“[The] Supreme Court has refused to imply a private right of action in a bare criminal statute.”
How later courts described this case
- “[The] Supreme Court has refused to imply a private right of action in a bare criminal statute.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
LEO WEST, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-02847 (UNA)
)
ANGUS KING, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
___________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s pro se complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and
application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), ECF No. 2. The Court grants Plaintiff’s
IFP application and, for the reasons explained below, it dismisses this matter without prejudice.
The complaint is difficult to follow. Plaintiff sues several United States senators and
representatives, contending that the [sic] “government is not affair a affair is not a job an jobs.”
See Compl. at 2–4. As best understood, Plaintiff goes on to broadly allege, without detail or
context, that “false statements” have been made regarding veterans’ access to housing. See id. at
4. He demands $1 million from each Defendant resulting from alleged “turmoil” at his current
veteran’s shelter, related to headaches caused by “fuss” and loud “voices.” See id.
First, pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656
F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a complaint to
contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] . . . (2) a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). The Rule 8 standard ensures that
defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive
answer and an adequate defense. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). Here, as
presented, neither the Court nor the Defendants can reasonably be expected to identify Plaintiff’s
claims, and the allegations fall well short of stating a plausible claim.
Second, even if his claims could be understood, Plaintiff fails to establish subject-matter
jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), citing only to 18 U.S.C. § 1001, see Compl. at 3, a
criminal statute that “does not create a private cause of action,” Lee v. United States Agency for
Int’l Develop., 859 F.3d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam); see Prunte v. Universal Music
Group, 484 F. Supp. 2d 32, 42 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[The] Supreme Court has refused to imply a private
right of action in a bare criminal statute.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
Rockefeller v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 248 F. Supp. 2d 17, 20 (D.D.C. 2003)
(same) (collecting cases).
For these reasons, this case is dismissed without prejudice. A separate Order accompanies
this Memorandum Opinion.
Date: November 27, 2024
/s/_________________________
ANA C. REYES
United States District Judge