Ross v. Knauf Insulation, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN ROSS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 3:23-cv-284-RAH

) [WO]

KNAUF INSULATION, INC., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION

John Ross, a commercial truck driver, was injured while opening the door to

his trailer when some of the trailer’s contents (insulation) fell on him. The insulation

was loaded onto Ross’ trailer by employees of Defendant Knauf Insulation, Inc.

Ross later sued, bringing claims of negligence and wantonness. Pending before the

Court is Knauf’s Motion for Summary Judgment, which largely challenges the

existence of a duty owed to Ross. Knauf’s motion is fully briefed and ripe for

decision. The motion will be denied in part and granted in part.

BACKGROUND

Knauf manufactures and sells insulation. (Doc. 55-2 at 22–23.) Knauf hires

motor carriers, one of which is Heartland Express, Inc., to transport its product to

Knauf’s customers. (Doc. 55-2 at 43–45; Doc. 55-3 at 17–19, Ex. 1.)

In May 2016, Knauf and Heartland entered into a transportation agreement

that designated Knauf as the shipper and Heartland as the motor carrier. (Id.) Under

the agreement, Heartland would hire drivers and provide them with a tractor and

trailer to transport Knauf’s insulation. (Id.)

Of importance here, Heartland has specific policies and instructions regarding

its transportation services and how its drivers interact with shippers such as Knauf.

For example, Heartland’s policies and driver manual prohibit drivers from breaking

a sealed trailer without authorization. (Doc. 57-2 at 3; Doc. 55-3 at 50.) If

authorization is not given, generally a seal can be broken only when the load arrives

at its delivery destination and instructions are given to the driver to break the seal.

(Doc. 57-2 at 3; Doc. 55-3 at 50–52.)

Ross was a driver for Heartland. On June 10, 2021, Heartland dispatched

Ross to transport a load of insulation from Knauf’s facility in Lanett, Alabama to

Cameron Ashley Building Products in Cordele, Georgia. (Doc. 55-1 at 223, 225–

26, 228.) Ross was instructed to bring with him two load-securement straps to the

Lanett facility. (Id. at 225, 228.)

When Ross arrived at the Lanett facility, he proceeded to the front office and

provided a Knauf employee with his information and his load-securement straps.

(Id. at 224–25.) Ross, however, was told that his straps were not needed because

Knauf had its own straps. (Id.) Ross then waited while Knauf loaded the trailer.

(Id.) Ross did not watch the loading process because Knauf prohibited drivers from

being in the loading area. (Doc. 57-1 at 40.)

The trailer was loaded with 210 individual bags of insulation. (Doc. 55-2 at

187.) The insulation bags were packed for delivery into 42 master bags, each

weighing between 150 and 300 pounds. (Doc. 55-1 at 263; Doc. 57-1 at 69.)

The loading was performed solely by Knauf employees. (Doc. 57-1 at 40.)

Once finished, Ross was notified that he could pick up the trailer. (Doc. 55-1 at

225.) Because the trailer was sealed, he did not inspect the trailer or its contents to

see if it was properly loaded or secured. (Doc. 55-5 at ¶¶ 3, 6.) Ross also did not

ask to break the seal to inspect the inside of the trailer. (Doc. 57-1 at 40; Doc. 55-5

at ¶¶ 3, 6.)

Ross then drove the load to the delivery destination in Georgia. (Doc. 55-5 at

¶ 3; Doc. 55-1 at 234–35.) There, he was instructed to break the seal and open the

trailer. (Doc. 55-1 at 234–35, 240–47; Doc. 55-5 at ¶ 3.) First, Ross opened the

right (passenger-side) trailer door and successfully secured it to the side of the trailer.

(Id.) He looked inside the trailer and noticed that the cargo on both sides was not

perfectly flush, but it otherwise appeared stable. (Id.) Ross next began to open the

left (driver-side) trailer door. (Id.) While opening that door, a gust of wind pushed

the door from Ross’ control, where it swung open. (Id.) At that moment, Ross was

struck on the back of the head by a 300-lb. master bag of insulation. (Id.) Three

more 300-lb. master bags then fell from the trailer, striking Ross in the back and

lower legs, and causing him to fall to the ground. (Id.) Ross claims to have sustained

injuries to his ankle, neck, and back because of the falling cargo. (Id.)

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where the materials in the record show

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). “[A] party

seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323 (1986). To meet its responsibility, the moving party must “identify[] those

portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits . . . which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). This Court must view

the evidence and the inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmovant. Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010);

Bingham, Ltd. v. United States, 724 F.2d 921, 924 (11th Cir. 1984).

If the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to

establish—with evidence beyond the pleadings—that a genuine dispute material to

each of its claims for relief exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). To prevent summary

judgment, a factual dispute must be both material and genuine. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). A fact is “material” if it has the potential

of “affect[ing] the outcome” of the case. Furcron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d

1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248). And to raise

a “genuine” dispute of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment, “the

nonmoving party must point to enough evidence that ‘a reasonable juror could return

a verdict’” in his favor. Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093, 1098 (11th Cir. 2018)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Furcron, 843 F.3d at 1303).

The nonmoving party is required “to go beyond the pleadings” and to present

competent evidence designating “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence

in support of the [non-moving party’s] position” cannot defeat a motion for summary

judgment. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The parties do

not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and there are adequate allegations to

support both. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

DISCUSSION

The central issue here is the existence of a duty under Georgia law.1 Knauf

argues that it owed no duty to Ross to secure the load in the trailer while Ross claims

that Knauf was negligent and wanton in not properly securing the load.

1 The parties agree that Georgia law applies because the accident causing the injury occurred in

Georgia.

Knauf advances two reasons why it owed no duty to secure the load. First,

there was no contractual, regulatory, or statutory duty to secure the load, and second,

Georgia does not recognize a general common law duty to keep others safe. Because

Ross concedes that Knauf did not owe a regulatory or statutory duty to secure the

load, (see doc. 57 at 1), and does not address the contractual duty issue, the Court

will address only whether Knauf owed a common law duty under Georgia law and

whether Knauf’s conduct amounts to wantonness.

Knauf Owed A Duty Under These Facts

To state a cause of action for negligence in Georgia, there must be (1) a legal

duty to conform to a standard of conduct raised by the law for the protection of others

against unreasonable risks of harm; (2) a breach of this standard; (3) a legally

attributable causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4)

some loss or damage flowing to the plaintiff’s legally protected interest as a result

of the alleged breach of the legal duty. City of Douglasville v. Queen, 514 S.E.2d

195, 197 (Ga. 1999) (citing Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693, 695 (Ga.

1982)). Ross argues a duty exists because of Georgia’s adoption of the Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 324A as applied under the facts here.

“The existence of a legal duty is a question of law for the court.” Rasnick v.

Krishna Hosp., Inc., 713 S.E.2d 835, 837 (Ga. 2011) (citing City of Rome v. Jordan,

426 S.E.2d 861, 862 (Ga. 1993)). As to duty in the negligence context, Georgia does

not recognize a general common law duty to keep others safe from unreasonable

harm. Dep’t of Lab. v. McConnell, 828 S.E.2d 352, 358 (Ga. 2019) (holding that a

general common law duty to keep others safe “has never been endorsed in a decision

of this Court that qualifies as precedent”). Even so, Georgia does recognize the

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A. See Ga. CVS Pharmacy, LLC v. Carmichael,

890 S.E.2d 209, 232–34 (Ga. 2023) (recognizing “Section 324A ‘as an accurate

statement of Georgia’s common law’”). Section 324A provides as follows:

One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render

services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the

protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the

third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise

reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if . . . (c) the harm is suffered

because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the

undertaking.

“Section 324 A [sic] imposes liability only where a party has in fact undertaken to

render services. It does not impose liability based upon the failure to render services

which should have been undertaken.” Finley v. Lehman, 463 S.E.2d 709, 710 (Ga.

1995) (citation omitted).

Because of the subject matter of this case, Knauf argues against application of

the Savage rule, an allocation of responsibility between shippers and carriers for

improper loading that has been embraced by several jurisdictions although not

explicitly in Georgia. The Savage rule provides:

The primary duty as to the safe loading of property is therefore upon

the carrier. When the shipper assumes the responsibility of loading, the

general rule is that he becomes liable for the defects which are latent

and concealed and cannot be discerned by ordinary observation by the

agents of the carrier; but if the improper loading is apparent, the carrier

will be liable notwithstanding the negligence of the shipper. This rule

is not only followed in cases arising under the federal statutes by

decisions of the federal courts but also for the most part by the decisions

of the state courts.

United States v. Savage Truck Line, Inc., 209 F.2d 442, 445 (4th Cir. 1953).

Knauf contends that the Savage rule does not apply here. Ross argues that it

should apply even though Georgia courts have not specifically spoken to it. There

is no need to make an Erie guess on whether Georgia would fully adopt the Savage

rule because the specific facts here, when viewed in a light favorable to Ross,

sufficiently establish the existence of a duty under the Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 324A in ways similar to Savage.

Ross has presented evidence showing that Knauf exercised exclusive control

over the loading and securing process. Knauf loaded the trailer and therefore made

the decisions on how to load the trailer and whether and how to secure the load if

the load was secured at all. Knauf declined to use Ross’ load straps, thereby inferring

that it was using its own straps and would be securing the load. Further, pursuant to

Knauf’s policies at the Lanett facility, Ross could not observe the loading and

securing process, as he was required to remain outside the loading area. Nor was he

given an opportunity to inspect the load prior to the trailer being sealed by Knauf.

All told, these facts also show that it was reasonable for Ross to rely upon Knauf to

secure the load. And given that Ross was not permitted to observe the trailer being

loaded and was given a sealed trailer, any problems with how the trailer was loaded

or secured were concealed (and therefore latent) and not capable of ordinary

observation by Ross without taking the affirmative step of breaking the seal and

entering the trailer.

Despite these facts, Knauf argues that it did not assume a duty to secure the

load because of the following language in its contract with Heartland:

If [Knauf] loads and seals the lading in or on the trailer . . . . [Heartland]

may break the seal on a trailer if, upon [Heartland’s] determination or

that of its operator or other representative, it becomes reasonably

necessary to do so to inspect, reposition, or protect the lading or

[Heartland’s] equipment or to comply with federal, state, municipal, or

provincial laws, rules and regulations.

(Doc. 55-3 at 38, § 8.)

But that language does not sweep to the broad conclusion that Knauf attempts

to make. First, that language makes it clear that Knauf may load and seal the trailer.

And second, nothing in that language affirmatively and absolutely transfers the duty

to secure the load to Heartland or the driver. It simply recognizes that Heartland

may break the seal if reasonably necessary to do so. That Heartland may have a

right to break the seal and inspect, reposition and protect the cargo, if reasonably

necessary to do so, does not absolve Knauf of any negligence in its own actions,

especially in the absence of any evidence that Heartland, and Ross in particular,

actually broke the seal, and inspected, repositioned, and/or protected the cargo. And

further, evidence has not been presented showing that it was reasonably necessary

by Heartland or Ross to break the seal.

Additionally, Knauf argues that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations

(“FMCSR”) exclusively impose the duty to secure cargo onto motor carriers and

drivers, thus absolving Knauf of any duty or liability for its own actions. While the

FMCSR does impose a duty on motor carriers and drivers, nothing in the regulations

suggest that it eliminates any common law duties that may arise when a shipper loads

and secures a trailer. See 49 CFR § 392.9; see, e.g., Cook v. Publix Supermarkets,

Inc., No. 19-CV-01087, 2021 WL 2497943, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2021)

(“[FMCSR] doesn’t impose an exclusive duty on anyone. . . . [N]othing in the

regulation’s text suggests such a duty supersedes or preempts other actors’ duties.”

(emphasis and citation omitted)).

Under Georgia law, control over a task and property can create a duty. See

generally, Martin v. Six Flags Over Ga. II, L.P., 801 S.E.2d 24, 34 (Ga. 2017)

(discussing that the level of control over premises and the method of work is

instructive of whether negligence occurred); Cham v. ECI Mgmt. Corp., 856 S.E.2d

267, 272 (Ga. 2021) (discussing that control over the property and task is key to

determining negligence); Tim’s Crane & Rigging, Inc. v. Gibson, 604 S.E.2d 763,

765 (Ga. 2004) (discussing control as a factor in determining negligence). And here,

the facts evidence control by Knauf, whether gratuitously or for consideration, in

loading the trailer and securing its cargo. In doing so, it undertook the common law

duty contemplated by Section 324A. See Carmichael, 890 S.E.2d at 232–34. Knauf

certainly could have loaded the trailer and then told Ross to use his straps to secure

the contents and then seal the trailer. But it did not.2

One additional point on the existence of a duty here. Ross has presented

evidence showing that, in the years preceding Ross’ accident, Knauf was aware of

its load securement issues and was actively reviewing its method of load securement,

even to the point of issuing a “Safety Alert” to its customers. (See generally doc.

57-3 (detailing Knauf’s internal review and discussions on falling freight).) Nothing

in the record suggests that Heartland was given a copy of the Safety Alert.

Viewing the evidence in a light favorable to Ross, Knauf has not shown its

entitlement to summary judgment on the issue of duty. Accordingly, Knauf’s motion

on this basis will be denied.

Ross’ Wantonness/Punitive Damages Claim

Knauf also moves for summary judgment on Ross’ affirmative claim for

wantonness, claiming that Georgia law does not recognize wantonness as an

affirmative claim (like Alabama does) nor do the facts, viewed favorably to Ross,

show a jury issue as to wanton conduct.

Under Georgia law, wantonness may be considered by a jury in evaluating

whether punitive damages are warranted. See Ga. Code § 51-12-5.1(b) (“Punitive

damages may be awarded only in such tort actions in which it is proven by clear and

convincing evidence that the defendant’s actions showed willful misconduct, malice,

fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that entire want of care which would raise the

presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.”). “Wanton conduct . . .

does not involve an actual intent to harm or inflict injury but is nevertheless

described as highly culpable conduct that is equivalent in spirit to actual intent to do

harm or inflict injury.” Ford Motor Co. v. Cosper, 893 S.E.2d 106, 116 (Ga. 2023)

2 Knauf also raises various arguments about Ross’ own conduct. These are more appropriate for

presentation to the jury under its comparative negligence defense.

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 450 S.E.2d

208, 212 (Ga. 1994)).

Knauf is entitled to summary judgment on Ross’ wantonness claim because

there is insufficient evidence showing highly culpable conduct that is equivalent in

Spirit to actual intent to do harm or inflict injury. Ross points to the Safety Alert and

Knauf’s internal audit documents (see doc. 57-3) as evidence sufficient to establish

a genuine dispute on wanton conduct. That by itself does not sufficiently show that

Knauf’s failure to secure the cargo in Ross’ trailer was so reckless or indifferent that

it was equivalent in spirit to actual intent. While the evidence supports that there 1s

a genuine dispute as to negligence, negligence alone, even gross negligence, cannot

support punitive damages without a showing of culpable conduct. Colonial Pipeline

Co. v. Brown, 365 S.E.2d 827, 830 (Ga. 1988) (“Punitive damages cannot be

imposed without a finding of some form of culpable conduct. Negligence, even

gross negligence, 1s inadequate to support a punitive damage award.’’). Thus, Knauf

is entitled to summary judgment on this claim, regardless of whether it is considered

a standalone claim for wantonness or a claim for punitive damages.

CONCLUSION

Knauf has not shown its entitlement to summary judgment with respect to the

claim of negligence, but it has shown its entitlement to summary judgment on the

wantonness claim. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Knauf’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (doc. 54) is due to be DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN

PART. This matter will proceed to trial solely on Ross’ claim of negligence against

Knauf.

DONE on this the 9th day of December 2024.

R. AUSTIN 4 Lin JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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