Kruskopf v. St. Charles Health System, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

MICHAEL KRUSKOPF,

MARY KATHRYN PHILLIPS,

KESTREL SCHMIDT, Case No. 6:23-cv-01196-MTK

KATHY MOUNTS, and

TAMARA NOBEL, OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,

vs.

ST. CHARLES HEALTH SYSTEM, INC.,

Defendant.

_________________________________________

KASUBHAI, United States District Judge:

Plaintiffs Michael Kruskopf, Mary Kathryn Phillips, Kestrel Schmidt, Kathy Mounds,

and Tamara Nobel (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against their former employer St.

Charles Health System, Inc. (“Defendant”) on August 16, 2023, alleging state and federal law

claims of employment discrimination. Compl. ¶¶ 9–10, ECF No. 1. Before the Court is

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF

No. 10. For the reasons below, Defendant’s motion is granted in part.

BACKGROUND

Each Plaintiff worked for Defendant during the COVID-19 pandemic. Compl. ¶ 3. On

August 4, 2021, Governor Brown announced a mandate that all health care workers must be fully

vaccinated or subject to weekly COVID-19 testing. The Oregon Health Authority subsequently

determined that weekly testing would not be sufficiently effective in addressing patient and

coworker safety risks, and the mandate was changed to require that all health care workers be

fully vaccinated. In summer 2021, Defendant “imposed a COVID-19 vaccine mandate on its

employees.” Id. ¶ 4. In November 2021, the U.S. Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services

imposed a nationwide vaccine mandate for healthcare workers. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld

the federal vaccine mandate and affirmed that the vaccine was “necessary to promote and protect

patient health and safety.” Biden v. Missouri, 595 U.S. 87, 93 (2022). Both the state and federal

vaccine mandates allowed for exceptions based on religious or disability-related accommodation

requests but required that such accommodations not pose a health risk to others, primarily

patients and coworkers.

Plaintiff Kruskopf was a registered nurse employed by Defendant. Compl. ¶ 6. After

Defendant announced its vaccine mandate, Plaintiff Kruskopf alleges that his “co-workers started

making rude and negative comments about those who chose not to get vaccinated” and

discriminated against unvaccinated individuals by requiring them to wear stickers on their

badges and use separate entrances. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff Kruskopf completed an exemption request

form on September 27, 2021. Durr Decl. Ex. 1, ECF No. 1. 1 Plaintiff Kruskopf stated his belief

that “[t]he requirement to take one or more of the experimental injections contradicts the

teachings of the Holy Bible,” citing several Bible verses underlying that belief. Id. Ex. 2.

Defendant granted Plaintiff Kruskopf’s requested exemption but placed him on unpaid

1 For purposes of this Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Defendants agree that Plaintiffs’ letters are

incorporated by reference into Plaintiff’s Complaint. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 3.

administrative leave from October 12, 2021, until his termination on February 16, 2022. Compl.

¶ 8.

Plaintiff Phillips was a certified nursing assistant employed by Defendant. Compl. ¶ 12.

Plaintiff Phillips completed an exemption request form on September 14, 2021. Durr Decl. Ex. 3.

Plaintiff Phillips asserted “a deeply held belief against receiving a COVID-19 vaccination” based

on her religion. Id. She added that “any coerced medical treatment goes against my religious

faith and the right of conscience to control one’s own medical treatment, free of coercion or

force” and that she has “a solemn, sincere, religious conviction or conscientious objection to any

treatment or prophylactic measure.” Id. Exs. 4, 5. Defendant granted Plaintiff Philips’ requested

exemption but placed her on unpaid administrative leave from October 18, 2021, until her

termination on February 16, 2022. Compl. ¶ 13.

Plaintiff Schmidt was registered nurse employed by Defendant. Compl. ¶ 17. After

Defendant announced its vaccine mandate, Plaintiff Schmidt alleges that her “co-workers made

rude and negative comments about unvaccinated people” and unvaccinated workers were “forced

to use[] different PPE, letting everyone know who was unvaccinated” amounting to a “hostile

work environment.” Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff Schmidt completed an exemption request form on

September 12, 2021. Durr Decl. Ex. 7. Plaintiff Schmidt asserted her belief that her body is a

“temple” given to her by God and that it is her “God-given responsibility and requirement…to

protect the physical integrity of [h]er body against unclean food and injections.” Id. Ex. 8.

Because she also believes that the vaccine is “impure” due to “the use of fetal cells deprived

from human life, mRNA,” she refused to “receive an injenction that will alter the natural reaction

God intended of my body.” Id. Defendant granted Plaintiff Schmidt’s requested exemption but

placed her on unpaid administrative leave from October 18, 2021, until her termination on

February 16, 2022. Compl. ¶ 16.

Plaintiff Noble was a registered nurse employed by Defendant. Compl. ¶ 19. After

Defendant announced its vaccine mandate, Plaintiff Noble alleges that she “witnessed workplace

discrimination, including doctors and nurses that treated unvaccinated patients, visitors, and staff

differently” including “refusing to test or treat patients in the emergency department, based

solely on their vaccination status.” Id. ¶ 21. She alleges that she heard comments such as “they

can just suffer” and witnessed patients being discharged without “medication or compassion”

such that she “feared for herself and her family if they ever needed treatment.” Id. Plaintiff Noble

completed an exemption request form on September 15, 2021. Durr Decl. Ex. 9. Plaintiff Noble

stated that she could not take the COVID-19 vaccination due to her Christian beliefs. Id. Ex. 10.

She cited several Bible verses that she believed conflicted with the mandate, including the belief

that her body is a “temple of the Holy Spirit” and that “God would not want me injecting this

into my body based on the COVID vaccines [sic] many additives and its mechanism of actions.”

Id. Defendant granted Plaintiff Noble’s requested exemption but placed her on unpaid

administrative leave from October 14, 2021, until she resigned on November 19, 2021. Compl. ¶

20.

Plaintiff Mounts is named in the caption of the Complaint but there are no allegations in

the Complaint itself concerning her.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only when there is no

cognizable legal theory to support the claim or when the complaint lacks sufficient factual

allegations to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Los Angeles Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins., 869

F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2017). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint’s factual allegations,

the court must accept as true all well-pleaded material facts alleged in the complaint and construe

them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. To be entitled to a presumption of

truth, allegations in a complaint “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but

must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the

opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

All reasonable inferences from the factual allegations must be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. at

800. The court need not, however, credit the plaintiff’s legal conclusions that are couched as

factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).

A complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to “plausibly suggest an

entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the

expense of discovery and continued litigation.” at 1216. “A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability

requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”

Id.

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss all Plaintiffs’ religious discrimination claims for failure to

plead that they held a bona fide religious belief in conflict with an employment duty. Defendant

also moves to dismiss any hostile work environment claims because unvaccinated individuals are

not a protected class entitled to protection by Title VII. The Court addresses each argument in

turn.

I. Employment Discrimination

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims that Defendant engaged in unlawful

employment discrimination based on religion under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Or.

Rev. Stat. (“ORS”) § 659A.030 by failing to properly accommodate Plaintiffs’ requests for

religious exemptions. Specifically, Defendant asks the Court to find that Plaintiffs have not

sufficiently alleged that they held religious beliefs that conflicted with the vaccine mandate.

To make out a prima facie case of religious discrimination based on a failure to

accommodate a religious exemption request under Title VII or ORS 659A.030, a claimant must

plead sufficient facts to show that (1) she had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an

employment duty; (2) she informed her employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer

took an adverse employment action because of the claimant’s inability to fulfill the job

requirement. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2004); see also

Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1437 n.2 (9th Cir.1993) (“Courts construe Oregon’s

statutory counterpart, Or. Rev. Stat. § 659.030 (1992), as identical to Title VII.”).

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to state a claim of religious

discrimination because it fails to allege the first element of such a claim—that Plaintiffs held a

bona fide religious belief that conflicted with the vaccine mandate. Defendant’s arguments

relating to each Plaintiff can be distilled into two general points: (A) that Plaintiffs’ allegations

about their faith are too conclusory to state a claim and (B) that Plaintiffs’ beliefs are truly

secular rather than religious in nature.

A. The Specificity of Plaintiff’s Pleading

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs failed to allege religious beliefs in conflict with an

employment duty because their allegations are conclusory and lack specificity. While courts

need not “take plaintiffs’ conclusory assertions of violations of their religious beliefs at face

value,” Bolden-Hardge v. Off. of California State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1223 (9th Cir.

2023) (internal citation omitted), assertions “of a sincere religious belief [are] generally

accepted.” Keene v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 22-16567, 2023 WL 3451687, at *2 (9th

Cir. May 15, 2023); see also Doe v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 19 F.4th 1173, 1176 n.3 (9th

Cir. 2021) (“We may not . . . question the legitimacy of [plaintiffs’] religious beliefs regarding

COVID-19 vaccinations.” (citing Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado C.R. Comm’n, 584

U.S. 617, 638 (2018))). Further, “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or

comprehensible to others in order to merit” protection. Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Indiana Emp. Sec.

Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).

Here, as summarized above, Plaintiffs Kruskopf, Phillips, Schmidt, and Noble have

alleged that their religious beliefs precluded them from taking the COVID-19 vaccine. The

letters included with their exemption requests describe the nature of those beliefs. Taking all

factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in the light

most favorable to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that their religious beliefs conflicted with

an employment duty because the vaccine mandate would require them to partake in a medical

intervention inconsistent with those religious beliefs. Accordingly, these Plaintiffs’ allegations

are sufficient at the pleading stage.

However, the Complaint contains no allegations concerning Plaintiff Mounts. She has

therefore failed to state a claim and her claims are dismissed.

B. “Secular” Allegations

Defendant also argues that even if Plaintiffs did allege beliefs in conflict with an

employment duty, those beliefs are secular and therefore insufficient to support their claims for

religious discrimination. Because “Title VII does not protect secular preferences,” employers

need not accommodate personal preferences couched as a bona fide religious belief. Tiano v.

Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 682 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). However, a

religious belief may still be sufficiently pled when alleged alongside secular beliefs. What You

Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws, U.S.

Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, § L.2 https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-

about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws (last visited Mar. 20, 2024)

(“[O]verlap between a religious and political view does not place it outside the scope of Title

VII’s religious protections, as long as the view is part of a comprehensive religious belief system

and is not simply an isolated teaching.”); see Doe, 19 F.4th at 1180 (citing What You Should

Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and Other EEO Laws, U.S. Equal

Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, § L.2–L.3 https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-

about-covid-19-and-ada-rehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws).

As the Court has already addressed, Plaintiffs plausibly allege sincere religious beliefs in

conflict with an employment duty. Defendant argues that because there are secular concerns

underlying the religious ones (e.g., medical or scientific beliefs about the contents of the vaccine

which lead them to conclude that taking the vaccine conflicts with their religious beliefs), the

beliefs as a whole are secular rather than religious. However, as noted above, the fact that

Plaintiffs also allege a medical component to their beliefs does not nullify their religious-based

objections to the vaccine.

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’ employment discrimination claims

is denied as to Plaintiffs Kruskopf, Phillips, Schmidt, and Noble, but granted as to Plaintiff

Mounts.

II. Hostile Work Environment – 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2)

Defendant also moves to dismiss all Plaintiffs’ hostile work environment claims under

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Title VII protects employees from discrimination on the basis

of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(2). For Plaintiffs to

make out a prima facie case under a hostile work environment theory, they must show: “(1) that

[they were] subjected to verbal or physical conduct [because of their religion]; (2) that the

conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of [their] employment and create an abusive work environment.” Vasquez v. Cnty. of

L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Gregory v. Widnall, 153 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir.

1998)).

Defendant argues that any hostile work environment claim fails because Plaintiffs did not

allege that they were members of a protected class. However, religion is an enumerated protected

class under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(2), and Plaintiffs have alleged that they held

“sincere and profound religious beliefs.” Compl. ¶ 3. Thus, the Court understands that the

argument underlying Defendant’s assertion is that Plaintiffs have not alleged that the conduct

was directed at their religion but was instead directed at their vaccination status, which is not

protected under Title VII. The question is therefore whether Plaintiffs have alleged facts which

plausibly establish harassment based on their religious status.

In the Ninth Circuit, a plaintiff sufficiently pleads a hostile work environment claim when

they allege, for example, that the verbal harassment contained epithets linked to their protected

status. See Sharp v. S&S Activewear, LLC, 69 F.4th 974, 979 (9th Cir. 2023) (stating that

“gender-specific epithets,” . . ha[ve] been consistently held to constitute harassment based upon

sex”) (internal quotation omitted); see also Kang v. U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810 (9th Cir.

2002) (“Generally, a plaintiff alleging racial or national origin harassment would present facts

showing that he was subjected to racial epithets in the workplace.”); Dawson v. Entek Intern, 630

F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that summary judgment was appropriate because the record did

not demonstrate that the plaintiff was “being verbally harassed for appearing non-masculine or

for otherwise not fitting the male stereotype”).

Here, Plaintiffs did not plausibly allege that they experienced harassment because of their

religious status. As summarized above, Plaintiffs Kruskopf, Schmidt, and Noble alleged conduct

directed at unvaccinated individuals, but there are no allegations which would allow a plausible

inference that the conduct occurred “because of” their protected religious status. There are no

allegations of epithets or other language directed at their religion, nor are there any allegations

which would allow the plausible inference that behavior directed at unvaccinated individuals was

“because of” those individuals’ religion. Indeed, the Complaint refers to conduct towards

“unvaccinated” individuals with no allegation that individuals remaining unvaccinated for non-

religious reasons were treated any differently than those who were unvaccinated for religious

reasons. Further, Plaintiffs Phillips and Mounts alleged no facts at all regarding a hostile work

environment. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is granted as to the hostile work

environment claims.

III. Leave to Amend

Plaintiffs have requested leave to amend their Complaint to address any deficiencies.

Rule 15 provides that the “court should freely give leave [to amend a pleading] when justice so

requires.” A district court should apply Rule 15’s “policy of favoring amendments . . . with

extreme liberality.” Price v. Kramer, 200 F.3d 1237, 1250 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks

omitted). The purpose of the rule “is ‘to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the

pleadings or technicalities.’” Novak v. United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011)). A district court,

however, may, within its discretion, deny a motion to amend “due to undue delay, bad faith or

dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments

previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the

amendment, [and] futility of the amendment.” Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d

981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g,

512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008)). “Not all of the factors merit equal weight. As this circuit and

others have held, it is the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party that carries the greatest

weight.” Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Futility of

amendment, however, “can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.” Bonin v.

Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiffs are granted leave to amend their Complaint because amendment would not be

futile here and amendment would not prejudice Defendant. There is no indication in the record

before the Court that amendment would be futile. Defendant would not be prejudiced by this

Court granting leave to amend because Plaintiffs have not yet amended their complaint, and

Defendant is on notice regarding the nature of the claims.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED IN

PART. Plaintiffs’ hostile work environment claims and Plaintiff Mounts’ employment

discrimination claim are dismissed with leave to amend within 30 days of the date of this

/ / /

/ / /

Opinion and Order. If Plaintiffs do not amend, then Defendant’s Answer is due 21 days from the

date the First Amended Complaint would have been due.

DATED this 6th day of December 2024.

s/ Mustafa T. Kasubhai

MUSTAFA T. KASUBHAI (He / Him)

United States District Judge