recognizing that liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading essentials”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading essentials”
- holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
GEORGE EDWARD ERVIN, ) Case No. 1:24-cv-1625
)
Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese
)
v. ) Magistrate Judge
) Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong
ROYAL HEAVEN GROUP HOME, )
et al., )
)
Defendants. )
)
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff George Edward Ervin, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a civil
complaint in this case naming as Defendants the Royal Heaven Group Home, social
worker McGregor Pace, Edward Retirement Home, the Cleveland Clinic, and
University Hospitals. (ECF No. 1.) It appears from Plaintiff’s complaint and the
attachments to it that he contends he has been impeded in his ability to work and as
a result was unable to obtain or retain housing. But his complaint fails to set forth
cogent factual allegations or legal claims. His Statement of Claim, in its entirety,
simply states:
On April 5, 2024, I went to Orientation at Giant Eagles for employment
as a new hire. I won’t [be] eligible until 10-3-2024. I received another
interview on June 5, 2024 at 3:30 PM. I also had financial with
Cuyahoga Community College and refused permission to go and refused
my right to come and [d]o job training, employed. Dr. DeGolia from
McGregor Pace gave an examination and refusal on May 1, 2024.
(Id., PageID #4.)
With his complaint, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis.
(ECF No. 2.) The Court GRANTS that application. For the reasons that follow, the
Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND DISCUSSION
Pleadings and documents filed by pro se litigants are “liberally construed,” and
a “pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, “the
lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits.” Pilgrim v.
Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110
(6th Cir. 1991)).
Pro se plaintiffs must still meet basic pleading requirements, and courts are
not required to make allegations on their behalf or create claims for them that they
have not spelled out in their pleading. Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,
528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008); Payne v. Secretary of Treasury, 73 F. App'x 836,
837 (6th Cir. 2003); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) (recognizing
that liberal construction for pro se litigants does not “abrogate basic pleading
essentials”).
To meet the minimum notice pleading requirements necessary to state a claim
in federal court, a complaint’s allegations must be sufficient to give the defendants
fair notice of what the plaintiff’s legal claims against them are and the grounds on
which they rest. Bassett, 528 F.3d at 437 (citing Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
76 F.3d 716, 726–27 (6th Cir. 1996)). To state a claim, a complaint must contain
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), governs dismissals for failure to state
a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)). Although detailed allegations are not required,
a plaintiff’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Moreover, federal law requires courts to screen all in forma pauperis
complaints and to dismiss before service any such complaint that the court
determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Based on this review, the Court finds that the statute requires dismissal of
Plaintiff’s complaint. Even liberally construed, the complaint fails to meet the basic
pleading requirements necessary to apprise Defendants of the factual and legal bases
for this lawsuit. And the unclear general assertions set forth in his Statement of
Claim fail to raise his right to relief against any Defendant above a speculative level
or to demonstrate that he states a claim on which the Court may grant relief. See
Lillard, 76 F.3d at 726–27 (courts are not required to accept summary allegations or
unwarranted conclusions in determining whether a complaint states a claim for
relief).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court
DISMISSES Plaintiffs complaint. Further, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the
Court certifies, that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 5, 2024
J.PhilipCalabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio