if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court 1 may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the claim differently
How later courts described this case
- if supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court 1 may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the claim differently
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
LEAHANNE PRINZI, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 24-20-E
)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, )
)
)
Defendant. )
O R D E R
AND NOW, this 2nd day of December, 2024, upon consideration of the parties’
cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court, after reviewing the Commissioner of
Social Security’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claim for disability insurance benefits
under Subchapter II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq., and her claim for
supplemental security income benefits under Subchapter XVI of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
1381 et seq., and finds that the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence and, accordingly, affirms. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S.
Ct. 1148, 1153-54 (2019); Jesurum v. Secretary of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs,
48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Brown v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir.
1988)). See also Berry v. Sullivan, 738 F. Supp. 942, 944 (W.D. Pa. 1990) (if supported
by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed, as a federal court
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may neither reweigh the evidence, nor reverse, merely because it would have decided the
claim differently) (citing Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981)).1
1 Plaintiff argues that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) failed to adequately
evaluate the opinion of Dr. Amanda White, Psy.D. (Doc. No. 11). Specifically, Plaintiff
contends that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) finding did not properly take
into consideration Dr. White’s opined mental limitations and that the ALJ did not
adequately analyze the supportability factor in assessing Dr. White’s opinion. (Id. at 7-
13). The Court disagrees with Plaintiff and finds instead that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s RFC finding and his ultimate determination that Plaintiff is not
disabled.
The Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Dr.
White’s opinion. As Plaintiff mentions, the two most important factors the ALJ considers
when evaluating medical opinions are supportability and consistency. 82 Fed. Reg. at
5853; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b) and (c), 416.920c(b) and (c). One court has
explained the distinction between supportability and consistency thus: “supportability
relates to the extent to which a medical source has articulated support for the medical
source’s own opinion, while consistency relates to the relationship between a medical
source’s opinion and other evidence within the record.” Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 6:20-CV-1197, 2021 WL 1565832, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2021). The record shows
that the ALJ adequately evaluated the supportability and consistency factors. Indeed,
when analyzing Dr. White’s opinion, the ALJ noted the following, in relevant part:
During her mental status examination, Dr. White observed the claimant was
cooperative, had a fair manner of relating, and appeared casually dressed,
and fairly groomed. In addition, her posture and motor behavior were
normal and she demonstrated appropriate eye contact. Further
examination showed the claimant’s speech was fluent and clear with
adequate expressive and receptive language and her thought process was
coherent and goal-directed with no evidence of hallucinations, delusions, or
paranoia. Dr. White also observed the claimant’s affect was depressed and
anxious but she was fully oriented with a clear sensorium. However, her
attention, concentration, and memory were impaired and she appeared to be
functioning in the below average range of intelligence. Dr. White then
noted the claimant’s reports that she was able to dress, bathe, and groom
herself, cook twice a week, clean once a week, wash laundry once a week,
and shop for groceries with someone else. The claimant also reported that
she managed her own money and socialized a bit but was not close with her
family. Based on the foregoing, Dr. White diagnosed the claimant with
generalized anxiety disorder and an unspecified depressive disorder. She
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then determined her impairments resulted in moderate limitations on her
ability to make judgments on simple work-related decisions and understand,
remember, and carry out complex work-related decisions, as well as marked
limitations on her ability to make judgments on complex work-related
decisions. Finally, Dr. White found her impairments resulted in mild
limitations on her ability to interact appropriately with the public,
coworkers, and supervisors and her ability to respond appropriately to usual
work situations and to changes in a routine work setting. (Ex. 6F/2-8).
* * *
The opinions of Dr. White, Dr. Schiller, and Dr. Ondis are all somewhat
but again not fully persuasive because the conclusion that the claimant
does not have a disabling mental health impairment is consistent with her
lack of professional mental health treatment and records from Dr. Beck,
who consistently described the claimant’s impairments as stable and
required no changes in her medication regimen. Nevertheless, given the
claimant’s allegations of anxiety characterized by shaking and her
tendency to stay home due to fear of having a seizure, the undersigned has
added additional limitations on her ability to interact with others.
Additionally, the undersigned finds a restriction to simple and routine
work is warranted by her mild cognitive dysfunction and subjective
complaints of memory difficulties.
(R. 28-29).
As the above analysis shows, the ALJ adequately evaluated the consistency and
supportability factors in relation to Dr. White’s opinion. As to consistency, the ALJ
stated that Dr. White’s opinion that Plaintiff does not have a disabling mental health
impairment was consistent with the rest of the record, which showed a lack of
professional mental health treatment, and with records describing her impairments as
stable and showing no changes in her medication. As to supportability, the ALJ
thoroughly analyzed Dr. White’s opinion and observations during the mental status exam
and showed that these observations did not align with Dr. White’s ultimate conclusions.
For instance, the ALJ explained that Dr. White’s findings were mainly unremarkable,
including that Plaintiff was cooperative, demonstrated appropriate eye contact, and her
thought process was coherent, but these did not completely align with Dr. White’s
conclusions, including that Plaintiff had moderate and marked limitations. (Id.).
Accordingly, the ALJ adequately evaluated the entirety of Dr. White’s opinion in giving
it full consideration in accordance with the regulations.
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Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED and that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. No. 16) is GRANTED
s/Mark R. Hornak, J.
United States District Judge
ecf: Counsel of record
The Court likewise rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s
stability with medication was insufficient to justify a finding of consistency between Dr.
White’s opinion and the rest of the record. (Doc. No. 11 at 11-12). Plaintiff contends that
“stable” does not equate to “improved.” (Id. (citing, inter alia, Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d
310, 319 (3d Cir. 2000)). However, Plaintiff overlooks that the ALJ may consider the
effectiveness of medication in assessing the RFC. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv),
416.929(c)(3)(iv). Moreover, unlike in Morales, the ALJ here did not supplant his lay
opinion by concluding that the claimant could return to work because he was stable and well
controlled with medication. Morales, 225 F.3d at 319. Instead, here, the ALJ noted that
Dr. Pamela Beck, D.O., consistently described Plaintiff’s impairments as stable and that she
required no changes in her medication regimen and the ALJ used this as evidence from the
rest of the record to show inconsistency with Dr. White’s opinion. This was a proper
consistency analysis. See Cook, 2021 WL 1565832, at *3 (stating “consistency relates to the
relationship between a medical source’s opinion and other evidence within the record.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on this point fails.
The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the hypothetical posed to the
vocational expert (“VE”) was in error. (Doc. No. 11 at 12-13). Plaintiff contends the
hypothetical improperly omitted Plaintiff’s marked limitation in her ability to make
judgments on complex work-related decisions, as opined by Dr. White. (Id.). The Court
views this argument as part and parcel of the Plaintiff’s objections to the RFC
determination as “objections to the adequacy of hypothetical questions posed to a
vocational expert often boil down to attacks on the RFC assessment itself.” Rutherford
v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005). As analyzed above, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC assessment, and because the operative hypothetical
accurately conveyed Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ appropriately relied upon the vocational
expert’s response.
The ALJ’s findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed.
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