The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 24-1811
Filed: December 3, 2024
________________________________________
)
BEVERLY BLAIR, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
THE UNITED STATES, )
)
Defendant. )
________________________________________ )
ORDER
Beverly Blair, proceeding pro se, alleges that various officials in Arkansas are not
following federal law. She also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. Based on
the information Ms. Blair provided to the court, the court GRANTS her leave to proceed in
forma pauperis.
Because Ms. Blair has sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must screen
the complaint to ensure that it states a claim, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and falls within this court’s
jurisdiction. As explained below, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this action.
This court’s primary grant of jurisdiction appears in the Tucker Act, which provides that:
[this court] shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any
claim against the United States founded either upon the
Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an
executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with
the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in
cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). But “[t]he Tucker Act, of course, is itself only a jurisdictional statute; it
does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages.”
United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). To invoke this court’s jurisdiction, Ms. Blair
must identify a “separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages.”
Greenlee Cnty. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 875 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). If Ms. Blair
fails to establish jurisdiction, this court must dismiss the complaint. RCFC 12(h)(3) (“If the
court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
action.”); Outlaw v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 656, 658-59 (2014).
It is Ms. Blair’s burden to establish this court’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the
evidence. Stephens v. United States, 884 F.3d 1151, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2018). When determining
whether this court has jurisdiction, “the court accepts as true all uncontroverted factual
allegations in the complaint, and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id.
at 1155 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739
F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Because Ms. Blair appears pro se, the court holds her pleadings
to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Naskar v. United States,
82 Fed. Cl. 319, 320 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). That leniency, however, does not relieve Ms. Blair from establishing this
court’s jurisdiction. Stephens, 884 F.3d at 1156; Kelley v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 812 F.2d
1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Minehan v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 249, 253 (2007).
From what the court can discern, 1 certain officials from the State of Arkansas Department
of Human Services, Division of Children and Family Services 2 and officers with the City of Pine
Bluff removed a juvenile from Ms. Blair’s home. ECF No. 9 at 1. This juvenile appears to be
related to Ms. Blair in some way because she complains about the “destruction” of her family
due to her not having contact with the juvenile since the removal from her home. ECF No. 9 at
1; ECF No. 11 at 1-2. Ms. Blair previously filed a complaint in the Eastern District of Arkansas
raising many of these same issues. See generally Blair v. Blackston, No. 4:23-CV-01207-LPR,
2024 WL 1833087 (E.D. Ark. Apr. 15, 2024), appeal dismissed, No. 24-1879, 2024 WL
4645224 (8th Cir. May 3, 2024). In that case, the district court found that Ms. Blair had failed to
state a claim or establish that court’s jurisdiction. Id. at *2. Before dismissing the complaint,
however, the district court granted Ms. Blair leave to amend her complaint and suggested she
seek counsel to assist her. Id. Ms. Blair then filed a notice of appeal to the Eighth Circuit, which
dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Blair v. Blackston, No. 24-1879, 2024 WL
4645224, at *1 (8th Cir. May 3, 2024). Having failed to amend her complaint within the time
allotted in its order, the district court dismissed her complaint. Order, Blair v. Blackston, No.
4:23-CV-01207 (E.D. Ark. June 25, 2024), ECF No. 13. Before this court, Ms. Blair complains
both about the removal of the child from her home and apparently about the failure of the district
court and Eighth Circuit to rule in her favor. See generally ECF Nos. 7, 9. She seeks $10 billion
in compensation and an injunction requiring certain individuals to enforce federal law. ECF No.
11 at 2.
Even assuming all alleged facts in the complaint to be true and construing them in the
best light for Ms. Blair, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear her claim. First, to the extent that
Ms. Blair’s allegations are against the State of Arkansas, the City of Pine Bluff, or the
individuals she identifies as failing to enforce federal law, see ECF No. 11 at 2, this court lacks
jurisdiction to hear those claims. Again, under the Tucker Act, this court’s jurisdiction is limited
1
The plaintiff has filed many documents with the court regarding her claims. See ECF Nos. 1, 7,
9, 11, 13, 18. The court reviews these documents and a similar complaint that she filed in case
number 4:23-cv-1207-LPR in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas to understand what she is alleging.
2
In her motion for summary judgment, Ms. Blair identifies the people that appear to have
removed the child from her home as working for “DCFS” and the City of Pine Bluff. ECF No.
11. The court understands DCFS to refer to the Division of Children and Family Services.
2
to cases against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). This jurisdiction does not extend to
any other party, and “if the relief sought is against others than the United States the suit as to
them must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court.” United States v. Sherwood, 312
U.S. 584, 588 (1941). Thus, this court does not have jurisdiction over cases against individual
federal officials. Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Similarly, this
court lacks jurisdiction over states or state officials and must dismiss those claims. Sherwood,
312 U.S. at 588.
Second, to the extent that Ms. Blair is complaining about the proceedings before the
Eastern District of Arkansas and/or the Eighth Circuit, see ECF No. 9 at 1 (“asking for relief and
for governmental oversight over its Courts”); id. at 3 (seeking relief and protection “from all
harm done from Courts”), this court lacks jurisdiction to review those decisions because “the
Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction to review the merits of a decision rendered by a
federal district court.” Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States, 862 F.3d 1370, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(citation omitted).
Third, Ms. Blair appears to base some of her claim on tort theories. See ECF No. 9 at 3
(alleging “Negligence and malfeasance”); see also ECF No. 7 3 (asserting “Federal Tort
Claims”). This court’s jurisdiction, however, only includes “cases not sounding in tort.” 28
U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Therefore, the court lacks jurisdiction over the complaint to the extent Ms.
Blair bases her claims on torts.
Finally, Ms. Blair has failed to identify a money-mandating source of law to support this
court’s jurisdiction. She points to two federal laws that the court addresses in turn. Insofar as
she brings her claims under Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679c, that
does not provide this court jurisdiction. Rather, it “establishes a cooperative state-federal foster
care and adoption assistance program for children.” Blair, 2024 WL 1833087, at *1 n.11
(quoting State of Missouri v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 864, 865 (8th Cir. 1987)). Although this statute
provides for various payments by the Federal Government to the States, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 670,
673b, 674, it does not provide or imply that a plaintiff may recover monetary damages in the
event of a violation. Her reliance on the Family First Prevention Services Act, Pub. L. No. 115-
123, §§ 50702-782, fares no better. That law amended Title IV in ways meant “to provide
enhanced support to children and families and prevent foster care placements through the
provision of mental health and substance abuse prevention and treatment services, in-home
parent skill-based programs, and kinship navigator services.” Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-123, § 50702, 132 Stat. 64. But there is nothing in the statutory text that
mandates or implies that the United States shall be liable for money damages for a violation.
Because this court lacks jurisdiction to hear Ms. Blair’s complaint, it must dismiss it.
Transfer to the Eastern District of Arkansas is not appropriate in this case under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1631 because the complaint that Ms. Blair filed here is materially the same as the complaint
that she previously filed in that court, which that court dismissed without prejudice because she
3
ECF No. 7 is a corrected version of the exhibit Ms. Blair filed with her complaint. Even though
she did not attach it to her amended complaint, the court considers it given the leniency with
which it reviews pro se complaints.
3
failed to amend her complaint before that court. Therefore, it is not in the interest of justice to
transfer the same complaint back to that court.
For the forgoing reasons, the court GRANTS the motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, ECF No. 2, DISMISSES plaintiff’s complaint, ECF No. 9, DENIES-AS-MOOT
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 11, and directs the Clerk’s Office to enter
judgment accordingly.
It is so ORDERED.
s/ Edward H. Meyers
Edward H. Meyers
Judge
4