Haynes v. Burnham

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JEFFERY LORENZO HAYNES, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 3:23-cv-698-MMH-MCR

SGT. C. BURNHAM, et al.,

Defendants.

___________________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff Jeffery Lorenzo Haynes, Jr., an inmate of the Florida penal

system, initiated this action in the Northern District of Florida by filing a pro

se Civil Rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Complaint; Doc. 1). On April

5, 2023, the Honorable Martin A. Fitzpatrick, United States Magistrate Judge,

directed Haynes to file an amended complaint. See Doc. 4. Haynes filed the

operative Amended Complaint (Amended Complaint; Doc. 5); and on June 12,

2023, the Honorable Allen Winsor, United States District Judge, upon

Haynes’s request, transferred the case to this Court (Doc. 9). Haynes is

proceeding in forma pauperis and names three Defendants in the Amended

Complaint: Sergeant C. Burnham; Officer T. Lister; and Officer E. Miller. See

Amended Complaint at 2-3. He raises claims of excessive force and a violation

of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). See generally id.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss

(Motion; Doc. 23). Haynes filed a response to the Motion (Response; Doc. 26).

The Motion is ripe for review.

II. Haynes’s Allegations1

In his Amended Complaint, Haynes alleges that on May 16, 2019, while

housed at Hamilton Correctional Institution (Hamilton C.I.), Defendants

Burnham, Lister, and Miller came into his cell and threatened Haynes that he

must “drop the case against Martin C[orrectional] I[nstitution] or they will

have him killed.” Amended Complaint at 5. Haynes states that he asked

Defendants to leave his cell, but Defendant Burnham sprayed a chemical agent

at Haynes’s face “without provocation.” Id. Haynes also states Defendant

Miller “punch[ed] him to the ground,” triggering Haynes’s attempt to “run out

of the cell.” Id. However, he was “slammed inside his cell” and “blood [was]

gushing from his head.” Id. Haynes states Defendants handcuffed him, and

1 In considering Defendants’ Motion, the Court must accept all factual

allegations in the Amended Complaint as true, consider the allegations in the light

most favorable to Haynes, and accept all reasonable inferences that can be drawn

from such allegations. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003); Jackson v.

Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994). As such, the facts recited here

are drawn from the Amended Complaint and may well differ from those that

ultimately can be proved.

while he was handcuffed, Defendants “kick[ed], punch[ed], and struck [him]

with weapons.” Id. at 6.

While Haynes asserts he did not “resist or threaten” Defendants during

this event, see id., he received a disciplinary report for battery or attempted

battery on correctional staff for the May 16, 2019 incident and was found

guilty, see id. at 7, 8. Haynes also alleges that during the disciplinary hearing,

he asked the disciplinary team to locate and call inmates who witnessed the

incident, but officials failed to call any witnesses. Id. at 8.

As a result of Defendants’ use of force, Haynes contends he was bleeding

from his eye, head, and face, and had “numerous bruises and abrasions to the

face and head.” Id. Haynes states that after the use of force, medical examined

him and applied sutures to the right side of his face and “treatment to his

head”; but medical staff “denied hospital treatment” and no doctor was present

to properly evaluate him for a head injury. Id. at 6, 8, 9. According to Haynes,

he suffers from mental health issues, including bipolar disorder, depression,

schizophrenia, and antisocial personality disorder. Id. at 7. Haynes further

states that his medical records would support his injuries. Id. at 7. He alleges

Defendants’ actions violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and the

ADA; and as relief, he requests compensatory and punitive damages. Id.

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the factual

allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002); see

also Lotierzo v. Woman’s World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.

2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of the

plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless,

the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements. Jackson v.

BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while

“[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]” the complaint should “‘give the defendant

fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, the plaintiff must allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual

content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556).

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal”) (quotations, citation, and

original alteration omitted). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true

all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions[,]” which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court

must determine whether the complaint contains “sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[.]’” Id. at

678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And, while “[p]ro se pleadings are held

to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will,

therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d

1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “‘this leniency does not give a court license to serve

as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in

order to sustain an action.’” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,

1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132

F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled in part on other grounds as

recognized in Randall, 610 F.3d at 709).

IV. Discussion

Defendants argue Haynes’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed

because: (1) Haynes’s claims are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

477 (1994), and Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); (2) Haynes is not

entitled to compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); (3) Haynes’s

request for punitive damages is barred under 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A); and (4)

Haynes fails to state a claim for relief under the ADA. See generally Motion.

In his Response, Haynes counters that his claim is not barred under Heck, that

Defendants’ actions and his resulting injuries are sufficient to warrant both

compensatory and punitive damages, and that his ADA claim should not be

dismissed because he suffers from mental health illnesses.2 The Court

addresses each of the arguments in turn.

1. Heck

Defendants contend Haynes’s claims should be dismissed because they

are barred under Heck and Edwards. Motion at 4-5. In doing so, they argue

that if Haynes is successful in this action, that decision would necessarily

undermine the disciplinary conviction stemming from the May 16, 2019

incident. Id. According to Defendants, this is necessarily so because Haynes’s

assertions are “wholly inconsistent with the facts upon which the disciplinary

conviction is based, and a judgment in favor of [Haynes] finding that he fully

2 In his Response, Haynes states that Defendants are not entitled to immunity,

but as Defendants have not requested dismissal on the basis of immunity, the Court

will not address those assertions in this order.

co-operated with the defendant’s order and was not threatening in any way

would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction.” Id. at 7.

“In order to prevail on a civil rights action under § 1983, a plaintiff must

show that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under

the color of state law.” See Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303

(11th Cir. 2001). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court “held that ‘when

a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider

whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence

has already been invalidated.’” Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 878-79 (11th Cir.

2007) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). The Eleventh Circuit has explained:

[W]e held in Dyer that “for Heck to apply, it must be

the case that a successful § 1983 suit and the

underlying conviction be logically contradictory.” Id. at

884. “In other words, as long as it is possible that a §

1983 suit would not negate the underlying conviction,

then the suit is not Heck-barred.” Id. at 879-80

(emphasis added). In this Circuit, we ask whether “it

is possible that the facts could allow a successful §

1983 suit and the underlying conviction both to stand

without contradicting each other.” Id. at 881

(emphasis added). Heck does not stand in the way of a

§ 1983 suit if, following the suit’s success, “there would

still exist a construction of the facts that would allow

the underlying conviction to stand.” Id. at 880. We

reaffirmed this understanding in Dixon v. Hodges, 887

F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“As long

as it is possible that a § 1983 suit would not negate the

underlying punishment, then the suit is not Heck-

barred.” (alterations adopted and emphasis added)

(quotation omitted)). Most recently, in Sconiers v.

Lockhart, we explained that “when the facts required

for a prisoner to prove his § 1983 case do not

necessarily logically contradict the essential facts

underlying the prisoner’s conviction, Heck does not

bar the § 1983 action from proceeding.” 946 F.3d at

1268.

Harrigan v. Metro Dade Police Dep’t Station #4, 977 F.3d 1185, 1192–93 (11th

Cir. 2020). Indeed, “[w]hen a plaintiff alleges a fact that, if true, would conflict

with the earlier punishment, but that fact is not necessary to the success of his

§ 1983 suit, the Heck bar does not apply.” Dixon, 887 F.3d at 1239. In Edwards

v. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 645–48, the Supreme Court extended Heck’s holding to

a prisoner’s challenge to disciplinary proceedings which result in the loss of

gain time.3

Here, the crux of Haynes’s claim is that Defendants used excessive force

against him. He subsequently received a disciplinary conviction for battery or

attempted battery on a correctional officer related to the events underlying the

use of force. While Haynes alleges that Defendants’ actions were unprovoked

and he did not “resist or threaten” Defendants during the altercation, those

allegations are not necessary to the success of his Eighth Amendment excessive

force claim. Indeed, it is possible that Haynes may have provoked Defendants

3 Defendants submit documentation regarding the disciplinary report and loss

of gain time as attachments to the Motion. See Docs. 23-1, 23-2.

or resisted, but that Defendants still used excessive force. See Dixon, 887 F.3d

at 1240 (finding an excessive force claim was not barred under Heck despite

the plaintiff’s denial of the facts underlying the disciplinary conviction because

it was “logically possible both that [the prisoner] lunged at [the officer] and

that [the officer] used excessive force against him.”). Here, because there is “a

construction of the facts that would allow the underlying conviction to stand,”

the claim is not barred under Heck. See Dyer, 488 F.3d at 880.

In support of their argument, Defendants rely on LaFlower v. Kinard,

No. 2:10-cv-82-FtM-29SPC, 2011 WL 2183555, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2011),

in which the court found an excessive force claim was barred under Heck where

the plaintiff’s allegations of an unprovoked attack were wholly inconsistent

with the facts of the underlying disciplinary convictions. But LaFlower is not

binding precedent, and since the entry of that order, the Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals has rejected the premise that a plaintiff’s admission of the facts

underlying a disciplinary conviction is necessary to succeed in an excessive

force suit. Hall v. Merola, 67 F.4th 1282, 1292 n.4 (11th Cir. 2023). Indeed, the

Eleventh Circuit has explained that Heck does not bar a suit if the plaintiff

can admit to the acts underlying the disciplinary conviction and still succeed

on his claim. Hall, 67 F.4th at 1292 n.2 (citing Dixon, 887 F.3d at 1238 (“A

prisoner may be punished for battery on a prison guard, and that prison guard

may be held liable for using excessive force on the prisoner in subduing him;

both may be true.”)). Here, even if Haynes admitted the truth of the

disciplinary report, his allegations suggest it is possible a jury could find

Defendants used excessive force in subduing him. Thus, Haynes’s Eighth

Amendment excessive force claim is not barred under Heck, and the Motion is

due to be denied on this basis.

2. Compensatory Damages

Defendants also argue that Haynes is not entitled to compensatory

damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) because he has not alleged that

Defendants’ actions resulted in him suffering more than de minimis physical

injuries. Motion at 9-13.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by

a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or

emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical

injury or the commission of a sexual act.” To satisfy § 1997e(e), a prisoner must

assert a physical injury that is more than de minimis. Brooks v. Warden, 800

F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2015). But the physical injury need not be

significant. See Thompson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 551 F. App’x 555, 557

(11th Cir. 2014).4

Taking Haynes’s allegations as true, as the Court must, he sufficiently

asserts he suffered physical injuries that are greater than de minimus. See id.

at 557, n.3 (describing an approach of asking whether the injury would require

a free world person to visit an emergency room or doctor) (citing Luong v. Hatt,

979 F. Supp. 481, 486 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (“A physical injury is an observable or

diagnosable medical condition requiring treatment by a medical care

professional.”)). Haynes asserts that following the use of force, blood was

“gushing” from his head, he had multiple bruises and abrasions on his head

and face, and he received stitches to his face and “treatment” to his head. Based

on these allegations, the Court finds Haynes asserts a physical injury that is

greater than de minimis. See McReynolds v. Ala. Dep’t of Youth Servs., 204 F.

App’x 819, 822 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding laceration to head that required

hospital visit and eleven stitches was not de minimus). As such, the Motion is

due to be denied to the extent that Defendants assert Haynes’s request for

compensatory damages is precluded under § 1997e(e).

4 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022);

see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not

considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

3. Punitive Damages

Defendants further argue that Haynes’s request for punitive damages

must be dismissed because it is statutorily barred. Motion at 14-21. According

to Defendants, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) precludes punitive damages in all civil

rights cases because such damages are “prospective relief.” Id. at 14. In support

of their contention, Defendants assert that punitive damages “are never

necessary to correct a violation of a federal right.” Id. at 14. They also contend

that even if an award of punitive damages is necessary to correct such a legal

violation, that award could not satisfy the PLRA’s “stringent limitations” as

the relief is neither “narrowly drawn” nor “the least intrusive means necessary

to correct the violation of the Federal right.” Id. at 15.

Section 3626(a)(1)(A) provides:

(1) Prospective relief. – (A) Prospective relief in any

civil action with respect to prison conditions shall

extend no further than necessary to correct the

violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff

or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any

prospective relief unless the court finds that such

relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,

and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct

the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give

substantial weight to any adverse impact on public

safety or the operation of a criminal justice system

caused by the relief.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Defendants are correct that punitive damages are

considered “prospective relief” under § 3626. See Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d

1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding “punitive damages are prospective relief”),

abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 395

(2015)). But their argument that punitive damages, as “prospective relief”

under § 3626, are precluded in prisoner civil rights actions is wholly misplaced.

Indeed, they cite Johnson as their primary support for this notion; but in

Johnson, the court did not hold that punitive damages were unavailable under

§ 3626 for § 1983 cases. Instead, in Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit clarified, in

the context of a § 1983 civil rights case, that § 3626(a)(1)(A) merely provides

the framework for awarding punitive damages. Id. at 1325. The court

explained “a punitive damages award must be no larger than reasonably

necessary to deter the kind of violations of the federal right that occurred in

the case . . . [and] that such awards should be imposed against no more

defendants than necessary to serve that deterrent function and that they are

the least intrusive way of doing so.” Id.

While the Court is unaware of an Eleventh Circuit case in which that

court has addressed Defendants’ specific argument here, the Court cannot

disregard the Eleventh Circuit’s long-standing recognition that punitive

damages are available in prisoner civil rights actions. Indeed, the Eleventh

Circuit has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) permits claims for punitive damages

for § 1983 claims without a physical injury requirement. Hoever v. Marks, 993

F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2021).5 And it has held “[p]unitive damages are

appropriate in § 1983 cases ‘where a defendant’s conduct is motivated by evil

intent or involves callous or reckless indifference to federally protected rights.’”

Barnett v. MacArthur, 715 F. App’x 894, 905 (11th Cir. 2017). Also, the

Eleventh Circuit Civil Pattern Jury Instructions on § 1983 damages include an

instruction on awarding punitive damages. See Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury

Instruction, Civil Cases, Civil Rights – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims – Damages §

5.13.

The Court also finds persuasive other district court decisions explicitly

finding that § 3626(a)(1)(A) does not preclude an award of punitive damages in

prisoner civil rights cases. See, e.g., Brown v. Semple, No. 3:16cv376, 2018 WL

4308564, at *14 (D. Conn. Sept. 10, 2018) (collecting cases); Douglas v.

Byunghak Jin, No. 11-0350, 2014 WL 1117934, at *4-5 (W.D. Penn. Mar. 20,

2014) (reasoning that if Congress “intended to abolish punitive damages in all

prisoner litigation under the PLRA, it would have done so directly, and in much

plainer terms”).6 Thus, the Court declines to find that § 3626 precludes a

5 In Hoever, the Eleventh Circuit declined to address the availability of

punitive damages in prison condition cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Hoever, 993 F.3d

at 1364 n.5.

6 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not

binding, they may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp.,

371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would

not be bound to follow any other district court’s determination, the decision would

have significant persuasive effects.”).

request for punitive damages in this § 1983 action, and the Motion is due to be

denied on this issue.

4. ADA claim

Defendants assert Haynes fails to state a claim under the ADA. Motion

at 21-22. According to Defendants, Haynes’s Amended Complaint “contains

nothing more than conclusory allegations and unsupported legal conclusions

regarding violations of the [ADA].” In his Response, Haynes fails to coherently

address Defendants’ argument. Rather, Haynes merely repeats his diagnoses

and cites irrelevant, non-binding case law.

Title II of the ADA provides: “[N]o qualified individual with a disability

shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or

be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see also

Pa. Dep’t of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 213 (1998) (holding Title II of the

ADA “unambiguously extends to state prison inmates”). “Only public entities

are liable for violations of Title II of the ADA.” Edison v. Douberly, 604 F.3d

1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 2010).

To state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must show:

(1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability;

(2) that he was either excluded from participation in

or denied the benefits of a public entity’s services,

programs, or activities, or was otherwise

discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that

the exclusion, denial of benefit, or discrimination was

by reason of the plaintiff’s disability.

Bircoll v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 480 F.3d 1072, 1083 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Shotz

v. Cates, 256 F.3d 1077, 1079 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Here, Haynes only sues Defendants in their individual capacities.

Amended Complaint at 2-3. Thus, because only public entities may be liable

under the ADA, Haynes fails to state an ADA claim against these individuals.

See Owens v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 602 F. App’x 475, 478 (11th Cir. 2015)

(“Since only public entities may be liable under the ADA, [the plaintiff] fails to

state ADA claims against [prison officials] in their individual capacities.”).

Nevertheless, even if Haynes sued Defendants in their official capacities, he

has failed to state a claim under the ADA. Haynes alleges that he has “Bipolar

Depression[,] Schizophrenia,[] and Antisocial Personality Disorders” and that

“Defendants violat[ed] [the] Americans with Disabilities Act.” Amended

Complaint at 7. But these conclusory statements are insufficient to state a

claim under the ADA. Indeed, even assuming those diagnoses amount to a

qualifying disability under the ADA, Haynes has failed to allege that he was

“excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a public entity’s

services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the

public entity” or that “the exclusion, denial of benefit, or discrimination was by

reason of [his] disability.” See Bircoll, 480 F.3d at 1083. Thus, Haynes has

failed to allege a plausible claim for relief under Title II of the ADA, and the

Motion is due to be granted as to this argument.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendants Miller, Burnham, and Lister’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 23) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

The Motion is GRANTED to the extent that Haynes’s ADA claim is

DISMISSED with prejudice. The Motion is otherwise DENIED.

2. Defendants Burnham, Lister, and Miller shall file an answer to the

Amended Complaint (Doc. 5) by January 6, 2025.

3. The Court will issue a separate order setting case management

deadlines.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 6th day of

December, 2024.

United States District Judge

JaxP-12

C: Jeffery Lorenzo Haynes, Jr., K72806

Counsel of record

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