Justin Quistopher Webb v. State of Tennessee

12/12/2024

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs December 10, 2024

JUSTIN QUISTOPHER WEBB v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Robertson County

No. 74CC2-2021-CR-261 William R. Goodman, III, Judge

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No. M2024-00833-CCA-R3-PC

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The Petitioner, Justin Quistopher Webb, pled guilty to attempted first degree murder and

theft of property and received a sentence of twenty years. Thereafter, he filed a petition for

post-conviction relief, alleging that his plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance in

failing to advise him of the significant consequences of the plea. After a hearing, the post-

conviction court denied the petition by finding that plea counsel was not ineffective. On

appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition,

asserting that he proved his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Upon our review,

we respectfully disagree and affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right;

Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TIMOTHY L. EASTER

and KYLE A. HIXSON, JJ., joined.

Gregory D. Smith, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Justin Quistopher Webb.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Ronald L. Coleman, Senior Assistant

Attorney General, and J. Katie Neff, Assistant Attorney General; Robert J. Nash, District

Attorney General; and Ann M. Kroeger, Assistant District Attorney General, for the

appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

A. T HE ATTEMPTED M URDER OF M S . K ING AND G UILTY P LEA

Sarah King represented the Petitioner in a conservatorship matter concerning his

Social Security funds. On May 14, 2021, the Petitioner and Ms. King appeared in

Nashville, where a court dissolved the conservatorship. As a result of this proceeding, a

significant portion of the Petitioner’s Social Security funds was returned to the Social

Security Administration, leaving him with approximately $350. The Petitioner became

upset with Ms. King over this reduction in his account balance despite her lack of control

over the allocation of these funds.

Three days after the dissolution of the conservatorship, on May 17, 2021, the

Petitioner stole a car in Nashville and drove to Ms. King’s residence in Robertson County.

Once there, he waited in the driveway for her to return. When Ms. King arrived, the

Petitioner approached her with a revolver and demanded the return of his money. Ms. King

attempted to evade the Petitioner by running around her vehicle. She shielded herself

behind the car as the Petitioner shot at her several times.

The confrontation was partially captured on Ms. King’s dashcam, which recorded

the Petitioner’s actions. As the incident continued, Ms. King’s husband emerged from the

house and fired shots into the air, prompting the Petitioner to stop his pursuit, drop his

firearm, and lie on the ground. Law enforcement officers soon arrived and took the

Petitioner into custody.

On March 25, 2022, the Petitioner entered a guilty plea to attempted first degree

murder and theft of property over $2,500, resulting in an effective twenty-year sentence to

be served in confinement. As part of the plea agreement, the State dismissed other charges.

The plea agreement included a waiver of certain appeal rights. In the “Petition for

Waiver of Trial by Jury and Request for Acceptance of Plea of Guilty,” the Petitioner

expressly acknowledged his right to an appeal but agreed to waive that right, except for the

possibility of appealing any sentence imposed following an “open” plea.1 During the plea

hearing, the Petitioner confirmed that he read the plea agreement, had an opportunity to

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The plea agreement provided that “I fully understand my right to have my case reviewed

by an Appellate Court, but hereby waive my right to a Motion for a New Trial and/or an Appeal other than

an appeal of any sentence imposed following an ‘open’ plea of Guilty or No Contest.”

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review the agreement with plea counsel, and understood the terms. The trial court

confirmed with the Petitioner that he understood the plea agreement’s terms, including the

waiver of appellate rights. When asked if he waived those rights, the Petitioner said,

“Yeah.”

The court further inquired whether the medications the Petitioner was taking

affected his understanding of the agreement, to which the Petitioner replied, “No, I don’t

think so.” The State’s counsel also added that the Petitioner “was forensically evaluated

and cleared. We had a forensic evaluation.” The trial court then accepted the plea and

sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty years to be served in the

Tennessee Department of Correction.

B. P OST-C ONVICTION P ETITION AND H EARING

On January 5, 2023, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief,

asserting that he was denied the ineffective assistance of counsel during his plea. He

alleged that his plea counsel failed to adequately explain the terms of the plea agreement,

including the waiver of his appellate rights. The Petitioner claimed that he thought he

would receive a probationary sentence rather than a term of incarceration. Finally, the

Petitioner asserted that medication impaired his ability to comprehend the plea agreement

fully.

On November 1, 2023, the post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing during

which the Petitioner was the sole witness. The Petitioner testified that plea counsel told

him that the agreement was for a probationary sentence and that there was “no explanation

as to me going to prison.” He claimed that he was taking different medications while he

was in pretrial confinement and had experienced blackouts. When the Petitioner was asked

about his waiver of the right to appeal, he replied that he did not read the plea paperwork.

He denied remembering that he signed the agreement but conceded that it appeared that he

did so. The Petitioner also said he did not recall discussing his waiver of rights with the

court.

During cross-examination, the Petitioner denied remembering that the trial court

asked about the rights he was waiving as a result of the plea. The Petitioner admitted that

he was evaluated for competency before the plea and was deemed competent to proceed.

C. D ENIAL OF P OST-C ONVICTION R ELIEF

Following the hearing, the post-conviction court denied the Petitioner’s claims for

relief by way of an amended written order entered on June 3, 2023. The court reasoned

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that the Petitioner failed to introduce sufficient proof to establish that plea counsel’s

representation was deficient or that “but for counsel’s actions, the result of the proceedings

would have been different.” The Petitioner filed a notice of appeal on June 7, 2024.

ANALYSIS

The Tennessee Post-Conviction Procedure Act provides an avenue for relief “when

the conviction or sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of any right

guaranteed by the Constitution of Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.”

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-103. A post-conviction petitioner has the burden of proving his

or her allegations of fact by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-

110(f). For evidence to be clear and convincing, “it must eliminate any serious or

substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.”

Arroyo v. State, 434 S.W.3d 555, 559 (Tenn. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted).

In this case, the Petitioner generally challenges the validity of his guilty plea. Our

supreme court has recognized that “[t]he validity of a guilty plea is a mixed question of

law and fact.” Lane v. State, 316 S.W.3d 555, 562 (Tenn. 2010). As such, our review of

whether the Petitioner entered a valid guilty plea in this case is de novo, applying a

presumption of correctness only to the post-conviction court’s findings of fact. Holland v.

State, 610 S.W.3d 450, 455 (Tenn. 2020).

A. Q UESTION P RESENTED FOR R EVIEW

As an initial matter, we must clarify the nature of the question presented for review.

In the Petitioner’s brief, his issue statement asserts only that his plea was invalid because

he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.2 The Petitioner’s argument weaves into

this issue other factors more typically considered in assessing the voluntariness of the plea

apart from ineffective assistance. However, the Petitioner does not raise the voluntariness

of his plea as a separate ground upon which post-conviction relief should have been

granted.

In many cases, “an issue may be deemed waived when it is argued in the brief but

is not designated as an issue in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(4).” Justice v. Board

of Prof’l Resp., 693 S.W.3d 225, 253 (Tenn. 2024) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). “Indeed, so important is this requirement that our supreme court has emphasized

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The question presented is stated as follows: “The Trial Court erred in not setting aside the

Appellant’s guilty plea due to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in violation of the VIth Amendment of the

U.S. Constitution and/or Art. I § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution.”

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that declining to address questions not properly raised is a way that we achieve fairness

and ensure the perceived integrity of the courts.” State v. Holmgren, No. M2023-00795-

CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 2891416, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 10, 2024) (cleaned up)

(quoting City of Memphis v. Edwards by & Through Edwards, No. W2022-00087-SC-R11-

CV, 2023 WL 4414598, at *2 (Tenn. July 5, 2023) (per curiam order)), no perm. app. filed;

Donovan v. Hastings, 652 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2022) (“The requirement of a statement of

the issues raised on appeal is no mere technicality[.]” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)).

It appears that the Petitioner’s challenge of the validity of his plea is limited to his

claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel during the plea process. The

State is apparently of the same mind, as it has limited its argument to this ground for relief.

With this clarification, we address the Petitioner’s issue on the merits.

B. I NEFFECTIVE A SSISTANCE OF C OUNSEL

When a defendant enters a guilty plea, he or she “waives several constitutional

rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the

right to confront his accusers.” State v. Mellon, 118 S.W.3d 340, 345 (Tenn. 2003). To that

end, “[i]n the landmark case of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the United States

Supreme Court held that to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the United States

Constitution, a guilty plea must be entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”

Garcia v. State, 425 S.W.3d 248, 262 (Tenn. 2013). Thus, a claim challenging the

constitutional validity of a guilty plea “falls squarely within the ambit of issues

appropriately addressed in a post-conviction petition.” State v. Wilson, 31 S.W.3d 189, 194

(Tenn. 2000).

In addition, article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution establishes that every

criminal defendant has “the right to be heard by himself and his counsel.” Similarly, the

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the

Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” Indeed, “[t]hese

constitutional provisions guarantee not simply the assistance of counsel, but rather the

reasonably effective assistance of counsel.” Nesbit v. State, 452 S.W.3d 779, 786 (Tenn.

2014).

In the context of a guilty plea, counsel’s “effectiveness may implicate the

requirement that a plea must be entered knowingly and voluntarily, i.e., that the petitioner

made the choice to plead guilty after being made aware of the significant consequences of

such a plea.” Johnson v. State, No. W2015-02498-CCA-R3-PC, 2017 WL 192710, at *4

(Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 17, 2017), no perm. app. filed; see State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540,

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542 (Tenn. 1999). Stated another way, once a defendant enters a guilty plea, the

effectiveness of counsel is relevant only to the extent that it affects the voluntariness of the

plea. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400

U.S. 25, 31 (1970)).

“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must

establish both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that counsel’s deficiency

prejudiced the defense.” Moore v. State, 485 S.W.3d 411, 418-19 (Tenn. 2016) (citing

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). A petitioner may establish that

counsel’s performance was deficient by showing that “counsel’s representation fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness.” Garcia, 425 S.W.3d at 256 (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 688).

To establish prejudice, a petitioner “must establish ‘a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.’” Davidson v. State, 453 S.W.3d 386, 393-94 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694). In the context of a guilty plea, the analysis of prejudice

focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance

affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words, in order to satisfy

the “prejudice” requirement, the defendant must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

Hill, 474 U.S. at 59; see also Taylor v. State, 443 S.W.3d 80, 84-85 (Tenn. 2014). Because

a post-conviction petitioner bears the burden of establishing both deficient performance

and resulting prejudice, “a court need not address both concepts if the petitioner fails to

demonstrate either one of them.” Garcia, 425 S.W.3d at 257.

In this case, the post-conviction court found insufficient evidence to show that the

Petitioner was denied the ineffective assistance of counsel. In reciting the facts, the court

found that the Petitioner’s testimony was contrary to his representations at the plea hearing,

including that he received the written plea agreement, reviewed it with counsel, and

understood the terms.

The record supports the post-conviction court’s findings. At the post-conviction

hearing, the Petitioner confirmed that his signature appeared on the plea paperwork and

that the written agreement provided, “I hereby waive my right to a Motion for a New Trial

and/or an Appeal,” except as to the sentence imposed. As shown by the transcript of the

original plea hearing, the Petitioner confirmed that he understood the terms of the plea,

including that he would be waiving the right to appeal. He represented that his medication

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did not affect his ability to understand the terms of his plea. Finally, the Petitioner

confirmed that he reviewed his plea with counsel and was satisfied with plea counsel’s

representation.

Although the Petitioner testified at the post-conviction hearing that he did not read

the plea agreement or discuss it with plea counsel, the post-conviction court implicitly

discredited the Petitioner’s testimony based on the conflicting representations under oath

at the plea colloquy. This court has recognized that “[a] defendant’s solemn declaration in

open court that his plea is knowing and voluntary creates a formidable barrier in any

subsequent collateral proceeding because these declarations carry a strong presumption of

verity.” See Mumphrey v. State, No. W2021-01439-CCA-R3-PC, 2023 WL 2028767, at *7

(Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 16, 2023) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), perm.

app. denied (Tenn. June 7, 2023); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). As such,

we conclude that the post-conviction court properly found that the Petitioner failed to show

that his plea counsel rendered deficient performance.

Because the Petitioner has not shown deficient performance, we need not separately

address whether he has suffered any prejudice. See Garcia, 425 S.W.3d at 257. We

observe, however, that the Petitioner has not claimed that he would have rejected the plea

and insisted on a trial had plea counsel explained the terms of the plea to him. See Hill,

474 U.S. at 59 (finding that the petitioner failed to establish prejudice because he did not

show “that, had counsel correctly informed him about his parole eligibility date, he would

have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial”); Taylor, 443 S.W.3d at 84-85. The

Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

CONCLUSION

In summary, we hold that the record supports the post-conviction court’s finding

that the Petitioner was not denied the effective assistance of counsel during his guilty plea.

Accordingly, because the Petitioner’s convictions are not void or voidable because of the

violation of a constitutional right, we respectfully affirm the denial of post-conviction relief

in all respects.

S/ Tom Greenholtz

TOM GREENHOLTZ, JUDGE

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