The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SEENA CHAUVIN CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 24-2485
TOWN OF FRANKLINTON, ET AL. SECTION “R” (5)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the unopposed motion of defendants Town of
Franklinton, Mayor Gregory Route, and Town of Franklinton City Hall for
partial dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 For the
following reasons, the Court grants the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 17, 2022, Seena Chauvin filed a charge of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging
that she was subjected to sexual harassment, discriminated based on sex, and
retaliated against during her employment with the Town of Franklinton.2
After investigation, the EEOC issued Chauvin a formal notice of right to sue
1 R. Doc. 8.
2 R. Doc. 8-3 at 1.
on September 26, 2023.3 The notice explicitly provided that any lawsuit in
federal or state court related to the charge “must be filed WITHIN 90 days of
your receipt of this notice.”4
On December 29, 2023, Chauvin filed a second charge of
discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that she was unlawfully terminated
after asking for reasonable accommodations, harassed, and discriminated
against after turning down sexual advances, which she describes as a part of
a “toxic environment” that had been “ongoing for the better part of 3 or more
years.”5 After investigation, the EEOC issued another formal notice of
Chauvin’s right to sue on June 24, 2024, which also identified the 90-day
time limit.6 Eighty-eight days later, on September 20, 2024, Chauvin sued
The Town of Franklinton, Mayor Gregory Route, and the Town of
Franklinton City Hall pro se in state court alleging, among other things, that
she was the subject of discrimination and retaliation based on sexual
harassment.7 Defendants removed the case on October 16, 2024.8
3 R. Doc. 8-4 at 1.
4 Id.
5 R. Doc. 8-5 at 1.
6 R. Doc. 8-6 at 1.
7 See R. Doc. 1-2.
8 See R. Doc. 1.
Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for sexual
harassment, discrimination, and retaliation as time-barred following her
failure to sue within 90 days of the first notice of right to sue.9 Plaintiff does
not oppose the motion. The Court considers defendants’ motion below.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007)). A claim is facially
plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. at 678. The Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and
must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Lormand v. U.S.
Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir. 2009). But the Court is not
bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
A legally sufficient complaint must establish more than a “sheer
possibility” that the party’s claim is true. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It need
9
not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must go beyond “‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’”
See id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, “[t]he complaint
(1) on its face (2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as true) (3) to
raise a reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will reveal relevant
evidence of each element of a claim.” Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257 (citations
omitted). The claim must be dismissed if there are insufficient factual
allegations “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there
is an insuperable bar to relief, see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must limit its review to the
contents of the pleadings, including attachments. Brand Coupon Network,
L.L.C. v. Catalina Mktg. Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014). The Court
may also consider documents attached to a motion to dismiss or an
opposition to that motion when the documents are referred to in the
pleadings and are central to a plaintiff’s claims. Id. “The district court ‘may
also consider matters of which [it] may take judicial notice.’” Hall v.
Hodgkins, 305 F. App’x 224, 227 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Lovelace v. Software
Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017-18 (5th Cir. 1996)).
III. DISCUSSION
Before bringing a suit in court, an employment-discrimination plaintiff
must exhaust administrative remedies, which occurs when the plaintiff files
a timely charge with the EEOC and receives a statutory notice of right to sue.
Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002). Under
Title VII, a plaintiff has ninety days to bring suit in federal court after receipt
of the statutory notice of right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). When the
receipt date of the right-to-sue letter is either unknown or disputed, courts
have presumed receipt dates ranging from three to seven days after the letter
has mailed. Taylor, 296 F.3d at 379. The ninety-day limitations period is
strictly construed. Id.
A second right-to-sue letter is ineffective to extend the ninety-day
limitations period concerning the same claim unless it is issued pursuant to
a reconsideration on the merits. See Washington v. City of Gulfport, Miss.,
351 F. App’x 916, 918 (5th Cir. 2009); Gitlitz v. Compagnie Nationale Air
France, 129 F.3d 554, 557 (11th Cir. 1997); Sparks v. Lowe’s Home Ctr., Inc.,
341 F. Supp. 2d 671, 674 (E.D. Tex. 2004). To hold otherwise would “allow
any future plaintiff to obliterate the ninety-day limitations period by
repeatedly refiling the same charge with the EEOC.” Sparks, 341 F. Supp. at
674; see also January v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just., 760 F. App’x 296, 300
(5th Cir. 2019) (holding that second right-to-sue letter did not make claim
“concerning the same incident” as her first EEOC charge timely). Because
this doctrine applies “where an employee files multiple charges of
discrimination encompassing the same events,” courts “consider ‘whether,
and to what extent, the two charges differ in scope and substance.’” Brown
& Brown of Mississippi, LLC v. Baker, No. 16-327, 2017 WL 5158667, at *6
(S.D. Miss. Nov. 7, 2017) (citing Felix v. City & Cty. of Denver,
729 F. Supp. 2d 1243, 1250 (D. Colo. 2010)).
The EEOC mailed a right-to-sue letter to Chauvin’s first charge on
September 26, 2023.10 The record does not show when Chauvin received the
letter, but using the more generous seven-day period, the Court assumes she
received it on October 3, 2023. Therefore, to timely assert a claim based on
the facts of her first EEOC charge, Chauvin had to file suit by January 1,
2024. Chauvin did not file her suit until September 20, 2024, over nine
months after the ninety-day deadline.11 Accordingly, any Title VII
discrimination and retaliation claims at issue in Chauvin’s first charge are
time-barred.
10 R. Doc. 8-4 at 1.
11 R. Doc. 1-2.
Plaintiff filed her second charge of discrimination on December 29,
2023,12 and the EEOC issued its notice of right to sue on June 24, 2024.13
The EEOC did not issue this letter pursuant to a reconsideration of the
merits.14 Plaintiff filed her present complaint on September 20, 2024, within
ninety days of her second notice of right to sue.15 It is unclear whether
Chauvin’s second charge addressed the same alleged acts and incidents of
sex discrimination and retaliation as her first, or whether it concerned
separate, subsequent conduct. Chauvin describes being terminated
following sexual advances from her coworkers, which she does not include in
her first charge, and identifies March 15, 2023, as the date of the “most
recent” discriminatory action against her,16 which occurred roughly four
months after she filed the first charge with the EEOC.17 But Chauvin
characterizes these actions as part of a “toxic environment” that has been
“ongoing” for the “better part of 3 or more years.”18
Chauvin may not assert any claims based on acts and incidents prior to
the filing of her first EEOC charge of discrimination. Only Chauvin’s sex
12 See R. Doc. 8-5.
13 R. Doc. 8-6.
14 Id.
15 R. Doc. 1-2.
16 R. Doc. 8-5 at 1.
17 See R. Doc. 8-3 at 1.
18 Id.
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation claims based on facts that
occurred after she filed her first EEOC charge on December 17, 2022, are
timely. See Prewitt v. Cont’l Auto., 927 F. Supp. 2d 435, 445 (W.D. Tex.
2013) (dismissing “any [discrimination] claims arising from the incidents
described in the [first and second] Charge[s] Plaintiff filed with the EEOC”
as “time-barred,” but not “any claims arising from the facts alleged in Charge
3—at least insofar as they do not repeat time-barred claims first brought in
Charges 1 and 2”); see also Brown, 2017 WL 5158667, at *6 (finding untimely
plaintiff’s gender discrimination claims related to her alleged demotion, the
subject of her first EEOC charge, but not plaintiff’s gender and age
discrimination claims related to her alleged constructive discharge, the
subject of her second); Simmons v. Tarrant Cnty. 9-1-1 Dist., No. 13-1389,
2014 WL 3720417, at *7 (N.D. Tex. July 22, 2014) (“Accordingly, Plaintiff
may pursue her Title VII claims over conduct occurring after the filing of the
2010 Charge that are contained in her 2012 Charge, but not conduct that
occurred before the 2010 Charge was filed.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS defendants’ motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s claims for sexual discrimination, sexual harassment, and
retaliation occurring before December 17, 2022. The Court DISMISSES
these claims with prejudice.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this _16th day of December, 2024.
ern Vares
SARAH S. VANCE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE