)

checklist scores, which collectively indicated severe depression, anxiety, and PTSD. (Id.

at 8-15). Further, Plaintiff posits the ALJ erred by failing to analyze the consistency of

Therapist Madison Foreman’s opinion in relation to Dr. Dante Emmanuel Mancini, Ph.D.’s

opinion. (Id. at 15-18). Plaintiff contends these errors led the ALJ to craft an inaccurate

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and ultimately reach the wrong conclusion: an RFC

without any mental limitations. (Id.). After carefully reviewing the record, the Court

disagrees with Plaintiff and finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.

The Court finds the ALJ did not commit reversible error when failing to mention

Plaintiff’s PHQ-9, GAD-7, and PTSD checklist scores expressly. At Step Two of the

sequential process, the ALJ found Plaintiff suffers from the severe impairments of heart

disease, status post myocardial infarct (with chest pain and palpitation but with normal

findings in August 2020), and degenerative disc disease. (R. 31). While Plaintiff is

correct that the ALJ did not find her alleged mental impairments to be severe, and that the

ALJ did not expressly mention her PHQ-9, GAD-7, and PTSD checklist scores, the ALJ

did not ignore Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairments as she analyzed Plaintiff’s

depression, anxiety, and PTSD thoroughly at Step Two. (See R. 33-36). Indeed, the

ALJ explained that Plaintiff sought treatment for PTSD after a motor vehicle accident and

that Plaintiff endorsed symptoms of depression and anxiety, consistent with PTSD, and

that these symptoms impaired Plaintiff’s daily functioning. (R. 34). The ALJ further

detailed many of Plaintiff’s mental status examinations, which were unremarkable during

the relevant period. (Id.). Additionally, the ALJ analyzed the opinions as to Plaintiff’s

mental limitations and found them to be unpersuasive. (R. 35-36). All this evidence led

the ALJ to logically conclude that Plaintiff’s mental impairments were not severe at Step

Two and, later, to conclude mental limitations were not warranted in Plaintiff’s RFC. In

sum, the Court finds the ALJ’s analysis at Step Two is supported by substantial evidence.

Likewise, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ erred by

failing to mention treatment notes from Akinola Mobolaji, CRNP, showing that Plaintiff’s

depression was worsening. (Doc. No. 13 at 12). Plaintiff contends that this error led the

ALJ to craft an inaccurate RFC, which contained no social or mental restrictions. (Id.).

Plaintiff overlooks that the ALJ is under no obligation to mention every piece of evidence

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within the record. Beety-Monticelli v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 343 Fed. Appx. 743, 747 (3d

Cir. 2009). Further, the ALJ stated in detail the history of Plaintiff’s depression and

treatment and noted that she described symptoms of her mental health worsening over time.

(See R. 34-38 (explaining Plaintiff complained she was forgetting everything and had

troubles with concentration and brain fog)). The ALJ’s opinion shows that she considered

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and rejected them based on their inconsistency with the

record evidence. (R. 40). Nothing suggests that express discussion of CRNP

Mobolaji’s notes would have led the ALJ to a different conclusion.

Additionally, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred by failing to

analyze the consistency of Ms. Foreman’s opinion in relation to Dr. Mancini’s opinion.

(Doc. No. 13 at 15-18). Both of these opinions were similar in that they stated Plaintiff

was at least moderately restricted in several areas of mental abilities. (Exs. 1A, 14F).

Plaintiff contends the ALJ’s error in not analyzing the consistency between these opinions,

in conjunction with the ALJ inaccurately stating that Ms. Foreman’s opinion was

inconsistent with normal findings on objective examination, led the ALJ to inappropriately

reject Ms. Foreman’s opinion. (Doc. No. 13 at 15-18). Plaintiff posits that this led the

ALJ to find an inaccurate RFC, which stated that Plaintiff had the ability to perform light

work with the exception that she could not drive a vehicle as part of her job duties. (See

R. 37-38).

However, Plaintiff’s argument notwithstanding, the regulations do not mandate that

the ALJ discuss the consistency between specific medical source opinions. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(c)(4); Nelson v. Kijakazi, No. 21-186, 2022 WL 504578, at *1 n.3 (W.D. Pa.

Feb. 18, 2022) (noting “while consistency is a factor ALJs consider in their evaluation of

medical opinion evidence, they are not specifically required to catalogue consistencies

between medical opinions in their decisions”). The ALJ’s rejection of Ms. Foreman’s

opinion based on normal findings on objective examinations is supported by substantial

evidence as the record demonstrates Plaintiff did have mostly normal findings upon

examination. (See R. 34 (stating “[m]ental status examination have been unremarkable

during the period of disability alleged[.]”)). Further, the ALJ’s failure to discuss the

PHQ-9 and GAD-7 scores in relation to their consistency with Ms. Foreman’s opinion is

not reversible error as these scores are based on Plaintiff’s subjective reports, not results

on objective examination. See Shaffer v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 23-129-J, 2024 WL

2804616, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Pa. May 31, 2024) (citation omitted) (stating “[t]he PHQ-9 and

GAD-7 exams are self-administered tests for depression and anxiety, respectively.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument fails.

For these reasons, the ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial

evidence. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.

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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 12) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. No. 15) is GRANTED.

s/Mark R. Hornak, J.

United States District Judge

ecf: Counsel of record

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