The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
SHREVEPORT DIVISION
STEPHEN PAUL PREZIOSI CIVIL ACTION NO. 23-1097
VERSUS JUDGE EDWARDS
LA DEPT CHILDREN & FAMILY MAG. JUDGE HORNSBY
SERVICES ET AL
MEMORANDUM RULING & ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants, the State of
Louisiana through the Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”),
Secretary Terri Ricks, Gary Franklin, Christian Merrit, and Bridget Depland-Grant
(collectively “Defendants”).1 Plaintiff Stephen Preziosi filed an opposition.2 For the
reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Stephen Preziosi filed the instant suit on August 10, 2023, against the
Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”), Secretary of DCFS
Terri Ricks, and DCFS employees Gary Franklin and Christian Merrit.3 Plaintiff
later amended his complaint to add Bridget Depland-Grant.4 Proceeding pro se,
Plaintiff alleges claims arising from state court divorce, custody, and child support
proceedings.5 His allegations include claims of procedural and systemic failures in
1 R. Doc. 20.
2 R. Doc. 23.
3 R. Doc. 1.
4 R. Doc. 12.
5 R. Doc. 1 at 3-5.
the family court and child support enforcement process.6 Plaintiff moved for a
temporary restraining order seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief
arising from his state court divorce, custody, and child support proceedings.7 The
Court issued an order denying Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order on
July 31, 2024.8 Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss on January 10, 2024.9
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.10 The complaint must be liberally
construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all facts pleaded in the complaint must be
taken as true.11 The complaint must, however, contain sufficient factual allegations,
as opposed to legal conclusions, to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its
face.”12 When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should presume they
are true, even if doubtful, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.13 Additionally, regardless of how well-pleaded the factual
allegations may be, they must demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief under
a valid legal theory.14
6 Id.
7 R. Doc. 37.
8 R. Doc. 38.
9 R. Doc. 20.
10 Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (5th Cir. 2009).
11 Id.
12 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
13 Id. at 679.
14 See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); McCormick v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th
Cir. 1997).
In considering a motion to dismiss, a court must ordinarily limit itself to the
contents of the pleadings and attachments thereto.15 “Documents that a defendant
attaches to a motion to dismiss are [also] considered part of the pleadings if they are
referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to her claim.”16 Indeed, any
documents attached to the briefing on a motion to dismiss may be considered by the
Court if the documents are sufficiently referenced in the complaint and no party
questions their authenticity.17
A document filed pro se is “to be liberally construed,”18 and “a pro se complaint,
however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.”19
III. LAW & ANALYSIS
Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), urging the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint
against them. Specifically, Defendants argue (1) that this Court’s jurisdiction over
the named Defendants is barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution and (2) that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief may be
granted.
1. Jurisdiction over the State and DCFS in Federal Court
15 Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6)).
16 Id. (quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)); see
also Kane Enters. v. MacGregor (USA), Inc., 322 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2003).
17 See Walch v. Adjutant General's Dep't of Tex., 533 F.3d 289, 294 (5th Cir. 2008).
18 See e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
19 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(f) (“All pleadings shall be so
construed as to do substantial justice”).
Defendants’ motion raises the issue of the State and DCFS’s immunity from
suit in a federal court pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend
to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.
Defendants maintain that the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit by a private
party against a state in federal court unless the State consents to suit or Congress
has abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity.20 Defendants further argue that the
Eleventh Amendment is applicable to the State and extends to DCFS as an alter ego
or arm of the State.21 In response to Defendants' arguments, Plaintiff does not
address Defendants’ assertions that the State and DCFS are immune to suit by
private individuals in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. Instead,
Plaintiff asserts that there is a right of a private party to bring a suit in federal court
against a state official for prospective relief.22
“Under the Eleventh Amendment, an unconsenting State is immune from suits
brought in federal court by [its] own citizens as well as citizens of another state.”23
The Supreme Court has held that the rule that “a State may not be sued without its
consent is [such] a fundamental rule of jurisprudence ... that the entire judicial power
20 R. Doc. 20-2 at 3.
21 R. Doc. 20-2 at 3.
22 R. Doc. 23 at 4 (“[T]his court has the authority to enjoin state officials from committing future
violations of federal law despite the nominal barrier posed by the Eleventh Amendment.”)
23 McCarthy ex rel. Travis v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 418 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974)).
granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought
by private parties against a State without consent given....”24
“Even in cases where the State itself is not a named defendant, the State's
Eleventh Amendment immunity will extend to any state agency or other political
entity that is deemed the ‘alter ego’ or an ‘arm’ of the State.”25 There is no bright-line
test for determining whether a political entity is an “arm of the State” for purposes of
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Instead, “the matter is determined by reasoned
judgment about whether the lawsuit is one which, despite the presence of a state
agency as the nominal defendant, is effectively against the sovereign state.”26 In
making this inquiry, the Fifth Circuit considers six factors: (1) whether state statutes
and case law characterize the agency as an arm of the state; (2) the source of funds
for the entity; (3) the degree of local autonomy the entity enjoys; (4) whether the entity
is concerned primarily with local, as opposed to statewide, problems; (5) whether the
entity has authority to sue and be sued in its own name; and (6) whether the entity
has the right to hold and use property.27 “[T]he most significant factor in assessing
an entity's status is whether a judgment against it will be paid with state funds.”28
“Absent waiver, neither a state nor agencies acting under its control are subject to
suit in federal court.”29
24 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984).
25 Vogt v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 294 F.3d 684, 688-689 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Regents of the Univ. of California v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997)).
26 Earles v. State Board of Certified Public Accountants of Louisiana, 139 F.3d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir.
1998).
27 See, e.g., Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council–President Govt., 279 F.3d 273, 281 (5th Cir.2002);
Anderson v. Red River Waterway Comm'n, 231 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir.2000).
28 Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 F.2d 144, 147–48 (5th Cir.1991).
29 Sherwinski v. Peterson, 98 F.3d 849, 851 (5th Cir.1996), citing Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer
Authority v. Metcaff & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993).
This Court and the Middle District of Louisiana have examined the
aforementioned factors and concluded that DCFS is an agency of the state and
entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.30 Additionally, La. R.S. 46:51
outlines the duties of the DCFS and provides that, the department, “through its
secretary shall administer the public assistance and welfare laws of the state....”31
The funding for DCFS comes from a State public assistance fund.32 The State of
Louisiana has not waived its immunity nor has it consented to suit in federal court.
Additionally, in this instance, the State of Louisiana's sovereign immunity has not
been abrogated by Congress. The Court further notes that Plaintiff, the party
asserting jurisdiction and bearing the burden of proof, has failed to offer any
exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
DCFS—as an agency of the State—is entitled to Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity. Thus, all claims against DCFS are barred and the agency is
hereby dismissed from the instant suit.
2. Claims against Secretary Terri Ricks, Gary Franklin, Christian
Merrit, and Bridget Depland-Grant
The remaining defendants, Secretary Terri Ricks, Gary Franklin, Christian
Merrit, and Bridget Depland-Grant, were sued by Plaintiff in their “official and
individual capacities.”33
30 El Bey v. Caddo Par. Juv. Ct., 2023 WL 1421955 (W.D. La. Jan. 30, 2023); Harmony Ctr., LLC v.
Jindal, 2010 WL 4955167 (M.D. La. Nov. 30, 2010).
31 La. R.S. 46:51.
32 See La. R.S. 46:101.
33 R. Doc. 12.
State officials acting in their official capacities may not be sued for
retrospective monetary damages under § 1983, but they may be sued for prospective
injunctive relief.34 A state official can be sued in his or her individual capacity and
held personally liable under § 1983 if it can be shown that the official, acting under
state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.35
In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff asks for a declaration that the remaining
defendants violated his constitutional rights and state and federal laws, monetary
compensation for damages including emotional distress and harm to his parental
rights, an injunction preventing further unconstitutional or coercive actions by the
defendants, disclosure and correction of records related to his case, termination of
specific legal actions and warrants against him, punitive and compensatory damages
for injuries, harm, and damages, and an award of attorney's fees and costs.36 All
taken together, these prayers are a mix of retrospective monetary relief and
prospective injunctive relief.
In the instant motion, remaining defendants assert that while Plaintiff did
name the above defendants in both their official and individual capacities, simply
naming a capacity is not enough to make it true.37 The remaining defendants assert
that Plaintiff’s complaint must be carefully reviewed to determine which capacity is
truly at issue, and, to do so, the Court must “look at the substance of the claims, the
relief sought, and the course of the proceedings to determine in which capacity the
34 See Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1253 (5th Cir.1988); See also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908).
35 Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25–31 (1991).
36 R. Doc. 1 at 12; R. Doc. 12 at 3.
37 R. Doc. 20-2.
defendant is sued.”38 Additionally, they assert that the Plaintiff has failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. In his response, other than stating that a
state official may be sued in their official capacity, Plaintiff does not address or
provide factual support for his allegations against any of the remaining defendants.
The Court declines an inquiry into whether the claims against the remaining
defendants are against them in their personal or official capacity because Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff’s complaint, as
amended, makes numerous vague assertions against the remaining
defendants. Despite naming Secretary Terri Ricks, Gary Franklin, Christian Merrit,
and Bridget Depland-Grant as defendants in his original and amended complaint,
Plaintiff makes no factual allegation concerning any named defendant. There is no
factual matter (much less “sufficient” factual matter) that this Court can find within
the original or amended complaint of any action taken by Ricks, Franklin, Merrit, or
Grant. The original and amended complaint contains only conclusory statements, and
even a liberal reading of Plaintiff’s complaint does not prevent dismissal.
Consequently, claims against the remaining defendants are dismissed.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
38 R. Doc. 20-2 at 5 (citing Hopkins v. Gusman, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60505, 2007 WL 2407247,
(E.D. La. Aug. 17, 2007); Hardesty v. Waterworks Dist. No. 4 of Ward Four, 954 F. Supp. 2d 461, 470
(W.D. La. 2013)).
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 20) Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs claims against DCFS,
Ricks, Franklin, Merrit, and Grant are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
THUS DONE AND SIGNED this 12th day of December, 2024.
JE = EDWARDS: JR.
U ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE