The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARCUS WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 1:23-cv-03447
SPECIALIZED LOAN SERVICING, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Marcus Washington, a D.C. resident, sued Specialized Loan Servicing, a
financial institution, under claims of fraud and racketeering. Before the Court is Defendant’s
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 27. Because Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
does not meet the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a) and 9(b), this Court
grants Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.1
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests whether the complaint “state[s] a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The Court “must first tak[e] note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state [a] claim to relief, and then determine whether the plaintiff has
pleaded those elements with adequate factual support to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
1
Plaintiff initially sued Specialized Loan Servicing for violating various consumer protection laws. Dkt. 1. His
Amended Complaint alleged similar violations of consumer protection laws. Dkt. 5. In his Second Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff dropped the consumer protection claims and brought only two claims: fraud and racketeering.
Dkt. 21. His Second Amended Complaint named as Defendants not just Specialized Loan Servicing, but also an
additional corporation, a limited liability company, and eighteen employees of the various companies sued. Id.
Only Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing filed a Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. 27. But because the reasons for
dismissal apply equally to all Defendants, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims in their entirety. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(a), 9(b).
its face.” Blue v. District of Columbia, 811 F.3d 14, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Mere
conclusions are insufficient to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Rule 8(a) provides that a pleading “must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the
claim” showing that the court has jurisdiction and that the pleader is entitled to relief. FED. R.
CIV. P. 8(a). This rule aims to give fair notice to defendants of the asserted claims so that they
can file responsive pleadings and raise appropriate defenses. See Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D.
497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977).
Under Rule 9(b), a party alleging fraud “must state with particularity the circumstances
constituting [the] fraud.” FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). This rule “normally [] means that the pleader
must state the time, place and content of the false misrepresentations, the fact misrepresented and
what was obtained or given up as a consequence of the fraud.” United States v. Cannon, 642
F.2d 1373, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (cleaned up). However, the particularity requirement under
Rule 9(b) “does not abrogate Rule 8, and it should be harmonized with the general directives in
subdivisions (a) and (e) of Rule 8 that the pleadings should contain a short and plain statement of
the claim or defense and that each averment should be simple concise and direct.” Id. at 1386
(cleaned up).
Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint fails to satisfy any of these standards. Count One
alleges that Defendant LoanDepot.com engaged in some kind of fraudulent transaction. Dkt. 21
at 7. Though Plaintiff—very briefly—details a loan agreement he made with LoanDepot.com,
he merely argues, without providing any evidence, that LoanDepot.com violated 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1001, 1010, 1341, and 1343. Id. Indeed, Plaintiff’s entire “factual background” consists of
just four sentences and mentions Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing once. Id. Not only does
this not provide Defendant Specialized Loan Servicing or any other Defendant with notice as to
the claims against them, but Plaintiff’s brief description wholly fails to “state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). Nor does
Plaintiff meet the heightened pleading standard for fraud claims, as he does not provide a single
detail required by Rule 9(b). Id.
Plaintiff’s second count fares no better. He incorporates the same four vague paragraphs
from Count One and simply adds that “[D]efendants, collectively, and each of them, conspired
with each other to further their ongoing business model in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961;
1962(d).” Id. Because none of Plaintiff’s claims are “meaningfully distinguished from bold
conclusions,” they “do[] not fulfill the requirements of Rule 8.” Webb v. Dep’t of Army, 2022
WL 17851470, at *1 (D.D.C. October 7, 2022). And since Rule 9(b) subjects allegations of
fraud to heightened scrutiny, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is undoubtedly deficient.
While the Court must construe a pro se complaint together with all the plaintiff’s filings,
see Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2015), none of
Plaintiff’s filings bolster his threadbare allegations. See Dkts. 30, 32. Neither his Reply nor
Surreply to Defendant’s Motion supplements his Second Amended Complaint with any new
facts, much less enough facts to satisfy either Rule 8(a) or Rule 9(b). Id. And though courts
hold pro se litigants’ complaints to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “even pro se litigants must comply with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” Boone v. Schorr, 1999 WL 1029160, at *1 (D.D.C. May
25, 1999). Thus, even a lenient reading of Plaintiff’s Complaint cannot overcome the sheer lack
of facts alleged. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for
failure to comply with Rule 8(a) and Rule 9(b).
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice.
This is a final appealable order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
terminate this case.
Date: November 22, 2024 ____________________________
Ana C. Reyes
United States District Judge