The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
DARICK EASTERLING : CIVIL ACTION
:
v. :
:
COUNTY OF DELAWARE : NO. 23-5016
MEMORANDUM
Bartle, J. December 3 , 2024
Plaintiff Darick Easterling, a correctional officer at
the George W. Hill Correctional Facility, in Delaware County,
Pennsylvania, alleges that defendant County of Delaware
(“Delaware County”) failed to accommodate him in and terminated
him from his job. He maintains that defendant interfered with
his rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2601, et seq. (“FMLA”) (Count I), discriminated and
retaliated against him under the FMLA (Count II), and
discriminated and retaliated against him on the basis of his
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendment
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. (“ADAAA”) (Counts III and IV)
and under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Stat.
§§ 951, et seq. (“PHRA”) (Counts V and VI).
Before the court is the motion of Delaware County for
partial summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as to plaintiff’s claims of retaliation pursuant
to the FMLA (Count II), ADAAA (Count IV), and the PHRA (Count
VI) (Doc. # 11).
I
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254
(1986). The court views the facts and draws all inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. See In re Flat Glass Antitrust
Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2004).
Summary judgment is granted when there is insufficient
evidence in the record for a reasonable factfinder to find for
nonmovant. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “The mere existence
of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmoving party]’s
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which
the jury could reasonably find for [that party].” Id. In
addition, Rule 56(e)(2) provides that “[i]f a party fails to
properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly
address another party’s assertion of fact as required by
Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for
the purposes of the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).
II
The following facts are construed in the light most
favorable to plaintiff.
Since 2003, plaintiff has worked as a Correctional
Officer at the George W. Hill Correctional Facility in Delaware
County. Since 2016, he has been unable to work more than twelve
hours consecutively due to a medical condition. He suffers from
spinal stenosis which causes chronic neck pain. To treat this
pain, he takes hydrocodone and gabapentin twice a day, every
twelve hours. Because the medication affects his ability to
focus and concentrate and blurs his vision, he cannot take the
medications during working hours.
On or about April 6, 2022, Delaware County assumed
management of the facility from the Geo Group, a private entity.
At that time, the new warden, Laura Williams, determined that
due to an employee shortage, it would be necessary for
correctional officers such as plaintiff to work mandatory
overtime, that is two eight-hour shifts for a total of sixteen
consecutive hours. On May 25, 2022, Easterling was terminated
due to his failure to do so.
When Geo Group managed the facility, it resolved the
shortage problem by having employees work a full eight-hour
shift, plus a portion of a second eight-hour shift. Rather than
requiring employees unable to work a full sixteen hours do so, a
second employee would volunteer to complete the remainder of the
shift. That way, those employees who could not work a full
sixteen hours were able to continue to hold their jobs.
In March of 2022, Warden Williams attended a
transition meeting with, among other individuals, the president
and vice president of the correctional officers’ union. At his
deposition, Frank Kwaning, the union president, testified that
during this meeting he commented that certain employees could
not complete mandatory overtime. He inquired what the County’s
position would be on continuing to accommodate them and Warden
Williams responded that such employees would be accommodated.
The union vice president, Ashley Gwaku, asked how this would
occur. Warden Williams replied that “we will get back to you
guys.”
As part of the facility’s transition to public
management, all correctional officers interviewed with the
County to retain their positions. Easterling interviewed for
his position as a correctional officer on March 14, 2022 and was
offered conditional employment that same day. He was scheduled
to begin working for the County on April 6, 2022, the date it
assumed management of the facility. His offer letter stated
that “mandated overtime” was an essential job duty. Such
overtime is described in the attached job description as an
“[a]bility to work up to sixteen (16) hours within a rolling 24-
hour period.”
Plaintiff states that on or about April 6, 2022 he
notified Warden Williams that he was unable to work sixteen
hours consecutively. Soon thereafter, he submitted an “ADA
Reasonable Accommodation Request Form” to the County. He
included a note from his doctor confirming that he could not
work more than twelve hours at one time. He provided this
paperwork to Human Resources, which requested that he resubmit
this information using the format provided by the County.
Angela Fratterelli, the Human Resources advisor and manager of
employee relationships and leave of absences, testified at her
deposition that no employee was to be disciplined while an
interactive process concerning proposed accommodations was
ongoing.
On April 13, 2022, plaintiff submitted conforming
paperwork to the County. A few days later, Human Resources gave
him another form for his doctor to complete.
On April 22, 2022, plaintiff was required to work two
consecutive eight-hour shifts. After working twelve hours, he
told his supervisor that he could not work any longer and left.
On April 29, 2022, Amanda Lubrano, a Lieutenant, filed a
disciplinary action form against him for this conduct despite
the County’s policy that no discipline would occur during the
pendency of an employee’s interactive process with the County to
determine his or her appropriate accommodation. This form
stated:
On April 29, 2022, you left the facility
prior to the end of your shift indicating
that you were ill. This leave was
unauthorized and against facility policy as
you do not have sick time to cover the
hours.
Upon receiving this notification, he attempted to provide his
lieutenant with documentation that showed that he had a pending
request for an accommodation. The lieutenant refused to accept
it.
On May 2, 2022, plaintiff met with Human Resources. In
that meeting, they discussed plaintiff’s condition and how it
impacted his performance.
On May 6, 2022, plaintiff again did not complete his
mandatory overtime because he needed to take his medication. In
response, Lubrano filed a disciplinary action form against him.
It stated that he “refused to complete his mandatory overtime
and felt sick stating he needed to take his medication.”
Although the form references an “attached statement,” no such
statement is in the record.
On May 17, 2022, plaintiff once more failed to
complete his mandatory overtime because of the need to take his
medication. On May 19, Lieutenant R. Davis, the shift commander
at the time, filed a disciplinary action form against plaintiff.
He wrote:
On May 17, 2022, at approximately 4:00am,
Officer Easterling notified the Shift
Commander’s Officer that he would be leaving
early on his mandatory overtime. This
officer has no sick time available.
The form states that the lieutenant then serving as shift
commander “refused to accept [Officer Easterling’s] paperwork”
which demonstrated that he had made a request for an
accommodation pursuant to the ADA. In connection with this
disciplinary action, plaintiff was suspended for one day.
Kwaning, the union president, testified that multiple
employees reached out regarding mandatory overtime when the
County announced it would be required and Easterling and other
employees submitted documentation regarding their inability to
complete sixteen consecutive hours of work. Although he was
union president at the time, his attempts to access the facility
in order to represent the union members were denied.
On May 25, 2022, the County terminated plaintiff. Its
letter stated:
The reason for this decision is that,
because of your medical condition, you are
unable to perform the essential functions of
the job. Specifically, based upon the
information provided by your medical
provider, as well as the additional
information and clarifications that we have
received from you (and that provider), you
are unable to work more than twelve (12)
consecutive hours due to the medicines you
are taking. . . . Given that you are unable
to do so and given that you and your medical
provider has advised that your medical
condition is a chronic, lifelong condition,
there are no accommodations that can be
provided.
(emphasis added).
III
First, Delaware County moves to dismiss plaintiff’s
claims of retaliation under the ADAAA (Count IV) and the PHRA
(Count VI).1 To establish a claim of retaliation under the ADAAA
and under the PHRA on the basis of a disability, plaintiff must
first make a prima facie showing of retaliation. He may do so
by showing that he engaged in protected conduct, that the
employer took an adverse action either after or at the same time
as the employee’s protected activity, and that the protected
conduct and the adverse action were causally related. Shaner v.
Synthes (USA), 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000).
The County does not contest that plaintiff engaged in
protected activity by requesting an accommodation or that his
termination was an adverse action. The County challenges the
third prong of plaintiff’s prima facie case. It argues that no
reasonable jury could conclude that plaintiff’s request to work,
1. Plaintiff’s PHRA claim is coextensive with his ADAAA claim
and will be addressed together. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d
102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996).
at most, twelve hours consecutively, on April 6, 2022, was
causally related to his termination on May 25, 2022. In Parrish
v. County of Delaware, my colleague Judge John F. Murphy denied
the County’s motion for summary judgment in a factually
analogous case. Civ. A. No. 22-4552, 2024 WL 3295585, at *1
(E.D. Pa. July 3, 2024). In that action, the plaintiff was a
correctional officer at the George W. Hill Correctional Facility
until she was terminated for her inability to work sixteen hours
due to a disability. Id. The County argued, as it does here,
that plaintiff had failed to establish a causal relationship
between her request for an accommodation and her termination.
Id. at *7. However, Judge Murphy concluded that all parties
agreed that plaintiff was terminated because she was unable to
work the overtime the County mandated. Id.
This reasoning applies in equal force to this case.
In its termination letter, the County concedes that he was
terminated because his medical condition made him “unable to
work more than twelve (12) consecutive hours.” Plaintiff has
come forward with evidence of a causal connection between his
disability and his subsequent termination.
The County also argues in this case that plaintiff has
failed to show a causal connection due to a lack of temporal
proximity. Temporal proximity is one indicator of retaliatory
intent, but if such proximity is not “unusually suggestive,” a
plaintiff may provide evidence of a “pattern of antagonism” in
the intervening period. See Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126
F.3d 494, 504 (3d Cir. 1997). For example, our Court of Appeals
has denied summary judgment on a claim of retaliation pursuant
to the ADA when plaintiff had sufficiently shown a causal
connection between her termination and her protected activity of
filing an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint, of
which defendant received notice a month before her termination.
Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp., Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 188-89 (3d
Cir. 2003). In that action, the court determined that a
reasonable jury could find that there was a causal connection on
the basis of temporal proximity and a pattern of antagonism,
such as her supervisor’s comment ten days prior to her
termination that she was “taking the legal route.” Id. at 189.
Here, the temporal proximity between plaintiff’s
request and his termination was only forty-two days.2 Coupled
with this time frame, plaintiff provides sufficient evidence of
antagonism. His superiors continued to impose disciplinary
action against him, a violation of Human Resources’ stated
policy not to impose discipline during the interactive process
2. The County maintains it was not informed of plaintiff’s
disability until he submitted the County’s paperwork on April
13, 2022. Plaintiff disputes this, as he avers that he
requested an accommodation on April 6, 2023 and therefore the
temporal proximity between that and his termination is forty-
nine days.
to determine the appropriate accommodation. Each time he
attempted to inform his superiors of his disability, they
refused to accept his documentation. Viewing this evidence in
the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could
find that he has established a causal relationship between his
request for an accommodation and his ultimate termination.
After establishing a prima facie case of retaliation,
the burden shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the adverse action. In this action,
the County states that working mandatory overtime is an
essential job requirement and that the County is unable to
accommodate employees that are unable to work sixteen hours
consecutively.
Plaintiff has the ultimate burden of persuasion to
show that this legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is merely
pretext. He may do so by pointing to evidence that would lead a
reasonable factfinder either to disbelieve the employer’s
articulated reason or to believe that the discriminatory reason
was more likely than not the motivating cause of the employer’s
action. Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 413 (3d
Cir. 1999). The County argues that plaintiff fails to provide
any evidence that its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason is
pretext for discrimination.
In Parrish, Judge Murphy also considered this
question. Civ. A. No. 22-4552, 2024 WL 3295585, at *8. He
ruled in that action that there were disputed facts as to
whether the County’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for
plaintiff’s termination was pretext. In that action, plaintiff
presented evidence that Warden Williams “had an agenda” to
target those who required ADAAA or FMLA accommodations and
Fratterelli testified that all employees who requested such
accommodations were terminated. Id.
In this action, plaintiff proffers similar evidence of
an “agenda.” Testimony shows that Warden Williams committed to
accommodating employees who were not capable of working sixteen
hours consecutively, then changed tack when Delaware County
began to manage the facility. Additionally, plaintiff has
evidence that, despite the County’s policy to decline to impose
discipline during the accommodations period, he was disciplined
on multiple occasions for his failure to complete two
consecutive eight-hour shifts. This break with accepted policy
supports plaintiff’s position that the County’s requirement that
all employees work mandatory overtime is pretext.
As in Parrish, a reasonable jury could find that that
discriminatory intent was more likely than not the motivating
cause of the County’s requirement. The motion of Delaware
County for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claims of
retaliation under the ADAAA and the PHRA will be denied.
IV
Delaware County further argues that summary judgment
should be granted in its favor on plaintiff’s claim of
retaliation under the FMLA (Count II). To establish an FMLA
retaliation claim, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he invoked
his right to FMLA-qualifying leave; (2) he suffered an adverse
employment action; and (3) the adverse action was causally
related to his invocation of rights. Ross v. Gilhuly, 755 F.3d
185, 193 (3d Cir. 2014).
The County first maintains that plaintiff failed to
request FMLA leave. The plaintiff need not provide his employer
with a formal written request for leave and the “employee need
not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the
FMLA . . . .” Sarnowski v. Air Brooke Limousine, Inc., 510 F.3d
398, 402 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c)). An
employee merely needs to state a qualifying reason for the
leave.
There is ample evidence in the record that plaintiff
clearly explained his reason for working at most twelve hours
consecutively. Each time he stated he was assigned mandatory
overtime and that he needed to take four hours of FMLA leave at
the end of each mandatory eight-hour shift. He submitted his
own paperwork upon beginning his position, re-submitted
paperwork that conformed with the County’s administrative
requirements, and notified his supervisor of his disability each
time he was scheduled to work sixteen hours consecutively.
While there is no evidence that he identified the FMLA in making
these requests, the statute imposes no such requirement.
Sarnowski, 510 F.3d at 402. A reasonable jury could find that
plaintiff invoked his right to FMLA leave.
Next, the County argues that plaintiff has not
established a causal connection between his request to limit his
mandatory overtime and his termination. As discussed above,
plaintiff does not merely rely on temporal proximity to prove
his case. He also provides evidence of a pattern of antagonism
which a reasonable jury may conclude is sufficient evidence of a
causal link between his request and termination.
The County also asserts that plaintiff cannot
establish that his request for leave under the FMLA was a
motivating factor in his termination. This argument is without
merit. The County’s letter states that he was terminated due to
his inability to work sixteen hours consecutively.
Finally, the County contends that plaintiff has failed
to show that its legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
terminating plaintiff is pretext. On the contrary, as the court
explains above, plaintiff has produced evidence that the
County’s requirement that all correctional officers work sixteen
hours consecutively as mandatory overtime is pretext. This is a
material, disputed fact, and thus summary judgment is not
appropriate on plaintiff’s claim of retaliation pursuant to the
FMLA.
The motion of Delaware County for summary judgment on
plaintiff’s claim for retaliation under the FMLA will be denied.