Steven Anderson v. Idoc Policy Administration Board Members

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 18 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEVEN ANDERSON, No. 22-35987

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00259-DCN

v.

MEMORANDUM*

IDOC POLICY ADMINISTRATION

BOARD MEMBERS; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

David C. Nye, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 4, 2024

Portland, Oregon

Before: CALLAHAN, NGUYEN, and SUNG, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Steven Anderson appeals the district court’s dismissal of his

Amended Complaint, which challenges the constitutionality of one of his parole

conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Amended Complaint requests three forms

of relief: declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. The district court

dismissed Plaintiff’s § 1983 action as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,

*

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

487 (1994), reasoning that a successful challenge “would necessarily imply the

invalidity” of Plaintiff’s parole revocation and the period of incarceration that he

was serving at the time. “We review the dismissal of a complaint as Heck-barred

de novo.” Hebrard v. Nofziger, 90 F.4th 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 2024). We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.1

We affirm the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for damages. Plaintiff has

forfeited any challenge to the dismissal of this claim. See Planet Aid, Inc. v.

Reveal, 44 F.4th 918, 923 n.2 (9th Cir. 2022) (appellants forfeited issue not

“specifically and distinctly” argued in their opening brief). On appeal, Plaintiff

argues the Amended Complaint “seeks only prospective declaratory and injunctive

relief”—not damages.

We vacate the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for prospective declaratory and

injunctive relief. As Defendants conceded during oral argument, regardless of

whether Plaintiff’s prospective relief claims were Heck-barred while he was

incarcerated, they are not currently Heck-barred because Plaintiff has been released

on parole again. See Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 2002)

(vacating and remanding Heck dismissal when plaintiff was released from prison

while his appeal was pending); Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 845-46 (9th Cir.

1

We grant Plaintiff’s request at Dkt. 31 for judicial notice of four documents

created by the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole. See Fed. R. Evid.

201(b)(2); Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001).

2

2013) (“[A] state parolee may challenge a condition of parole under § 1983 if his

or her claim, if successful, would neither result in speedier release from parole nor

imply, either directly or indirectly, the invalidity of the criminal judgments

underlying that parole term.”); see also Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 614-

15 (9th Cir. 2019), abrogated on other grounds by City of Grants Pass v. Johnson,

144 S. Ct. 2202 (2024). Further, Plaintiff’s prospective relief claims are not moot

because he is still subject to the challenged parole condition.2 We therefore vacate

the judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s declaratory and injunctive relief claims and

remand for the district court to consider the merits of these claims under § 1983.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.

The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

2

Because we do not need to decide whether Plaintiff’s prospective relief claims

were Heck-barred during his prior incarceration, we express no views on the issue.

3