Opinion

Ervin v. Royal Heaven Group Home

Court
District Court, N.D. Ohio
Filed
Dec 5, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.2%

recognizing that liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading essentials”

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing that liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading essentials”
  • holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

GEORGE EDWARD ERVIN, ) Case No. 1:24-cv-1625

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge

) Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

ROYAL HEAVEN GROUP HOME, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff George Edward Ervin, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a civil

complaint in this case naming as Defendants the Royal Heaven Group Home, social

worker McGregor Pace, Edward Retirement Home, the Cleveland Clinic, and

University Hospitals. (ECF No. 1.) It appears from Plaintiff’s complaint and the

attachments to it that he contends he has been impeded in his ability to work and as

a result was unable to obtain or retain housing. But his complaint fails to set forth

cogent factual allegations or legal claims. His Statement of Claim, in its entirety,

simply states:

On April 5, 2024, I went to Orientation at Giant Eagles for employment

as a new hire. I won’t [be] eligible until 10-3-2024. I received another

interview on June 5, 2024 at 3:30 PM. I also had financial with

Cuyahoga Community College and refused permission to go and refused

my right to come and [d]o job training, employed. Dr. DeGolia from

McGregor Pace gave an examination and refusal on May 1, 2024.

(Id., PageID #4.)

With his complaint, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis.

(ECF No. 2.) The Court GRANTS that application. For the reasons that follow, the

Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND DISCUSSION

Pleadings and documents filed by pro se litigants are “liberally construed,” and

a “pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to a less stringent

standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, “the

lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v.

Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110

(6th Cir. 1991)).

Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are

not required to make allegations on their behalf or create claims for them that they

have not spelled out in their pleading. Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,

528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008); Payne v. Secretary of Treasury, 73 F. App'x 836,

837 (6th Cir. 2003); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) (recognizing

that liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading

essentials”).

To meet the minimum notice pleading requirements necessary to state a claim

in federal court, a complaint’s allegations must be sufficient to give the defendants

fair notice of what the plaintiff’s legal claims against them are and the grounds on

which they rest. Bassett, 528 F.3d at 437 (citing Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,

76 F.3d 716, 726–27 (6th Cir. 1996)). To state a claim, a complaint must contain

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the

dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), governs dismissals for failure to state

a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)). Although detailed allegations are not required,

a plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Moreover, federal law requires courts to screen all in forma pauperis

complaints and to dismiss before service any such complaint that the court

determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Based on this review, the Court finds that the statute requires dismissal of

Plaintiff’s complaint. Even liberally construed, the complaint fails to meet the basic

pleading requirements necessary to apprise Defendants of the factual and legal bases

for this lawsuit. And the unclear general assertions set forth in his Statement of

Claim fail to raise his right to relief against any Defendant above a speculative level

or to demonstrate that he states a claim on which the Court may grant relief. See

Lillard, 76 F.3d at 726–27 (courts are not required to accept summary allegations or

unwarranted conclusions in determining whether a complaint states a claim for

relief).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court

DISMISSES Plaintiffs complaint. Further, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the

Court certifies, that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 5, 2024

J.PhilipCalabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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