The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF OREGON
EUGENE DIVISION
LEILA NICHOLS, Case No. 6:23-cv-01460-MTK
Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER
v.
PEACEHEALTH, a corporation,
Defendant.
KASUBHAI, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Leila Nichols (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against her former employer,
PeaceHealth (“Defendant”), on October 5, 2023, alleging state and federal law claims of
employment discrimination. ECF No. 1. Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF No. 19. For the
reasons below, Defendant’s motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a Registered Nurse for approximately seventeen years.
2d Am. Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 18. On August 4, 2021, Governor Brown announced a mandate
that all health care workers must be fully vaccinated or subject to weekly COVID-19 testing. The
Oregon Health Authority (“OHA”) subsequently determined that weekly testing would not be
sufficiently effective in addressing patient and co-worker safety risks, and the mandate was
changed to require that all health care workers be fully vaccinated. In the summer of 2021,
Defendant notified its employees that it would be implementing and enforcing a COVID-19
vaccine mandate in accord with the Oregon mandate. 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 12. In November 2021,
the U.S. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services imposed a nationwide vaccine mandate for
healthcare workers. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the federal vaccine mandate and affirmed
that the vaccine was “necessary to promote and protect patient health and safety.” Biden v.
Missouri, 142 S. Ct. 647, 652 (2022). Both the state and federal vaccine mandates allowed for
exceptions based on religious or disability-related accommodation requests but required that
such accommodations not pose a health risk to others, primarily patients and coworkers.
As a devoutly religious individual who adheres to principles of a Christian faith, Plaintiff
applied for a religious exemption to Defendant’s vaccine mandate on or about August 30, 2021.
2d Am. Compl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff’s exemption request was granted, and she was placed on unpaid
administrative leave on September 1, 2021. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff filed this action on October 5,
2023, alleging state and federal law claims of employment discrimination based on religious
faith. Id. ¶¶ 19-30. On August 24, 2024, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim and granted her
leave to replead. ECF No. 17. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 23, 2024. See
2d Am. Compl.
STANDARDS
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only when there is no
cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual
allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Los Angeles Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co.,
869 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2017). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint’s factual
allegations, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint
and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. To be entitled to a
presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause
of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to
enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th
Cir. 2011). All reasonable inferences from the factual allegations must be drawn in favor of the
plaintiff. Los Angeles Lakers, Inc., 869 F.3d at 800. The court need not, however, credit the
plaintiff’s legal conclusions that are couched as factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678–79 (2009).
A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to “plausibly suggest an
entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the
expense of discovery and continued litigation.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a
probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant engaged in unlawful
employment discrimination based on religion under Or. Rev. Stat. (“ORS”) § 659A.030 and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act by failing to properly accommodate her request for a religious
exemption to the COVID-19 vaccine mandate. The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s
Complaint on this basis, finding that Plaintiff’s “allegations concerning the religious nature of
her objection to the vaccine mandate and the conflict between her religious beliefs and the
vaccine mandate are conclusory.” ECF No. 17 at 3. Plaintiff has amended her complaint, but
Defendant argues that the new allegations are still conclusory and are secular in nature. In
particular, it argues that the Second Amended Complaint does not allege sufficient details to
determine whether Plaintiff’s underlying beliefs are religious or secular in nature. Def. Mot. at 7;
Def. Reply at 2. Defendant asks the Court to find that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that
she held religious beliefs that conflicted with her compliance with their employer’s vaccine
mandate and to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice on that basis.
To make out a prima facie case of religious discrimination based on a failure to
accommodate a religious exemption request under Title VII or ORS 659A.030, a claimant must
plead sufficient facts to show that (1) she had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an
employment duty; (2) she informed her employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer
took an adverse employment action because of the claimant’s inability to fulfill the job
requirement. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2004); see also
Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1437 n. 2 (9th Cir.1993) (“Courts construe Oregon’s
statutory counterpart, Or.Rev.Stat. § 659.030 (1992), as identical to Title VII”).
While courts need not “take plaintiffs’ conclusory assertions of violations of their
religious beliefs at face value,” Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of California State Controller, 63 F.4th
1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal citation omitted), assertions “of a sincere religious belief
[are] generally accepted,” Keene v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 22-16567, 2023 WL
3451687, at *2 (9th Cir. May 15, 2023); see also Doe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 19 F.4th
1173, 1176 n.3 (9th Cir. 2021) (“We may not . . . question the legitimacy of [plaintiffs’] religious
beliefs regarding COVID-19 vaccinations.” (citing Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado C.R.
Comm’n, 584 U.S. 617, 638 (2018))). Further, “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical,
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit” protection. Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of
Indiana Emp. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
Here, Plaintiff alleged:
Under divine law, my Christian faith is protected receiving the COVD-19
vaccination violates my religious beliefs and practices. My body is the Temple of
the Holy Spirit, made to be clean and pure. Taking the vaccination does not leave
my body clean and pure in the eye of the Lord.
2d Am. Compl. ¶ 12. These allegations identify Plaintiff’s religious belief that her “body is a
Temple of the Holy Spirit made to be clean and pure,” as well as a specific conflict between that
belief and her employer’s vaccine mandate: that the vaccination would not leave her body “clean
and pure.” Taking the allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of
Plaintiff, she has plausibly alleged enough detail to identify the religious nature of her objection.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations are secular in nature because she has not
alleged a religious origin to her belief that vaccines are not “clean” or “pure.” Def. Mot. 7.
Defendant has not cited any binding authority requiring such an allegation. While “Title VII does
not protect secular preferences,” Tiano v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 682 (9th Cir.
1998) (citations omitted), a religious belief may still be sufficiently pled when alleged alongside
secular beliefs, What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act,
and Other EEO Laws, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, § L.2,
https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-
and-other-eeo-laws (last visited Mar. 20, 2024) (“[O]verlap between a religious and political
view does not place it outside the scope of Title VII’s religious protections, as long as the view is
part of a comprehensive religious belief system and is not simply an isolated teaching.”); see
Doe, 19 F.4th at 1180 (citing What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, § L.2–L.3,
https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-
and-other-eeo-laws). The coupling of a secular belief about the purity of the vaccine alongside a
religious belief about injecting an “impure” substance into Plaintiff’s body does not render the
conflict secular as a whole.
Thus, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged sincere religious beliefs in conflict with an
employment duty, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss should be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 19) is DENIED.
DATED this 12th day of December 2024.
s/ Mustafa T. Kasubhai
MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (He / Him)
United States District Judge