Jenkins v. Social Security Administration

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

TERRY MICHAEL WHITE

JENKINS,

:

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:24-cv-4244

Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison

v.

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A.

Jolson

SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION, et al., :

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Terry Michael White Jenkins, an Ohio resident proceeding pro se, filed this

action against the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), the Columbus Division of

Police (“CPD”), the Secret Service, the United States Postal Service (“USPS”), the

Franklin County Sheriff’s Office, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and “T.V.B.H.

and C.O.B.H.—State of Ohio.”1 (ECF No. 1-1.) This matter is before the Court on

Mr. Jenkins’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1).

The Court GRANTS Mr. Jenkins’s request to proceed in forma pauperis.

However, having performed an initial screen, this action is DISMISSED pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

The Court DENIES as moot Mr. Jenkins’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF

1 The Court understands that “T.V.B.H.” refers to Twin Valley Behavioral

Healthcare and that “C.O.B.H.” refers to Columbus Behavioral Health.

No. 2) and Motion for Funds, to Add Information, and for Injunction (ECF No. 4),

and the Court further DENIES his Motion to Recuse (ECF No. 3).

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because the Court granted Mr. Jenkins leave to proceed in forma pauperis, it

must screen his Complaint and dismiss it, or any portion of it, that is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The

Court construes Mr. Jenkins’s Complaint in his favor, accepting all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true, and evaluates whether it contains “enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

“[P]ro se litigants are not relieved of the duty to develop claims with an

appropriate degree of specificity.” Kafele v. Lerner, Sampson, Rothfuss, L.P.A., 161

F. App’x 487, 491 (6th Cir. 2005). The role of the Court is not to “conjure allegations

on a litigant’s behalf.” Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal

quotations and citations omitted). Rather, a complaint must include more than

“labels and conclusions” and “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of

action[.]” Kafele, 161 F. App’x at 491. In sum, although pro se complaints are to be

construed liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “basic pleading

essentials” are still required. Wells v. Brown, 891 F. 2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

II. ANALYSIS

Mr. Jenkins’s Complaint is not a model of clarity. Against no particular

Defendant, he alleges discrimination on the basis of race and sex. (ECF No. 1-1,

PAGEID # 6.) He specifically asserts that Franklin County Sheriff Dallas Baldwin

starved and tortured him and stole his dentures. (Id., PAGEID # 9.) He also claims

that CPD falsely arrested him. (Id.) He alleges that the SSA “refused [his] written

request for [a] food stamps application” and “refused to issue [him] money for

disability on a Direct Express Card[.]” (Id., PAGEID # 11, 28.) Finally, Mr. Jenkins

contends that (1) the USPS refused to deliver his letters; (2) the DOJ failed to

provide him with a “an attractive white girl attorney”; (3) the Secret Service did not

allow him to have sex; and (4) Twin Valley Behavior Healthcare and Columbus

Behavioral Health forced him to “pretend to talk” and fed him the wrong foods. (Id.,

PAGEID # 9–16.) Along with asking for “unspecified damages,” Mr. Jenkins’s

Complaint contains numerous disturbing and vulgar threats and demands for relief.

(ECF No. 1-1.)

Mr. Jenkins fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. At the

outset, it is wholly uncertain who he alleges discriminated against him because of

his race or sex. He says he was called various names but does not specify who called

him those names. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID # 6.) Mr. Jenkins also fails to

allege any legal basis for these discrimination claims (such as the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or a

state law). As such, the Court cannot assess whether he alleges these claims with

the requisite factual specificity. See Kafele, 161 F. App’x at 491. To read more into

Mr. Jenkins’s allegations of discrimination would be to conjure allegations on his

behalf. The Court declines to do so.

Next, the Court construes Mr. Jenkins’s allegations against CPD as asserting

an arrest without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. See Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 255 (6th Cir. 2003).

But he again fails to support this claim with any factual specificity—his Complaint

never mentions an arrest. Regardless, CPD is not an entity subject to suit under

§ 1983. See Gordon v. Clinton Police Dep’t, No. 3:19-CV-496, 2021 WL 1431544, at

*2 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 15, 2021) (citing Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir.

1994)). And to the extent Mr. Jenkins’s Complaint could be construed as alleging a

claim against the City of Columbus, “a local government may not be sued under

§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of

Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Instead, a municipality is

liable under § 1983 only “when execution of a government’s policy or custom …

inflicts the injury.” Id. Mr. Jenkins alleges no such policy or custom here.2

2 Mr. Jenkins may also be attempting to bring this claim against “Mayor

Ginther.” (See ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID # 9; ECF No. 1-3, PAGEID # 41.) But he does

not tie Mayor Ginther to this claim at all. See Murphy v. Grenier, 406 F. App’x 972,

974 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Personal involvement is necessary to establish Section 1983

liability.”).

Mr. Jenkins’s allegations that Sheriff Baldwin starved and tortured him and

stole his dentures likewise fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Court construes the first two allegations as claims of excessive force and

deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment under § 1983. See

Hale v. Boyle Cnty., 18 F.4th 845, 852 (6th Cir. 2021); Chapple v. Franklin Cnty.

Sheriff’s Officers FCCC 1 & 2, No. 2:21-cv-05086, 2022 WL 16734656, at *4 (S.D.

Ohio Nov. 7, 2022) (Marbley, J.). Mr. Jenkins fails to articulate facts that could

allow the Court to infer that Sheriff Baldwin was responsible for any of these

alleged wrongs. Although Mr. Jenkins describes being held “hostage,” “tortur[ed],”

and “fed … the wrong foods,” he attributes these actions to “law enforcement

agencies” or “T.V.B.H. and C.O.B.H. and [the] Franklin County Jail … [and]

Jackson Pike.” (See, e.g., ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID # 9, 13–14.) Because § 1983 liability

requires a defendant’s personal involvement in the deprivation of rights, this claim

must also be dismissed. See Murphy, 406 F. App’x at 974.

Similarly, Mr. Jenkins’s claim concerning the loss of his personal property

“while at Jackson Pike” cannot proceed against Sheriff Baldwin. Mr. Jenkins fails to

allege Sheriff Baldwin’s personal involvement in the loss of his dentures or other

property. What’s more, a plaintiff “deprived of property through a random and

unauthorized act” of a government employee does not state a due process claim

“merely by alleging the deprivation of property.” Darling v. Lake Cty. Bd. of

Comm’rs, No. 1:12CV194, 2012 WL 1902602, at *17 (N.D. Ohio May 25, 2012)

(citing River City Capital, L.P. v. Bd. of Cty. Com’rs, Clermont Cty., Ohio, 491 F.3d

301, 306 (6th Cir. 2007)). Rather, a plaintiff must also plead “that state remedies for

redressing the wrong are inadequate.” Perdue v. Ohio Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:13CV878,

2014 WL 661707, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 19, 2014) (Barrett, J.) (citation omitted).

Here, Mr. Jenkins does not provide “any facts which indicate that the state post-

deprivation remedies are inadequate or unavailable to redress the wrong.”

Thompson v. Esham, No. 1:15-cv-553, 2016 WL 692542, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 22,

2016) (Barrett, J.). He has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Mr. Jenkins next alleges that the SSA “refused [his] written request for [a]

food stamps application” and “refused to issue [him] money for disability on a Direct

Express Card[.]” (Id., PAGEID # 11, 28.) These contentions do not amount to a legal

claim. Additionally, this Court may review only a “final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A

decision is not “final” until “a claimant presents [his] claims to the Commissioner

and exhausts the administrative process established by the applicable regulations.”

Merchant v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:18-cv-307, 2019 WL 4222670, at *2 (S.D.

Ohio Sept. 5, 2019) (Morrison, J.) (citing Willis v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390, 396–97

(6th Cir. 1991)). That administrative process includes four steps: “(1) an initial

determination; (2) reconsideration; (3) an [administrative law judge (ALJ)] hearing

and decision; and (4) Appeals Council review or denial[.]” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.900(a)(1)–(4)). Consequently, to the extent Mr. Jenkins attempts to challenge

a denial by the SSA of disability benefits or food stamps, it is unclear from his filing

that this Court has jurisdiction to address his challenge at this point. See Willis,

931 F.2d at 396–99 (denying mandamus relief because plaintiff failed to complete

administrative process).

Rounding out his allegations, Mr. Jenkins accuses USPS of refusing to mail

his letters and the DOJ of not providing him with “an attractive white girl

attorney.” (ECF No. 1-1, PAGEID # 9, 18.) Neither of these are legal claims. Mr.

Jenkins also fails state a cognizable claim against the Secret Service. (Id., PAGEID

# 15 (alleging that “the Secret Service boys and girls [ ] said they would never let me

have sex with our attractive female family”). The same is true of his remaining

allegations against Twin Valley Behavior Healthcare and Columbus Behavioral

Health (id., PAGEID # 12–13 (alleging the two entities “tried to force” him to

“pretend to talk” and fed him the “wrong” food so he was “sick with pain and

constipation”)) because they, like CPD, cannot be sued in federal court under

§ 1983. Williams-Starr v. Twin Valley Behav. Healthcare Hosp., No. 2:20-CV-4105,

2020 WL 4673403, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2020) (Jolson, M.J.), report and

recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 5230797 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 2, 2020) (Sargus, J.)

(holding that Twin Valley Behavioral Health, administered by Ohio Department of

Mental Health, cannot be sued under § 1983 because it is not a “person” and

because State of Ohio immune from suit under Eleventh Amendment).

In sum, none of Mr. Jenkins’s claims survive an initial screen under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). His Complaint is therefore DISMISSED.

III. OTHER PENDING MOTIONS

Because this case must be dismissed, Mr. Jenkins’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (ECF No. 2) and his Motion for Funds, to Add Information, and for

Injunction (ECF No. 4) are DENIED as moot.

Turning to Mr. Jenkins’s Motion for Recusal (ECF No. 3), “[a]ny justice,

judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify [herself] in any

proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 455(a). “Motions to recuse under § 455 are to be decided in the first instance by

the judicial officer sought to be disqualified.” Moss v. Fairborn City Sch., No. 3:08-

CV-00393, 2009 WL 10679470, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 5, 2009) (Ovington, M.J.)

(citations omitted). The standard by which a judge should consider a motion to

recuse “is an objective standard” that asks “what a reasonable person knowing all

the relevant facts would think about the impartiality of the judge.” In re Nat’l

Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 19-3935, 2019 WL 7482137, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 10,

2019) (quoting Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125, 129 (6th Cir. 1980)). “This standard

is not based on the subjective view of a party, no matter how strongly that

subjective view is held.” United States v. Nelson, 922 F.2d 311, 319 (6th Cir. 1990),

cert. denied, 499 U.S. 981 (1991) (internal quotations and citation omitted).

In his Motion, Mr. Jenkins demands that the Undersigned recuse herself

because “Morrison or Morrison-related family delivered the bad food at T.V.B.H. or

C.O.B.H.” and because “a Sarah tried to hustle [him] for $20.00.” (ECF No. 3,

PAGEID # 77, 81.) He also requests the Magistrate Judge’s recusal because “he was

locked down … with a Kimberly supposedly a female that would not let [him] take

her picture” and objected when he “tried to kiss [her] on the cheek.” (Id., PAGEID

# 78–79.) Mr. Jenkins’s Motion presents no facts that would cause a reasonable

person knowing all relevant information to question the impartiality of the

Magistrate Judge or the Undersigned. The Motion is DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Mr. Jenkins’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (ECF No. 1) but DISMISSES this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The Court

DENIES as moot Mr. Jenkins’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 2) and

his Motion for Funds, to Add Information, and for Injunction (ECF No. 4). The

Court DENIES his Motion to Recuse (ECF No 3).

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal of this

action would not be taken in good faith. The Clerk is DIRECTED to TERMINATE

this case from the docket of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of Ohio.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Sarah D. Morrison

SARAH D. MORRISON, CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT