Gaston v. Lake County

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

ANGEL E. GASTON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 5:23-cv-369-WFJ-PRL

LAKE COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff Angel E. Gaston’s Amended Civil Rights

Complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Doc. 12).1 Plaintiff,

proceeding pro se, is currently housed in South Florida Reception Center.

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), federal courts are obligated to conduct an

initial screening of certain civil suits brought by prisoners to determine whether they

should proceed. Upon review, a court is required to dismiss a complaint (or any

portion thereof) in the following circumstances:

(b) Grounds for Dismissal.–On review, the court shall identify cognizable

claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the

complaint–

1 A previous Order dismissed multiple defendants and permitted Plaintiff the opportunity to

cure the deficiencies of his original complaint. See Doc. 8.

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs courts to dismiss actions

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or seek monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court

must read a plaintiff’s pro se allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

519 (1972). Although federal courts give liberal construction to pro se pleadings, courts

“nevertheless have required them to conform to procedural rules.” Albra v. Advan, Inc.,

490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).

Federal Rule Civil Procedure 8 requires that a pleading contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Mathew v. Paynter, 752 F. App'x 740, 742 (11th Cir. 2018). There is no

required technical form, but “each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Each separate claim should be presented in a separate

numbered paragraph, with each paragraph “limited as far as practicable to a single set

of circumstances.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). The allegations must also “give the

defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quotation omitted) (ellipses in

original).

With respect to whether a complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may

be granted,” § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) mirrors the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), so courts apply the same standard in both contexts. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112

F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th

Cir. 2008). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Labels and

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” that

amount to “naked assertions” will not do. Id. (quotations, alteration, and citation

omitted). Moreover, a complaint must “contain either direct or inferential allegations

respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable

legal theory.” Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. For Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th Cir.

2001) (quotations and citations omitted).

II. Amended Complaint2

On October 27, 2020, Plaintiff was arrested in Lake County. (Doc. 12 at 11).

He claims that during his entire incarceration at Lake County he was not able to get

in touch with his assigned attorney and he was subjected to “excessive physical abuse

and torture by the detention deputies.” Id. at 12, 13. Plaintiff “wrote multiple

grievances and contacted everyone (jail doctors, mental health department, chaplain,

judges, and my attorneys) that I could to assist me in the abuse I was experiencing at

2 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains facts and allegations against Defendants that have

been dismissed. Those facts will not be included in this section.

the hands of the detention deputies.” Id. at 13. Due to an alleged lack results from his

grievances, Plaintiff conducted hunger strikes. Id.

Plaintiff claims that while he was housed at the Lake County Detention Center

(“LCDC”) he was repeatedly denied access to the law library because he had counsel.

Deputy Helton advised Plaintiff that “only pro se detainees were permitted access to

legal materials, printing, and copying; once per week for only one hour.” Id. at 15.

Deputy Helton allegedly told Plaintiff that this policy was put in place by Derick

Shroth, legal counsel for the Lake County Sheriff’s Department, approved by Sheriff

Grinnell, and enforced by Captain Edwards and Lt. Weddle. Id. Due to the policy,

Plaintiff claims he was unable to get the forms needed to dismiss his counsel and

proceed pro se. Deputy Helton eventually provided Plaintiff the requested form. Id. at

16.

In March 2022, Plaintiff dismissed his counsel and proceeded pro se with

standby counsel from the Office of Criminal Conflict and Civil Regional Counsel. Id.

at 26–27. Plaintiff was then permitted access to the law library consistent with LCDC’s

policy. Id. at 27. In September 2022, Plaintiff “submitted a civil complaint that

involved Lake County and several detention deputies to be copied” and for the first

time, Deputy Mitchell charged him a copy fee of $1.00 per page. Id. at 30. Plaintiff

claims this was in retaliation to him filing a complaint against the conditions of his

confinement. Id. Later, Deputy Malia refused to make copies of his legal documents.

Id.

In January 2023, Master Deputy Knight “removed my access to legal materials

as punishment for disputing and grieving her refusals to copy and mail out my legal

documents to the Court.” Id. at 31. When Plaintiff grieved this “blatent [sic]

retaliation,” the grievances were declared “invalid” and Deputy Knight’s actions were

supported by Sergeant Dolen and Lieutenant Weddle. Id. at 32.

III. Analysis

“In order to prevail on a civil rights action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show

that he or she was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state

law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). Section 1983

“requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or

omissions and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d

397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Circuit has held that § 1983 claimants must

allege facts to support their claims with some specificity. Wilson v. Strong, 156 F.3d

1131, 1135 (11th Cir. 1998).

A. Defendant Lake County

1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Plaintiff sues Lake County, alleging the Lake County court system permitted

his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be violated by his court-appointed

counsel.3 (Doc. 12 at 33–35). Plaintiff compiles a laundry list of alleged deficient acts

and complaints against these dismissed defendants. See id. at 33–35. As to Lake

3 Plaintiff’s claims against his counsel were dismissed with prejudice. (Doc. 8 at 7–9).

County, Plaintiff mere states, “Lake County did not satisfy the dictates of the 6th

Amendment that call for fair court hearings.” Id. at 34. The amended complaint

contains nothing more than a conclusory allegation of Lake County’s involvement in

his criminal court proceedings. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief may

be granted.

2. Access to Courts

Plaintiff sues Lake County, alleging it deprived him of adequate access to the

courts in violation of the 14th Amendment. (Doc. 12 at 35–36). He alleges Lake

County has a policy that only permits pro se detainees access to the law library,

copying, and printing and deprives all others the ability to prepare and file habeas

corpus or civil rights actions.

Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430

U.S. 817, 828 (1977). That right may be met “by providing prisoners with adequate

law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Id. at 828. When

interpreting the right of access to courts outlined in Bounds, the Eleventh Circuit has

held that access to additional legal material is not mandatory where legal counsel is

provided as an alternative. Smith v. Hutchins, 426 F. App'x 785, 789 (11th Cir. 2011)

(citing Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir. 1985) (“concluding state

need not provide prisoners assistance of counsel in addition to libraries for purpose of

filing collateral suits, stating, ‘it is noteworthy that Bounds refers to law libraries or

other forms of legal assistance, in the disjunctive, no fewer than five times.’”)); Edwards

v. United States, 795 F.2d 958, 961, n. 1, 3 (11th Cir. 1986)) (stating that when counsel

is offered, the alternative of other legal assistance is not mandatory, citing Bounds, 430

U.S. at 828); Daker v. Warren, 660 F. App'x 737, 740 (11th Cir. 2016) (reiterating that

under Eleventh Circuit precedent access to a law library is not mandatory for a pro se

defendant when counsel has been offered); Singleton v. FS No. 7084, No. 3:11-cv-70-J-

12TEM, 2011 WL 617942, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 15, 2011) (holding there is no

constitutional right to access legal materials in preparing a pro se defense in a criminal

case when counsel has been offered and the plaintiff has elected to represent himself).

Here the requirements of Bounds were satisfied because Plaintiff had the option

to receive assistance from court-appointed counsel. See Smith, 426 F. App'x at 790 n.5

(“Regardless of whether Bounds applies to pretrial detainees, we conclude in this case

Bounds does not require access to a law library where Smith had the option of

assistance of appointed counsel.”). Plaintiff's allegations show that Plaintiff was

represented by court-appointed counsel in his state court criminal case, but he

dismissed his counsel to represent himself. (Doc. 12 at 26).

Further, to the extent Plaintiff claims Sheriff Grinnell, Derick Shroth, Captain

Edwards, Deputy Helton, and Lieutenant Weddle prevented from pursuing civil rights

and habeas cases, see Doc. 12 at 13–14, 15, 22, 35–36, he has also failed to state a

claim. To state a claim for a denial of access to the courts, a plaintiff must allege an

“actual injury.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see also Barbour v. Haley, 471

F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). “Actual injury may be established by demonstrating

that an inmate's efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous claim were frustrated or impeded by

... an official's action.” Barbour, 471 F.3d at 1225 (citations omitted). The Eleventh

Circuit has held a prisoner asserting an access-to-courts violation must allege the

defendant's conduct interfered with a criminal appeal, a petition for habeas corpus, or

a civil rights action. Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1332 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[P]rison

officials’ actions that allegedly violate an inmate's right of access to the courts must

have impeded the inmate's pursuit of a nonfrivolous, post-conviction claim or civil

rights action.” (quoting Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 1998))).

Plaintiff failed to plead any facts related to the cases he was prevented from bringing,

let alone establish that they were nonfrivolous.

3. Monell Claims

While the Supreme Court has held that local government entities are “persons”

within the scope of § 1983, and thus subject to liability, Plaintiff cannot rely on a theory

of respondeat superior to hold Lake County liable. McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283,

1289 (11th Cir. 2004); see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 (1978)

(finding that a county does not incur § 1983 liability for injuries caused solely by its

employees). “It is only when the execution of the government's policy or custom ...

inflicts the injury that the [county] may be held liable under § 1983.” City of Canton v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (omission in original and internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, to impose § 1983 liability on Lake County, Plaintiff must show “(1)

that his constitutional rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or

policy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that

the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell, 392 F.3d at 1289. To

successfully prove a policy or custom, it is generally necessary for a plaintiff to

demonstrate “a persistent and wide-spread practice.” Id. at 1290. This threshold

burden “prevents the imposition of liability based upon an isolated incident.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff claims his access to court rights were violated due to Lake

County’s failure “to act and evaluate its plan to ascertain compliance with

constitutional standards against a custom and culture of direct and/or indirect

deliberate indifference to the detainees ineffective assistance in preparation and filing

of meaningful legal documents” and its failure “act against Mr. Grinnell’s and Mr.

Shroth’s policies of preventing access to the courts.” (Doc. 12 at 36). He further claims

that “Lake County failed to train county policymakers to establish policies and

procedures that would ensure the rights of detainees to access the courts and have

adequate access to effective and competent legal representation.” Id. at 37. Because

Plaintiff has failed to state a constitution violation regarding his ineffective assistance

and access to court claims, his Monell claims similarly fail.

B. Detention Deputies4

1. Retaliation

Prison officials violate a prisoner's “First Amendment rights to free speech and

to petition the government” by punishing that prisoner “for filing a grievance

4 Master Deputy Knight, Deputy Malia, Deputy Mitchell and Unknown Deputy #1. See

Doc. 12 at 37.

concerning the conditions of his imprisonment.” Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321

(11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1112 (11th Cir. 2006)). To

prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff must satisfy three elements: “first, that his speech

or act was constitutionally protected; second, that the defendant's retaliatory conduct

adversely affected the protected speech; and third, that there is a causal connection

between the retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech.” Id. (quoting Bennett

v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005)).

Plaintiff alleges that Unknown Deputy #1 retaliated against him by depriving

him “of my right to attend first appearance and then gave false statements and

documentation to the Court stating that I refused to participate in the proceeding.”

(Doc. 12 at 37). Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of retaliation because he has fails

to allege that this action by Unknown Deputy #1 was related to any protected speech

or act.

Plaintiff claims that Deputy Mitchell and Deputy Malia retaliated against him

in violation of his First Amendment rights. (Doc. 12 at 37). He states that prior to

September 9, 2022, he had never been charged for making copies of legal documents.

Id. However, after he submitted a civil rights complaint against several detention

deputies, Deputy Mitchell retaliated by charging him one dollar per page to copy the

78-page complaint. Id. Roughly a month later, Deputy Malia refused to make copies

of Plaintiff’s legal documents. Id. at 30, 37–38. Plaintiff claims these acts were in

retaliation to him naming LCDC staff members in a lawsuit. Id. Next, Plaintiff claims

Master Deputy Knight retaliated against him due him filing a grievance against her.

Id. at 38. Knight “remov[ed] my access to legal materials and research.” Id.

Plaintiff’s allegations against Master Deputy Knight and Deputies Mitchell and

Malia, accepted as true, state a claim for retaliation under the First Amendment.

2. Conspiracy

Plaintiff merely speculates about the existence of a conspiracy. He fails to assert

that the alleged conspirators made and shared a single plan to deprive him of a federal

right or that the conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,

which caused an injury to Plaintiff. See Burge v. Ferguson, 619 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1237

(M.D. Fla. 2008) (holding to properly state a claim for conspiracy under § 1983, a

plaintiff must allege, with specificity, that the defendants agreed to deny the plaintiff

his constitutional rights, and that defendants did, in fact, violate plaintiff's

constitutional rights); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984) (A

court may properly dismiss a conspiracy claim if it includes only conclusory

allegations and does not contain specific facts to inform the defendant “of the nature

of the conspiracy alleged.”); Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1260 (11th

Cir. 2010) (“A plaintiff claiming a § 1983 conspiracy must prove the defendants

‘reached an understanding’ to violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights.”); Bailey v.

Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Alachua Cnty., Fla., 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he

linchpin for conspiracy is agreement, which presupposes communication.”). And his

vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts are insufficient.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 565 (recognizing that allegations of conspiracy must be

supported by allegations of fact that support a “plausible suggestion of conspiracy,”

not merely a “possible” one). This claim is due to be dismissed for failure to state a

claim.

3. Negligence

Negligence claims are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the law

is well-settled that the Constitution is not implicated by a defendant's negligent acts.

Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344,

348 (1986) (“As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process Clause, whether

procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of due care by prison

officials.”). Thus, Plaintiff’s negligence claim is due to be dismissed for failure to state

a claim.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Lake County, Sheriff Peyton

C. Grinnell, Derick Shroth, Captain Edwards, Lieutenant Weddle,

Deputy Helton, and Unknown Deputy #1 are DISMISSED without

prejudice for failure to state a claim.

2. The claims for First Amendment retaliation against Master Deputy

Knight and Deputies Mitchell and Malia remain pending.

3. To continue the prosecution of this case, Plaintiff must complete the

necessary forms and submit service copies of his Amended Complaint

(Doc. 12) with all attachments in order to serve the remaining

Defendants.

4. The Clerk is directed to send Plaintiff blank summons forms and blank USM-

285 (“Process Receipt and Return”) forms. Plaintiff must submit a completed

copy of each of the enclosed forms for each Defendant. Plaintiff is required to

fill in the name and street address of each Defendant in the appropriate spaces

on the summons and USM-285 forms. Plaintiff shall fill in 60 days as the

number of days allowed to answer. Plaintiff must sign the USM-285 form.

5. Plaintiff shall mail the completed forms, along with 3 identical copies of the

Amended Complaint (Doc. 12) to the Clerk's Office within 21 DAYS from the

date of this Order. Failure to return the completed forms and service copies

within this time period will result in dismissal for failure to prosecute, without

further notice.

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida on November 22, 2024.

me,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Pro Se Party

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