State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

STATE OF CONNECTICUT EX REL. JEREMIAH

DUNN, CHIEF STATE ANIMAL CONTROL

OFFICER v. NANCY BURTON

(AC 45710)

Alvord, Elgo and Seeley, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court vesting in the

plaintiff ownership of numerous goats in the defendant’s possession found

to be neglected and cruelly treated and from the judgment of the court

dismissing the defendant’s counterclaim. The defendant claimed, inter alia,

that the court improperly determined that she failed to comply with its

order to relinquish ownership of the goats or pay a surety or cash bond by

the deadline. Held:

The defendant’s claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the verified

petition to vest temporary custody of the goats with the Department of

Agriculture failed because the petition sufficiently detailed the defendant’s

neglect and cruel treatment of the goats so as to comply with the require-

ments of the governing statute ((Supp. 2022) § 22-329a (c)).

This court declined to review the defendant’s inadequately briefed claims

that the trial court improperly denied her motion to suppress certain evi-

dence, that it did not decide her motion to relinquish the goats in a timely

manner, that it improperly denied her motion to relinquish, that § 22-329a

is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in the present case, and that

the trial court improperly dismissed her counterclaim, in part, on the ground

of sovereign immunity.

This court could not conclude that the defendant was denied due process

when she was not allowed to present her motion to suppress certain evidence

at the hearing regarding the temporary custody of the goats, as that hearing

resulted in only an order of temporary custody of the goats and, had the

defendant posted bond as required by § 22-329a (f), she could have presented

her concerns about the evidence at a subsequent hearing.

This court declined to review the defendant’s claim that she was entitled

to notice and a hearing prior to the seizure of her goats pursuant to statute

(§ 19a-341), the defendant having failed to identify where in the voluminous

record the trial court’s ruling on that claim could be found.

The trial court did not incorrectly conclude that temporary custody of the

goats should vest with the department, the plaintiff having established that

it was more probable than not that the goats were neglected or cruelly

treated by the defendant.

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

The trial court’s finding that the defendant did not relinquish ownership of

the goats by the deadline ordered by the court was supported by the record

and was not clearly erroneous.

The trial court did not improperly determine that the defendant failed to

pay the bond ordered by the court pursuant to § 22-329a (c), as there was

no dispute that she did not pay the required amount by the deadline.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing, in part, the defen-

dant’s counterclaim on the basis of the prior pending action doctrine because

the present action and a separate action brought by the defendant that was

pending before the Superior Court were virtually alike.

Argued March 5—officially released November 26, 2024

Procedural History

Verified petition seeking, inter alia, custody in favor

of the plaintiff of certain animals in the defendant’s

possession that allegedly were neglected or cruelly

treated, and other relief, brought to the Superior Court

in the judicial district of Hartford, where the court,

Cobb, J., issued an order vesting temporary custody of

the animals with the plaintiff; thereafter, the case was

transferred to the Superior Court in the judicial district

of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket, where the

court, Bellis, J., denied the defendant’s motion to sup-

press certain evidence and rendered judgment vesting

permanent custody of the animals with the Department

of Agriculture, from which the defendant appealed to

this court; subsequently, the defendant filed a counter-

claim; thereafter, the court, Bellis, J., granted the plain-

tiff’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim and rendered

judgment thereon, and the defendant filed an amended

appeal. Affirmed.

Nancy Burton, self-represented, the appellant (defen-

dant).

Matthew I. Levine, deputy associate attorney general,

with whom were Daniel M. Salton, assistant attorney

general, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney gen-

eral, for the appellee (plaintiff).

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

Opinion

SEELEY, J. The self-represented defendant, Nancy

Burton, appeals from the judgment of the trial court

vesting permanent custody with the Commissioner of

Agriculture, through the Department of Agriculture

(department), of sixty-five goats owned by the defen-

dant and from the judgment of the court dismissing the

defendant’s counterclaim against the plaintiff, the state

of Connecticut. On appeal, the defendant raises a num-

ber of claims, which we distill to the following: (1) the

court lacked jurisdiction over the verified petition filed

by Jeremiah Dunn, the chief animal control officer of

the plaintiff, to vest temporary custody of the goats

with the department, (2) the court improperly denied

her motion to suppress, which attacked the process by

which the warrant to search her property and seize the

goats was issued pursuant to General Statutes (Supp.

2022) § 22-329a (b),1 (3) she was ‘‘denied due process

when she was not allowed to present [her] motion to

suppress for adjudication,’’ (4) she was entitled to

notice and a hearing prior to the seizure of her goats

pursuant to General Statutes § 19a-341,2 (5) the court

improperly determined that the goats were subjected

to neglect and cruel treatment, (6) the court improperly

determined that the defendant failed to comply with its

order to relinquish ownership of the goats by April 16,

2021, or pay a surety or cash bond in the amount of

$32,000 by that date, (7) § 22-329a is unconstitutional

on its face and as applied in this case, and (8) the court

improperly dismissed the defendant’s counterclaim on

the ground that the claims raised in the counterclaim

were barred by either sovereign immunity or the prior

1

Hereinafter, unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 22-329a in

this opinion are to the version of the statute set forth in the 2022 supplement

to the General Statutes.

2

Although § 19a-341 was amended in 2024; see Public Acts 2024, No. 24-

70, § 1; that amendment has no bearing on the merits of this appeal. For

simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

pending action doctrine. We affirm the judgments of

the court.

The following facts, as set forth in the record or the

trial court’s memorandum of decision vesting tempo-

rary custody of the goats with the department, and

procedural history are relevant to this appeal. At all

relevant times, the defendant was the owner of real

property located at 147 Cross Highway in Redding

(property), on which she kept a herd of goats. The

Redding Police Department (police department) had

received at least 120 complaints regarding the goats

kept on the property, most of which related to roaming

goats and violations of town ordinances. In April, 2020,

one of the goats was in the road and was struck by a

motor vehicle.3 The department, as well, received at

least five complaints regarding the goats, most of which

concerned their care and condition. On or about Octo-

ber 7, 2020, the state animal control unit received a

complaint concerning injured and/or neglected goats

kept on the property. Following that complaint, on

October 15, 2020, Barbara Godejohn, a state animal

control officer, along with Redding Police Detective

Christina Dias, observed approximately fifty goats on

the property, one of which appeared to be walking on

its knees and unable to stand. Subsequently, Charles

DellaRocco, a state animal control officer, was assigned

to investigate a complaint made by the defendant and,

on December 10, 2020, he went to the property.

Although the defendant did not allow DellaRocco onto

the property, DellaRocco was able to observe thirty-

five to forty-five goats from a distance, one of which

was visibly limping. On February 3, 2021, DellaRocco

observed the goats from a nearby location, where he

viewed the defendant as she provided a minimal amount

3

As a result of the motor vehicle accident involving the goat, the defendant

was arrested and charged with animal cruelty. That case is pending before

the Superior Court.

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

of hay to a goat paddock containing ten goats. On the

basis of DellaRocco’s observations of the goats on Feb-

ruary 3, 2021, the department decided to conduct fur-

ther surveillance of the property for the purpose of

determining the condition of the herd. That surveil-

lance, which concluded on March 4, 2021, resulted in

a number of animal health and property management

concerns, including that the goats were not given

enough food and fresh water, they were not provided

with adequate shelters from the elements, the existing

shelters were in disrepair, either missing walls or a roof,

and the goats were living in unsanitary conditions as a

result of manure piling up several feet high. The goats

themselves appeared to be in poor condition as well,

with some having overgrown hooves, which affected

their gait and mobility.

As a result of these concerns, Dunn filed an applica-

tion for a search and seizure warrant pursuant to § 22-

329a (b) to seize the goats. The warrant application

was accompanied by an affidavit from DellaRocco, who

attested, on the basis of his observations, that the goats

were being treated cruelly.4 The court granted the appli-

cation and issued the warrant on March 9, 2021, finding

that there was probable cause that the goats were

neglected or cruelly treated. The following day, the

warrant was executed, and the department took cus-

tody of sixty-five live goats and one dead goat from

the property. Furthermore, members of the department

who were present during the execution of the warrant

discovered between forty and fifty dead goats, in vari-

ous stages of decomposition, in multiple locations

throughout the property. Thereafter, Dunn filed a veri-

fied petition seeking, inter alia, temporary custody of

the goats and requesting the court to issue an order to

the defendant to show cause why the court should not

4

Tanya Wescovich, a state animal control officer, was a coaffiant on the

affidavit in support of the search warrant.

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

vest custody of the goats in the department.5 The court

granted that request, issued a show cause order to the

defendant and ordered a remote hearing to be held on

March 30, 2021. The court held an evidentiary hearing

on the verified petition for temporary custody on March

30 and April 8, 2021. Thereafter, the court, Cobb, J.,

granted the petition in part and ordered, inter alia, that

‘‘[t]emporary care and custody of the sixty-four live

goats seized by the [plaintiff] . . . shall continue to be

vested in the [plaintiff] . . . .’’

In its memorandum of decision relating to the plain-

tiff’s request seeking an order of temporary custody of

the sixty-five goats seized from the property, the court

made the following findings: ‘‘The defendant is the

owner of the property located at 147 Cross Highway,

Redding . . . and sixty-five live goats that lived on the

property prior to March 10, 2021, when the animals

were seized by the [plaintiff]. The defendant had owned

other goats that died on the property. Forty to fifty

goats were found dead and decaying on the property,

with some of the carcasses found decaying in black

plastic bags and Rubbermaid plastic bins. In October,

2020, the defendant voluntarily transferred twenty-

three live goats from her property and placed them at

an animal rescue facility.

‘‘The defendant neglected the goats and treated them

cruelly in a number of ways, including: (1) The defen-

dant did not properly maintain the hooves of many of

5

In the verified petition, Dunn also requested that (1) upon vesting tempo-

rary custody of the animals in the department, the court issue an order

requiring the defendant either to relinquish ownership of the goats or post

a surety or cash bond with the department, (2) the court make a finding

that the goats were in imminent harm, neglected and/or cruelly treated in

violation of General Statutes § 53-247, (3) the court vest permanent owner-

ship and custody of the goats with the department, and (4) the court order

the defendant to pay to the department the expenses incurred by the depart-

ment to provide proper food, shelter and care to the goats, calculated at a

rate of $15 per goat per day until ownership of the goats is vested in the

plaintiff, as well as veterinary costs and expenses incurred.

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

the goats, allowing the hooves to grow too long which

impacted their mobility.

‘‘(2) The defendant did not maintain the property or

the shelters in that she did not remove manure that

accumulated on the property and inside the shelters.

Certain of the shelters had manure piled up to a foot

high. The buildup of the manure in the shelters limited

the space available in the shelters for the goats and

impeded the goats’ ability to use them. The manure was

also a hazard to the goats’ health and safety.

‘‘(3) Many of the goats seized by the [plaintiff] had

manure caked into their fur and were missing significant

areas of fur on their coats.

‘‘(4) The defendant failed to provide the goats with

adequate food or water. Many of the goats were under-

weight. Also, photographs depict many empty and dry

food and water containers on the property. Certain of

the buckets appeared to have had water in them but

the water had frozen due to the freezing temperatures.

When state investigators conducted a surveillance of

the property over a two day period, one noted she did

not see the defendant provide any food or water at

any time.

‘‘(5) When the defendant did provide water to the

goats, she did not use a hose system, but rather pur-

chased plastic gallon water bottles. The amount of

water provided to the goats from these water bottles

was insufficient. Also, the defendant then allowed

empty plastic water bottles to be left around the prop-

erty, where the goats had access and could chew on

them.

‘‘(6) The defendant did not provide the goats with

proper or adequate shelter. The number of shelters

located on the property [was] limited and sufficient to

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

accommodate only about thirty-five goats, not the sixty-

five goats living on the property. In addition, the shelters

were decrepit with missing walls and parts of ceilings.

As a result, many of the shelters failed to provide proper

protection for the animals from the rain, snow, cold,

wind and other inclement weather.

‘‘(7) The defendant allowed the property to be riddled

with numerous dead and decaying goats.

‘‘(8) The defendant allowed at least one goat to die

on the property without proper care or treatment nor

did she provide the goat with a proper or humane death.

On March 10, the [plaintiff] found a recently deceased

goat lying on the floor of a shelter used by the live

goats. There was evidence that the deceased goat had

fallen and could not get up and had been scraping his

legs against the floor of the shelter prior to its death.

Parts of that dead goat’s body had been eaten by rodents

or other vermin.

‘‘Since the goats were seized by the [plaintiff] on

March 10, 2021, and have been in the [department’s]

custody, one goat has died and six kids have been born,

putting the number of goats in the [department’s] care at

seventy. When the six kids were born, their birthweights

were unusually low, and all needed human intervention

to survive.

‘‘The court finds that while in the defendant’s care,

the sixty-five goats were in imminent harm and were

neglected and cruelly treated by the defendant. The

court, therefore, determines that the [plaintiff] has met

its burden to establish reasonable cause to find that the

animals’ condition and the circumstances surrounding

their care by the defendant require that temporary care

and custody continue to be assumed by the [plaintiff]

to safeguard the goats’ welfare.’’

The court, therefore, vested temporary care and cus-

tody of the sixty-four live goats seized and the newly

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

born kids in the department. The court also ordered

that the defendant, ‘‘[o]n or before April 16, 2021 . . .

relinquish ownership of the animals to the [plaintiff] or

post a surety or cash bond with the [department] in the

amount of [$500] per each of the sixty-four remaining

live goats seized by the [plaintiff] to pay for the reason-

able expenses in caring and providing for such animals

. . . .’’ The court further ordered the defendant to ‘‘pay

the expenses incurred by the [department] in providing

proper food, shelter and care to each animal calculated

at the rate of [$15] per goat per day beginning March

11, 2021, and continuing until the goats are returned to

the defendant, the defendant relinquishes custody of

the goats or permanent custody of the goats is vested

in the [department] . . . [and] . . . pay all veterinary

costs and expenses incurred for the welfare of the ani-

mals, which costs are not covered in the per diem rate

during the period the goats remain in the [department’s]

temporary care and possession.’’

On April 20, 2021, the plaintiff filed a motion for an

order requesting that the court vest permanent custody

of the goats in the department. The basis for the motion

was the defendant’s failure to post a bond or to volunta-

rily relinquish ownership of the goats, as ordered by

the court on April 9, 2021, and as required by § 22-329a

(f).6 In its motion, the plaintiff asserted: ‘‘Pursuant to

6

General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22-329a (f) provides: ‘‘If the court issues

an order vesting the animal’s temporary care and custody in some suitable

state, municipal or other public or private agency or person, the owner or

owners shall either relinquish ownership of the animal or post a surety bond

or cash bond with the agency or person in whom the animal’s temporary

care and custody was vested. The surety bond or cash bond shall be in the

amount of five hundred dollars for each animal placed in the temporary

care or custody of such agency or person and shall secure payment for the

reasonable expenses of the agency or person having temporary care and

custody of the animal in caring and providing for such animal until the court

makes a finding as to the animal’s disposition under subsection (g) of this

section. The requirement that a bond be posted may be waived if such

owner provides satisfactory evidence that such owner is indigent and unable

to pay for such bond.’’

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

the order of the court, the defendant was given a choice

of posting a bond, in order to protect the plaintiff from

the increasing expense of caring for her goats during

the pendency of these proceedings, or relinquishing

ownership over them. The order unambiguously

required the defendant to choose. The court required

the defendant to post a surety or cash bond in the

amount of $32,000 ($500 per animal). The defendant

has refused to comply with the order of the court.

Instead, the defendant sent a check to the plaintiff in

the amount of $450 and has attempted to unilaterally

modify the order to her benefit. Notably, the defendant’s

attempt to ignore the order is based, in part, on her

desire to proceed only to oppose the [plaintiff’s] efforts

to obtain ownership over nine specifically identified

goats. By any metric, the defendant has wilfully defied

the order of the court by failing to post the bond as

required by the court or [to] relinquish ownership over

the goats. As a result of the defendant’s refusal to com-

ply with the court’s order, ownership must be vested

in the [department].’’ The defendant filed an objection

to the plaintiff’s motion for an order on April 27, 2022.

On May 4, 2022, the court granted the plaintiff’s

motion for an order. In its written order, the court,

Bellis, J., stated: ‘‘The clear and unambiguous order of

the court . . . on April 9, 2021, required the defendant

to either relinquish control of the goats to the [plaintiff]

or post surety or cash bond with the [department] in

the amount of [$500] for each of the sixty-four remaining

live goats no later than April 16, 2021. While the defen-

dant filed a motion to ‘Relinquish Ownership of Goats

for Immediate Release to Qualified Animal Rescue

Sanctuaries’ on the April 16, 2021 deadline, that motion,

which was subsequently denied, was an offer to relin-

quish ownership of the goats to two animal sanctuaries

and various private individuals of the defendant’s own

choosing. Simply put, it was not an offer to relinquish

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

control of the goats to the [plaintiff]. As such, the defen-

dant did not relinquish control of the goats to the [plain-

tiff] by the April 16, 2021 court deadline. Therefore, the

sole issue for the court is whether the defendant posted

surety or cash bond with the [department] in the amount

of [$500] for each of the sixty-four remaining live goats.

The total amount due, on or before April 16, 2021, pursu-

ant to the court’s order, was $32,000. The defendant

makes no claim that the $32,000 was paid. The court

rejects the defendant’s argument that the [plaintiff]

waived the $32,000 based on her claim that the [plaintiff]

had done so in the past in other matters. There is neither

argument nor evidence in this case that the [plaintiff]

has waived the surety or cash bond, but, more import-

antly, the imposition of the surety or cash bond was a

binding order of the court [that] the parties were

required to comply with. For these reasons, the motion

of the [plaintiff] is granted. Permanent ownership of all

of the defendant’s goats and their offspring, born and

unborn, is vested in the [department]. Additionally, pur-

suant to . . . § 22-329a (h), the sum of $39,360 ($15/

day for forty-one days of care for sixty-four goats) plus

any veterinary costs not covered by the per diem rate

associated with the care of the goats for that forty-one

day time period shall be paid by the defendant to the

[department].’’ (Emphasis in original.)

Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for judg-

ment in accordance with the court’s May 4, 2022 order.

On June 22, 2022, the court, Bellis, J., granted the

motion and rendered judgment for the plaintiff with

respect to its action against the defendant but noted

that a counterclaim filed by the defendant remained

pending. The defendant appealed to this court from

the June 22, 2022 judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

Thereafter, the court, Bellis, J., granted a motion to

dismiss the counterclaim filed by the plaintiff following

argument on the motion, and the defendant filed an

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

amended appeal with this court challenging the judg-

ment dismissing her counterclaim. Additional facts and

procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

We first address the defendant’s claim that the court

lacked jurisdiction over the verified petition to vest

temporary custody of the goats with the department.

The defendant bases this claim on her assertion that,

because the verified petition fails to identify the goats

individually and to ‘‘plainly state’’ facts pertaining to

the neglect and cruel treatment with regard to each

goat seized, the goats were never brought within the

jurisdiction of the court as a result of this alleged defi-

ciency in the verified petition. Thus, according to the

defendant, the court lacked jurisdiction over this case

pursuant to the governing statute, § 22-329a (c). The

plaintiff, on the other hand, counters that this claim,

which concerns the sufficiency of the verified petition,

does not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of

the court. We conclude that, even if we assume, without

deciding, that the claim implicates the court’s jurisdic-

tion over the matter, the claim nonetheless fails, as

the verified complaint sufficiently complied with the

requirements of the statute.

We first set forth our standard of review for this

claim. The defendant’s claim ‘‘presents a question of

statutory construction over which we exercise plenary

review. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur funda-

mental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the

apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words,

we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the mean-

ing of the statutory language as applied to the facts

of [the] case, including the question of whether the

language actually does apply. . . . The meaning of a

statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from

the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and

unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable

results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the

statute shall not be considered. General Statutes § 1-

2z. . . . [A] statute is plain and unambiguous when the

meaning . . . is so strongly indicated or suggested by

the [statutory] language . . . that . . . it appears to be

the meaning and appears to preclude any other likely

meaning. . . . [I]f the text of the statute at issue . . .

would permit more than one likely or plausible mean-

ing, its meaning cannot be said to be plain and unambig-

uous.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal

quotation marks omitted.) Demarco v. Charter Oak

Temple Restoration Assn., Inc., 226 Conn. App. 335,

339–40, 317 A.3d 1137, cert. denied, 349 Conn. 923, 321

A.3d 1130 (2024). ‘‘It is a basic tenet of statutory con-

struction that [w]e construe a statute as a whole and

read its subsections concurrently in order to reach a

reasonable overall interpretation.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Townsend v. Commissioner of Correc-

tion, 226 Conn. App. 313, 331, 317 A.3d 1147 (2024).

Applying these principles to § 22-329a (c), and for the

reasons that follow, we conclude that the defendant’s

interpretation of § 22-329a (c) is not consistent with

the plain language of the statute.

Section 22-329a (c) applies after the department has

taken custody of animals and provides in relevant part

that an animal control officer ‘‘shall file with the [S]upe-

rior [C]ourt . . . a verified petition plainly stating such

facts of neglect or cruel treatment as to bring such

animal within the jurisdiction of the court . . . .’’

(Emphasis added.) The defendant argues that we

should construe ‘‘such animal’’ as used in the statute as

meaning each individual animal. She does so, however,

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

without citation to any authority supporting that inter-

pretation.7 ‘‘Courts are not permitted to read words into

the statute that the legislature did not insert.’’ Dusto v.

Rogers Corp., 222 Conn. App. 71, 108, 304 A.3d 446

(2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 939, 307 A.3d 274 (2024);

see also Randolph v. Mambrino, 216 Conn. App. 126,

143, 284 A.3d 645 (2022) (‘‘ ‘[w]e will not read into a

[statute] words or limitations that are not there’ ’’). We,

therefore, decline to read into the statute words that

are not stated therein.

Furthermore, as we have stated, the statute must be

read as a whole. Subsection (b) of § 22-329a permits

any animal control officer to take physical custody of

‘‘any animal upon issuance of a warrant finding proba-

ble cause that such animal is neglected or is cruelly

treated . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) ‘‘[S]uch animal’’

under the statute thus means any animal over which

the animal control officer, i.e., the department, takes

custody, which could range from one to many animals.

In the present case, custody was taken over sixty-five

7

In her appellate briefs, the defendant cites only to other Superior Court

animal welfare cases in which the verified petitions addressed specific

animals in support of her claim that each of the sixty-five goats had to be

referenced individually in the verified petition in the present case. See State

ex rel. Dunn v. Kornstein, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,

Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (February 20, 2020) (seizure of 1 cow, 137

chickens, 33 ducks, 6 dogs, and 18 cattle); State ex rel. Connors v. Olajos,

Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S

(March 8, 2016) (seizure of 32 horses, 78 chickens, 19 rabbits and 2 dogs);

State ex rel. Dunn v. Wilson, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford,

Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S (February 4, 2021) (seizure of eight horses).

These cases, in addition to being nonbinding authority, do not provide

support for that proposition. Although the verified petition in each case

made specific references to some of the animals seized, each petition did

not do so with respect to the remainder of the seized animals and, instead,

referred to them generally or as a whole by category of animal. These cases,

thus, do not support a conclusion that the plaintiff is obligated under the

statute to identify each animal that is part of the seizure and make specific

factual allegations regarding each animal individually, and the defendant

has not provided any other authority demonstrating otherwise.

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

goats. It logically follows that the requirement in sub-

section (c) of a plain statement of facts of neglect and

cruel treatment in the verified petition must be made

as to the animals—the sixty-five goats—over which the

department took custody. In the present case, the veri-

fied petition set forth in great detail the observations

of various animal control officers during the course of

the surveillance operation that took place prior to the

seizure of the goats. Those observations revealed health

concerns related to the goats, as well as property man-

agement concerns, including that ten to twelve ‘‘goats

had extremely long hooves that affected their mobility,’’

one of the goats appeared to be limping and unable to

stand, the animals had to take shelter in manure filled

enclosures because manure was allowed to accumulate

in and around the paddocks, ‘‘the animals [did] not

have adequate access to fresh water,’’ and ‘‘the shelter

provided in the paddocks did not provide enough space

to shelter all of the animals and the shelters did not

provide an adequate wind break for high winds and

cold weather.’’ The verified petition further outlined the

conditions of the goats and the property following the

seizure. For example, it explained that, ‘‘[d]uring the

execution of the warrant, dozens of dead goats, esti-

mated to be between forty . . . and fifty . . . were

discovered in multiple locations on the property in vari-

ous stages of decomposition’’ and that dead goats were

found in plastic bags, inside trash containers, and in a

shallow pit that was covered by plywood. Of the sixty-

five goats that were seized, the verified petition alleged

that a number of them were visibly underweight, had

fur that was missing, matted, or caked in mud and

manure, and had ‘‘extremely long hooves that were not

being maintained and were affecting the mobility of the

animals.’’

We conclude that the facts alleged in the verified

petition sufficiently detailed the neglect and cruel treat-

ment of the goats so as to comply with the terms of

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

§ 22-329a (c). The clear and unambiguous language of

the statute requires the animal control officer to include

in the verified petition a plain statement of the facts

demonstrating neglect and cruel treatment of ‘‘such

animal’’ over which custody has been taken. In the

present case, sixty-five goats were seized from the prop-

erty. The verified petition sets forth a plain statement

of the facts pertaining to the neglect and cruel treatment

of the herd of goats that resided on the property. There

is no language in the statute requiring that the plain

statement of facts of neglect and cruel treatment single

out ‘‘each’’ individual animal seized, as argued by the

defendant. Moreover, the allegations of cruel treatment

pertaining to the goats stemmed in large part from the

defendant’s management of the property. As we have

stated, the verified petition alleged that the defendant

failed to provide adequate shelter for the goats, failed

to give them sufficient access to fresh water, and

allowed the goats to live in manure filled shelters and

with dead goats in various stages of decomposition

strewn about the property. All of the goats on the prop-

erty were being subjected to these unsanitary condi-

tions. It, thus, would be nonsensical for the statute

to require that the verified petition assert a separate

allegation as to each individual goat when, as here, the

allegations contained therein plainly stated the cruel

treatment to which the goats, as a herd, were being

subjected. ‘‘[A] court must construe a statute as written.

. . . Courts may not by construction supply omissions

. . . or add exceptions merely because it appears that

good reasons exist for adding them. . . . The intent of

the legislature, as this court has repeatedly observed,

is to be found not in what the legislature meant to say,

but in the meaning of what it did say. . . . It is axiom-

atic that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to

accomplish a particular result. That is a function of the

legislature.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

v. Richard P., 179 Conn. App. 676, 688, 181 A.3d 107,

cert. denied, 328 Conn. 924, 181 A. 3d 567 (2018). The

defendant’s claim, therefore, is unavailing.

II

The defendant next challenges the court’s denial of

her April 8, 2021 motion to suppress,8 which attacked

the process by which the warrant to search her property

and seize the goats was issued pursuant to § 22-329a

(b). In her motion, the defendant alleged that the war-

rant was ‘‘procured under false pretenses’’ by Della-

Rocco, that his affirmations under oath to procure the

warrant were ‘‘highly suspect,’’ and that his affidavit

was ‘‘replete with false, fanciful and ridiculous’’ asser-

tions that were made recklessly and that did not estab-

lish probable cause. The defendant sought a new proba-

ble cause hearing, the warrant ‘‘stricken,’’ and the goats

returned. On appeal, the defendant reiterates her asser-

tions that DellaRocco lacked credibility and that the

warrant failed to establish probable cause. She now

argues for the first time that (1) DellaRocco lacked

credibility because he wilfully withheld facts, namely,

that he failed to disclose a prior arrest on felony charges

of larceny and forgery, and that such facts, if known,

‘‘would have doomed the [warrant] application’’; and

(2) the trial judge who made the finding of probable

cause to issue the warrant had a conflict of interest.

Because these arguments were not raised in the defen-

dant’s motion to suppress9 and are being raised for the

8

In an order dated April 13, 2022, the court, Bellis, J., denied the motion

summarily.

9

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the defendant ‘‘does not have a

fourth amendment right to suppress evidence in civil proceedings like animal

welfare actions.’’ As the plaintiff maintains, ‘‘[o]ur jurisprudence has long

held that one cannot exclude evidence based on an alleged fourth amend-

ment violation in civil cases.’’ Although this court recently determined that

the exclusionary rule does not apply in the context of a civil animal welfare

action involving a warrantless search; see State ex rel. Dunn v. Connelly,

228 Conn. App. 458, 459–60, A.3d (2024); the present case, in contrast,

involves a claim that the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained

assertions that were known to be false and omitted material facts, thereby

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

first time on appeal, we decline to review them.10 See

Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas v. Burke, 218 Conn.

App. 542, 546 n.4, 292 A.3d 81 (declining to review claim

raised for first time on appeal), cert. denied, 347 Conn.

904, 297 A.3d 567 (2023). Moreover, with respect to her

claim that DellaRocco’s allegations in his affidavit in

support of the warrant lacked credibility and did not

establish probable cause, the defendant makes conclu-

sory assertions without any citation to authority or anal-

ysis of the law as applied to this case. ‘‘Where the parties

cite no law and provide no analysis of their claims, we

do not review such claims.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Jalbert v. Mulligan, 153 Conn. App. 124, 133,

101 A.3d 279, cert. denied, 315 Conn. 901, 104 A.3d 107

implicating Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L.

Ed. 2d 667 (1978). See footnote 10 of this opinion. We need not decide

whether the exclusionary rule applies in such circumstances in light of

the defendant’s failure to adequately brief her claim regarding her motion

to suppress.

10

We note that, in her motion to suppress, the defendant cited to Franks

v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978),

in support of her claim that the warrant affidavit was premised on false

statements and omitted material facts. ‘‘In Franks v. Delaware, supra, [438

U.S.] 155–56, the United States Supreme Court held that where the defendant

makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly

and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by

the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is

necessary to the finding of probable cause, the [f]ourth [a]mendment requires

that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request. . . . The court in Franks

mentioned only a false statement . . . included . . . in the warrant affida-

vit; subsequent cases, however, have extended Franks to include material

omissions from such an affidavit.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Grant, 286 Conn. 499, 519–20, 944 A.2d 947, cert.

denied, 555 U.S. 916, 129 S. Ct. 271, 172 L. Ed. 2d 200 (2008). On appeal,

the defendant has neither cited to Franks nor argued in her appellate briefs

that she was entitled to a Franks hearing. We, therefore, deem any such

claim abandoned. See Samelko v. Kingstone Ins. Co., 329 Conn. 249, 255

n.3, 184 A.3d 741 (2018) (claim raised at trial but not argued on appeal was

deemed abandoned); see also Harris v. Bradley Memorial Hospital & Health

Center, Inc., 306 Conn. 304, 319, 50 A.3d 841 (2012) (‘‘[a]n appellant who

fails to brief a claim abandons it’’ (emphasis omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted)), cert. denied, 569 U.S. 918, 133 S. Ct. 1809, 185 L. Ed. 2d

812 (2013).

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

(2014). ‘‘We repeatedly have stated that [w]e are not

required to review issues that have been improperly

presented to this court through an inadequate brief.

. . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is

required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure

to brief the issue properly.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Prescott v. Gilshteyn, 227 Conn. App. 553, 571

n.8, 322 A.3d 1060 (2024). Because the defendant has

inadequately briefed her challenge to the denial of her

motion to suppress, we decline to review this claim.11

11

We are mindful that ‘‘[i]t is the established policy of the Connecticut

courts to be solicitous of [self-represented] litigants and when it does not

interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice

liberally in favor of the [self-represented] party. . . . Nonetheless,

[a]lthough we allow [self-represented] litigants some latitude, the right of

self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant

rules of procedural and substantive law.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Burton v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 337 Conn. 781, 803–804, 256

A.3d 655 (2021); see also Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Caldrello, 192 Conn.

App. 1, 34, 219 A.3d 858 (‘‘ ‘[a]lthough we are solicitous of the rights of pro

se litigants . . . [s]uch a litigant is bound by the same rules . . . and proce-

dure as those qualified to practice law’ ’’), cert. denied, 334 Conn. 905, 220

A.3d 37 (2019). ‘‘[A]lthough we recognize and adhere to the well-founded

policy to accord leeway to self-represented parties in the appeal process,

our deference is not unlimited; nor is a litigant on appeal relieved of the

obligation to sufficiently articulate a claim so that it is recognizable to a

reviewing court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) L. K. v. K. K., 226

Conn. App. 279, 303 n.11, 318 A.3d 243 (2024); see also Burton v. Dept. of

Environmental Protection, supra, 804; Bank of New York Mellon v. Horsey,

227 Conn. App. 94, 107 n.9, 321 A.3d 441 (2024). Moreover, although the

defendant is a self-represented party, she was a licensed attorney prior

to being disbarred in 2008; see https://www.jud.ct.gov/attorneyfirminquiry/

JurisDetail.aspx (last visited November 15, 2024); and, therefore, has legal

training that most self-represented litigants do not have. See Nationstar

Mortgage, LLC v. Giacomi, 226 Conn. App. 467, 480 n.8, 319 A.3d 794 (2024);

see also United States v. Pierce, 649 Fed. Appx. 117, 117 n.1 (2d Cir. 2016)

(‘‘[The defendant] was a licensed attorney before he was automatically

disbarred as a result of his conviction in this case. . . . While [i]t is well

established that a court is ordinarily obligated to afford a special solicitude

to [self-represented] litigants, it is also well established that a lawyer repre-

senting himself [or herself] ordinarily receives no such solicitude at all. . . .

Because the rationale for this latter rule is that an attorney is experienced

in litigation and familiar with the procedural setting presented . . . it

extends to disbarred attorneys . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

III

The defendant next claims that she was ‘‘denied due

process when she was not allowed to present [her]

motion to suppress for adjudication.’’ We disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to this claim. At the end of the day of the

hearing on March 30, 2021, concerning the plaintiff’s

verified petition, the plaintiff’s counsel requested that

the court issue an order for temporary custody, which

he argued would trigger subsection (f) of § 22-329a and

allow for the remainder of the hearing to address a

permanent order for custody of the goats. The court

declined to issue any order at that time. On April 8,

marks omitted.)), cert. denied, 580 U.S. 1104, 137 S. Ct. 841, 197 L. Ed. 2d

78 (2017); Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining

that ‘‘the degree of solicitude’’ afforded to self-represented litigants is not

identical and ‘‘may be lessened where the particular [self-represented] liti-

gant is experienced in litigation and familiar with the procedural setting

presented’’). The defendant also has represented herself in numerous appeals

before this court and our Supreme Court. See Burton v. Dept. of Environ-

mental Protection, supra, 337 Conn. 781; Burton v. Commissioner of Envi-

ronmental Protection, 323 Conn. 668, 150 A.3d 666 (2016); Burton v. Domin-

ion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542, 23 A.3d 1176 (2011); Statewide

Grievance Committee v. Burton, 299 Conn. 405, 10 A.3d 507 (2011); Burton

v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 291 Conn. 789, 970 A.2d

640 (2009); Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Connecticut Siting

Council, 286 Conn. 57, 942 A.2d 345 (2008); Statewide Grievance Committee

v. Burton, 282 Conn. 1, 917 A.2d 966 (2007); Jackson v. Drury, 191 Conn.

App. 587, 216 A.3d 768, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 938, 218 A.3d 1050 (2019);

Burton v. Freedom of Information Commission, 161 Conn. App. 654, 129

A.3d 721 (2015), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 901, 136 A.3d 642 (2016); Burton

v. Connecticut Siting Council, 161 Conn. App. 329, 127 A.3d 1066 (2015),

cert. denied, 320 Conn. 925, 133 A.3d 459 (2016); Burton v. Dominion

Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 129 Conn. App. 203, 21 A.3d 824, cert. denied, 302

Conn. 929, 28 A.3d 342 (2011); Statewide Grievance Committee v. Burton,

88 Conn. App. 523, 871 A.2d 380 (2005), aff’d, 282 Conn. 1, 917 A.2d 966

(2007); Honan v. Dimyan, 85 Conn. App. 66, 856 A.2d 463 (2004). As a

result, she is more experienced in litigation than most self-represented

parties and is well versed with the rules of appellate procedure. See Turner

v. Commissioner of Correction, 201 Conn. App. 196, 224, 242 A.3d 512

(2020), cert. denied, 336 Conn. 945, 250 A.3d 694 (2021).

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

2021, at the outset of the second day of the hearing,

the court referred to the conversation from the previous

day concerning the issue of whether the hearing should

be for a permanent or temporary order. The court stated

that it believed that the statute called for a two step

process, that is, the court first had to determine whether

a temporary order of custody was necessary and then,

if necessary, it could address permanency at a separate

proceeding. Both counsel for the plaintiff and the defen-

dant initially agreed with the court proceeding that way

and focusing the hearing on whether an order of tempo-

rary custody was warranted. Thereafter, the defendant

notified the court that she had filed a motion to suppress

and requested that her motion take priority over the

proceedings that day, as she believed that ‘‘it should

be considered first before anything else happen[ed] fur-

ther in th[e] case.’’ The court responded by stating that

the proceedings that day would be moving forward and

indicated that it would not be addressing the defen-

dant’s motion to suppress at the hearing that day, after

which the defendant objected to the way in which the

court was proceeding with the hearing, arguing that her

due process rights required the court to consider her

motion to suppress before continuing with the hearing.

The court, nonetheless, overruled her objection to mov-

ing forward on the issue of a temporary order and

stated: ‘‘With respect to your motion to suppress, this

is a civil proceeding, it’s not a criminal proceeding. Your

motion will be taken up in due course, but not right

now. This is a temporary proceeding, as I said before.’’

(Emphasis added.)

The defendant asserts in her appellate brief that ‘‘[t]he

motion was later marked ‘off’ . . . sua sponte by [Hon.

Jane S. Scholl, judge trial referee], who had virtually

no other involvement in the case. The motion was even-

tually denied without notice or a hearing by Judge Bellis

on April 13, 2022 . . . a full year later. The defendant’s

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

supplement to motion to suppress . . . and motion in

limine were also summarily disposed of by denial.

Thereby, the defendant was denied the opportunity to

pursue her challenge to the warrant, which, if success-

ful, would have led to immediate release of all the goats

and termination of this case and threats of excessive

monetary penalties. The court’s refusal to allow the

defendant a hearing on the motion to suppress and

related motions was a clear denial of due process.’’

(Emphasis added.)

We next set forth general principles governing due

process claims. ‘‘Whether a party was deprived of his

[or her] due process rights is a question of law to which

appellate courts grant plenary review. . . . The core

interests protected by procedural due process concern

the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and

in a meaningful manner. . . . Fundamental tenets of

due process require that all persons directly concerned

in the result of an adjudication be given reasonable

notice and opportunity to present their claims or

defenses. . . . Due process, unlike some legal rules, is

not a technical conception with a fixed content unre-

lated to time, place and circumstances. . . . Instead,

due process is a flexible principle that calls for such

procedural protections as the particular situation

demands.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Cameron v. Santiago, 223 Conn. App. 836,

842–43, 310 A.3d 391 (2024). ‘‘Due process does not

mandate full evidentiary hearings on all matters, and

not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call

for the same kind of procedure. . . . So long as the

procedure afforded adequately protects the individual

interests at stake, there is no reason to impose substan-

tially greater burdens . . . under the guise of due pro-

cess.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Sarah

S., 110 Conn. App. 576, 589 n.7, 955 A.2d 657 (2008).

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

Our Supreme Court has explained that ‘‘[t]he extent

to which procedural due process must be afforded the

recipient is influenced by the extent to which he [or

she] may be condemned to suffer grievous loss. . . .

Whether the loss threatened by a particular type of

proceeding is sufficiently grave to warrant more than

average certainty on the part of the factfinder turns on

both the nature of the private interest threatened and

the permanency of the threatened loss.’’ (Internal quota-

tion marks omitted.) In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD),

189 Conn. 276, 297, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).

Under the statutory scheme of § 22-329a, if an animal

has been seized pursuant to a warrant finding probable

cause that such animal is neglected or is cruelly treated

under subsection (b), an animal control officer must

file a verified petition plainly stating the facts of neglect

or cruel treatment. See General Statutes (Supp. 2022)

§ 22-329a (b) and (c). Pursuant to subsection (d) of

§ 22-329a, ‘‘[i]f physical custody of an animal has been

taken pursuant to subsection . . . (b) . . . and it

appears from the allegations of the petition filed pursu-

ant to subsection (c) of this section and other affirma-

tions of fact accompanying the petition, or provided

subsequent thereto, that there is reasonable cause to

find that the animal’s condition or the circumstances

surrounding its care require that temporary care and

custody be immediately assumed to safeguard its wel-

fare, the court shall either (1) issue an order to show

cause why the court should not vest in some suitable

state, municipal or other public or private agency or

person the animal’s temporary care and custody pend-

ing a hearing on the petition, or (2) issue an order

vesting in some suitable state, municipal or other public

or private agency or person the animal’s temporary care

and custody pending a hearing on the petition. A hearing

on the order issued by the court pursuant to subdivision

(1) or (2) of this subsection [(show cause order)] shall

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

be held not later than fourteen days after the issuance

of such order.’’ If, following a hearing on the show

cause order, a court vests temporary ‘‘care and custody’’

of the animal ‘‘in some suitable state, municipal or other

public or private agency or person,’’ the owner ‘‘shall

either relinquish ownership of the animal or post a

surety bond or cash bond’’ to pay for the reasonable

expenses of the agency having temporary care of the

animal until there is a final disposition pursuant to

subsection (g). General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22-

329a (f).

Following an order of temporary custody, § 22-329a

(g) (1) requires that a hearing must be held at which

it must be demonstrated that the animal, in fact, is or

is not being neglected or cruelly treated.12 Subsection

(g) of § 22-329a provides in relevant part: ‘‘If, after hear-

ing, the court finds that the animal is neglected or cru-

elly treated, it shall vest [permanent] ownership of the

animal’’ with the department or ‘‘any state, municipal

or other public or private agency . . . or . . . per-

son,’’ but if the court finds that the animal is not

neglected or cruelly treated, it may return the animal

to its owner. General Statutes (Supp. 2022) § 22-329a

(g) (1) and (3). At this hearing, the animal owner has

an opportunity to contest the seizure, which necessarily

includes challenging the validity of the warrant. Thus,

under the statute, the deprivation of an animal owner’s

right in a temporary custody adjudication is neither

final nor irrevocable; such order must be followed by

a hearing to determine permanent ownership of the

animal, including consideration of whether such animal

must be returned to the owner. See Cookson v. Cookson,

201 Conn. 229, 235, 514 A.2d 323 (1986) (‘‘the depriva-

tion of rights in a temporary custody adjudication is

12

We note that there is nothing in the statute that prevents parties from

agreeing to hold a hearing in one step, as long as the hearing is held within

fourteen days of the show cause order.

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26 ,0 0 Conn. App. 1

State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

neither final nor irrevocable’’ (emphasis added; internal

quotation marks omitted)).

In the present case, the court made it clear to the

parties that it would be addressing the verified petition

in a two step process: first, it would determine, follow-

ing the March 30 and April 8 hearings, whether an order

of temporary custody of the goats was necessary. If it

did so and issued such an order, and if the defendant

subsequently paid the bond set by the statute and did

not relinquish ownership of her goats, then a second

hearing would be held to address permanent custody

of the goats. Thus, when the defendant raised the issue

of her motion to suppress and the court told her it

would not be addressed at that temporary proceeding

but that it would be ‘‘taken up in due course,’’ the court

was indicating that it was not appropriate to address

the motion at that time, but that it would be addressed

at a future hearing. Pursuant to § 22-329a (g) (1), there

would have been a hearing on permanent custody, pro-

vided the defendant paid the bond as set forth in the

court’s order and the statute. In the present case, how-

ever, the defendant did not post the bond and, conse-

quently, a subsequent hearing on permanent custody,

at which she could have raised her challenge to the

validity of the search warrant, never took place. On

the basis of this record, we cannot conclude that the

defendant was denied due process. In light of the fact

that the hearing on April 8, 2021, resulted in an order

of temporary custody of the goats, the defendant was

not denied due process as a result of the court’s failure

to consider her motion to suppress at that hearing.13 As

13

In State v. Kane, 218 Conn. 151, 588 A.2d 179 (1991), the Supreme Court

addressed a similar issue in the context of a probable cause hearing. Pursuant

to General Statutes § 54-46a, a defendant charged with any crime punishable

by death, life imprisonment without the possibility of release or life imprison-

ment is entitled to a probable cause hearing. In Kane, the defendant argued

on appeal that he was denied due process because the statute governing

probable cause hearings precluded him from having a hearing on his motion

to suppress at the probable cause stage of the proceedings. See id., 155.

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

the court stated, the motion would be ‘‘taken up in due

course.’’ The fact that the motion was never ultimately

‘‘taken up’’ is due to the defendant’s failure to post the

bond as required by the statute and ordered by the

court, which obviated the need for a permanent custody

hearing. See part VI B of this opinion. The defendant’s

concerns about the validity of the warrant could have

been raised at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner had she posted a bond for the goats following

the order vesting their temporary custody in the depart-

ment. The defendant’s claim that she was denied due

process, therefore, fails.

IV

The defendant’s next claim is that she was entitled

to notice and a hearing prior to the seizure of her goats

pursuant to § 19a-341.14 Specifically, the defendant

In rejecting the defendant’s claim, the Supreme Court explained that ‘‘[a]

preliminary hearing is not designed to be a dress rehearsal for the trial.

. . . [A]s long as the defendant was afforded the opportunity to challenge

the admissibility of his statements at trial, the adjudicatory phase of the

proceeding against him, his right to due process was preserved.’’ (Citations

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 159.

14

General Statutes § 19a-341 is titled, ‘‘Agricultural or farming operation

not deemed a nuisance; exceptions. Spring or well water collection operation

not deemed a nuisance,’’ is located in the chapter of the General Statutes

titled, ‘‘Public Health and Well-being,’’ and provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a)

Notwithstanding the provisions of any general statute or municipal ordi-

nance or regulation pertaining to nuisances to the contrary, no agricultural

or farming operation, place, establishment or facility, or any of its appurte-

nances, or the operation thereof, shall be deemed to constitute a nuisance,

either public or private, due to alleged objectionable (1) odor from livestock,

manure, fertilizer or feed, (2) noise from livestock or farm equipment used

in normal, generally acceptable farming procedures, (3) dust created during

plowing or cultivation operations, (4) use of chemicals, provided such chemi-

cals and the method of their application conform to practices approved

by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection or, where

applicable, the Commissioner of Public Health, or (5) water pollution from

livestock or crop production activities, except the pollution of public or

private drinking water supplies, provided such activities conform to accept-

able management practices for pollution control approved by the Commis-

sioner of Energy and Environmental Protection; provided such agricultural

or farming operation, place, establishment or facility has been in operation

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

asserts that an investigation of her property and the

goats was conducted in 2017 and 2018 pursuant to § 19a-

341, which resulted in a finding that the goats

‘‘appear[ed] to be in good condition with food and water

available.’’ That finding is set forth in a 2018 investiga-

tion report by the department that was admitted as a

full exhibit at the March 30, 2021 hearing. On appeal, the

defendant relies on that report as ‘‘prima facie evidence

that [her] goat operation conforms with generally

accepted agricultural practices pursuant to § 19a-341

. . . .’’ She also argues that the plaintiff was thus

required to ‘‘overcome such prima facie evidence at a

hearing preceded by notice before it could lawfully

proceed with the 2021 seizure . . . .’’ We decline to

review this claim.

First, the defendant does not include any citations

in her appellate brief to the record showing when she

raised this claim before the court or when it was

addressed or decided by the court. Indeed, the report

itself, on which the defendant relies in making this

claim, makes no reference to § 19a-341. Instead, the

report was generated in connection with a complaint

of animal cruelty filed against the defendant pursuant

to General Statutes § 53-247 (a), and it simply concludes

that, at the end of the investigation that occurred in

2017 and 2018, ‘‘all goats on the property appear[ed]

to be in good condition with food and water available,’’

without mentioning any compliance with § 19a-341.

Moreover, at the March 30, 2021 hearing, when the

defendant offered the report into evidence, she made

no reference to § 19a-341 or to her claim that it entitled

her to a hearing prior to the seizure of her goats; instead,

for one year or more and has not been substantially changed, and such

operation follows generally accepted agricultural practices. Inspection and

approval of the agricultural or farming operation, place, establishment or

facility by the Commissioner of Agriculture or the commissioner’s designee

shall be prima facie evidence that such operation follows generally accepted

agricultural practices . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

she questioned DellaRocco about the investigation of

the complaint of animal cruelty that formed the basis

of the report. Also, on the basis of our review of the

record up to and through the temporary custody hearing

held on March 30 and April 8, 2021, we could not find

any motion filed by the defendant claiming that she

was entitled to notice and a hearing under § 19a-341

prior to the seizure of her animals in early March, 2021.

As our Supreme Court recently has stated, it is the

responsibility of parties, not an appellate court, ‘‘to

clearly identify how and where in the record the claim

that the party is raising on appeal was preserved for

review and where in the record the trial court’s ruling

on the claim may be found . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)

Dur-A-Flex, Inc. v. Dy, 349 Conn. 513, 589–90, 321 A.3d

295 (2024). That is especially true in a case such as the

present one, in which the pleadings are voluminous.

We, therefore, decline to review this claim.

V

The defendant next challenges the court’s determina-

tion that the plaintiff met its burden to establish that

the goats were subjected to neglect and cruel treatment

while in the defendant’s care. In its April 9, 2021 decision

vesting temporary custody of the goats with the depart-

ment, the court determined that the plaintiff met its

burden to establish ‘‘reasonable cause’’ that the goats

were neglected and cruelly treated by the defendant.

In support of her claim on appeal, the defendant first

argues that the court should have held the plaintiff to

the burden of proving its claim by a fair preponderance

of the evidence15 but, instead, improperly applied a

15

Proof by a preponderance of the evidence means, after a consideration

of all the evidence fairly and impartially, there is enough evidence to produce

‘‘a reasonable belief that what is sought to be proven is more likely true

than not true.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Aviles, 277 Conn.

281, 317, 891 A.2d 935, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 840, 127 S. Ct. 108, 166 L. Ed.

2d 69 (2006). Thus, to meet the fair preponderance of the evidence standard,

the evidence had to induce a reasonable belief that it is more probable or

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

‘‘minimal standard’’ of reasonable cause.16 The defen-

dant further argues that there was no evidence pre-

sented at the temporary custody hearing to support a

finding that the goats were neglected or cruelly treated

and, thus, that even the lower standard of reasonable

cause was not met. We need not decide which standard

applies to an order vesting temporary custody following

a show cause hearing17 because, even under the higher

standard of a fair preponderance of the evidence, the

defendant’s claim fails.

We begin by setting forth our standard of review.

‘‘[T]he scope of our appellate review depends upon the

proper characterization of the rulings made by the trial

court. To the extent that the trial court has made find-

ings of fact, our review is limited to deciding whether

such findings were clearly erroneous. When, however,

the trial court draws conclusions of law, our review is

plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions

are legally and logically correct and find support in the

facts that appear in the record.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Walters v. Servidio, 227 Conn. App. 1,

29, 320 A.3d 1008 (2024). When, as in the present case,

likely than not that the goats were neglected or cruelly treated. See generally

State v. Reilly, 60 Conn. App. 716, 725, 760 A.2d 1001 (2000).

16

The reasonable cause standard is akin to that of probable cause. See

Karen v. Loftus, 228 Conn. App. 163, 193, A.3d (2024); Prioleau v.

Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 116 Conn. App. 776, 783,

977 A.2d 267 (2009). Probable cause ‘‘is a bona fide belief in the existence

of facts essential under the law for the action and such as would warrant

a [person] of ordinary caution, prudence and judgment, under the circum-

stances, in entertaining it.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Adriani v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 220

Conn. 307, 316, 596 A.2d 426 (1991).

17

We note that the defendant has not adequately briefed her claim that

the court applied the wrong standard. In light of the inadequate briefing,

the plaintiff briefly counters this claim by asserting that the defendant

incorrectly argues that a preponderance of the evidence standard applies

and that the correct standard is the reasonable cause standard. We thus

leave for another day our decision on this issue.

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

the resolution of a question of law ‘‘depends on underly-

ing facts that are in dispute, that question becomes, in

essence, a mixed question of fact and law. Thus, we

review the subsidiary findings of historical fact . . .

for clear error, and engage in plenary review of the trial

court’s application of . . . legal standards . . . to the

underlying historical facts.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) ASPIC, LLC v. Poitier, 208 Conn. App. 731,

742, 267 A.3d 197 (2021).

In State ex rel. Gregan v. Koczur, 287 Conn. 145, 947

A.2d 282 (2008), our Supreme Court addressed the issue

of what constitutes ‘‘neglect’’ for purposes of § 22-329a.

In doing so, the court started ‘‘with the relevant lan-

guage of [General Statutes (Rev. to 2005)] § 22-329a (a):

‘The Chief Animal Control Officer, any animal control

officer or any municipal or regional animal control offi-

cer may lawfully take charge of any animal found

neglected or cruelly treated, in violation of sections 22-

366, 22-415 and 53-247 to 53-252, inclusive, and shall

thereupon proceed as provided in subsection (b) of this

section . . . .’ It is clear from this language that § 22-

329a does not contain an independent standard of

neglect but, instead, incorporates by reference the stan-

dards of the specific statutes enumerated therein. . . .

[Section] 53-247 is the only statute listed in § 22-329a

that applies to [the defendant’s] conduct. Accordingly,

to determine what constitutes neglect under § 22-329a

under the circumstances of this case, we must look to

the language of § 53-247. Section 53-247 provides in

relevant part: ‘(a) Any person who . . . deprives of

necessary sustenance . . . any animal, or who, having

impounded or confined any animal, fails to give such

animal proper care or . . . fails to supply any such

animal with wholesome air, food and water, or . . .

having charge or custody of any animal . . . fails to

provide it with proper food, drink or protection from

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

the weather . . . shall be fined not more than one thou-

sand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or

both. . . .’ It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that

the neglect referred to in § 22-329a includes the failure

to provide necessary sustenance, proper care, whole-

some air, food and water under § 53-247 (a).’’ State ex

rel. Gregan v. Koczur, supra, 153–54; see also Bethle-

hem v. Acker, 153 Conn. App. 449, 463, 102 A.3d 107

(‘‘[i]t is reasonable to conclude that the neglect referred

to in § 22-329a includes the failure to provide necessary

protection from the weather’’), cert. denied, 315 Conn.

908, 105 A.3d 235 (2014).

Applying the fair preponderance of the evidence stan-

dard to the present case, and on the basis of our careful

review of the record relating to the two day evidentiary

hearing held on March 30 and April 8, 2021, we conclude

that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to pro-

duce a reasonable belief that it is more probable or

likely than not that the goats were neglected or cruelly

treated. DellaRocco testified to the information in his

investigative report, which was admitted into evidence.

Specifically, he testified to the poor conditions of the

property observed during the preseizure surveillance,

including that the shelters on the property were inade-

quate to house the goats, filled with manure and in a

dilapidated condition with the roof caving in on one of

them. He also testified to observing goats limping and

having issues with their hooves and with walking, as

well as to the large number of empty plastic water

bottles on the property and to the fact that he never

saw the defendant provide water to the goats during

his surveillance. He explained that when the warrant

was executed, he walked the entire property and con-

firmed his prior observations. He further testified that

there was not enough room for every goat to be in

a shelter.

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

State Animal Control Officer Tanya Wescovich pro-

vided testimony as well regarding a report she prepared

following the investigation of the property, which was

admitted as a full exhibit, and as to her observations of

the goats having extremely long hooves, the excessive

amount of manure piled up in the shelters, which caused

her concern for the health of the goats, and the large

number of empty plastic water bottles on the property

to which the goats had access. She further testified that

there were nine pregnant goats at the time of the seizure,

that five of them gave birth to six kids in total, and that

none of the kids would have survived without human

intervention. Similar to DellaRocco’s testimony, Wes-

covich testified that she did not see the defendant give

water to the goats during her surveillance shifts, during

which she observed ten to fifteen goats that were either

limping or could not move properly. Wescovich

explained that once she gained access to the property

during the execution of the warrant, she became aware

that even more goats had issues. Other witnesses who

testified during the two day hearing included Nancy

Jarvis-Deluca, a state animal control officer who partici-

pated in the execution of the warrant; Rosa Buonomo,

the operator of an animal rescue; and the defendant.

In addition to the exhibits entered into evidence that

were previously mentioned, the exhibits before the

court also included, inter alia, numerous photographs

taken on the day of the seizure, which showed the

condition of the property, shelters and goats; the search

warrant application and supporting affidavit; a supple-

mental investigative report submitted by Jarvis-Deluca;

and satellite images of the property.

The documentary and testimonial evidence presented

shows that the defendant failed to provide the goats

with adequate shelter, both in terms of space to shelter

all the goats and for protection from high winds and

cold weather; failed to give them sufficient access to

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

fresh water; failed to properly care for the goats’ hooves

by letting them become overgrown, which affected the

mobility of the goats; and allowed the goats to live in

unsanitary conditions with manure filled shelters and

with dead goats in various stages of decomposition

strewn about the property. That evidence was sufficient

to demonstrate that it is more probable than not that

the goats were not provided with proper care, drink

and protection from the weather to establish neglect

for purposes of § 22-329a. See State ex rel. Gregan v.

Koczur, supra, 287 Conn. 153–54;18 Bethlehem v. Acker,

supra, 153 Conn. App. 463. In her appellate brief, the

defendant focuses much of her challenge to the court’s

finding of neglect on the fact that her goats were not

identified to have any serious medical conditions and

did not appear to be dehydrated so as to warrant their

seizure. This court has determined previously, however,

that ‘‘[n]owhere does our statutory, regulatory, or com-

mon-law scheme require an animal to be suffering from

a present illness as a prerequisite to finding that the

animal is neglected.’’ Bethlehem v. Acker, supra, 467

n.12. Moreover, this claim ignores the court’s factual

findings that the goats not only endured extreme cruelty

and neglectful conditions, but as many as forty to fifty

of them died in the defendant’s care as well.

We conclude that the plaintiff established that it is

more probable than not that the goats were neglected

18

In State ex rel. Gregan v. Koczur, supra, 287 Conn. 157–58, ‘‘the defen-

dant was keeping forty-six live cats and one dead cat in a 950 square foot

residence, much of which was so cluttered with personal effects, trash and

bags of raw garbage that it was unusable. The [trial] court . . . found, and

the evidence amply demonstrated, that the residence was, and had been

for some time, in a ‘deplorable, filthy, unsanitary [and] unhealthy’ condition,

with cat feces, vomit and urine present throughout. . . . [A] person of

ordinary intelligence would know that confining forty-six cats in these

unhealthy conditions constituted a failure to provide proper care for the

cats under any reasonable standard.’’ Our Supreme Court thus found that the

defendant’s conduct in allowing the cats to live in unsanitary and unhealthy

conditions fell within the ‘‘ ‘unmistakable core of prohibited conduct’ ’’ and

constituted neglect under § 22-329a. Id., 157.

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

or cruelly treated.19 The defendant, therefore, has failed

to demonstrate that the court incorrectly concluded

that temporary custody of the goats should vest with

the department.

VI

The defendant’s next two claims concern the court’s

April 9, 2021 order that, ‘‘[o]n or before April 16, 2021,

the defendant shall relinquish ownership of the animals

to the [plaintiff] or post a surety or cash bond with the

[department] in the amount of [$500] per each of the

sixty-four remaining live goats seized by the [plaintiff]

to pay for the reasonable expenses in caring and provid-

ing for such animals . . . .’’ With respect to this order,

the defendant claims that (1) she complied with the

order to the extent that it required relinquishment of

the goats by April 16, 2021, and (2) she complied with

the bond requirement of the order. We disagree with

both claims and address them in turn.

A

The defendant first asserts that she complied with

the order regarding relinquishment by filing a motion

on April 16, 2021, in which she sought to ‘‘relinquish

ownership of [her] goats for immediate release to quali-

fied animal rescue facilities and individuals as identified

by the defendant’’ (motion to relinquish). In connection

with this claim, the defendant also appears to be arguing

that the court did not issue a ruling in a timely manner

and, ultimately, improperly denied her motion. We are

not persuaded.

After the court issued its April 9, 2021 order requiring

the defendant, by April 16, 2021, either to relinquish

19

Of course, in light of our conclusion that the plaintiff established that

it is more probable than not that the goats were neglected or cruelly treated,

it necessarily follows that the court correctly determined that the plaintiff

proved there was reasonable cause that the goats were neglected or cru-

elly treated.

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

ownership of the goats to the plaintiff or to post a surety

or cash bond in the amount ordered, the defendant,

instead, filed her motion to relinquish. Thereafter, the

plaintiff filed a motion for an order requesting that

the court vest permanent custody of the goats in the

department as a result of the defendant’s failure to

relinquish ownership of the goats or to post a bond, as

required by § 22-329a (f). In its written order granting

the plaintiff’s motion and vesting permanent custody

of the goats with the department, the court stated that

the language of its prior order was clear and unambigu-

ous and ‘‘required the defendant to either relinquish

control of the goats to the [plaintiff] or post surety or

cash bond with the [department] in the amount of [$500]

for each of the sixty-four remaining live goats, no later

than April 16, 2021.’’ The court further stated that the

defendant’s motion to relinquish ‘‘was not an offer to

relinquish control of the goats to the [plaintiff]. As such,

the defendant did not relinquish control of the goats to

the [plaintiff] by the April 16, 2021 court deadline.’’

(Emphasis in original.) The defendant’s claim, there-

fore, appears to be challenging the court’s finding, made

in its order vesting permanent custody of the goats with

the department, that the defendant had not complied

with its April 9, 2021 order regarding relinquishment of

the goats. That raises an issue of fact, which we review

under the clearly erroneous standard of review. See

Meineke Bristol, LLC v. Premier Auto, LLC, 227 Conn.

App. 64, 73, 319 A.3d 826 (2024) (‘‘A finding of fact is

clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the

record to support it . . . or when although there is

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed . . . . Our author-

ity, when reviewing the findings of a judge, is circum-

scribed by the deference we must give to decisions of

the trier of fact, who is usually in a superior position

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

to appraise and weigh the evidence. . . . The question

for this court . . . is not whether it would have made

the findings the trial court did, but whether in view of

the evidence and pleadings in the whole record it is

left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-

ted.)).

The court’s April 9, 2021 order, which tracked the

language of § 22-329a (f), gave the defendant the choice

between two options to be completed by April 16, 2021,

namely, relinquish ownership of the goats to the plain-

tiff or post a surety or cash bond in the amount ordered.

We agree with the court that filing a motion was not a

proper response to the court’s order. Moreover, the

court was correct in finding that the motion to relin-

quish ‘‘was not an offer to relinquish control of the

goats to the [plaintiff].’’ (Emphasis altered.) Rather, as

the defendant states in her appellate brief, ‘‘[t]he motion

[sought] to relinquish the goats with the single qualifica-

tion that they be rehomed to facilities and individuals

selected by the defendant.’’ The addition of that qualifi-

cation by the defendant, however, is contrary to the

general rule that ‘‘[a]n order of the court must be obeyed

until it has been modified or successfully challenged.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Celini v. Celini,

115 Conn. App. 371, 382, 973 A.2d 664 (2009); see also

Eldridge v. Eldridge, 244 Conn. 523, 530, 710 A.2d 757

(1998). In the present case, the defendant is improperly

attempting, unilaterally, to modify the requirement of

the court’s order that she relinquish ownership of the

goats to the plaintiff by adding the qualification that

the goats be rehomed to a facility or individual of her

choosing, which she cannot do, regardless of whether

she believes any particular animal rescue is a more

suitable environment for the goats. There is nothing in

the statutory scheme governing the welfare of animals

that allows the owner of a seized animal to decide or

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

direct where a seized animal must go following a finding

of neglect or cruel treatment of the animal. The court’s

finding that the defendant did not relinquish ownership

of the goats by April 16, 2021, is supported by the record

and is not clearly erroneous.

To the extent that the defendant claims on appeal

that the court did not decide her motion to relinquish

in a timely manner and then improperly denied it, we

conclude that such claims are inadequately briefed. The

defendant has not cited any authority demonstrating

that there was a time period in which the motion had

to be decided or why the court’s ultimate denial of the

motion was improper.20 ‘‘[F]or this court judiciously and

efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal

. . . the parties must clearly and fully set forth their

arguments in their briefs. . . . The parties may not

merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the rela-

tionship between the facts of the case and the law cited.

. . . State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 724, 138 A.3d 868

(2016). Claims are inadequately briefed when they are

merely mentioned and not briefed beyond a bare asser-

tion. . . . Claims are also inadequately briefed when

20

Instead, the defendant makes one reference to § 22-329a (g) (1), arguing

that it ‘‘mandates that, once a judge has made a finding of neglect and cruel

treatment, as Judge Cobb did in her April 9, 2021 order, she was under

obligation to immediately vest ownership of the goats, as distinguished from

temporary custody, in a [26 U.S.C.] § 501 (c) (3) facility permitted by law

to care for neglected and cruelly treated animals, such as [the animal rescue

she had suggested], with no prior hearing requirement, or a state, municipal-

ity or individual.’’ This statute does not pertain to motions to relinquish or

in any way explain why the court’s denial of the defendant’s motion was

improper. Furthermore, we do not construe the statutory language as requir-

ing the court to immediately vest ownership of the goats to an animal rescue

of the defendant’s choosing. The statute specifically provides that, ‘‘[i]f, after

hearing, the court finds that the animal is neglected or cruelly treated, it

shall vest ownership of the animal in any state, municipal or other public

or private agency which is permitted by law to care for neglected or cruelly

treated animals or with any person found to be suitable or worthy of such

responsibility by the court.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Supp.

2022) § 22-329a (g) (1). The court complied with the statute when it exercised

its discretion to vest ownership of the goats with the department.

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

they . . . consist of conclusory assertions . . . with

no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no

citations from the record . . . .’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Roberts, 227 Conn. App. 159,

185–86, 320 A.3d 989 (2024). The defendant’s brief is

devoid of citations to authority to support her asser-

tions. Consequently, we decline to review these claims.

B

Next, the defendant claims that the court improperly

determined that she failed to pay the bond ordered by

the court pursuant to § 22-329a (f) within the deadline

set by the court. Specifically, she argues that she com-

plied with the order regarding the bond when she sub-

mitted a bank check to the plaintiff’s counsel by the

deadline in the amount of $450 along with a letter, which

identified nine goats. The defendant subsequently sub-

mitted payments totaling $5070, which she claims is a

sufficient amount for ten of the goats. Our resolution

of this claim requires little discussion.

As we stated, the court’s April 9, 2021 order provided

the defendant with two options: relinquish ownership

of the goats or pay a bond as set by the court. With

respect to the bond issue, the court stated: ‘‘The total

amount due, on or before April 16, 2021, pursuant to

the court’s order, was $32,000. The defendant makes

no claim that the $32,000 was paid.’’ There is no dispute

in the record that the defendant did not pay the required

amount by the April 16 deadline. On appeal, she argues

first that she was not required to pay the bond because

she relinquished ownership of the goats by way of her

motion to relinquish. We already have rejected that

claim. Because the defendant did not relinquish owner-

ship of the goats, she was required to pay the $32,000

bond by April 16, 2021, which she failed to do. The

defendant also makes a number of arguments about

how the deadline to pay the bond was extended, by

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

which point she had made incremental deposits totaling

more than $4500, which she claimed was sufficient to

secure more than nine goats. The order, however, did

not give the defendant the option to pay a bond in an

amount that would cover only nine goats, beyond the

deadline. Even if we were to agree, without deciding,

that the deadline had been extended, the defendant

never paid the required amount of the bond. Her claim,

therefore, fails.21

VII

The defendant next claims that § 22-329a is unconsti-

tutional on its face and as applied in this case. We

decline to review this claim due to inadequate briefing.

We begin by noting that, in her principal appellate

brief, the defendant states that she challenged the con-

stitutionality of § 22-329a by motion, which was denied.

She then states: ‘‘The defendant asserts the unconstitu-

tionality of the statute facially and as applied to her

on appeal by incorporating the argument previously

presented and presenting additional issues herein.’’ Our

rules of practice contain page and word limits for appel-

late briefs. See Practice Book §§ 67-3 and 67-3A. The

defendant cannot sidestep those requirements by

directing us in her appellate brief to arguments in sup-

port of her claim that are raised in another document.

See Robb v. Connecticut Board of Veterinary Medicine,

204 Conn. App. 595, 612, 254 A.3d 915 (2021) (‘‘The

plaintiff’s attempt to incorporate by reference his

amended verified complaint into his principal appellate

brief is not procedurally proper. As is apparent in this

case, permitting legal claims to be incorporated by ref-

erence into an appellate brief would, among other

21

There is also no merit to the defendant’s claim that she paid a sufficient

bond pursuant to Practice Book § 38-8, which pertains to cash bail in criminal

matters, as the present case is controlled by the bond provision set forth

in § 22-329a (f).

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

things, enable litigants to circumvent the page limita-

tions set forth in Practice Book § 67-3. See, e.g., Papic

v. Burke, 113 Conn. App. 198, 217 n.11, 965 A.2d 633

(2009) (‘it is not permissible to use [an] appendix [to

an appellate brief] either to set forth argument or to

evade the thirty-five page limitation provided in Practice

Book § 67-3 and already met by the [appellant’s] brief’).’’

(Footnote omitted.)), cert. denied, 338 Conn. 911, 259

A.3d 654 (2021).

In her principal appellate brief, the defendant argues

that § 22-329a is unconstitutional on its face, stating

that ‘‘[t]he statute suffers from constitutional defects

in addition to those cited . . . in her motion’’ and list-

ing the alleged defects. According to the defendant, the

statute, on its face and as applied, denies ‘‘fundamental

freedoms and protections from abusive conduct by the

state in violation of the first, fourth, eighth and four-

teenth amendments.’’

In her appellate brief, the defendant devotes a few

sentences to a short paragraph to each of these claimed

grounds challenging the statute’s constitutionality, with

no citation to authority. She also fails to include any

relevant law concerning what must be shown to estab-

lish that a statute is unconstitutional on its face or as

applied. In all, the defendant devotes three pages of

her appellate brief to her challenge to the constitutional-

ity of § 22-329a on all of these grounds and pursuant

to the first, fourth, eighth and fourteenth amendments

to the federal constitution. As our Supreme Court has

cautioned, ‘‘[a]lthough the number of pages devoted to

an argument in a brief is not necessarily determinative,

relative sparsity weighs in favor of concluding that the

argument has been inadequately briefed. This is espe-

cially so with regard to first amendment and other con-

stitutional claims, which are often analytically complex.

See, e.g., Schleifer v. Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843,

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

871–72 (4th Cir. 1998) (‘[f]irst [a]mendment jurispru-

dence is a vast and complicated body of law that grows

with each passing day’ and involves ‘complicated and

nuanced constitutional concepts’), cert. denied, 526

U.S. 1018, 119 S. Ct. 1252, 143 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1999);

Missouri v. National Organization for Women, Inc.,

620 F.2d 1301, 1326 (8th Cir.) (first amendment issues

are ‘complex’), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842, 101 S. Ct. 122,

66 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1980); see also In re Melody L., 290

Conn. 131, 154–55, 962 A.2d 81 (2009) (one and one-

half page equal protection claim was inadequate), over-

ruled on other grounds by State v. Elson, 311 Conn.

726, 746–47, 91 A.3d 862 (2014); Connecticut Light &

Power Co. v. Dept. of Public Utility Control, [266 Conn.

108, 120, 830 A.2d 1121 (2003)] (claim under takings

clause was inadequately briefed when plaintiff provided

‘no authority or analysis in support of its specific

claim’); In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn. App. 167, 181, 743

A.2d 165 (1999) (attempt to brief two constitutional

claims in two and one-half pages was inadequate).’’

State v. Buhl, supra, 321 Conn. 726. We conclude that

the defendant has not adequately briefed her claim chal-

lenging the constitutionality of § 22-329a, both on its

face and as applied to her. Therefore, we decline to

review this claim.

VIII

The defendant’s last claim is that the court improperly

dismissed her counterclaim. We are not persuaded.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of this claim. In her counterclaim dated May

3, 2022, the defendant made a number of claims, which

can be summarized as follows: (1) the defendant’s

fourth amendment rights were violated because the

affidavit submitted by DellaRocco in support of the

search warrant omitted material facts and contained

false statements and because the verified petition did

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

not plainly state the facts of neglect and cruel treatment

as required by § 22-329a (c); (2) the department violated

§ 22-329a (i) by allowing favored individuals priority to

adopt the goats; (3) the department violated the defen-

dant’s due process rights by providing false testimony

at the hearing before Judge Cobb held on March 30 and

April 8, 2021; (4) the defendant’s first amendment rights

were violated by the commencement of these proceed-

ings in retaliation for the defendant’s speech; and (5)

§ 22-329a is unconstitutional on its face and as applied

to the defendant and infringes on the defendant’s first

amendment rights. The relief sought in the counterclaim

included the ‘‘return of the goats, a declaratory judg-

ment that § 22-329a is unconstitutional, and the extin-

guishment of all demands for bonds or other monetary

payments.’’ The plaintiff moved to dismiss the counter-

claim on four grounds, namely, that the counterclaim

was (1) barred by sovereign immunity, (2) barred by

the prior pending action doctrine, (3) untimely and (4)

not properly brought in this in rem proceeding. The

court based its decision dismissing the counterclaim

on the grounds of sovereign immunity and the prior

pending action doctrine. We therefore limit our discus-

sion regarding this claim to those two grounds and

address them in turn.

A

The court granted the motion to dismiss on the

ground of sovereign immunity only with respect to three

of the five claims asserted in the counterclaim.22 The

court concluded that the three claims did not allege

sufficient facts to bypass sovereign immunity or to show

22

The court declined to grant the motion to dismiss on the ground of

sovereign immunity as to the defendant’s first two claims of violations of

the fourth amendment and § 22-329a (i). Nevertheless, as to those two claims,

the court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the claims were

precluded under the prior pending action doctrine, which we address in

part VIII B of this opinion.

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

that an exception to the state’s sovereign immunity

applied, in that the claims failed to set forth a substantial

claim that the defendant’s constitutional rights were

violated.

The defendant’s briefing on this issue consists of

three short paragraphs. She first appears to suggest

that, because the trial court declined to grant the motion

to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity as to two

of the grounds raised in the counterclaim, sovereign

immunity did not justify dismissal of the other three

grounds in the counterclaim. Next, the defendant

asserts that dismissal of the counterclaim should have

been raised, if at all, by way of a motion to strike, rather

than a motion to dismiss, because, according to the

defendant, the issues raised in the motion to dismiss

concerned the sufficiency of the allegations pursuant

to Practice Book § 10-39, not the jurisdiction of the

court. See Practice Book § 10-30. Aside from referenc-

ing those two rules of practice, the defendant provided

no other citation to authority to support her assertions,

and her brief lacks any analysis of applicable law con-

cerning sovereign immunity or any exceptions thereto,

including how any exception to the state’s sovereign

immunity applies to her claims.23 As we have stated

23

‘‘The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or

sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law. . . . It has

deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin

in ancient common law. . . . Not only have we recognized the state’s immu-

nity as an entity, but [w]e have also recognized that because the state can act

only through its officers and agents, a suit against a state officer concerning

a matter in which the officer represents the state is, in effect, against the

state. . . . Exceptions to this doctrine are few and narrowly construed

under our jurisprudence. . . . Chief Information Officer v. Computers Plus

Center, Inc., 310 Conn. 60, 79–80, 74 A.3d 1242 (2013).’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Jakobowski v. State, 219 Conn. App. 839, 848, 296 A.3d 226

(2023). ‘‘[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity implicates subject matter

jurisdiction and is therefore a basis for granting a motion to dismiss.’’ (Inter-

nal quotation marks omitted.) Spillane v. Lamont, 350 Conn. 119, 126,

A.3d (2024).

‘‘It is . . . well established that [t]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the

state is not absolute.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public

Health v. Estrada, 349 Conn. 223, 237, 315 A.3d 1081 (2024). Indeed, ‘‘[o]ur

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

previously in this opinion, ‘‘[c]laims are . . . inade-

quately briefed when they . . . consist of conclusory

assertions . . . with no mention of relevant authority

and minimal or no citations from the record’’; (internal

quotation marks omitted) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.

Caldrello, 192 Conn. App. 1, 35, 219 A.3d 858, cert.

denied, 334 Conn. 905, 220 A.3d 37 (2019); and ‘‘parties

may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing

the relationship between the facts of the case and the

law cited.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vaccaro

v. D’Angelo, 184 Conn. App. 467, 488, 195 A.3d 443

(2018). In the present case, the defendant’s brief on this

issue contains no meaningful analysis of how the court’s

dismissal of a portion of the counterclaim on the ground

of sovereign immunity was improper, nor does it cite

to relevant legal principles or analyze how the facts of

this case relate to any applicable law. As a result of the

defendant’s inadequate briefing,24 we decline to review

case law has identified three recognized exceptions to sovereign immunity:

‘(1) when the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implica-

tion, statutorily waives the state’s sovereign immunity . . . (2) when an

action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial

claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff’s constitu-

tional rights . . . and (3) when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive

relief on the basis of a substantial allegation of wrongful conduct to promote

an illegal purpose in excess of the officer’s statutory authority.’ ’’ Spillane

v. Lamont, supra, 350 Conn. 127. Relevant to this appeal are the second

and third exceptions. ‘‘For a claim made pursuant to the second exception,

complaining of unconstitutional acts, [our Supreme Court] require[s] that

[t]he allegations of such a complaint and the factual underpinnings if placed

in issue, must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally pro-

tected interests. . . . For a claim under the third exception, the plaintiffs

must do more than allege that the defendants’ conduct was in excess of

their statutory authority; they also must allege or otherwise establish facts

that reasonably support those allegations. . . . In the absence of a proper

factual basis in the complaint to support the applicability of these exceptions,

the granting of a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is

proper.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Columbia

Air Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Transportation, 293 Conn. 342, 350, 977 A.2d

636 (2009).

24

For similar reasons, we also decline to review the defendant’s claim

that the court should have granted her motion to open and vacate the

judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff on the ground of fraud. Like with

many of her other claims on appeal, the defendant has provided no citation

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

her claim that the court improperly dismissed her coun-

terclaim, in part, on the ground of sovereign immunity.

B

We next turn to the defendant’s claim that the court

improperly dismissed her counterclaim, in part, on the

basis of the prior pending action doctrine. Although the

defendant’s briefing of this claim also is minimal, the

defendant clearly raises two grounds for challenging

the court’s decision to dismiss a portion of her counter-

claim on the basis of the prior pending action doctrine,

namely, that the prior pending action doctrine ‘‘does

not apply because one of its key elements—identity of

parties—is not met’’ and because the two actions seek

different relief. We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. Prior to filing her counterclaim, the defendant

commenced an action in the Superior Court on April

6, 2021, against a number of parties, including the

department, alleging a variety of claims regarding the

seizure of the goats from her property. See Burton v.

Mason, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury,

Complex Litigation Docket, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-

S (Mason action). That action is still pending in the

Superior Court. In the present case, in granting the

motion to dismiss, in part, on the basis of the prior

pending action doctrine, the court stated: ‘‘[T]he depart-

ment argues that the counterclaim is virtually identical

to authority to support her claim, let alone an analysis of relevant authority

as it pertains to her claim. Instead, in two short paragraphs, she makes

unfounded allegations about alleged retaliatory conduct of the trial judge.

In its order denying the motion to open and vacate, the court cautioned the

defendant ‘‘not to assert a claim unless there is a basis in law and fact for

doing so that is not frivolous’’ and that ‘‘personal attacks on the court are

inappropriate and will not be tolerated’’ and may subject the defendant to

sanctions, should she continue to assert groundless claims. We echo those

words of caution and remind the defendant that unsupported accusations

that have no basis in fact or law cannot be properly considered by this

court and have no place in proceedings before this court.

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

to the pending claims against the department in [the

Mason action]. The remaining claims are that the

department violated the [defendant’s] fourth amend-

ment rights when DellaRocco lied in his affidavit to

obtain a search warrant and that the department vio-

lated § 22-329a (i) by allowing favored individuals prior-

ity to adopt the goats. In [the Mason action], the [defen-

dant] brings these exact same claims. Although the

relief sought is slightly different, as the [defendant]

seeks monetary damages in [the Mason action] but not

in the present case, and declaratory relief in the present

case but not in [the Mason action], the actions are

still virtually identical. In such instances, the court has

discretion to decide whether the circumstances justify

dismissal. In the present case, the circumstances clearly

justify dismissal. The counterclaim is yet another trans-

parent attempt to relitigate Judge Cobb’s order of tem-

porary care and custody. The [defendant] has already

filed a motion to disqualify Judge Cobb, a motion to

vacate, a motion to reopen the hearing, a motion to

reargue, a motion to declare . . . § 22-329a unconstitu-

tional, a motion to suppress and for return of property,

and a motion for immediate release of her goats, as

well as motions to reargue these motions. Given the

blatantly ‘oppressive and vexatious’ nature of the coun-

terclaim, dismissal under the prior pending action doc-

trine is justified. Any claims that the [defendant] may

have against the department and its agents can be adju-

dicated in the [Mason action].’’

We next set forth the legal principles and standard

of review that govern our resolution of this claim. ‘‘[T]he

prior pending action doctrine permits the court to dis-

miss a second case that raises issues currently pending

before the court. The pendency of a prior suit of the

same character, between the same parties, brought to

obtain the same end or object, is, at common law, good

cause for abatement. It is so, because there cannot be

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

any reason or necessity for bringing the second, and,

therefore, it must be oppressive and vexatious. This is

a rule of justice and equity, generally applicable, and

always, where the two suits are virtually alike, and in

the same jurisdiction. . . . The policy behind the doc-

trine is to prevent unnecessary litigation that places a

burden on crowded court dockets.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Cameron v. Santiago, supra, 223 Conn.

App. 840 n.3.

‘‘Under the prior pending action doctrine, the court

must determine whether the two actions are: (1) exactly

alike, i.e., for the same matter, cause and thing, or

seeking the same remedy, and in the same jurisdiction;

(2) virtually alike, i.e., brought to adjudicate the same

underlying rights of the parties, but perhaps seeking

different remedies; or (3) insufficiently similar to war-

rant the doctrine’s application. . . . If the two actions

are exactly alike or lacking in sufficient similarities, the

trial court has no discretion. In the former case, the

court must dismiss the second action, and in the latter

instance, the court must allow both cases to proceed

unabated. Where the actions are virtually, but not

exactly alike, however, the trial court exercises discre-

tion in determining whether the circumstances justify

dismissal of the second action.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Loch View, LLC v. Windham, 211

Conn. App. 765, 772–73, 274 A.3d 140 (2022). ‘‘In order

to determine whether the actions are virtually alike, we

must examine the pleadings . . . to ascertain whether

the actions are brought to adjudicate the same underly-

ing rights of the parties. . . . The trial court’s conclu-

sion on the similarities between the cases is subject to

our plenary review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-

ted.) Rousseau v. Weinstein, 204 Conn. App. 833, 844,

254 A.3d 984 (2021). We also note that ‘‘a motion to

dismiss is the proper vehicle to raise the issue of a prior

pending action’’; (internal quotation marks omitted)

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

A1Z7, LLC v. Dombek, 188 Conn. App. 714, 722 n.2, 205

A.3d 740 (2019); and that ‘‘[t]he prior pending action

doctrine applies equally to claims and counterclaims.’’

Conti v. Murphy, 23 Conn. App. 174, 178, 579 A.2d

576 (1990).

Because these claims are seeking different remedies,

we examine the pleadings in both actions to determine

whether they have been brought to adjudicate the same

underlying rights of the parties. The two claims in the

counterclaim that were dismissed on the basis of the

prior pending action doctrine alleged a violation of the

defendant’s fourth amendment rights stemming from

the allegedly illegal search of her property and a viola-

tion of § 22-329a (i) by the department. Our review of

the pleadings in the Mason action demonstrates that

those very same claims have been raised against the

department in that action. Like in the counterclaim in

the present case, the defendant alleges in the Mason

action that the department violated her fourth amend-

ment rights because DellaRocco lied in his testimony

at the hearing on March 30, 2021, his affidavit included

false statements and omitted facts, and the search of her

property was illegal and was not supported by probable

cause. She also alleges in the Mason action that the

department violated § 22-329a (i).

We conclude, following our review of the record

before us, that the present case and the Mason action

both stem from the same factual circumstance—the

seizure of the goats from the defendant—and involve

the same parties and identical claims. Even though the

relief sought in both actions is not identical, both

actions seek the same goals or objectives, namely, to

adjudicate the defendant’s rights and the propriety of

the seizure of the goats and the proceedings that fol-

lowed. See Lodmell v. LaFrance, 154 Conn. App. 329,

335, 107 A.3d 975 (2014) (‘‘ ‘[T]he applicability of the

doctrine does not turn on the issue of whether the two

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State ex rel. Dunn v. Burton

actions seek the same remedy. . . . The key question

is whether the two actions are brought to adjudicate

the same underlying rights.’ ’’), cert. denied, 315 Conn.

921, 107 A.3d 959 (2015). Moreover, the defendant’s

argument that the doctrine does not apply to the present

case because the parties are not identical fails in light of

this court’s decision in Modzelewski v. William Raveis

Real Estate, Inc., 65 Conn. App. 708, 783 A.2d 1074,

cert. denied, 258 Conn. 948, 788 A.2d 96 (2001). In that

case, the defendant raised a similar argument, which

this court rejected, concluding that, ‘‘[w]hile the parties

are not ‘identical’ in that there are two additional parties

to the prior action, the identical parties to the present

action are involved in the prior one.’’ Id., 714. The rea-

soning in Modzelewski applies equally to the present

case; the parties in the present action are both involved

in the Mason action, and the fact that there are addi-

tional defendants in the Mason action does not preclude

application of the prior pending action doctrine to the

present case. See id. Accordingly, we agree with the

court that both actions are virtually alike. We further

conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that the circumstances justified dismissal,

in part, of the counterclaim against the department in

the present case on the basis of the prior pending action

doctrine.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.