The opinion
Case: 24-60086 Document: 53-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/22/2024
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
November 22, 2024
No. 24-60086 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Clarence Cocroft; Tru Source Medical Cannabis,
L.L.C.,
Plaintiffs—Appellants,
versus
Chris Graham, in his official capacity as the Commissioner of the
Mississippi Department of Revenue; Riley Nelson, in his official capacity
as the Chief of Enforcement of the Mississippi Alcoholic Beverage Control
Bureau;Doctor Daniel P. Edney, in his official capacity as
State Health Officer for the State of Mississippi Department of Health,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 3:23-CV-431
______________________________
Before Smith, Clement, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Jerry E. Smith, Circuit Judge:
Clarence Cocroft and his medical-marihuana dispensary, Tru Source
Medical Cannabis, L.L.C., appeal a judgment of dismissal of their First
Amendment challenge to Mississippi’s near-total restriction on the advertis-
ing of medical marihuana. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive
relief against several state defendants in their official capacities. The plain-
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No. 24-60086
tiffs contend that the First Amendment protects their right to engage in
medical-marihuana advertising because Mississippi law permits the under-
lying commercial transactions.
This case presents an issue of first impression in our Circuit. The par-
ties agree that the speech at issue is commercial and that the Central Hudson
test governs our analysis. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). As a threshold matter, commercial speech
receives no First Amendment protection if the underlying commercial con-
duct is illegal. The Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), 21 U.S.C. § 801
et seq., prohibits activities involving marihuana—including activities involve-
ing medical marihuana—nationwide. And the Supremacy Clause means that
the CSA is the law in Mississippi regardless of what state law might say.
Marihuana is therefore illegal in Mississippi, and the state faces no constitu-
tional obstacle to restricting commercial speech relating to unlawful transac-
tions. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of dismissal.
I.
Since 1970, the federal CSA has prohibited the manufacture, distribu-
tion, dispensing, and possession of marihuana. Id. §§ 812(Sched-
ule I)(c)(10), 841(a)(1), 844(a). That law additionally criminalizes the adver-
tising of marihuana. Id. §§ 812(Schedule I)(c)(10), 843(c).
In 2022, Mississippi enacted the “Mississippi Medical Cannabis
Act,” Miss. Code Ann. § 41-137-1 et seq., which authorizes the sale and
use of marihuana for certain medicinal purposes. The Act creates an exten-
sive regulatory and licensing framework, and it charges the Mississippi
Department of Health (“MDOH”) and the Mississippi Department of Rev-
enue (“MDOR”) with administering the program. Miss. Code Ann.
§ 41-137-7. The Act requires both Departments, in that role, to promulgate
rules and regulations, including “[r]estrictions on the advertising, signage,
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and display of medical cannabis[.]” Id. § 41-137-41(1)(d)(x). The Act
specifically permits some advertising, though. The Departments’ rules
may not prevent appropriate signs on the property of a dispen-
sary, listings in business directories, including phone books,
listings in cannabis-related or medical publications, display of
cannabis in company logos and other branding activities, dis-
play on dispensary websites of pictures of products that the dis-
pensary sells, or the sponsorship of health or not-for-profit
charity or advocacy events[.]
Id.
MDOH has exercised its regulatory authority to the full extent per-
mitted under the Act; its rules prohibit medical-marihuana “advertising and
marketing in any media, including but not limited to” broadcast, electronic,
and print media. 15 Miss. Admin. Code Pt. 22, Subpt. 9, R. 9.1.1. The
prohibition also extends to mass text and email communications, displays of
medical cannabis products “in windows or public view,” advertisements
“that can be viewable or otherwise perceived as a public space,” and solicited
or paid reviews, testimonies, or endorsements from patients, caregivers, or
practitioners. Id. The MDOH rules do, however, authorize licensed medical
cannabis establishments “to participate in [specified] branding activities . . .
in order to publicize their businesses.” Id. Pt. 22, Subpt. 9, R. 9.2.1.
“Permissible branding activities include:”
1. Establishment of a website and/or social media presence that
provides general information on the licensed entity’s contact
information, retail dispensing locations, and a list of products
available;
2. Listings in business directories (inclusive of phone books,
cannabis-related or medical publications);
3. Display of cannabis in company logos and other branding
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activities; and,
4. Sponsorships of health or not-for-profit charity or advocacy
events.
Id. Pt. 22, Subpt. 9, R. 9.2.2. 1
The plaintiffs allege that they are injured by Mississippi’s rules be-
cause they cannot advertise “in ways that allow them to effectively reach new
customers,” “inform the public about Mississippi’s medical marijuana pro-
gram,” and “inform the public about Tru Source’s location, products, and
prices.” Were it not for these restrictions, the plaintiffs maintain, they would
advertise through print, broadcast, social, and other media. The plaintiffs
contend that the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause protects their right
to engage in such advertising because Mississippi law has authorized the
underlying commercial transactions.
The district court granted the defendants’ Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Evaluating the
case under Central Hudson, the court held that medical-marihuana adver-
tising does not qualify for First Amendment protection because federal law
criminalizes the underlying transactions.
II.
“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).”
Vizaline, L.L.C. v. Tracy, 949 F.3d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation and
citation omitted). “We accept all well-pleaded facts as true, construing all
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. But we do
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1
The only form of advertising that MDOH permits that the Act (arguably) does
not require it to allow is a dispensary social-media presence for providing general informa-
tion. Compare Miss. Code Ann. § 41-137-41(1)(d)(x) with 15 Miss. Admin. Code
Pt. 22, Subpt. 9, R. 9.2.2.
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not accept as true conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or
legal conclusions.” Hernandez v. W. Tex. Treasures Est. Sales, L.L.C.,
79 F.4th 464, 469 (5th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).
“It is well established that the party seeking to uphold a restriction on
commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it.” Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993) (cleaned up). Thus, “the State ha[s] the burden to
prove all elements of the Central Hudson test.” Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d
442, 446 (5th Cir. 2009).
III.
In Central Hudson, the Court set forth the four-prong test for evaluat-
ing the regulation of commercial speech:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful ac-
tivity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield
positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that
interest.
447 U.S. at 566.
This case boils down to whether medical-marihuana transactions are
“lawful” commercial activity in Mississippi. Supreme Court precedent
teaches that the lawfulness of the underlying commercial activity is a
“threshold matter” in determining whether related commercial speech
comes within the ambit of the First Amendment. See Thompson v. W. States
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002) (“Under [the Central Hudson] test we
ask as a threshold matter whether the commercial speech concerns unlawful
activity or is misleading. If so, then the speech is not protected by the First
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Amendment.”); and Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (Commercial speech “at
least must concern lawful activity” to be protected.) (emphasis added).
Because unlawfulness is dispositive, the most natural reading of Central
Hudson’s first prong makes quick work of this case: Marihuana transactions
are illegal in every state by virtue of federal law, so no commercial speech
proposing such transactions “concern[s] lawful activity.” Cent. Hudson,
447 U.S. at 566. Thus, the First Amendment poses no obstacle to a ban on
such speech.
The crux of the plaintiffs’ contention to the contrary is that, because
Mississippi has not exercised its power to prohibit medical marihuana, the
First Amendment does not authorize Mississippi to exercise its “concomitant
power” to regulate commercial speech proposing medical-marihuana trans-
actions. The plaintiffs thus advance a kind of “same-sovereign” theory of
commercial-speech regulation: Only the sovereign that enacted the law reg-
ulating the underlying conduct has the power to enact laws restricting related
commercial speech. It is the exercise of the state’s own “power to prohibit a
product,” the plaintiffs say, that triggers its “limited power to prohibit
speech about that product.” The plaintiffs urge a reading of Central Hudson
that does not merely ask, “Is this product illegal?” but instead inquires, “Has
the jurisdiction that is banning this commercial speech first prohibited the
commercial conduct it proposes?” The state defendants counter that it is
the status of illegality in the relevant jurisdiction—not the identity of the sov-
ereign that enacted the prohibition—that counts under Central Hudson.
A.
Plaintiffs’ same-sovereign theory is unsupported by law. First, Cen-
tral Hudson lends no support to that notion. “For commercial speech to
come within [the First Amendment], it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading.” Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. That reads as a
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status-based inquiry: “Is the status of the underlying activity legal?”
Supreme Court decisions applying Central Hudson frame the question
similarly. 2
The sole Supreme Court opinion that plaintiffs cite for their theory is
not to the contrary. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484
(1996), the Court invalidated a Rhode Island statute that banned price adver-
tising for alcoholic beverages. Justice Stevens, in a plurality opinion speaking
for himself and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, wrote that com-
mercial speech cases have “explained that the State’s power to regulate com-
mercial transactions justifies its concomitant power to regulate commercial
speech that is ‘linked inextricably’ to those transactions.” 3 The plaintiffs
take this to mean that a state cannot regulate commercial speech unless its
own state legislature has first regulated the underlying conduct; a state’s own
conduct regulation is the requisite justification for its “concomitant” power
to enact speech restrictions.
But that is an unlikely reading for several reasons. First, neither of the
two cases Justice Stevens cited supports the plaintiffs’ interpretation. See
Friedman, 440 U.S. at 10 n.9; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456. Second, the facts of
44 Liquormart involved a state-level speech restriction related to transactions
that were legal under both federal and state law; the identity of the sovereign
regulating the commerce was not at issue. Finally, Justice Stevens’s opinion
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2
See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 (1983) (“The State may
. . . prohibit commercial speech related to illegal behavior.”); see also Bd. of Trs. of State
Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 475 (1989); Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States,
527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999); Thompson, 535 U.S. at 367 (all citing Central Hudson’s status-
based legality inquiry without suggesting any same-sovereign rule).
3
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 499 (plurality opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Ken-
nedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.) (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10, n.9 (1979);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
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in 44 Liquormart spoke for only four Justices, and no subsequent Supreme
Court majority has cited his opinion to suggest that a state’s power to regu-
late commercial speech is “concomitant” to its own power to regulate
transactions.
The plaintiffs do not fare any better with caselaw from other circuits.
Of the six cases the plaintiffs cite from sister circuits, none turns on the issue
of whether the state itself must enact the underlying criminal law as a pre-
requisite to regulating the related commercial speech. The closest those
cases come to supporting the plaintiffs’ theory is merely to quote Justice
Stevens’s line from 44 Liquormart without any additional explanation. 4
None of them addresses the question whether a state can regulate comercial
speech related to federally illegal transactions that the state has not separately
prohibited. And the plaintiffs’ single favorable reported state case—
involving, as here, advertising restrictions on marihuana in a state permitting
marihuana against a backdrop of federal illegality—did not even mention
44 Liquormart or the concomitant-power theory in its prong one analysis. See
Seattle Events v. State, 512 P.3d 926, 934–35 (Wash. Ct. App. 2022) (applying
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4
See United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(cited Justice Stevens’s “concomitant” quotation in 44 Liquormart; the outcome did not
turn on which sovereign regulated the underlying conduct); United States v. Wenger,
427 F.3d 840, 846 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoted Justice Stevens’s line from 44 Liquormart but
included no additional language suggesting a same-sovereign requirement; the case did not
turn on such a requirement); Conn. Bar Ass’n v. United States, 620 F.3d 81, 94–95 (2d Cir.
2010) (included a bare recitation of the 44 Liquormart line but did not turn on which sov-
ereign regulated the underlying conduct); Campbell v. Robb, 162 F. App’x 460, 469 (6th
Cir. 2006) (quoted Justice Stevens in 44 Liquormart; did not turn on the same-sovereign
question); see also Katt v. Dykhouse, 983 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1992) (did not turn on whether
the state itself made the commercial conduct illegal); Okla. Telecasters Ass’n v. Crisp,
699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983) (merely held, in relevant part, that advertising restrictions
are not immune from First Amendment scrutiny just because the state has broad power to
regulate the underlying transactions), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Cap. Cities Cable, Inc.
v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984).
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Central Hudson prong one).
In the final analysis, a state’s ability to ban commercial speech is “con-
comitant” to the unlawful status of the underlying transaction. It is constitu-
tionally irrelevant whether the state or the federal government imposed the
status of illegality.
B.
Contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertions, Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975), does not change that analysis. Bigelow merely focuses the inquiry,
teaching that the relevant legal status is in the place where the advertised
transaction would occur. Thus, in Bigelow, the Court held that Virginia could
not ban advertising within its borders for abortion-related transactions that
would occur in New York because those transactions were legal in New York.
“[A State] may not, under the guise of exercising internal police powers, bar
a citizen of another State from disseminating information about an activity
that is legal in that State.” Id. at 824–25.
Bigelow therefore clarifies the precise question in Central Hudson
prong one: whether a proposed transaction is legal under the laws of the jur-
isdiction where it would occur. That necessarily and especially includes fed-
eral law because federal law is the law of every United States jurisdiction. 5
Here, Mississippi has restricted advertisements for transactions that are ille-
gal under federal law, which is the law of Mississippi.
Plaintiffs resist such an interpretation of Bigelow, citing Dunagin v.
City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc). That case involved a
statewide restriction on liquor advertising in a state with both “wet” and
_____________________
5
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (The Constitution, valid treaties, and valid federal
laws “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”).
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“dry” counties. We rejected the state’s argument that liquor advertising
could be banned on the ground that it “promote[s] illegal activity.” Id.
at 742–43. But Dunagin does not alter the meaning of Bigelow; it merely
demonstrates that Bigelow applies to conflicting county, in addition to state,
laws. Like Bigelow and unlike this case, Dunagin addressed a statewide adver-
tising restriction covering transactions that were legal under federal, state,
and (some) county law. Id. There was no federal (or, in Dunagin, no state)
backdrop of illegality as there is here.
The plaintiffs also glean support from a First Circuit case and a Ninth
Circuit case applying Bigelow. The former involved an advertisement that
“promotes activity which has been determined to be criminal in all jurisdic-
tions.” New England Accessories Trade Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Nashua, 679 F.2d
1, 3 (1st Cir. 1982). The plaintiffs seize on a hypothetical that appeared in
dictum: “If New York, or some other state, decided to legalize the sale and
use of marijuana, New Hampshire would have greater difficulty under Bige-
low [sic] prohibiting an advertisement suggesting that the Big Apple was the
place to get high on marijuana. But that is not the situation before us.” Id.,
679 F.2d at 4. The New England Accessories court merely purported to apply
Bigelow, and it did not even mention the backdrop of federal marihuana ille-
gality. Neither that case nor Bigelow involved state authorization of some-
thing illegal nationwide.
The Ninth Circuit case involved advertisements for drug parapher-
nalia and conducted a straightforward application of Bigelow in the context of
conflicting laws among different states: “[T]he advertiser who proposes a
transaction in a state where the transaction is legal is promoting a legal activ-
ity. Its speech deserves First Amendment protection.” Wash. Mercantile
Ass’n v. Williams, 733 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1984). Again, the court merely
restated the rule in Bigelow that governs conflicting laws among different
states.
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Under Central Hudson, viewed through the lens of Bigelow, a state can
ban commercial speech proposing transactions within the state wherever
those transactions violate the law—including federal law, which is the
“supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
C.
Two reported state cases have squarely addressed the question. The
first supports the defendants’ position. See Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v.
State, 368 P.3d 1131 (Mont. 2016). As here, the plaintiffs challenged a state
prohibition on medical-marihuana advertising where the state had passed a
law authorizing medical-marihuana transactions. The court held that the law
did not violate the First Amendment because the use or possession of medical
marihuana is not a “lawful activity” for purposes of Central Hudson. Id.
at 1150. The court employed a straightforward Supremacy Clause analysis to
evaluate the legal status of marihuana in Montana. Id. at 1149–50. Congress
has criminalized marihuana, the court reasoned, and federal law is supreme
over any state law to the contrary. Id. at 1150. “That a person possesses or
uses medical marijuana in compliance with the laws of his or her state of resi-
dence provides no defense under the federal law.” Id. (citing Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 29 (2005)). The court concluded that “an activity that is
not permitted by federal law—even if permitted by state law—is not a ‘lawful
activity’ within the meaning of Central Hudson’s first factor.” Id.
In Seattle Events, the court reached the opposite result, holding that
the licensed sale of marihuana is “lawful” for purposes of Central Hudson
where states have permitted its sale. The court’s brief analysis was largely
ipse dixit. First, the court marshaled no Supreme Court authority for its
holding, citing only dictum from New England Accessories and language from
Williams as the “existing case law support[ing]” its conclusion. Seattle
Events, 512 P.3d at 935. Second, the court never engaged with the Montana
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court’s reasoning. Rather, it distinguished Montana Cannabis on the ground
that that case involved only a federal constitutional challenge, whereas the
Washington plaintiffs brought both federal and state constitutional claims.
Id. The Seattle Events court ended its analysis of prong one in conclusionary
fashion: “Because existing case law supports extending constitutional pro-
tections to advertising for activities that are legal in the state where the trans-
action would occur, we hold that restricted marijuana advertising from
licensed retailers in Washington concerns lawful activity.” Id. (citing New
England Accessories and Williams).
The reasoning in Seattle Events is not persuasive. For example, the
court observes at one point that “[t]he sale of marijuana remains illegal under
federal law,” but it proceeds to hold that “the licensed sale of marijuana is
legal in Washington.” Id. Putting the First Amendment issue aside, those
two statements are incongruous with the Supremacy Clause. Furthermore,
the sole reason the court felt free to disregard the logic of Montana Cannabis
was because that case involved only a federal First Amendment claim. That
explanation makes little sense, however, because the Washington court ex-
plained that the same Central Hudson analysis applied to both the state and
federal claims in that case. Id. at 932. Thus, the Seattle Events court undercut
the very basis on which it distinguished Montana Cannabis, and it failed to
grapple with whether an activity that is illegal nationwide can qualify as a
“lawful activity” in any state.
The reasoning in Montana Cannabis, which the district court adopted
here, is persuasive and dispositive. That logic proceeds in three steps:
(1) Under Central Hudson, the First Amendment permits a state to
ban advertising of commercial activity that is illegal within that
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state. 6
(2) Marihuana, including medical marihuana, is illegal in every state
because it is illegal under federal law; that some states permit mari-
huana as a matter of state policy does not alter the nationwide
application of federal law. 7
(3) Therefore, the First Amendment does not preclude state bans on
marihuana advertising.
The plaintiffs attack this reasoning as a Supremacy Clause analysis
instead of an application of First Amendment principles. Not so. They are
well-settled First Amendment principles that implicate the Supremacy Clause
in this case. Those principles permit states to ban commercial speech about
activities that are not “lawful.” Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. And the
Supremacy Clause defines what is “lawful” where a valid federal law is
involved. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
Here, the federal CSA prohibits marihuana (including medical mari-
huana) in every state. The Supreme Court confirmed in Gonzales v. Raich
that the CSA is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause, and it held that the Supremacy Clause “unambiguously provides”
that the federal CSA governs even in states with more permissive marihuana
laws. 8 Marihuana is illegal in every United States jurisdiction, “any Thing in
_____________________
6
Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566; Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 824–25.
7
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Raich, 545 U.S. at 27–29 (holding that the federal
CSA validly criminalizes marihuana used for “any purpose” nationwide) (emphasis in
original).
8
Raich, 545 U.S. at 27–29. Although plaintiffs suggest that marihuana is “effec-
tively legal at the federal level,” no such category of “effectively legal” exists. Congres-
sional funding and executive branch enforcement decisions do not alter the illegality of
marihuana under the CSA. See, e.g., United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1179 n.5 (9th
Cir. 2016) (O’Scannlain, J.) (Despite Congress’ funding choices, “[t]he CSA prohibits the
manufacture, distribution, and possession of marijuana. Anyone in any state who pos-
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the . . . Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const.
art. VI, cl. 2. Because marihuana is not a “lawful activity” in Mississippi, the
First Amendment poses no obstacle to the state’s commercial-speech
restrictions.
* * * * *
To qualify for First Amendment protection, commercial speech must
“at least concern lawful activity.” Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Federal
law criminalizes medical marihuana in every state—including Mississippi.
Therefore, Mississippi’s commercial-speech restrictions do not offend the
First Amendment.
The judgment of dismissal is AFFIRMED.
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sesses, distributes, or manufactures marijuana for medical or recreational purposes (or
attempts or conspires to do so) is committing a federal crime.”).
14