DEEJAIZ LLC v. TOWNSHIP OF FRANKLIN

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DEEJAIZ LLC, ef al.,

Plaintiffs, Civil Action No, 23-3192 (MAS) (RLS)

Vv. MEMORANDUM OPINION

TOWNSHIP OF FRANKLIN, ef al,

Defendants.

SHIPP, District Judge

This matter comes before the Court upon Defendants the Township of Franklin (the

“Township”), Vincent Lupo (“Lupo”), Doug Kowalsky (“Kowalsky”), John Hauss (“Hauss’’),

Vincent Andrew Dominach, Jr. (“Dominach”), and Sapana Shah’s (“Shah”) (collectively

“Defendants”) motion to dismiss (ECF No. 23) Plaintiffs Deejaiz LLC D/B/A Supreme Eventz

and Supreme Productionz (“Deejaiz”), Jason Robinson, and Danyale Robinson’s (collectively

“Plaintiffs”) Amended Complaint (ECF No. 19). The Court has carefully considered the parties’

submissions and reaches its decision without oral argument under Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For

the reasons below, Defendants’ motion is granted.

1. BACKGROUND

Deejaiz is an “African-American/Minority owned business consisting of a social meeting

and event space” which “hosted various social events, receptions, bar/bat mitzvahs, birthday

parties[,] and other private gatherings...” (Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 19.) Defendants are the

Township and various of its officials. Ud. 5-6.) On February 4, 2021, Plaintiffs filed for and

obtained a use variance approval from the Township. (/d. ¢ 2.) When seeking the variance,

Plaintiffs presented testimony regarding the nature and use of the building that Deejaiz would

operate out of (the “Premises”). Ud.) Some testimony was presented that guests would be allowed

to cater in food and alcohol, and discussion was had as to the types of parties and events the

Premises would host. Ud.) Ultimately, the Township approved a variance, and the Premises was

designated an A-3 use group.! (Id. ¥ 4.)

On February 8, 2022, Kowalksy, fire marshal for the Township, advised Plaintiffs that he

needed to inspect the Premises. (/d. § 20.) On February 9, 2022, Kowalsky informed Plaintiffs that

Hauss, the Township’s Director of Fire Prevention, was concerned that Plaintiffs were hosting

events at the Premises. (See id. { 22.) Plaintiffs responded to Hauss’s concern with proof that they

received prior approvals from the Township to host events. (See id. 22-23.) After receipt of

Plaintiffs’ proof, Kowalsky advised Plaintiffs that someone “dropped the ball” and that he would

investigate to see what needed to be done from a “fire safety angle.” Ud. J§ 24-25.)

On March 9, 2022, the Township, through its Fire Prevention Department, “issued a Notice

of Imminent Hazard and Order to Take Corrective Action” (the “Notice”), which was signed by

' Plaintiffs also allege they were granted a certification of occupancy for a B use group. (Am.

Compl. 4] 6.) This certificate “indicates that health department approval would be needed to bring

food onsite.” (/d. § 7.) Plaintiff disputes this characterization, alleging that Lupo stated to Plaintiffs

that “if you so much as open a bottled water,” you are an A-use group. (/d. § 10; see also id. 4 9

(alleging further that “[t]he B-[u]se group designation would negate the allowance of food on site

or the need to contact the [h]ealth [d]epartment, as . . . allowing consumption of food and beverage

on the [P]remises would place [the Premises] in an A-2 [u]se group per guidelines”).)

Hauss. Ud. J 27.) The Notice “mandated that Plaintiff[s] cease operations/events” at the Premises

by Noon that same day. (/d.) No Township Construction Official signed the Notice. Ud. § 31.)

After receipt of the Notice, Plaintiff immediately filed an appeal with the Somerset County

Construction Board of Appeals and requested a meeting with Township Officials to ensure

Plaintiffs’ business was not affected.* Ud. § 32.) At a meeting with the Township, Hauss

“bombarded [Plaintiffs] with accusations[,]” and Plaintiffs were instructed to fix identified

problems unrelated to the Premises. (See id. § 35-36 (providing that Defendants demanded that

Plaintiffs fix items “not related to the rented space, [but] rather [related to] other parts of the

building”).) The Township’s insistence that Plaintiffs stop their business to fix the Township’s

concerns grew primarily from a flyer in the Township’s possession which purported to show that

Plaintiffs would be hosting a “Bougie Nights” event that was “not approved, promoted[,] or

allowed by Plaintiff[s] and did not occur.” Ud. {[{[ 38-40.)

Subsequent Plaintiffs’ meeting with the Township, Lupo “granted a variant to the .. .

Notice which allowed Plaintiff[s] to continue holding events at the [P]remises provided that, as

recommended by [Plaintiffs’ Fire Code expert], there were two . .. Fire Watch professionals

present at every event and that a detailed list of all such events be reviewed and approved by

* To this end, Plaintiffs seemed to be operating under the assumption that the Premises was

designated an A-2 use, although they were aware they were operating under an occupancy placard

designating the Premises as an A-3 use. (See Am. Compl. § 32 (requesting a meeting with

Township officials to see how Plaintiffs’ might remove any “imminent perils or hazards” as

required by the Notice, “if any, as well as implement appropriate measures to comply with A-2

group requirements” (emphasis added)); but see Am. Compl. § 6 (providing that Plaintiffs

were granted certification of occupancy with a B use designation); id. | 4 (suggesting Plaintiffs

were offered a variance to operate as an A-3 use).)

... Hauss since” these measures “would eliminate any alleged imminent peril or hazard.” Ud.

41.)

On March 16, 2022, Hauss and Lupo visited the Premises and requested minor repairs. (Jd.

{ 42.) Plaintiffs satisfactorily completed the requested repairs to the Premises.* (/d.) On March 21,

2022, Dominach sent Plaintiffs an email correspondence suggesting he would try and find an

alternate location for Plaintiffs to operate their business. Ud. 99 43-44.) As of April 7, 2022,

however, Dominach indicated to Plaintiffs that he had been unsuccessful in finding a place for

Plaintiffs to relocate. (Ud. § 46.) At a June 8, 2022 hearing, Dominach would testify that “[t]here

were many other spaces available for Plaintiff to occupy[,]” but they were not in Plaintiffs’

budget.’ (/d. 4] 47-48, 56.)

Plaintiffs also independently conducted a search for a new location to operate their

business. (See id. { 50.) In particular, Plaintiffs expressed interest in a “non-African American

owned entity” formerly known as Bonkerz. (/d.) Plaintiffs “requested an [Open Public Records

Act] request for said location” but it was repeatedly ignored. (/d. 4 51.) Eventually, after filing a

Complaint with the New Jersey Government Records Council, however, Plaintiffs’ OPRA request

was granted. Ud. J 52-60.) Upon review of Bonkerz, it became apparent that while it was

marketed as an Arcade and Restaurant, it was classified as an A-3 use, like the Premises, instead

Plaintiff further alleges that during this inspection, Hauss and Lupo pointed out other concerns

with the building that were unrelated to the Premises. (Am. Compl. 4 42.) These concerns,

Plaintiffs allege, were the responsibility of the landlord. (/d.) Plaintiff maintains that Shah later

cited some of these concerns when revoking Plaintiffs’ right to operate. (/d.)

Plaintiffs aver that they “never discussed a budget with... Dominach, and [that] he admitted the

same in the [June 8] hearing.” (Am. Compl. § 57.) Plaintiff maintains that Dominach’s

deceitfulness is “[c]learly evidence of bias, racial or otherwise, directed at [Plaintiffs].” (7d. 59.)

of the required A-2 use that Plaintiffs were instructed an establishment must be in order to serve

food. (See id. |] 62-63.)°

On April 11, 2022, Plaintiffs received a letter from Shah, the Township’s attorney,

outlining several concerns the Township had with the use of the Premises. (See id. § 91.) On May

22, 2022,° despite complying with all the Township’s requirements and the variant allowed by

Lupo, the Township shut down Plaintiffs’ business. (/d. { 94.) This was done despite Plaintiff's

good faith attempt to meet with the Township in an effort to provide updates on progress that was

being made at the Premises. (/d.)

On February |, 2023, Plaintiffs served a demand letter on the Township related to a Notice

of Tort Claim Plaintiffs filed against the Township on June 6, 2022. (/d. § 96.) On February 21,

2023, Plaintiffs received correspondence from the Township’s claims administrator that Plaintiffs’

Notice of Tort Claim was denied on November 22, 2022. (Id. J 97.)

On June 12, 2023, after receiving the claims administrator’s correspondence, Plaintiffs

filed their initial Complaint in this matter. (ECF No. 1.) On February 8, 2024, this Court dismissed

all of Plaintiffs’ claims without prejudice after Defendants initially moved to dismiss. (ECF No.

Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on March 11, 2024.’ (ECF No. 19.) Defendants again

The Court notes that it does not recite Plaintiffs’ allegations in paragraphs 63-90 because they

are an amalgamation of rhetorical questions, legal argument, or reframing of factual allegations

that Plaintiffs already set forth. (See Am. Compl. §{ 63-90.) Instead, the Court sets forth only

Plaintiffs’ plausible, non-conclusory factual allegations.

Just before the Township’s decision, Plaintiffs amended their appeal to the Construction Board

of Appeals, and a hearing was scheduled for June 8, 2022. (id. J 95.)

7 The Court notes that Plaintiffs did not timely file the Amended Complaint. (See Order, ECF No.

18 (granting Plaintiffs 30 days from February 8, 2024 to file an amended complaint); Am. Compl.

(filing the Amended Complaint on March 11, 2024, more than 30 days after the Court’s Order).)

While the Court will consider Plaintiffs’ claims, Plaintiffs are advised that future court deadlines

are to be adhered to or else Plaintiffs risk this Court declining to hear their claims.

moved to dismiss (ECF No. 23), Plaintiffs opposed (ECF No. 25), and Defendants replied (ECF

No, 26).

Il. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)* “requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of

what the .. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Conley vy. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

A district court conducts a three-part analysis when considering a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011). “First, the court

must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’” /d. (alteration in original)

(quoting Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Second, the court must accept as true all of

plaintiffs well-pleaded factual allegations and “construe the complaint in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff[.]” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

“Although we must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, we are not compelled to accept

unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual

allegation.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc) (internal quotations

omitted); Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (holding that courts may ignore bare statements that

“the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). A facially plausible

claim “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” fowler, 578 F.3d at 210 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). On a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion, the “defendant bears the burden of showing that no claim has been presented.” Hedges v.

Unless otherwise specified, all references to “Rule” or “Rules” hereinafter refer to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926

F.2d 1406, 1409 Gd Cir. 1991)).

Il. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs in their Amended Complaint allege: (1) violation of the Fifth Amendment’s

Takings Clause and/or Just Compensation Clause; (2) violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Equal Protection Clause and/or Due Process Clause; (3) violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VI”) (collectively the “Federal Claims”); (4) violation of the New Jersey Civil

Rights Act, Equal Protection Clause; and (5) tortious interference with economic advantage

(collectively the “State Claims”).? (Am. Compl. J§ 99-224.) For the reasons outlined below,

Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims fail and this Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining

State Claims.

A. The Federal Claims

Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims arise under: (1) the Fifth Amendment; (2) the Fourteenth

Amendment; and (3) Title VI. (Am. Compl. Jf 99-154, 184-209.) Defendants seek to dismiss each

theory of constitutional violation and claim that Plaintiffs bring. (See generally Defs.’ Moving Br.,

ECF No. 23.) The Court addresses each in turn.

1. Fifth Amendment

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and/or

the Just Compensation Clause. (Am. Compl. 99-154.) Both of these theories of Fifth

Amendment violation derive from a “regulatory taking” allegation, which Plaintiffs again aver in

their Amended Complaint. Ud. § 103.)

’ Plaintiffs bring substantially the same claims as set forth in the original Complaint. (See generally

Compl.; Am, Compl.) Plaintiffs only alter their theory of tortious interference. (Am. Compl.

{| 210-24; Compl. ff 111-35.)

“There are two types of regulatory takings [a plaintiff can aver]: (1) takings per se or total

takings, where the regulation denies all economically beneficial productive use of the property

[...]; and (2) partial takings that, though not rendering the property idle, require compensation

under the test set forth in Penn [Cent]. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104... (1978).”

Nekrilov v. City of Jersey City, 45 F 4th 662, 669 (3d Cir. 2022) (internal citations omitted). “[A]

party challenging governmental action as an unconstitutional taking bears a substantial burden.”

E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523 (1998).

The Court’s analysis can be brief because Plaintiffs offer no substantive amendments to

their “total takings” or “partial takings” allegations. (See generally Am. Comp.) First, as to “total

takings,” in this Court’s February 8, 2024 Opinion dismissing Plaintiffs’ original Complaint (the

“Previous Opinion”), this Court explained that Plaintiffs’ contention that the eventual shutting

down of Plaintiffs’ business constitutes a taking by the Township is untenable. (Previous Op.

11-12, ECF No. 17.) This is because the Third Circuit and Supreme Court do not recognize a

“general right to do business” protected by the Fifth Amendment. (/d. at 12 (quoting Nekrilov, 45

F.4th at 670 and Coll. Sav. Bank vy. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,

675 (1999).) Here, again, Plaintiff maintains that the eventual closing of their business constitutes

a “total taking.” (Pls.’ Opp’n Br. *19,'° ECF No. 25 (“Here, in our matter, we have a ‘regulatory

taking’ which has deprived the Plaintiffs of all economically beneficial use of the [Premises] . . .

[t]his is evident as the Plaintiffs were eventually shut down and not permitted to operate their

business out of the [Premises]. This complete termination of business operations rises to the

standard of rendering the [Premises] valueless . . . thus effectuating a [total] taking.”).) This

All page numbers preceded by an asterisk refer to the page number in the ECF header.

contention was squarely rejected in the Previous Opinion, and this Court finds no reason to revisit

its finding here again. (See Previous Op. 11-12.)

Second, this Court previously considered a “partial taking” theory on behalf of Plaintiffs

and found that Plaintiffs could not sustain a partial taking theory on the facts alleged because “the

Township was enforcing zoning laws and regulations for public health, safety, and welfare

reasons . . . and therefore” the Township acted permissibly and did not need to compensate

Plaintiffs for any partial taking, if one occurred at all. (Previous Op. 14); see also Greenblatt v.

Klein, 634 F. App’x 66, 69 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding that a “legitimate enforcement” of a

municipalities’ laws and regulations does not constitute an impermissible regulatory taking). The

Court made these findings despite Plaintiffs “not provid[ing] any specific arguments regarding

their allegations for partial takings.” (Previous Op. 13 (considering a partial taking theory on

Plaintiffs behalf only “out of an abundance of caution.”’).) For a second consecutive time, however,

Plaintiffs do not provide any specific arguments with respect to how the Notice or Defendants’

actions constitute a partial taking. (See generally Pls.’ Opp’n Br.) As such, for the reasons

previously stated, any partial taking theory that Plaintiffs intend to bring in the Amended

Complaint is rejected.

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege a regulatory takings

claim under the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fifth

Amendment claim is granted.

2. Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Defendants next move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ reasserted equal protection and due process

claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment. (See generally Defs.’ Moving Br.) Defendants

primarily contend that Plaintiffs’ claims of race-based discrimination are conclusory and devoid

of factual support. (/d. at 28-29.) The Court agrees.

a. Equal Protection

“To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, .. . plaintiff[s] must allege that[:]

(1) [they are] member[s] of a protected class; (2) that [they were] treated differently from similarly

situated individual; and (3) that this disparate treatment was based on his or her membership in the

protected class. Kaul v. Christie, 372 F. Supp. 3d 206, 254 (D.N.J. 2019) (citing Kasper v. Cnty.

of Bucks, 514 F. App’x 210, 214-15 (3d Cir. 2013)). Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that they

are members of a protected class (Am. Compl. □□□ 1-3), and that other similarly situated businesses

were treated differently. Ud. {| 50, 61-63 (alleging that a separate business with “non-African

American” owners received preferential treatment from the Defendants which Plaintiffs did not

receive despite both being classified as A-3 uses).) Plaintiffs’ claims, however, fail at the third

element; Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege that the disparate treatment they identify was based on

race.

To be clear, there are no non-conjectural allegations in the Amended Complaint that may

reasonably be construed to suggest that Defendants acted with a discriminatory intent, or that

Plaintiffs were treated differently on account of their race. (See, e.g., Am. Compl. 63-65 (asking

a series of rhetorical questions like why the owners of Bonkerz, who were non-diverse, were not

targeted by the Township for code violations).) Instead, Plaintiffs provide “what-else-could-it-be”

type allegations in an effort to create an inference of racially-motivated discrimination from facts

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that in and of themselves do not suggest any such discrimination occurred. Twombly, 550 U.S, at

545 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level’); In

re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Prods. Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Liability Litig., 903 F.3d 278,

281 (3d Cir. 2018) (finding that at the motion to dismiss stage, a “plaintiff must... allege facts

that would permit a factfinder to determine, without relying on mere conjecture,” that a plaintiff's

allegations can successfully state a claim); Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (Gd Cir. 1991)

(affirming a claim’s dismissal where the allegations underlying it were based “merely upon [the

plaintiff's] own suspicion and speculation”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ allegations of race-based

discrimination and a failure of the Township to offer Plaintiffs equal protection fail because they

are speculative and conclusory, and Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ equal protection

claim is therefore granted."!

b. Due Process

Defendants’ also move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ substantive and procedural due process

claims. (See Defs.’” Moving Br. 32-39.) First, as to Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim, here,

like with Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim, Plaintiffs offer no new argument as to why their claim

" Plaintiffs’ Monell claim fails for the same reasons. A Monell claim requires, in part, that a

plaintiff adequately allege a “policy or custom” on the part of a local government which “inflicts

[an injury] that the government as an entity [can be held] responsible for.” Bernal v. Borough of

Bogata, No. 22-5044, 2023 WL 1883353, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2023) (quoting Monell vy. Dep't of

Soc. Servs. Of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged

in a policy and custom of “discrimination and unequal treatment based on race.” (Am. Compl.

{ 178.) As just stated, however, all of Plaintiffs’ allegations sounding in discrimination are

conjectural, and the Amended Complaint is devoid of factual allegations that might support an

inference of race-based discrimination against Plaintiffs, let alone a “policy and custom” of the

same. (See generally Am. Compl.) In fact, Plaintiffs themselves provide allegations that are

self-aware as to their speculative nature where they even go so far as to explicitly recognize that

race may not be Defendants’ motivating factor in acting against Plaintiffs’ interests at all. (See,

e.g., id. ¥ 59 (alleging that certain actions by Dominach were deceitful, and that such deceit is

“[c}learly evidence of bias, racial or otherwise, directed at [Plaintiffs]”)(emphasis added).)

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should succeed. (See generally Pls.’ Opp’n Br.) Moreover, Plaintiffs fail to point this Court to any

new allegations that might suggest Defendants engaged in behavior that “shocks the conscience,”

which this Court previously found absent from Plaintiffs’ original Complaint. (See Previous Op.

20 (finding, as this Court does here again, that ‘Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding Defendants’

alleged racial discrimination in enforcing fire code regulations amount only to unsupported

accusations because “there is an absolute dearth of facts within the ... pleading to even inferentially

support this broad assertion.’” (citation omitted)); see also (Pls.’ Opp’n Br. *28 (contending, as

they previously did in opposing Defendants’ first motion to dismiss, that “Defendants have racially

targeted Plaintiffs and their business and imposed variances and violations upon them” and

“Plaintiffs were not subjected to the same until well over a year” after the business began

operating.”); Pls.’ Previous Opp’n Br. 24, ECF No. 7).) As such, the Court finds no reason to

revisit its previous findings where Plaintiffs provide no new relevant allegations, and Plaintiffs’

substantive due process claim is again dismissed.

Second, as to procedural due process, Plaintiffs primary contention is that they did not

receive a “fair and impartial” hearing. (Pls.’ Opp’n Br. 29.) Here, Plaintiffs did make amendments

responsive to this Court’s previous findings that they failed to provide sufficient details as to what

hearings they were referring to in bringing their procedural due process claim. (Am. Compl. 4 47,

56-58, 95; Previous Op. 21-22.) These changes, however, do not save Plaintiffs’ procedural due

process claim.

“To prevail on a procedural due process claim, a litigant must show[:] (1) that the state

deprived him of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property[;] and (2) that the deprivation

occurred without due process of law.” Elansari v. United States, 823 F. App’x 107, 112 (3d Cir.

2020) (quoting Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 285 (3d Cir. 2008)). “In analyzing a

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procedural due process claim, the first step is to determine whether the nature of the interest is one

within the contemplation of the ‘liberty or property’ language of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 143 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92

(1972)). “It is elementary that procedural due process is necessitated only if there has been a taking

or deprivation of a protected interest.” Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 670 F.2d 1316, 1321 (3d

Cir. 1982) (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)). Here, Plaintiffs have failed

to adequately allege a “taking,” thus Plaintiffs must show the “deprivation of a protected interest.”

Id. To that end, Plaintiffs allege that they “lost use and enjoyment of the P[remises] as well as its

intended business use and benefit.” (Am. Compl. 206.)

Defendants do not challenge that Plaintiffs’ alleged property interest is sufficient; instead,

Defendants challenge that the process that it offered Plaintiffs was constitutionally deficient.

(Defs.’ Moving Br. 35-37.) Plaintiffs allege that they were not “given an adequate opportunity to

defend against governmental action” and that they were not “given the opportunity to cure any

alleged violations.” (Am. Compl. { 205.) Plaintiffs provide no further allegations as to why process

was deficient. (See generally id.)

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations above, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is

replete with allegations that sound in constitutionally-sufficient process. See Mathews v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (holding that “some form of hearing is required before an individual is

finally deprived of a property interest” and setting forth that this hearing need only generally be

“an opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner’” (quoting

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965))). To begin, Plaintiffs allege that they requested a

hearing after receiving the Notice, and by Plaintiffs’ own allegations, one was given. (See Am.

Compl. {ff 32-41.) Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that they were given the opportunity to provide

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certain evidence to Kowalsky, and that Kowalsky expressed no interest in interfering with

Plaintiffs’ business. (Am. Compl. ff 23-26.) The Township then offered Plaintiffs an opportunity

to cure their concerns after a meeting with Plaintiffs, which Plaintiffs attempted to comply with

while seeking a new location for Deejaiz. (Am. Compl. J 36, 41-42.) Eventually, Plaintiffs were

instructed to cease operating, a decision which Plaintiffs appealed to the Construction Board of

Appeals. (Am. Compl. 95.) Under NJ. Stat. Ann. § 52:27D-127(b), Plaintiffs then had the

opportunity to appeal the Board’s decision to the Superior Court. There is no allegation or other

indication in the record that Plaintiffs exercised that right. (See generally Am. Compl.)

Given the above allegations, this Court can discern no basis for Plaintiffs’ conclusory

proclamation that they were not given an adequate opportunity to defend against government

action. Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to adequately allege a procedural due process claim, and

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim is granted.

3. Title VI Claim

That leaves only Plaintiffs’ Title VI claim as the sole remaining Federal Claim. This claim

is predicated on Plaintiffs successfully alleging intentional racial discrimination. Williams v.

Pennridge Sch. Dist., 782 F. App’x 120, 127 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding that the “hallmark” of Title

VI claims is “intentional discrimination” (collecting cases)); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,

280 (2001) □ [I]t is . . . beyond dispute . . . that [Title VI] prohibits only intentional

discrimination.”). For the same reasons outlined above that Plaintiffs cannot successfully state

their other claims based upon speculative racial discrimination, Plaintiffs’ ‘Title VI claim also fails.

Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Title VI claim is granted.

" Because there are no adequately pled federal claims, the Court does not need to reach the issue

of qualified immunity. (Defs.’ Moving Br. 37.)

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B. The State Law Claims

In light of the above findings, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the State Claims. “[W]here[, as here,] the claim[s] over which the district court has original

jurisdiction [are] dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state

claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide

an affirmative justification for doing so.” Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788

(3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); accord. Garges v. People’s Light & Theatre

Co., 529 F. App’x 156, 163 (3d Cir. 2013); Hagq v. Warren County Corr. Ctr., No. 21-17202,

2022 WL 2473440, at *2 (D.N.J. July 6, 2022). Here, no principles of judicial economy,

convenience, or fairness exist that might support this Court’s exercise of continued jurisdiction.

As such, this Court declines supplemental jurisdiction, and the State Claims are dismissed without

prejudice. W. Mifflin, 45 F.3d at 788.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is dismissed in its entirety. An

appropriate order will follow this Memorandum Opinion.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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