Burton v. Smith

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

JONATHAN MICHAEL BURTON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-1195-BJD-SJH

OFFICER G. SMITH, et al.,

Defendants.

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ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants, Smith, Prock, and

Mitchell’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 9; Def. Mot.) and

Plaintiff’s Opposition thereto (Doc. 12; Pl. Opp.).

I. Status

Plaintiff, Jonathan Michael Burton, an inmate of the Florida

Department of Corrections, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis on a

Complaint for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer

G. Smith, Sergeant D. Mitchell, and Sergeant E. Prock, in their individual and

official capacities, based on conduct that occurred at Florida State Prison on

April 21, 2020 (Doc. 1; Compl.). The events started when Plaintiff refused to

leave the doctor’s office and had to be carried down the hallway. Id. at 5. At

some point after Plaintiff began to walk normally, Smith and Mitchell became

upset and pushed Plaintiff’s wrists against the restraints by forcing his arms

upwards, then forced him into his cell, and attacked him without justification.

Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff alleges that Smith and Mitchell punched and stomped on

him while he was still in full restraints, and Smith also hit Plaintiff’s head

with his radio, thereby “bust[ing] [his] head.” Id. at 6. After this altercation,

Prock and other officers had to escort Plaintiff back to the doctor’s office. Id. At

that point, Plaintiff was “very upset” because of the beating and “tried to step

to the officer.” Id. After Plaintiff returned to his cell, Prock allegedly put his

finger in Plaintiff’s buttocks. Id.

Based on these events, Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants violated his

Eighth Amendment rights: Smith and Mitchell – through their excessive use

of physical force, and Prock – through his commission of a sexual act. Id. at 7.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. Id.

II. Discussion

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s official capacity claims must be

dismissed based on sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Def.

Mot. at 4–5. Plaintiff agrees and asks for leave to amend the Complaint to

proceed against Defendants solely in their individual capacities. Pl. Opp. at 1,

3, 8. In light of Plaintiff’s lack of opposition, the official capacity claims against

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all Defendants will be dismissed. Plaintiff does not need to amend the

Complaint to reflect the dismissal of these claims.

Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s request for compensatory

damages against Smith and Mitchell must be dismissed because the injuries

he sustained as a result of their use of force are not greater than de minimis.

Def. Mot. at 6–10. Defendants interpret the Complaint as alleging pain in

Plaintiff’s wrists and bleeding from his head as a result of Smith and Mitchell’s

excessive use of force. Id. at 9. The Court notes, however, that the Complaint

is somewhat vague about Plaintiff’s alleged injuries. In the Complaint,

Plaintiff alleges that Smith and Mitchell’s excessive use of force caused him

“long time pain” and “a bust head.” Compl. at 6–7. Plaintiff then asks for

compensatory damages based on his “pain and suffering.” Id. at 7. By

submitting medical records simultaneously with his Opposition, Plaintiff

attempts to prove that his injuries were greater than de minimis. See Doc. 13

at 3–9. However, the Court will not consider these records at the pleading

stage. Even assuming these records are central to the claims, it is unclear if

they are undisputed by Defendants. Furthermore, even if they are undisputed,

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the records appear to be incomplete.1 Therefore, based on the record before the

Court, it is premature to decide whether Plaintiff’s injury is de minimis.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages must

be dismissed as statutorily barred. Def. Mot. at 10–18. According to

Defendants, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) precludes punitive damages in all civil

rights cases because such damages constitute “prospective relief.” Id. at 11. In

support of their contention, Defendants argue “punitive damages are never

necessary to correct a violation of a federal right.” Id. They also contend that

even if an award of punitive damages is necessary to correct such a legal

violation, that award could not satisfy “stringent limitations” imposed by the

Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), as the relief is neither “narrowly drawn”

nor “the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal

right.” Id. at 12. Plaintiff responds that he is entitled to punitive damages for

Defendants’ willful or malicious conduct. Pl. Opp. at 6–7.

Section 3626(a)(1)(A) provides:

(1) Prospective relief. ―

(A) Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison

conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the

violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.

1 Of note, Plaintiff filed another civil rights action premised on the events that

took place on April 21, 2020 where the Court extensively addressed Plaintiff’s injuries

in its order on summary judgment. See Doc. 114 in Case No. 3:21-cv-597-WWB-MCR.

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The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless

the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no

further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,

and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation

of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any

adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal

justice system caused by the relief.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Defendants are correct that punitive damages are

considered “prospective relief” under § 3626. See Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d

1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding “punitive damages are prospective relief”),

abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 395

(2015)). But their argument that punitive damages, as “prospective relief”

under § 3626, are precluded in prisoner civil rights actions is wholly misplaced.

Indeed, they cite Johnson as their primary support for this notion, but Johnson

did not hold that punitive damages were unavailable under § 3626 for § 1983

cases. Instead, in Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit clarified, in the context of a §

1983 civil rights case, that § 3626(a)(1)(A) merely provides the framework for

awarding punitive damages. Id. at 1325. It explained “a punitive damages

award must be no larger than reasonably necessary to deter the kind of

violations of the federal right that occurred in the case . . . [and] that such

awards should be imposed against no more defendants than necessary to serve

that deterrent function and that they are the least intrusive way of doing so.”

Id.

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While the Court is unaware of an Eleventh Circuit case that has

addressed Defendants’ specific argument here, the Court cannot disregard the

Eleventh Circuit’s long-standing recognition that punitive damages are

available in prisoner civil rights actions. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has held

that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) permits claims for punitive damages for § 1983 claims

without a physical injury requirement. Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353, 1364

(11th Cir. 2021).2 And it has held “[p]unitive damages are appropriate in § 1983

cases ‘where a defendant’s conduct is motivated by evil intent or involves

callous or reckless indifference to federally protected rights.” Barnett v.

MacArthur, 715 F. App’x 894, 905 (11th Cir. 2017). Also, the Eleventh Circuit

Civil Pattern Jury Instructions on § 1983 damages include an instruction on

awarding punitive damages. See Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction,

Civil Cases, Civil Rights – 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims – Damages § 5.13.

The Court also finds persuasive other district court decisions explicitly

finding that § 3626(a)(1)(A) does not preclude an award of punitive damages in

prisoner civil cases. See, e.g., Brown v. Semple, No. 3:16cv376, 2018 WL

4308564, at *14 (D. Conn. Sept. 10, 2018) (collecting cases); Douglas v.

Byunghak Jin, No. 11-0350, 2014 WL 1117934, at *4-5 (W.D. Penn. Mar. 20,

2 In Hoever, the Eleventh Circuit declined to address the availability of

punitive damages in prison condition cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3626. Hoever, 993 F.3d

at 1364 n.5.

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2014) (reasoning that if Congress “intended to abolish punitive damages in all

prisoner litigation under the PLRA, it would have done so directly, and in much

plainer terms”). Thus, the Court finds that § 3626 does not preclude a request

for punitive damages in this § 1983 action.

Finally, to the extent Plaintiff requests various types of relief in his

Opposition, such requests are improperly included in an opposition to a motion.

Also, to the extent Plaintiff asks for fixed wing and hand-held camera footage,

his request is premature because a scheduling order has not been entered yet.

Pl. Opp. at 1, 4.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendants, Smith, Prock, and Mitchell’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 9) is GRANTED only to the extent that Plaintiff’s

official capacity claims against all Defendants are dismissed, and DENIED in

all other respects.

2. All Defendants shall file an answer to the Complaint within

twenty-one (21) days from the date of this Order.

3. A separate order will enter setting case management deadlines.

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DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 25th day of

November, 2024.

BRIAN, DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-11 11/25

Jonathan Michael Burton, #Y50899

Counsel of Record