“[I]t is not the court’s concern that an employer may be wrong about its employee’s performance, or be too hard on its employee. Rather, the only question is whether the employer’s proffered reason was pretextual, meaning that it was a lie.”
How later courts described this case
- “[I]t is not the court’s concern that an employer may be wrong about its employee’s performance, or be too hard on its employee. Rather, the only question is whether the employer’s proffered reason was pretextual, meaning that it was a lie.”
- “Federal courts have authority to correct an adverse employment action only where the employer’s decision is unlawful, and not merely where the adverse action is unwise or even unfair.”
- “[C]ourt[s] disregard the portions of the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 submissions that make legal arguments and assert legal conclusions, which are not factual statements at all.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
WESTERN DIVISION
Pierre G. Thorsen,
Plaintiff,
Case No.: 3:20-cv-50132
v.
Judge Iain D. Johnston
Community Unit School District 300,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Pierre G. Thorsen brings this Fifth Amended Complaint (“Complaint”)
against Community Unit School District (“the District”), alleging Title VII
employment discrimination and other supplemental state law claims. The District
moved for summary judgment. For the reasons below, the Court grants the District’s
Motion.
Background
1) Rule 56.1 Discussion
Before summarizing the material facts, the Court must first address Thorsen’s
total noncompliance with Local Rule 56.1.1 Local Rule 56.1 “is designed, in part, to
aid the district court, ‘which does not have the advantage of the parties’ familiarity
1 Throughout this Opinion, the Court refers to “Thorsen” (and not “Thorsen’s counsel”),
because that’s standard practice. However, the Court doesn’t expect Thorsen, a represented
plaintiff, to know the ins and outs of 56.1. Instead, the Court blames Thorsen’s counsel and
directs its frustrations and bewilderments squarely in their direction.
with the record and often cannot afford to spend the time combing the record to locate
the relevant information,’ in determining whether a trial is necessary.” Delapaz v.
Richardson, 634 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). “The obligations set
forth by a court’s local rules are not mere formalities.” Zuppardi v. Wal–Mart Stores,
Inc., 770 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2014). Given 56.1’s importance, the Seventh Circuit
has “consistently and repeatedly upheld a district court’s discretion to require strict
compliance with its local rules governing summary judgment.” Bordelon v. Chicago
Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Waldridge v.
Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir.1994) (collecting cases)).
Local Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit a
statement of material facts that it contends are undisputed and entitle it to summary
judgment. L.R. 56.1(a)(2). Then, the party opposing summary judgment must file a
response. L.R. 56.1(b)(2). The response must consist of numbered paragraphs that
correspond to the movant’s paragraphs. 56.1(e)(1). A party must admit, dispute or
partially admit or dispute each of the movant’s paragraphs. 56.1(e)(2). “To dispute
an asserted fact, a party must cite specific evidentiary material that controverts the
fact and must concisely explain how the cited material controverts the asserted fact.”
56.1(e)(3).
Especially important in this case, Local Rule 56.1 bars the nonmoving party
from “set[ting]forth any new facts” in its response. 56.1(e)(2); see also Phillipson v.
McAleenan, No. 14-CV-08138, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169093, at *1–*6 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
30, 2019), aff'd sub nom. Phillipson v. Wolf, 831 F. App’x 212 (7th Cir. 2020). Nor can
the nonmovant assert legal arguments. 56(e)(1); see also Rivera v. Guevara, 319 F.
Supp. 3d 1004, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“[C]ourt[s] disregard the portions of the parties’
Local Rule 56.1 submissions that make legal arguments and assert legal conclusions,
which are not factual statements at all.”).
Thorsen’s Local Rule 56.1(b)(2) filing is essentially impenetrable. Improper
(and unsightly) formatting, lengthy irrelevant facts and inferences, and legal
arguments blanket its fifty-one pages, shrouding all (if any) procedurally compliant
responses. No characterization does justice; the Court lets Thorsen’s Response speak
for itself, exemplified by these examples:2
• District Fact 6 (dkt. 195, pg. 2):3 “In February 2019, the
District received a complaint from the parents of a Jacobs
High School student…”
o Thorsen’s Response (dkt. 226, pg. 3): “. . . The
wording ‘received a complaint’ is purposely ambiguous.
Although the District received a complaint, Plaintiff
never received a copy of it, even though he had a
contractual right to a copy. While D300 ‘received a
complaint,’ [the complaining family] never provided a
‘written’ complaint of their accusations, so D300 would
2 The Court’s quotations are an improvement because they reformat Thorsen’s filing, which
employs confusing tables and numbered lines. See, e.g., dkt. 226, pgs. 10–12, 19–21, 49–51.
Thorsen also arbitrarily divides the District’s paragraphs into separate facts, further
complicating the Court’s work and likely violating LR 56.1(e) (“[The] response must consist
of numbered paragraphs corresponding to the numbered paragraphs in [the movant’s]
statement.”) (emphasis added).
3 A note on numbering and citations: The District divides its facts into separate sections and
restarts the numbering at each new section. Thorsen, in turn, further divides the District’s
paragraphs. For simplicity’s sake, the Court cites the respective page on which the fact
appears.
not be contractually obligated to provide any complaint
to Plaintiff, leaving him unable to prepare for the fact-
finding meeting.”
• District Fact 12 (dkt. 195, pg. 2): “Once the District gathered
information from students, [District officials] held a fact-
finding meeting with Plaintiff.”
o Thorsen’s Response (dkt. 226, pg. 5): “. . . The
meeting was not fact-finding. Facts that disputed the
[complaining family’s] claims were ignored. . . . ”
(Thorsen’s complete response to District Fact 12
reaches 600+ words).
• District Fact 70 (dkt. 195, pg. 14): “Plaintiff was also not the
only teacher in the District to have resigned when facing
disciplinary action.”
o Thorsen’s Response (dkt. 226, pgs. 49–51) (denying in
part) Plaintiff, a Christian, was not truly facing
disciplinary action. Instead, a long series of contrived
disciplinary actions had already taken place in
coordination with the Muslim family and the union in
order to establish a pretextual paper trail to justify
terminating Plaintiff, thus appeasing the Muslim
family who were threatening to sue D300. (citation
omitted). Plaintiff was not ‘facing’ true disciplinary
action; he was forced to choose between termination or
resignation, which is a fundamentally different position
than the stated fact. (citation omitted). Plaintiff, a
Christian, is the only tenured teacher to be told to enter
a placeholder grade by his department chair four school
days after a Muslim family’s initial contact/verbal
complaint with D300 about Plaintiff, then subsequently
subject to his first ever formal discipline to be placed in
his personnel file, just four days after the second
meeting with the Muslim family. (citations omitted).
Plaintiff was the only Kane County teacher of the year
nominee whose Christianity was discussed by central
office secretaries with disdain and vitriol just two days
after district administration met for the second time
with a Muslim family who, without filing a written
complaint, made allegations against Plaintiff based on
a supposition inconsistent with text messages they
collected. (citations omitted). Plaintiff was the only
tenured Christian teacher who was subject to discipline
based on unsubstantiated accusations that a Muslim
family “thinks” happened, despite never obtaining any
testimony from the daughter/student. (citations
omitted). And subsequently had a Notice to Remedy
with a multitude of infractions listed that did not
violate the policies cited. Plaintiff, who is Christian,
was the only tenured teacher whose union
representation was informed of “all the details” three
days after a Muslim family made false accusations.
Plaintiff is the only tenured teacher whose union then
conspired with administration to ambush Plaintiff at
the fictitious grade meeting with an unannounced
second topic. (citations omitted).
The Christian Plaintiff was the only teacher who was
falsely accused of not following the curriculum three
school days after the third time the Muslim family met
with administration. (citations omitted).
At a seemingly unrelated disciplinary meeting held two
days after the Muslim family’s second meeting with
administration, Plaintiff, a Christian, is the only
tenured teacher who, with union representation at his
side, sat through a disciplinary meeting about entering
the placeholder grade he was instructed to enter, while
the union representative had the evidence in hand. The
union destroyed the evidence and refused to pursue a
grievance related to the placeholder grade discipline so
that the union and administration could build a paper
trail that would make it appear as though the teacher
was not meeting the district’s legitimate expectations.
(citations omitted).
Plaintiff was the only Christian teacher who sat in a
meeting that began with a discussion of the potential
lawsuit of the Muslim family, after which, Plaintiff was
threatened with termination and forced to resign for
conducting activities, known by O’Keefe to be aligned
with the curriculum, policies, and initiatives created
and promoted by D300. (citation omitted). This, not
coincidentally, followed a month’s-long series of threats
of a lawsuit from the Muslim family. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff’s documents were not viewed by
administration or union representation. (citation
omitted). The matter had already been discussed with
the School Board prior to the meeting. (citation
omitted). Plaintiff is the only tenured teacher whose
Christianity was mocked by administration two school
days after his forced resignation, primarily by Falk, the
social studies divisional administrator at Hampshire
high school, who stated in his deposition that the topic
related to the KFC bucket prop (Kentucky Fried
Christians) came up later in the curriculum. (citation
omitted). For greater detail on Plaintiff being the only
teacher subject to what Movant is attempting to paint
as resigning when facing discipline, a chronological
explanation with citations and evidence to support the
above facts is included as (citation omitted).
• District Fact 24 (Dkt. 195, pg. 15) “According to the Union,
the likely repercussion of a violation of a Notice to Remedy
would be termination . . . .”
o Thorsen’s Response (Dkt. 226, pg. 13) (denying-in-
part) “Opening this point with ‘according to the union’
is an obvious attempt to deflect blame. . . . ”
Flouting the Rules, Thorsen tosses his responsibility to efficiently identify the
material facts onto the Court, inverting Local Rule 56.1’s purpose and forcing the
Court to hack through irrelevant and inadmissible clutter. Under these
circumstances, the Court is entitled to enforce strict compliance and grant summary
judgment for the District. Bordelon, 233 F.3d at 527.
It’s also unfair to the District to permit this sort of briefing. Though the Local
Rules primarily guard the Court’s resources, they simultaneously ensure an efficient
litigation process. The Court may choose to expend many days sifting through
Thorsen’s Response, but it doesn’t follow that the Court can demand that the District
do the same. It’s a bad incentive too: bury a Rules-compliant movant in pages of
56.1(b)(2) violations, creating the illusion of disputed facts, and suffocate a
meritorious motion. Further, permitting Thorsen’s Response would also allow him to
end-run 56.1(d)(5): “An opposing party’s LR 56.1(b)(3) statement of additional facts
must not exceed 40 numbered paragraphs,” without the court’s permission. Thorsen’s
Response fills fifty pages with new facts, which would far exceed the allotted amount
were they alleged in a 56.1(b)(3) statement.
The Court finds that Thorsen’s 56.1(b)(2) Response deserves to be stricken in
its entirety. His 56.1(b)(3) statement of additional facts doesn’t fare much better,
rarely providing specific record citations, as 56.1(d)(2) requires, speculating and
relying on inadmissible conjecture.4 To the extent Thorsen’s additional facts aren’t
duplicative, they’re immaterial, inadmissible, or not 56.1 compliant. Nevertheless,
the Court explains separately why the District is entitled to summary judgment on
the merits. In doing so, it considers (as much as possible) Thorsen’s 56.1(b)(2)
Response but construes any ambiguity resulting from his noncompliance against him.
See Igasaki v. Ill Dept. of Fin. & Prof. Reg., 988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2021) (finding
it “well within [the district court’s] discretion” to strike some of the improperly
asserted facts, but consider others).
4 See, e.g., dkt. 226, pg. 53 (“The District had already conspired with the Union to undermine
Thorsen, behind his back.”) (citing three pages of Thorsen’s affidavit speculating about a
conspiracy); Id. (“Thorsen provided the student with resources that helped her, as opposed
to the ineffectual resources the District provided.”); Id. (“The District is trying to diminish
Christians and Christianity from the historical record, because it removed all Christian books
from the Jacobs library, diminished Christian knowledge and understanding from the
curriculum following the discharge of Thorsen and eliminated the Christian Uprising Club,
while allowing non-Christian religious clubs to remain.”) (citing collectively Thorsen’s own
affidavit, another affidavit saying the school cancelled the club, and an “Exhibit 26,” (likely
Exhibit 25) showing a list of various cultural celebration months).
2) Facts
Thorsen quibbles with the way the District’s characterizes nearly all of its
facts, and often provides lengthy explanations for their existence or significance. But,
for the most part, Thorsen doesn’t dispute these determinative facts:
Parents alleged that Thorsen acted inappropriately with their daughter,
encouraging her to convert to Christianity and otherwise violating appropriate
student–teacher boundaries. That allegation sparked an investigation into Thorsen’s
conduct at school. The investigation—including a meeting with Thorsen—led the
District to recommend and the School Board to adopt a resolution that imposed a
suspension and certain restrictions on Thorsen’s behavior. Immediately after his
return, the District learned that Thorsen may have engaged in conduct that violated
those restrictions and interviewed students to gather more information. The District
then instructed Thorsen to participate in an investigatory meeting, at which he
admitted to the underlying conduct but contended it was appropriate. Believing the
District would fire him, Thorsen resigned. These are the details:
a. Relevant Non-Parties
Colleen O’Keefe was the District’s Chief Legal Officer. Dkt. 195, pg. 2; Dkt.
226, pg. 2. Kara Vicente was its Chief Academic Officer. Dkt. 195, pg. 2; Dkt. 226,
pg. 2. Mike Williamson was the President of the District’s teachers’ union. Dkt. 195,
pg. 3; Dkt. 226, pg. 7. Rob Lyons is an Illinois Education Association attorney. Dkt.
195, pg. 5; Dkt. 226, pg. 14. Lynn Adler is an attorney and a director with the Illinois
Education Association. In this factual background, the Court considers the “the
District” and the District’s “Board of Education” separate entities. So, the District’s
action isn’t necessarily the School Board’s action.
b. District’s Initial Investigation & Findings (February–April 2019)
Thorsen taught World History at a District school from 1997 until August
2019. Dkt. 226, pg. 52, ¶ G1. At all relevant times, Thorsen observed and practiced
Christianity. Dkt. 195, pg. 1; dkt. 226, pg. 1. In February 2019, a student’s parents
complained to the District about Thorsen’s interactions with the student. Dkt. 195,
pg. 2. The parents alleged that Thorsen gave their daughter a Bible, inappropriately
discussed religion with her, and provided her with contact information for adults not
affiliated with the District. Id.; dkt. 226, pg. 53 ¶ G20 (Thorsen noting his
“extraordinary efforts to help a troubled student, providing her with more help than
the District”).
To keep things organized, this is essentially the District’s standard disciplinary
process: (1) Someone files a complaint against a teacher, (2) the district investigates
the complaint, (3) the district organizes a “fact-finding” meeting with the accused, (4)
the district drafts a “Notice to Remedy,” (5) the District discusses the Notice with the
accused at a “fact-finding follow-up,” (6) the District proposes the Notice to Remedy
at the School Board’s meeting, (7) the School Board must adopt it.
In Thorsen’s case, the District investigated the parents’ allegations. Dkt. 195,
pg. 2. It then organized a “fact-finding” meeting. Id. pg. 3. Fact-finding meetings
help determine what occurred and gives an employee the chance to respond to
concerns. Id. As required, the District informed Thorsen that the meeting could lead
to discipline and that he could bring a union representative. Id.; dkt. 226, pg. 7. In
that three-hour meeting, Thorsen admitted that he provided a student with resources
outside the District, and sometime discussed religion with inquiring students. Id.,
dkt. 226, pgs. 9–10. Thorsen believes that the District didn’t give him enough time
to present his case and that the Union didn’t properly represent him. See dkt. 226,
pgs. 5–6.
c. District’s Notice to Remedy
The District determined that Thorsen violated the District’s policies, and
prepared a “Notice to Remedy.”5 Dkt. 195, pgs. 3–4. A Notice to Remedy is a state-
required official, written statement that lists issues a tenured teacher must correct
to continue employment. Id. at 4.
The Notice explained that “[b]ased on the investigation,” the District concluded
that: (1) Thorsen initiated a student Bible Study class without the knowledge or
approval of the District. See dkt. 195, Ex. 4, pg. 1; (2) Provided a student with a Bible;
Id. (3) Repeatedly discussed religion, particularly Christianity, with students and in
a way that was not part of the school’s curriculum; (4) Engaged in conversations with
a student about the student’s religious conversion, and made positive comments
5 In his 56.1(b)(2) Response, Thorsen (in 1500+ words) challenges each of the District’s factual
findings in its Notice to Remedy. But the material fact is whether the District (rightly or
wrongly) determined that Thorsen violated the District’s policies. This isn’t the time or place
to challenge the District’s substantive findings.
about her interest in Christianity; (5) Discussed one student’s personal matters with
other students; (6) Without informing the parents or directing the student to trained
staff, “[p]rovided the student with the names and contact information of several
adults that have no affiliation with the school or District,” which Thorsen said he did
to “provide [the student] with a support network and to prepare for the possibility
that the student may be disowned by her parents.” Dkt. 195, Ex. 4, pg. 1.
The District determined that Thorsen “exhibited an unacceptable lack of
understanding as to the appropriate parameters of the teacher/student relationship.”
Id. Consequently, it recommended that the Board impose a seven-day unpaid
suspension, transfer schools, and adopt remedial directives for Thorsen to follow after
his return. Relevant in this case included three specific directives:
(8) Do not discuss religion with students unless it is in in
the context of an academic subject that the prescribed
curriculum dictates. More specifically, do not give
preferential treatment to any single religion or religious
belief. This includes discussing your faith and/or the faith
of others before, during or after school. This also includes
answering questions about your faith and Christianity
before, during or after school.
(14) Refrain from referencing a student’s cultural,
religious, or racial background or discussing the same any
time during the performance of the your duties. This
includes instructional time and all interactions with
colleagues and students in your professional capacity as
teacher. The only exception to this directive would be if the
information is relevant to the health, safety, or welfare
concern.
(15) Refrain from making comments or discussing topics
that would imply an inappropriate level of familiarity with
a student.
Id. The Notice also stated that “[f]ailiure to comply with these directives will result
in further disciplinary action, up to and including your dismissal as a tenured
employee in this School District.” Id.
On April 16, 2019, the District held a fact-finding follow-up meeting to discuss
the Notice with Thorsen. Dkt. 195, pg. 4; dkt. 226, pg. 13. Union President
Williamson, and Illinois Education Association attorney Rob Lyons were present.
Dkt. 195, pgs. 4–5; dkt. 226, pgs. 13–14. The Union frequently involved attorneys in
the Notice proceedings. Dkt. 195, pg. 5; dkt. 226, pg. 14. O’Keefe, Vicente, and
Willamson all testified that each part of the Notice was explained to Thorsen and that
clarifying questions were asked. Dkt. 195, Ex. 2, 119:16–121:24; Ex. 3, 96:1–18; Ex.
6, 73:24–74:17. 6
On April 23, 2019, the District’s Board of Education adopted the resolution
authorizing the Notice to Remedy. Dkt. 195, pgs. 5–6; Dkt. 226, pg. 15. Thorsen
admits that the above Notice provisions “applied to [Thorsen’s] professional conduct
6 In response, Thorsen points to his own affidavit saying the Union representatives didn’t
speak during the meeting. As the Court explains below, the extent to which the Union
representatives participated in the meetings is immaterial to deciding the Title VII question.
and interactions with students, generally, for the balance of his employment.” Dkt.
195, pgs. 5–6; Dkt. 226, pg. 16.
d. Thorsen’s August 2019 Conduct
Pursuant to the Notice, the District transferred Thorsen to another school.
Dkt. 195, pgs. 5–6; Dkt. 226, pg. 17. He was assigned two classes, World History and
U.S. History, as well as an academic support period. The academic support period
functioned like a study hall, where a teacher supervised and answered general
questions, but wasn’t expected to conform to any curriculum.7
On the first day of school, in both his classes and the academic support period,
Thorsen conducted a “get-to-know-you ice-breaker.” Dkt. 195, pg. 6; Dkt. 226, pg. 18.
Thorsen asked students about the “historical background” of their last names. Dkt.
196, Ex. 1, 40:13–20. If a student didn’t understand what Thorsen meant by that
question (which many didn’t), he would ask “what’s the background of your last name,
can you tell me the origin of that name?” Id. 40:22–41:2. If students were still
confused, Thorsen would use his name as an example and tie it to his Scandinavian
and Norwegian background. Id. 41:20–42:12. If students didn’t know the origins,
Thorsen encouraged them to discuss their “family background and heritage of th[eir]
name” with their parents and let him know. Id. 42:3–42: 21. Thorsen was the only
7 Thorsen splits hairs over a teacher’s role in the study period. The District says it’s not
“instructional time,” and that there’s no curriculum but that students can ask for help with
their classes. According to Thorsen, he can only assist if he’s also instructing. That’s all
beside the point, because Thorsen admits that the Notice applied to all of his interactions and
conduct.
teacher known to have conducted such an ice-breaker. 8 Id. Ex. 11; 36:4–19; Ex. 3.,
24:14–25:20.
The District received a complaint about or otherwise became aware of
Thorsen’s ice-breaker.9 See Id. Ex. 3, 23:4–12; Ex. 12, ¶¶ 4–6. In response, the
District investigated the accusation. Dkt. 195, pg. 7; dkt. 226; pg. 23. It interviewed
approximately ten students in Thorsen’s class. Dkt. 195, pg. 7; dkt. 226; pg. 23. The
students “consistent[ly]” reported that Thorsen’s ice-breaker asked them to provide
information about “their background[,] heritage, [and] ethnicity.” Dkt. 195, Ex. 3., 24.
The students also reported that once they shared information about their cultural
background, Thorsen would comment on how that background might affect them
today. See Dkt. 195, Ex. 2, 50:20–51:6 (“[I]f they were half German and half Italian,
he would say something to the effect of . . you’re at war with yourself . . . because
this part of you is fighting this part of you.”).10
The interviewed students also reported that Thorsen had empty Kentucky
Fried Chicken (“KFC”) buckets in his classroom on the first days of schools. Dkt. 195,
8 Thorsen writes a 550+ word essay responding to this fact, offering a winding, irrelevant
tangent about his understanding of the ice-breaker and other school policies. As the Rules
require, the Court ignores all of that. He also doesn’t identify another teacher who was
known to lead such an ice-breaker.
9 In 700+ words, Thorsen contends that there’s no documented evidence of a “complaint”
related to the ice-breaker. The District couldn’t produce one, instead largely admitting that
they’re not 100% sure how it came to their attention—a Board member’s child, another
teacher, or through the grapevine. But Thorsen admits he ran the ice-breaker, so it’s baffling
why he spills so much ink on this immaterial point.
10 Thorsen doesn’t dispute this information, indeed he admits “the students may have
reported the ice-breaker.” Instead, his lengthy response “denying in-part” only argues that
his ice-breaker was consistent with the curriculum. The Court, therefore, accepts that
students made these reports.
pg. 8; dkt. 226; pg. 24. When a student asked about the buckets, Thorsen explained
that they symbolized how Christians were persecuted and burned alive in ancient
Rome, becoming “Kentucky Fried Christians.”11 Dkt. 195, pg. 8; dkt. 226; pgs. 24–26.
e. August 2019 Notice of Fact-Finding and Thorsen’s Departure
On or around August 20, 2019, O’Keefe sent a Notice of Fact-Finding, directing
Thorsen to report to a meeting on August 23, 2019. Dkt. 195, pg. 8; dkt. 226; pg. 26.
The Notice of Fact-Finding advised Thorsen that the meeting’s purpose was to
investigate whether his actions on the first few days of school violated the April 2019
Notice to Remedy, specifically directives (8) (discussing religion outside of prescribed
curriculum); (14) (referencing a student’s cultural, religious, or racial background);
and (15) (making comments or discussing topics that would imply an inappropriate
level of familiarity with a student). Dkt. 195, pg. 8; dkt. 226; pgs. 26–27.
The facts show that at the time the District notified Thorsen about the
meeting, the District intended to gather more information and determine what
happened in the classroom; the District hadn’t yet decided about Thorsen’s
employment.12 Dkt. 195, Ex. 2, 96:1–97:14, 113:4–18 (O’Keefe testifying that she
participated in fifty meetings and never went into them with predetermined
11 Again, Thorsen admits all of this as a factual matter, but argues that his actions were
within the curriculum.
12 Thorsen denies this (i.e. argues that the District had already made a decision), but points
to no facts in the record to refute it. Instead, he argues that, because he didn’t share
documents or sufficiently present his case at the meeting, the District must have already
made a determination before they scheduled the meeting. But that’s an inference, not a fact.
So, for summary judgment purposes, the District’s version is undisputed.
conclusions); Ex. 3, 87:22–89:6 (Vicente testifying that the meeting’s purpose was to
give Thorsen an opportunity to respond to the allegations); Ex. 6, 29:13–30:15
(Williamson testifying that fact-finding meeting are meant to determine whether the
accusations are truthful). The District hadn’t communicated with the Board about
Thorsen’s alleged violations before the meeting.13 Ex. B, 34:14–16.
Thorsen, O’Keefe, Vicente, and Williamson attended the August 23, 2019
meeting. Dkt. 195, pg. 9; dkt. 226; pg. 29. Lynn Adler, an attorney and a director
with the Illinois Education Association, also attended. Id. The purpose of Union
representation at the fact-finding meeting was to advise Thorsen and ensure
compliance with the collective bargaining agreement.14 Dkt. 195, pg. 10.
At the meeting, Thorsen admitted that he conducted the ice-breakers and that
he discussed his KFC prop during an academic support period. Dkt. 195, pgs. 9–10;
dkt. 226; pgs. 31–32. He also admitted that he hadn’t used the KFC props since
approximately 2006. Id. Thorsen said both the ice-breaker and the prop complied
with the District’s polices. Dkt. 226; pgs. 31–32. O’Keefe then said, “in her view,”
13 Thorsen denies this fact, essentially arguing that contact occurred between the District and
the parent of an interviewed student in Thorsen’s class who was also a Board member. The
record supports that response, but the Court understands the District to be saying that there
was no formal communication (i.e. a letter/advisement) sent to the Board of Education before
the fact-finding meeting. Regardless, it seems immaterial whether a Board member (or the
Board) knew about the fact-finding meeting.
14 The Court accepts this as a fact, because Thorsen doesn’t meaningfully dispute it. He cites
Williamson’s testimony that the Union didn’t recommend one action over another, instead
explaining the expected ramifications of each approach (which is what “advise” means). See
Dkt. 226, pg. 30 (citing dkt. 195, Ex. 6, 36:2, 17, 18). Thorsen also argues, without any proof,
that the Union “worked against” him, citing with no pinpoint his 1500+ word, conjecture-
filled response to another fact.
Thorsen violated the Notice to Remedy,15 but that she was not the person who could
suspend or terminate him. Dkt. 195, Ex. 2, 56:18–57:20. To terminate or suspend a
tenured teacher like Thorsen, the Board would need to adopt such a resolution. Dkt.
195, pg. 10.
The Court can’t make sense of Thorsen’s responses to what happened next at
the meeting. But in sum (and drawing reasonable inferences in Thorsen’s favor
despite 56.1 violations), O’Keefe implied that the Board would likely accept her
findings and ultimately fire him. See dkt. 195, pg. 10. Without District officials
present, Williamson and Adler discussed Thorsen’s options and largely agreed with
O’Keefe’s predictions. See dkt. 195, pg. 10. Williamson and Adler suggested
Thorsen’s best move was to resign. See dkt. 195, pg. 10. Williamson and Adler
communicated Thorsen’s willingness to resign to O’Keefe. See dkt. 195, pg. 10.
O’Keefe returned with a letter of resignation, and Thorsen, feeling pressured, signed
it. See dkt. 195, pg. 10. Thorsen admits that O’Keefe didn’t speak directly to him
about resigning. See dkt. 226, pg. 40. Thorsen speculates that, outside his presence,
O’Keefe told Williamson and Adler that Thorsen had to resign immediately.16
15 The Court also accepts this as a fact, because Thorsen’s “denial” isn’t appropriate. He
writes “[r]efusing to view Plaintiff’s documents, and not taking them with for the Board to
view disproves O’Keefe[’s] assertion that ‘in her view’ he had violated the Notice to Remedy
because her ‘view’ did not include all the facts.” That nonsensical argument belongs nowhere
near a 56.1(b)(2) response.
16 Thorsen denies that O’Keefe and Vicente did not tell Williamson that Thorsen needed to
resign before leaving the meeting. Dkt. 226, pg. 38. Citing his own affidavit, Thorsen infers
that such a condition was imposed because Williamson came back into the room and
(according to Thorsen) said “the deal is, you have to make that choice before you leave the
room.” (emphasis added). Dkt. 226, pg. 38. Thorsen reasons that since “it takes two sides to
make a deal, the time limit probably came from O’Keefe and/or Vicente.” Dkt. 226, pg. 38.
The Court can’t take that sort of 56.1 response seriously either.
Thorsen also speculates, without evidence, that O’Keefe had prepared a letter of
resignation before the meeting and that Williamson and Adler “colluded” with the
District.
Summary Judgment Analysis
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists if a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant, construing the evidence and all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986); Rickher v. Home Depot, Inc., 535 F.3d 661, 664 (7th Cir.
2008). However, the Court need not draw every conceivable inference, only
reasonable ones. Moser v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.3d 895, 905 (7th Cir. 2005). And
“[s]peculation is insufficient to withstand summary judgment.” Ortiz v. John O.
Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1127 (7th Cir. 1996). Indeed, “the nonmoving party ‘must
do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’”
Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986)). Under Local Rule 56.1, the Court limits its analysis to the facts presented in
the Parties’ 56.1 statements. Kirsch v. Brightstar Corp., 78 F. Supp. 3d 676, 697 (N.D.
Ill. 2015).
a) Title VII Claim
First, the Court understands Thorsen to ground his Title VII claim on his
August 2019 departure. That’s the natural reading of his Complaint and the only
issue he substantively addresses in his 56.1(b)(2) Memorandum. Importantly, then,
Thorsen doesn’t claim that the April 2019 Notice to Remedy and Thorsen’s suspension
constituted a Title VII adverse employment action or discrimination.17
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(1). In discrimination cases, “[w]hen a defendant moves for summary
judgment, the ‘singular question’ for the district court is whether the plaintiff has
introduced evidence that would ‘permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the
plaintiff’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, or other proscribed factor caused the discharge
or other adverse employment action.’” Igasaki v. Ill. Dept. of Fin. & Prof. Reg., 988 F.
3d 948, 957 (7th Cir. 2021).
One way of defeating an employer’s summary judgment motion is to meet the
burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct.
1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Id. “The familiar McDonnell Douglas approach requires
a plaintiff to make a prima facie case of discrimination, at which point the burden
shifts to the employer to offer a nondiscriminatory motive, and, if the employer does
17 Thorsen alleges in his Fifth Amended Complaint that “Defendant otherwise created a
hostile environment, intolerable conditions, and undue restrictions against Christianity,”
citing the Notice to Remedy. But his 56.1 briefings don’t argue that the April 2019 events
constitute discrimination or an adverse action. On the contrary, his briefings focus
exclusively on the August departure.
so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer’s stated reason
was a pretext.” Id. (citing Purtue v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 963 F.3d at 598, 602 (7th
Cir. 2020)). To make a prima facie case under McDonell Douglas, a plaintiff must
show: (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he met his employer’s legitimate
expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) another similarly
situated employee outside of his protected class received better treatment from his
employer. Marshall v. Indiana Dep’t of Correction, 973 F.3d 789, 791–92 (7th Cir.
2020). But a plaintiff need not use the McDonell Douglas framework after Ortiz v.
Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016). Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 957. At
summary judgment, “[w]hat matters is whether [a plaintiff] presented enough
evidence to allow the jury to find in [his] favor.” Vega v. Chicago Park Dist., 954 F.3d
996, 1004 (7th Cir. 2020). Under either framework, Thorsen fails to make the
required showing.
1) Adverse Employment Action
As a threshold matter, Thorsen must first establish that the District took an
adverse employment action against him. If, on the other hand, Thorsen voluntarily
resigned, the District wouldn’t face Title VII liability. In this case, Thorsen contends
that his August 2019 departure constituted an adverse employment action.
As this Court carefully explained in its Order on the District’s Motion to
Dismiss, dkt. 46, an employer’s conduct can constitute an adverse action even if a
plaintiff technically resigned. See dkt. 46, pgs. 10–18 (discussing other scenarios that
qualify as an adverse action, specifically “threat-plus misrepresentation,” “can’t-take-
it-anymore,” and “fait accompli” theories). In that decision, the Court noted Thorsen’s
“sparse” allegations, and stressed that “[w]hen a plaintiff has difficulty framing a
claim, that is likely a bad sign as to the merits of the action.” Id., at pg. 16. The
Court conceded, however, that “[its] suspicions of the merits of the claims does not
result in dismissal.” Id., at pg. 17.
As the Court predicted, discovery didn’t help Thorsen’s speculative claim.
Even considering the additional “facts” inappropriately thrown in Thorsen’s
56.1(b)(2) response, a reasonable fact-finder can’t conclude that Thorsen didn’t resign
on his own. Thorsen’s claim rests largely on his unsupported theory that the Union
and the District colluded “behind his back.” In reality, as his Union representatives
explained, it was in Thorsen’s best interest to resign as it avoided a “termination” on
his record. Thorsen admits that O’Keefe lacked the authority to fire him sua sponte
(hampering his threat-plus and fait accompli theories), although he argues with little
admissible support that the Board rubber-stamped the District’s decisions. Without
any discussion, he also concludes that the August 2019 meeting’s circumstances
(where he was allegedly yelled at without counsel and only given a resignation offer)
qualifies as a termination under the “can’t take it anymore standard.” These are
largely the same “scarce” facts that barely survived a motion to dismiss; they’re
insufficient to meet the summary judgment standard.
b) Religious Discrimination
Assuming, arguendo, that the District effectively fired Thorsen, he still can’t
defeat the summary judgment motion. His claim turns on a simple, largely
uncontested question: In April 2019, did the District validly adopt a Notice to Remedy
restricting Thorsen’s conduct? Thorsen doesn’t meaningfully allege that the District
singled him out to impose strict conditions. To the contrary, credible allegations
about Thorsen’s conduct were brought to the District’s attention, prompting an
investigation. After conducting many interviews and meeting with Thorsen, the
District found that Thorsen behaved inappropriately, failing to respect proper
student–teacher boundaries. The District then proposed and the School Board
adopted the April 2019 Notice.
An important note: Thorsen never alleges that the District didn’t afford him
due process or that the restrictions were unconstitutional.18 He disagrees with the
District’s substantive findings and believes he acted properly with the student, but
that’s all irrelevant. Without Thorsen identifying something legally wrong with the
District’s Notice, it’s not the Court’s job to second-guess whether it reached the correct
decision in initially imposing the restrictions.
With the Notice restrictions in place, a reasonable fact-finder can’t conclude
that Thorsen “met his employer’s legitimate expectations.” The Notice clearly barred
Thorsen from discussing a student’s “cultural, religious, or racial” background or
speaking about religion outside the assigned curriculum. Yet, on the first days of
school, Thorsen led an irregular ice-breaker that, at a minimum, prodded discussion
18 Thorsen mentions many times that his Union representatives didn’t participate as much
as he thought they should have. Similarly, he believes the District didn’t adequately consider
his arguments at the April 2019 meeting. True or not, neither renders the Notice legally
inadequate.
about restricted topics. Additionally, Thorsen brought multiple KFC buckets
(unquestionably likely to provoke inquiry) to highlight ancient Christians’
willingness to engage in martyrdom.
Thorsen devotes much of his 56.1(b)(2) Response to arguing why his actions
technically fell within the curriculum, and therefore didn’t violate the Notice. The
Court doesn’t need to decide whether that’s true, though it notes Thorsen seems to
stretch the language. The District had just suspended Thorsen and imposed clear
conditions on his return. It could legitimately expect that, on his first days back, he
wouldn’t come near the line. And, in any event, firing him for borderline
transgressive conduct doesn’t then establish that the discharge was religiously
discriminatory. See Gates v. Caterpillar, Inc., 513 F.3d 680, 691 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing
Ineichen v. Ameritech, 410 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is not the court’s concern
that an employer may be wrong about its employee’s performance, or be too hard on
its employee. Rather, the only question is whether the employer’s proffered reason
was pretextual, meaning that it was a lie.”)); Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d
691, 697 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Federal courts have authority to correct an adverse
employment action only where the employer’s decision is unlawful, and not merely
where the adverse action is unwise or even unfair.”).
Finally, Thorsen doesn’t identify any similarly-situated employee who the
District treated more favorably. He alleges without support that the District allowed
other employees to discuss their personal views, and that others led similar ice-
breakers. Again, he provides no admissible proof to support that speculation. But
even if he’s right, he doesn’t allege that those employees were subject to a Notice to
Remedy that imposed specific restrictions, so they’re not similarly situated. So,
Thorsen doesn’t rebut the presumption that the District acted without a religiously
discriminatory purpose.
Thorsen doesn’t fare better under the Ortiz framework. Under that standard,
the “determinative question” is whether the evidence would permit a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s religion caused the discharge or other
adverse employment action. Ortiz, 834 F. 3d at 765. In Thorsen’s case, the admissible
evidence demonstrates that the District imposed restrictions on Thorsen’s conduct
because parents credibly accused him of acting inappropriately and not respecting
proper boundaries.19 When the District believed that Thorsen violated those
restrictions, they prepared to impose further consequences. But at all times, the
evidence shows it was Thorsen’s Notice violations—not his religion—that triggered
disciplinary action.
c) Remaining Counts
Because the Court grants the District’s Motion on the Title VII claim, it
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the fraud and conspiracy claims.
See RWJ Mgmt. Co. v. BP Prods. N. Am., 672 F.3d 476, 479-80 (7th Cir. 2012). These
claims are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
19 The restrictions undoubtedly touched on religious conduct, but the evidence shows that
religious discussions were the means by which Thorsen allegedly crossed student–teacher
boundaries, so it’s unsurprising that the Notice restricted such conduct. Again, Thorsen
doesn’t allege that the Notice restrictions violated any other law.
Conclusion
For the above reasons, the Court grants the District’s Motion [192]. It dismisses the
remaining state law claims for lack of jurisdiction.
Date: December 19, 2024 By: SS
Tain D. Johnston
United States District Judge
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