The opinion
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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
HAZEL M. FOLTZ : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
JAMES H. FOLTZ : No. 304 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Order Entered January 26, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin County Domestic Relations at
No(s): CP-44-SPA-45-2023,
PACSES No. 104302030
BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 17, 2024
Hazel M. Foltz (Wife) appeals the order issued by the Mifflin County
Court of Common Pleas, which established the obligation of James H. Foltz
(Husband) to pay spousal support. Wife argues that the trial court should
have deviated from the basic guideline amount to increase the amount of the
support award. After careful review, we affirm.
The relevant factual and procedural background is as follows. Husband
and Wife have been married for nearly 60 years. They are now separated,
although no divorce proceedings have been initiated. Wife lives in the marital
home, while Husband lives in a VA long-term care facility. Wife filed for
spousal support. Wife’s only means of income was social security ($1,240);
Husband received social security and retirement income ($3,430.96).
Following a support conference, it was recommended Husband pay Wife
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$636.22 per month in support (plus arrears), pursuant to the statutory
guidelines, which left Wife with a total monthly net income of $1,876.22.
Wife requested a de novo hearing before the trial court. She argued
that Husband’s support obligation should be deviated upward for two reasons.
First, Wife maintained that a deviation under Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5(b) was
appropriate, because she should be treated like “a community spouse” under
the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, which would have entitled her to
$2,465 per month as a “Minimum Monthly Maintenance Needs Allowance”
(MMMNA). See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d);(h).
Alternatively, Wife argued that a personal loan should have been
considered as a part of a mortgage deviation under Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(e).
After the hearing, trial court took the matter under advisement. On January
26, 2024, the trial court denied Wife’s request, determining that she was not
entitled to any deviation.
Wife timely filed this appeal. She presents the same two issues for our
review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in deviating from the
support guidelines in accordance with Pa.R.C.P. 1910-
16.5(b) by failing to consider the minimum monthly
maintenance needs allowance for a community
spouse where the obligor spouse is in a long-term care
facility.
2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to deviate
from the support guidelines, or consider [the Rules of
Procedure considering mortgage deviation].
Wife’s Brief at 4.
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We review support awards for an abuse of discretion. See Hanrahan
v. Bakker, 186 A.3d 958, 966 (Pa. 2018).
When evaluating a support order, this Court may only
reverse the trial court's determination where the order
cannot be sustained on any valid ground. We will not
interfere with the broad discretion afforded the trial court
absent an abuse of the discretion or insufficient evidence to
sustain the support order. An abuse of discretion is not
merely an error of judgment; if, in reaching a conclusion,
the court overrides or misapplies the law, or the judgment
exercised is shown by the record to be either manifestly
unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias or
ill will, discretion has been abused.
Silver v. Pinskey, 981 A.2d 284, 291 (Pa. Super. 2009) (en banc) (citations
omitted).
In Pennsylvania, spousal support awards are calculated in accordance
with specific statutory guidelines. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 4322(a); see also
Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-1. The guidelines ensure that similarly situated persons
are treated similarly. § 4322(a). The guidelines are based on the reasonable
needs of the spouse seeking support and the ability of the obligor to provide
support. Id. The emphasis is on the parties’ net incomes, with allowable
deviations for unusual needs, extraordinary expenses and other factors that
warrant special attention. Id. There is a rebuttable presumption that the
amount of the award resulting from the application of the guidelines is the
correct amount. § 4322(b).
Should the trier-of-fact deviate from the basic guideline amount, the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure set forth certain factors which must be
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considered: “(1) unusual needs and unusual fixed obligations; (2) a party’s
other support obligations; (3) other household income; (4) the child's age [(in
matters pertaining to child support deviation)]; (5) the parties’ relative assets
and liabilities; (6) medical expenses not covered by insurance; (7) the parties’
and the child’s standard of living [(regarding child support)]; (8) in a spousal
support or alimony pendente lite case, the duration of the marriage from the
date of marriage to the date of final separation; and (9) other relevant and
appropriate factors[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5(b) (“Support Guidelines.
Deviation”).
Wife does not contest the trial court’s calculation of the basic guideline
amount. Rather, Wife claims the trial court should have deviated upward from
the basic guideline amount, as permitted by the Rules. She maintains
deviation was appropriate for two reasons. We address each in turn.
In her first appellate issue, Wife presents a novel argument. She
analogizes her and Husband’s situation to those spouses receiving Medicaid
Long Term Care (LTC) benefits. Under the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage
Act, if one spouse enters a nursing facility (deemed the “institutionalized
spouse”), then the other spouse (deemed the “community spouse”) might be
entitled to a Minimum Monthly Maintenance Needs Allowance (or “MMMNA”).
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(h). The MMMNA reflects a “legislative judgment that
a [community spouse] should have a basic monthly income to cover housing
and the costs associated with housing, with an additional amount to ensure
that the [community spouse] can afford other necessities of life, such as food
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and clothing.” See Kuznick v. Department of Public Welfare, 5 A.3d 832,
833 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-5(d)(3) and 55 Pa.
Code § 181.452(d)). Put another way, the MMMNA shields the community
spouse from the necessary spenddown of a couple’s financial resources when
the other spouse enters a nursing home.
Wife argues that the trial court should have deviated from the basic
support amount to treat her as if she were a community spouse, even though
Husband does not receive Medicaid LTC benefits. Put in raw numbers, Wife
proposes that an upward deviation ($588.78) be added to recommended
support award ($636.22), which when combined with her social security
income ($1,240), would leave her with the equivalent of an MMMNA ($2,465).
Wife cites no direct authority to support her argument, and we have
discovered none. By way of analogy, however, she offers our decision in Love
v. Love, 33 A.3d 1268 (Pa. Super. 2011).
In Love, the trial court issued an order obligating the husband to pay
spousal and child support to the wife. The wife was an immigrant, and as
such, the husband had previously executed an affidavit of support pursuant
to the Immigration and Nationality Act. The affidavit required the husband to
sponsor the wife by providing her with a minimum level of financial support
(equal to 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines). This level of financial
support was higher than the basic guideline amount of support ordered by the
trial court. The wife argued the trial court erred, because it did not deviate
from the spousal support guideline amount, leaving her short of what the
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husband agreed to pay under the immigration sponsorship affidavit. See
generally Love, 33 A.3d at 1271-73.
Love concerned several important issues, which are not analogous to
the case before us. Notably, we explained that the husband’s sponsorship
affidavit (i.e., his promise of support) was a contractual obligation. Id. at
1273. This obligation was independent of spousal support and would survive
divorce; the obligation was enforceable by wife, the federal government, any
state government, and any governmental agency. Id. We then had to decide
whether the wife could enforce the contractual obligation via our state support
system, or whether she had to seek a separate civil remedy, either in the state
or federal court. See id.; see also Nicholson v. Combs, 703 A.2d 407 (Pa.
1997); but see Love, at 1280-81 (Freedberg, J., Dissenting). Ultimately, we
concluded the trial court had to enforce the husband’s contract to pay the
agreed upon amount, as part of the support action. Id. at 1273.
Relevant here, we held that the trial court should have used the
deviation factors under Rule 1910.16-5(b) to enforce the husband’s
contractual obligation, per the sponsorship affidavit. Id. The trial court “could
have, but failed to, utilize Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5(b)(1) and (9) to enforce the
affidavit as an allowable deviation from the support guidelines.” Id. at 1275.
As noted above, Rule 1910.16-5(b)(1) pertains to the “unusual needs and
unusual fixed obligations;” (b)(9) includes “other relevant and appropriate
factors.” Thus, we agreed with the wife that a deviation was appropriate
based on the husband’s “uncontested commitment to support her at a
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minimum amount equal to 125 percent of the federal poverty guidelines [(as
set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act)].” Id. We found this
agreement was “tantamount to an exceptional circumstance that would
warrant a deviation from the guideline amount.” Id.
Returning to the instant case, Wife argues Love is on point. She
maintains that the trial court had to bring her support award up to the MMMNA
level, just as the trial court in Love had to bring the wife’s support award up
to the level set forth by the husband’s affidavit of sponsorship under the
Immigration and Nationality Act. In both cases, Wife argues, the lynchpin was
Rule 1910.16-5(b).
Wife’s reliance on Love is logical, but in the end unavailing. Critically,
the trial court in Love had no choice but to deviate from the guideline support
amount to enforce the husband’s contractual obligation. Rule 1910.16-5(b)
(the deviation factors) was simply the mechanism that enabled the trial court
to adjust the award.
Here, by contrast, the trial court retained its discretion. There is no
analogous entitlement or contractual obligation mandating the court’s
enforcement. Husband does not receive Medicaid LTC benefits and Wife is not
entitled to an MMMNA. This fact disposes of Wife’s claim.1
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1 We do not reach the question, whether a trial court must utilize the state
support system to enforce an MMMNA entitlement, in the same manner that
the Love trial court was required to enforce an immigration sponsorship
entitlement.
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Notably, the trial court could have employed Rule 1910.16-5(b) to bring
Wife’s award up to the same level as an MMMNA by considering Husband’s
circumstances and their effect on the parties’ finances. Rule 1910.16-5(b)
provides several applicable factors, to say nothing of the catchall “other
relevant and appropriate factors” enumerated in (b)(9). Unlike in Love, here
the trial court had discretion to determine whether Wife rebutted the
presumption that guideline amount was correct and grant an upward deviation
based on these factors. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-5 – 2005 Comment; cf. 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 4322(b). The court considered Wife’s request, but ultimately
determined that no deviation was appropriate. Upon review, nothing in the
record indicates the trial court “overrode or misapplied the law,” or exercised
judgment that was “either manifestly unreasonable or the product of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” See Silver, 981 A.2d at 291. Wife’s first
issue merits no relief.
In her next appellate issue, Wife presents an alternative reason to
support her claim for an upward deviation. Wife argues that a personal loan
she took out for roof repairs should have qualified for the “mortgage
deviation.” To explain, the guidelines assume that the spouse occupying the
marital residence will be solely responsible for the mortgage payment, real
estate taxes, and homeowners’ insurance. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(e).
Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 1910.16-6(e)(1), the court may require the
obligor (here, Husband) to pay an additional amount, if: the obligee (here,
Wife) is living in the marital residence; and the mortgage payment exceeds
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25% of the obligee’s monthly net income (including spousal support). In such
a circumstance, the court may require the obligor to pay up to half of the
excess.
Importantly, Rule 1910.16-6(e)(4) defines “mortgage” as “a first
mortgage, real estate taxes, and homeowners’ insurance and may include a
subsequent mortgage, a home equity loan, and other marital obligations
secured by the marital residence.” (Emphasis added).
In this case, the parties’ mortgage did not quite meet the 25%
threshold. The mortgage payment was $446.81; Wife’s monthly net income,
including the guideline support award, was $1,876.22; thus, the mortgage
payment constituted 23.81% of Wife’s income, just shy of the 25% threshold.
However, Wife argued to the trial court that if her personal loan payment
was added to the mortgage payment, as permitted by Rule 1910.16-6(e)(4),
then the combined encumbrance would equate 35.37%, well over the 25%
threshold.2 Wife maintained that her the personal loan should have been
considered under the Rule 1910.16-6(e)(4) definition of a mortgage, because
it was related to the house (i.e., roof “weatherization.”).3 If considered, then
pursuant to Rule 1910.16-6(e)(1), Wife would have been entitled to a
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2 $446.81 (monthly mortgage payment) + $216.89 (monthly payment on
Wife’s personal loan) = $663.70 ÷ $1,876.22 (Wife’s total monthly net
income, including the guideline award) = 35.37%.
3 It is unclear whether Wife’s personal loan was a home equity loan. It does
not matter. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(e)(4).
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mortgage deviation – i.e., up to half of the excess: $97.28.4 All told, Wife’s
maximum deviation would have increased her guideline support award from
$636.22 to $733.50.5 The trial court denied Wife’s request for a mortgage
deviation.
On appeal, Wife claims that the trial court’s opinion did not adequately
address her request. She asks that this Court remand and direct the court to
consider and then opine whether such a deviation was appropriate. See Wife’s
Brief at 10-11. Under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure, “the judge
who entered the order giving rise to the notice of appeal, if the reasons for
the order do not already appear of record, shall…file of record at least a brief
opinion of the reasons for the order, or for the rulings or other errors
complained of, or shall specify in writing the place in the record where such
reasons may be found.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Here, the trial court issued a statement in lieu of an opinion upon the
filing of Wife’s concise statement of matters complained of on appeal. Therein,
the court stated, after review of Wife’s alleged errors, it believed that the
explanation in its order satisfied the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
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4 The total excess is 10.37%, or $194.56.
35.37% (combined encumbrance relative to Wife’s total monthly net income)
- 25% (threshold percentage) = 10.37% (excess percentage) X $1,876.22
(Wife’s total monthly net income) = $194.56 (raw excess dollars) X 50%
(statutory maximum percentage) = $97.28 (statutory maximum Rule
1910.16-6(e) deviation).
5 $636.22 (guideline award) + $97.28 (maximum Rule 1910.16-6(e)
deviation) = $733.50.
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Although a more thorough explanation of its decision would have been
welcomed, we find the trial court’s statement and order satisfied Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a). The order indicated that the court did consider the Wife’s
mortgage/loan claim vis-à-vis Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(e). The statement in lieu
of an opinion further indicated that the court reviewed Wife’s appellate issues
and concluded they were meritless. Upon review of the transcript of the
proceeding, we observe that the mortgage issue was put squarely before the
court. The court then took the matter under advisement. Simply put, there
is nothing to suggest the court failed to consider Wife’s argument. No remand
is necessary.
To the extent that Wife preserved the substantive claim – namely,
whether the trial court erred when it refused to include a mortgage deviation
– we hold that the court acted within its discretion. Rule 1910.16-6(e) states
clearly the court “may include a subsequent mortgage, home equity loan, and
other marital obligations secured by the marital residence.” (Emphasis
added). The 2005 Comment to Pa.R.C.P. 1910.16-6(e) clarifies: “While real
estate taxes and homeowners' insurance must be included if the trier-of-fact
applies the provisions of this subdivision, the inclusion of second mortgages,
home equity loans and other obligations secured by the marital residence is
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within the trier-of-fact's discretion based upon the circumstances of the
case.” (Emphasis added).6
Nothing required the trial court to include Wife’s personal loan when
determining whether she qualified for a mortgage deviation. Wife does not
convince us the court abused its discretion for failing to grant her request for
an upward deviation based upon this loan. Upon review of the facts of record,
we cannot hold that the court’s decision was “manifestly unreasonable.” We
discern no “misapplication of law” or “bias, ill-will or prejudice.” See Silver,
supra. Wife’s second issue merits no relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/17/2024
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6 Moreover, we have long held that the use of the term “may” denotes the
discretionary options of the trial court. See Raymond v. Raymond, 279
A.3d 620, 629 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citing In re Slaughter, 738 A.2d 1013 (Pa.
Super. 1999) and 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921).
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