THOMPSON-EL v. TOWNSHIP OF GREEN BROOK

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

GEORGIA THOMPSON-EL,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 19-14253 (GC) (TJB)

v.

TOWNSHIP OF GREEN BROOK, et al., OPINION

Defendants.

CASTNER, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon Defendants’—Lawrence Township’s and

Detective Joseph Radlinsky’s (Lawrence Defendants)—Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (Rule) 56.1 (ECF No. 32.) Plaintiff Georgia Thompson-El

opposed. (ECF No. 39.) Defendants replied. (ECF No. 42.) The Court has carefully considered

the parties’ submissions and decides the matter without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78(b) and

Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons set forth below, and other good cause shown, the Motion

for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural Background

On June 26, 2019, Plaintiff brought suit against Lawrence Township and Detective Joseph

Radlinsky of the Lawrence Township Police Department (LTPD). (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff alleges

1 Defendants Green Brook Township and Officer Anthony Pepe of the Green Brook Police

Department (Green Brook Defendants) also filed a motion for summary judgment. The Court has

issued a separate decision as to those Defendants.

that she was “arrested and charged with multiple crimes without probable cause and with willful

and reckless disregard as to whether [Defendants] had charged the right person with the alleged

crimes.” (Id. at 5.2)

Plaintiff asserts seven claims against Defendants: (1) unlawful arrest and imprisonment

against Detective Radlinsky in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VIII)3; (2) malicious

prosecution against Detective Radlinsky in violation of § 1983 (Count IX); (3) municipal liability

against Lawrence Township in violation of § 1983 (Count X); supervisory liability against

“Lawrence John Doe Defendant” in violation of § 1983 (Count XI); false arrest and false

imprisonment in violation of state law (Count XII); malicious prosecution in violation of state law

(Count XIII); and violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-

2 et seq. (Count XIV). (ECF No. 1.)

B. Statement of Facts4

1. Theft at Zoe’s Kitchen

On April 8, 2017, at approximately 1:00 p.m., a man identified as P.L. had his credit cards

stolen as he ate lunch at Zoe’s Kitchen, a restaurant located in Lawrenceville, New Jersey. (Defs.

SMF ¶ 6; Pl. SMF ¶ 6.) On that same day, at approximately 1:45 p.m., someone made three

attempts to use P.L.’s credit cards at a Target located in South Brunswick, New Jersey. (Id. ¶ 7.)

2 Page numbers for record cites (i.e., “ECF Nos.”) refer to the page numbers stamped by the

Court’s e-filing system and not the internal pagination of the parties.

3 The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

4 The factual circumstances surrounding this action, as revealed through discovery, are set

forth in the parties’ submissions in accordance with Local Civil Rule 56.1. (See “Defs. SMF”,

ECF No. 32-1; “Pl. SMF”, ECF No. 39-1.) Any disagreements amongst the parties as to the timing

or characterization of certain aspects of the incident in question are noted for clarity where

necessary and appropriate.

P.L. contacted the Lawrence Police Department and described the incident to Officer Bruce

B. Miller. (ECF No. 32-2.) P.L. told Officer Miller that he felt his jacket moving, and when he

turned around, “he observed the three suspects sitting at a table and asked what was going on.”

(Id.) The three suspects told P.L. that he could search their bags, but he declined and left shortly

after. (Id.) P.L. described the three suspects as a black female in her mid-20’s, a middle-aged

black female, and a middle-aged black male. (Id.) Thereafter, the LTPD began an investigation

into the incident.

2. Lawrence Investigation

Detective Radlinksy for the LTPD conducted the investigation into the theft of P.L.’s credit

cards at Zoe’s Kitchen. (Defs. SMF ¶ 9; Pl. SMF ¶ 9.) Detective Radlinsky’s investigation is set

forth in the Lawrence Police’s Supplemental Narrative dated April 13, 2017, as modified and

approved on June 12, 2017. (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. G at 57-62.)

On April 13, 2017, Detective Radlinsky went to Zoe’s Kitchen to locate any surveillance

videos or persons who may have witnessed the event. (Id. at 58.) No such videos or witnesses

were located. (Id.) On April 17, 2017, Detective Radlinsky went to the South Brunswick Target

and obtained surveillance footage and two still images of the persons who had attempted three

transactions using P.L.’s credit cards. (Defs. SMF ¶ 10; Pl. SMF ¶ 10.) The still images taken

from the Target surveillance video, (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. G at 51-53), showed a Black female

wearing a white baseball cap, a dark jacket, and blue jeans. (Defs. SMF ¶ 11; Pl. SMF ¶ 11.)

Detective Radlinsky then contacted P.L. to request he view the Target still images to see if they

matched the individuals at Zoe’s Kitchen. (Id.)

While awaiting P.L.’s response, Detective Radlinsky viewed an online alert bulletin posted

by Officer Anthony Pepe from the Green Brook Police Department (GBPD). (Defs. SMF ¶ 12;

Pl. SMF ¶ 12.) The Green Brook Bulletin was related to an alleged theft by three Black persons

at the Bonefish Grill in Green Brook, New Jersey, on April 8, 2017, the same day as the Zoe’s

Kitchen theft. (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. C at 42-43.) The Green Brook Bulletin provided additional

information related to the incident at the Bonefish Grill and the Green Brook investigation.

Specifically, Officer Pepe obtained a New Jersey license plate number for a vehicle registered to

Plaintiff. (Id.) The Green Brook Bulletin further reported that the suspects attempted to use the

stolen credit cards at a Walmart and Target located in Watchung, New Jersey. (Id.) The Green

Brook Bulletin contained a photo of a Black female wearing a white baseball cap, a dark jacket,

and blue jeans. (Id.) Detective Radlinsky recognized the Black female suspect from the Bonefish

Grill incident as the same Black female suspect from the South Brunswick Target surveillance

video because she was wearing the same clothing. (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. G at 57-62.) Detective

Radlinsky also recognized the male suspect in the photos as the same male involved in his own

investigation. (Id.) The Green Brook Bulletin identified two of the three suspects as Georgia

Thompson and Georgia Thompson’s ex-husband, Douglass Thompson. (Id.)

Detective Radlinsky testified that the Green Brook Bulletin was “crucial” to his

investigation because he had not identified any of the three suspects prior to receiving it. (ECF

No. 32-2 Ex. D at 53:18-25.) Thereafter, Detective Radlinsky contacted Officer Pepe and

summarized their conversation in his report as follows:

Officer Pepe, after determining the ownership of the suspect

vehicle, contacted Georgia Thompson via phone. He advised her as

to the nature of his call to which she responded that she knew

nothing about her vehicle being used in a crime. When Officer Pepe

asked her to come to his police department, Georgia Thompson

refused and said she did not know anything about the incident that

he was investigating. She refused to answer any further questions

and Officer Pepe concluded his phone interview with her.

I asked Officer Pepe about his identification of Georgia

Thompson and he stated that he identified her with “100% certainty”

after comparing Georgia Thompson’s New Jersey driver’s license

photo to his surveillance video.

Officer Pepe explained to me that after he became aware of

the suspect’s vehicle registered to Georgia Thompson, he checked

the motor vehicle history of the vehicle in an attempt to locate any

tickets issued to the vehicle. Officer Pepe located a motor vehicle

summons that was issued to Douglass Thompson after he was

stopped operating the suspect vehicle. He then viewed the driver’s

license for Douglass Thompson and compared it the surveillance

video from his incident. He determined that Douglass Thompson

was the male in the surveillance video from the incident in Green

Brook.

[(ECF No. 32-2 Ex. G at 57-62.) 5]

Detective Radlinsky testified at his deposition that he never reviewed the Green Brook

surveillance video upon which Officer Pepe had made his identifications of Plaintiff and Douglass

Thompson. (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. D at 62:2-5.) In both his deposition and supplemental narrative,

Detective Radlinsky stated that, independent of Officer Pepe’s findings, he compared Plaintiff’s

driver’s license photo, (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. H at 63-64), to the surveillance video from the South

Brunswick Target, (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. E at 51-53), and confirmed that the female with the white

baseball cap was Plaintiff. (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. D at 106:10-15.) Detective Radlinsky testified that

his identification “was based on the shape of her face, the shape of her nose, her lips, anything that

I could see below the eyebrows because the brim of the hat comes down.” (Id. at 75:12-23.) With

respect to Douglass Thompson, Detective Radlinsky also independently compared Thompson’s

driver’s license photo to the South Brunswick Target surveillance video and concluded that he was

5 Plaintiff disputes the truth of Officer Pepe’s statements as summarized by the Lawrence

Supplemental Narrative. (Pl. SMF ¶ 15.)

unable to determine with “100% certainty” that Douglass Thompson was the Black male in the

South Brunswick Target video. (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. G at 57-63.)

On April 27, 2017, Detective Radlinsky met with P.L., the victim of the Zoe’s Kitchen

theft, and showed P.L. the still images from the South Brunswick Target’s surveillance video (ECF

No. 32-2 Ex. E at 51-53). (See ECF No. 32-2 at 57-63.) From those images, P.L. identified the

Black female wearing the white baseball cap as one of the Black female suspects that sat behind

him at Zoe’s Kitchen. (Id.) Detective Radlinsky testified at his deposition that he “never showed

[P.L.] a picture of Georgia Thompson.” (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. D at 96:21-22.) Specifically, Detective

Radlinsky testified as follows:

Q. At that time, did you exhibit to [P.L.] the P-23, the photo of Ms.

Thompson?

A. P-23? Driver’s license photo, no.

Q. So [P.L.] never identified P-23 or Ms. Thompson directly as

being the woman that he referred to as one of the suspects?

A. No. My purpose of having him view the—the people, suspects

in this case from the surveillance—stills taken from the

surveillance video was to corroborate his description of the

people who were in the restaurant at the time that his wallet was

stolen.

[(Id. at 83:25 to 84:11.)6]

6 Plaintiff disputes Detective Radlinsky’s description of his meeting with the victim. (Pl.

SMF ¶ 18.) Detective Radlinsky did not keep a record of the identification procedure, of the

photographs shown, or of the victim’s response. (See ECF No. 32-2 Ex. D at 82:15-16.) Policies

and procedures adopted by the LTPD require a law enforcement officer to make a record of an

out-of-court identification, in a video or audio format, and to provide relevant details of how the

identification took place. (See ECF No. 38-3 at 4-13, 15-26.) There is no record of the

identification procedure, except for email correspondence between Detective Radlinsky and P.L.

setting up the meeting and Detective Radlinsky's statements in the report. (ECF No. 32-2 at 61.)

The Lawrence Supplemental Narrative thus concludes, “[b]ased on the totality of

circumstances, probable cause was determined to charge Georgia Thompson” with “1 Count of

Theft of Movable Property” and “1 Count of Credit Card Theft.” (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. G at 61.) In

his deposition, Detective Radlinsky testified that there was probable cause based on surveillance

videos, surveillance images, and his identification of Plaintiff through her driver’s license

photograph and surveillance still images as compared to Officer Pepe’s identification of Plaintiff

from the Green Brook investigation. (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. D at 85:8-17.)

Plaintiff denies any involvement in the theft at Zoe’s Kitchen and denies ever being in

Lawrence Township. (ECF No. 38-1 Ex. A at 92:5-10.) Plaintiff asserts that on April 8, 2017,

she was at a medical facility in North Plainfield from approximately 11:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m., and

then went home for a few minutes before heading to Home Depot. (Id. at 35:21-37:7.) After

leaving Home Depot at around 12:30 p.m., Plaintiff visited her babysitter’s house in Union to drop

off soil, leaving there at around 12:45 p.m. (Id. at 37:8-15.) Subsequently, Plaintiff went shopping

at multiple stores in East Orange, Union, and Watchung from approximately 12:45 p.m. to 4:45

p.m. before returning home to Scotch Plains. (Id. at 37:16-40:8.) Plaintiff then drove to the

Bonefish Grill in Green Brook where she had dinner with her friend Junior Hamilton and her

boyfriend for approximately two hours. (Id. at 40:9-47:6.) Following dinner, Plaintiff went to a

Costco Gas Station and then returned home. (Id. at 46:25-47:6.)

3. Charges Against Plaintiff and Grand Jury Indictment

On June 8, 2017, Detective Radlinsky prepared a Complaint-Summons against Plaintiff,

charging her with theft of movable property, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:203A, and credit card theft, N.J.

Stat. Ann. § 2C:21-6(c)(1). (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. I at 66-76.) As part of the criminal complaint,

Detective Radlinsky signed an affidavit of probable cause. (Id. at 74-75.) Detective Radlinsky’s

affidavit states the following:

The Defendant, along with her co-defendant (Edwards), did

remove the victim’s wallet from his jacket pocket while he dined at

a restaurant in the jurisdiction of Lawrence Township. The

Defendant and co-defendant then used the victim’s credit card to

purchase merchandise from the Target store in South Brunswick[,]

New Jersey.

Investigation conducted by the complainant. Victim

witnessed defendant and co-defendant at the time that his wallet was

stolen.

[(Id. at 75.)]

After Plaintiff received the complaint-summons by mail, she appeared, without an attorney,

in Lawrence Township Municipal Court in June 2017. (ECF No. 38-1 Ex. A at 99:18-102:12.)

Plaintiff appeared in court twice more in July and August 2017. (Id. at 104:1-106:15.)

On February 1, 2018, Detective Radlinsky testified before the Mercer County Grand Jury.

(ECF No. 32-2 Ex. J at 78-94.) There, he testified, in part, as follows:

Q. So you -- and then the victim in this case positively identified

Georgia Thompson as the woman that was sitting behind him at

Zoe[’]s Kitchen?

A. That’s correct.

. . .

A. So, we had not gained an [identity] of that male. But when I showed

him the picture of Georgia Thompson, he said that’s the woman that

said I could search her bags, she was seated behind me.

[(Id. at 88-90.)]

When Detective Radlinsky was asked about these grand jury statements at his deposition,

Detective Radlinsky testified as follows:

Q. Okay. Sir, what you in these two answers stated or testified that

[P.L.] identified Georgia Thompson as the woman in Zoe’s Kitchen

that he saw, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. But you never showed him a picture of Ms. -- Ms. Thompson,

correct?

A. Correct.

Q. So[,] he never, even identified Ms. Thompson as that woman,

correct?

A. No.

Q. So that’s false, right?

Q. Yes.

[(ECF No. 32-2 Ex. D at 95:24-96:1-11.)]

On February 1, 2018, the Mercer County Grand Jury indicted Plaintiff for credit card theft

in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:21-6(c)(1). (Defs. SMF ¶ 28.)7 As a result, on February 7,

2018, Plaintiff was ordered to appear in Mercer County for an arraignment on February 20, 2018.

4. Bench Warrant, Arrest, and Dismissal of Charges

Plaintiff failed to appear at her arraignment, and as a result a bench warrant was issued on

February 21, 2018. (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. L at 98.) After the court issued a bench warrant, Plaintiff

sent the court a letter requesting an adjournment. 8 (Id.)

7 Plaintiff was also indicted in Somerset County for the theft at the Bonefish Grill that was

described in the Green Brook Bulletin. (Defs. SMF ¶ 32.) There, a complaint-warrant was filed,

and a separate warrant was requested by the Somerset County Prosecutor’s office. (Pl. SMF ¶ 33.)

8 Plaintiff received a letter in the mail notifying her of the warrant, but she testified in her

deposition that she did not receive a copy of the warrant itself. (ECF No. 32-2 at 112:8-21.)

On April 4, 2018, during a motor vehicle stop in Berkeley Heights, Plaintiff was arrested

pursuant to the Somerset County warrant and the Mercer County bench warrant. (Defs. SMF ¶

33.) Plaintiff spent eight days at the Somerset County jail before she was transferred to the Mercer

County jail, where she stayed until she was released on April 16, 2018. (ECF no. 32-2 at 113:1-

115:10.) On October 15, 2018, the Mercer County charges were dismissed against Plaintiff. (Defs.

SMF ¶ 34.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment shall be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if it

could lead a “reasonable jury [to] return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of

the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id.

When deciding the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court must determine

“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether

it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52. The Court must

grant summary judgment if any party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “[I]nferences, doubts, and issues of credibility should be

resolved against the moving party.” Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n.2 (3d Cir.

1983).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Claims for Unlawful Arrest and Imprisonment (Count VIII) And

Malicious Prosecution (Count IX)

“By its terms, . . . [§ 1983] creates no substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for

deprivations of rights established elsewhere.” Castro v. New Jersey, 521 F. Supp. 3d 509, 517 n.6

(D.N.J. 2021) (quoting City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985)). To state a

claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the conduct deprived her of her rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) the

conduct challenged was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo,

446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011); Shuman ex rel.

Shertzer v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff asserts that Detective Radlinsky’s conduct violated her rights under the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendment based on (1) unlawful arrest and imprisonment and (2) malicious

prosecution. Plaintiff alleges that her arrest and prosecution were due to Detective Radlinsky

accusing her of theft without following proper photo identification procedures or conducting the

most minimally competent investigation. (ECF No. 39 at 8.)

To bring a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must establish “(1) that there was an arrest; and

(2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.” James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d

675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). A claim for false imprisonment arises when a person is arrested without

probable cause and is subsequently detained pursuant to that unlawful arrest. See Adams v. Officer

Eric Selhorst, 449 F. App’x 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). In other words, a claim

of false imprisonment in this context is derivative of a claim for arrest without probable cause. See

Johnson v. Camden Cnty. Prosecutors’ Off., Civ. No. 11-3588, 2012 WL 273887, at *4 n.2 (D.N.J.

Jan. 31, 2012) (citations omitted).

“To prove malicious prosecution under section 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the

defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiffs favor;

(3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted maliciously or

for a purpose other than bringing a plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of

liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Estate of

Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

In moving for summary judgment with respect to the § 1983 claims against Detective

Radlinsky, the Lawrence Defendants primarily argue that the bench warrant provided probable

cause for and proximately caused Plaintiff’s arrest. (ECF No. 32-1.)

1. Probable Cause for Plaintiff’s Arrest

The Fourth Amendment prohibits police from making an arrest except “upon probable

cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “Probable cause exists if there

is a ‘fair probability’ that the person committed the crime at issue.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d

781, 789 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997)). Put

another way, “probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the arresting

officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an

offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police,

71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995). Importantly, “summary judgment for false arrest and false

imprisonment is proper only if no reasonable juror could find a lack of probable cause for any of

the charged crimes.” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020); Groman v. Twp. of

Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995). Although, generally, “the question of probable cause

in a section 1983 damage suit is one for the jury,” Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124

(3d Cir. 1998), a district court may conclude “that probable cause did exist as a matter of law if

the evidence, viewed most favorably to Plaintiff, reasonably would not support a contrary factual

finding,” and may enter summary judgment accordingly. Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d

497, 514 (citing Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1997)).

Here, the Complaint alleges that Detective Radlinsky “caused the initiation of criminal

charges against Plaintiff without probable cause, and acted with reckless indifference as to whether

Plaintiff was the person who committed the alleged crimes.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 154.) Further, the

Complaint contends that Detective Radlinsky’s conduct, including the initiation of charges and his

grand jury testimony, caused Plaintiff to be arrested and confined in jail. (Id. ¶ 155.) In opposition,

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s arrest was effectuated pursuant to a valid warrant. (ECF No. 32

at 13-23.)

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that where a plaintiff is

arrested pursuant to a bench warrant issued due to their failure to appear, probable cause exists for

the arrest and thus there is no Fourth Amendment violation. See Johnson v. Provenzano, 646 F.

App’x 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2016); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings Harrisburg Grand Jury

79-1, 658 F.2d 211, 214 (3d Cir. 1981) (“The simple fact of nonappearance provided the

government with probable cause to apply for a bench warrant.”). “When a defendant is named in

a bench warrant, probable cause for arrest exists, and any Fourth Amendment argument arising

out of the arrest is without merit even if the bench warrant later turns out to be invalid.” Jones v.

Gloucester Cty., Civ. No. 08-614, 2009 WL 10727989, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2009) (citations

omitted).

Here, the court issued the bench warrant because Plaintiff did not appear at her arraignment.

(ECF No. 32-2 Ex. L at 98) (“[B]ased upon your failure to appear at the court’s post indictment

arraignment conference scheduled on Monday, February 20th, 2018[,] at 9:00 am before the

Honorable Robert Bingham II, a level III bench warrant was issued.”) (emphasis added). Plaintiff

admits she received the letter advising her of the date of the post indictment arraignment, (ECF

No. 38-1 Ex. A at 107:20-10), and that she did not appear in court for that conference, (id. at

108:11-12). Further, Plaintiff does not allege or present any evidence as to whether the warrant

itself was based on deceptive information submitted to the issuing judge. Nor does Plaintiff argue

in her opposition brief that the bench warrant did not provide probable cause for her arrest. (See

generally ECF No. 39.)

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s bench warrant provides probable cause for her

arrest. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to

Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful arrest and imprisonment against Detective Radlinsky.

2. Malicious Prosecution – Proximate Causation

Next, the Court turns to the parties’ proximate causation arguments as they relate to

Plaintiff’s remaining § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution against Detective Radlinsky. Plaintiff

argues that her entire interaction with the court system was attributable to Detective Radlinsky’s

malicious charges and therefore, he is the proximate cause of her harm (i.e., arrest and

imprisonment). (ECF No. 39 at 27.) On the other hand, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s failure

to appear proximately caused her alleged damages, not the charges brought against her. (ECF No.

32-1 at 16-19.)

It is well established that “[a] § 1983 claim requires that the state actor was the proximate

cause of the plaintiff’s harm.” Johnson, 646 F. App’x at 282 (citing Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d

238, 246 (3d Cir. 2004)); Castro v. State of New Jersey, 521 F. Supp. 3d 509, 524 (D.N.J. 2021)

(same); see also Burnsworth v. PC Lab., 364 F. App’x 772, 775 (3d Cir. 2010) (“It is axiomatic

that ‘[a] §1983 action . . . employs the principle of proximate causation.’” (citing Hedges v. Musco,

204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000))). The Third Circuit has held that “[t]o establish the necessary

causation, a plaintiff must demonstrate a ‘plausible nexus’ or ‘affirmative link’ between the

[defendant’s action] and the specific deprivation of constitutional rights at issue.” Hedges, 204

F.3d at 121 (citing Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990)). “As a general matter,

the actions of a judicial officer sever the chain of causation between any police conduct and an

improper arrest.” Johnson, 646 F. App’x at 282 (citations omitted). However, the Third Circuit

has clarified that judicial action would be precluded “as a superseding cause only in the situation

in which the information, submitted to the judge, was deceptive.” Id. (citations and internal

quotations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that a genuine issue of fact exists as to

whether the bench warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest was issued as a result of deceptive information

submitted to the judge by Detective Radlinsky. Indeed, the issuance of the bench warrant appeared

to be a direct result of Plaintiff’s failure to appear, as stated in the letter notifying Plaintiff of the

issuance of the bench warrant. (See ECF No. 32-2 Ex. L at 98.) Further, based on the record, the

Court does not find any indication that the court issued the bench warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest as

a result of any deception by Detective Radlinsky. 9 See, e.g., Johnson, 646 F. App’x at 282; Piazza

v. Lakkis, Civ. No. 11-2130, 2013 WL 424724, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 4, 2013) (“There is no

allegation, nor could there be, that an issuance of a warrant by a judge in whose court the plaintiff

undisputedly failed to appear is somehow a continuing malicious act by the defendant.”).

9 Plaintiff does present evidence as to whether Detective Radlinsky’s affidavit of probable

cause contained recklessly false or otherwise deceptive information with respect to the victim’s

identification of Plaintiff as a suspect. However, there is no indication in the record that the judge

relied on the affidavit in issuing the bench warrant for Plaintiff’s failure to appear.

In a factually analogous case, the plaintiff in Piazza failed to appear at a scheduled

arraignment at court and as a result, the court issued a bench warrant that led to her arrest and

retention at a correctional facility. Id. at *1. The plaintiff there asserted that she received notice

of the hearing but believed it was not necessary to appear. Id. The Piazza court found that the

plaintiff was unable to establish that the defendant was the proximate cause of her deprivation of

liberties because “plaintiff’s own negligence [in failing to appear] severs the necessary nexus

between the acts of the defendants and her deprivation.”10 Id. at *4.

Further, because the bench warrant was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s arrest, her

arguments related to deprivation of liberty lack merit. Plaintiff asserts that she was deprived of

liberty due to the pending legal proceedings beyond her arrest. (ECF No. 39 at 35-36.) For

instance, Plaintiff asserts that she appeared in court on three separate occasions, was fingerprinted,

and did not have her charges dismissed for six months after her arrest (ECF No. 38-1 Ex. A at

102:9-15; 104:5-8; 105:12-25; Defs. SMF ¶ 34.) These restrictions, however, are not sufficient to

constitute a deprivation of Plaintiff’s liberty interests. See Black v. Montgomery Cnty., 835 F.3d

358, 367 (3d Cir. 2016). While, the Third Circuit has held that “some onerous types of pretrial,

non-custodial restrictions constitute” a deprivation of rights, Id., Plaintiff has not alleged any

“significant pretrial restrictions,” such as, whether Plaintiff was free to travel, whether she posted

bail, whether she had to regularly report to pretrial services, or any other restrictions demonstrating

Plaintiff’s liberty was restricted. Id.; see also Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222 (3d

Cir. 1998) (finding that the Plaintiff’s liberty was restricted because “he had to post a $10,000

10 Because the Court grants summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for unlawful

arrest and imprisonment and malicious prosecution, the Court need not address Defendants’

probable cause or qualified immunity arguments with respect to those claims.

bond, . . . attend all court hearings including his trial and arraignment, . . .was required to contact

[p]retrial [s]ervices on a weekly basis, and he was prohibited from traveling outside New Jersey

and Pennsylvania.”); cf. DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 2005)

(finding that the plaintiffs’ liberty was not restricted because they “were only issued a summons;

they were never arrested; they never posted bail; they were free to travel; and they did not have to

report to Pretrial Services. Their liberty was restricted only during the Municipal Court trials and

the Fourth Amendment does not extend beyond the period of pretrial restrictions.”).

Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to

Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution against Detective Radlinsky.

B. Section 1983 Claim for Municipal Liability (Count X)

The Court next addresses Plaintiff’s municipal liability claims. To find a municipality

liable under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove the existence of a policy or custom that resulted in a

constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694-95

(1978). Liability “must be founded upon evidence that the government unit itself supported a

violation of constitutional rights.” Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990). A

plaintiff can show the existence of a policy when a decisionmaker with final authority “issues an

official proclamation, policy, or edict.” Id. (quoting Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d

1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990)). Custom may be established by showing that a “course of conduct,

although not specifically endorsed or authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as

virtually to constitute law.” Id. A plaintiff must also “demonstrate that, through its deliberate

conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs

of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997) (emphasis in original).

To make out a claim under a failure to train or supervise theory, the plaintiff must show

that “the failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights of persons with whom those

employees will come into contact.” Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir.

2014) (citation omitted). “Additionally, ‘the identified deficiency in a . . . training program must

be closely related to the ultimate injury;’ or in other words, ‘the deficiency in training [must have]

actually caused’ the constitutional violation.” Id. (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489

U.S. 378, 391 (1989)).

Importantly, municipal liability under § 1983 requires an underlying constitutional

violation. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. Indeed, without a “violation in the first place, there

can be no derivative municipal claim.” See Mulholland v. Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227,

245 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013); Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (if a municipal employee

“inflicted no constitutional injury . . ., it is inconceivable that [the municipality] could be liable”).

Here, the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against

Detective Radlinsky, so no constitutional violation exists to provide a basis to hold Lawrence liable

under § 1983. See, e.g., Hohsfield, v. Staffieri, Civ. No. 21-19295, 2021 WL 5086367, at *4

(D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2021) (finding that the plaintiff’s claims against the township failed because the

court dismissed underlying civil rights claims); Brooks v. Codispoti, Civ. No. 12-05884, 2015 WL

9462086, at *11 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2015) (finding that “[s]ince this [c]ourt will dismiss [the]

[p]laintiff’s § 1983 claims against [the] [d]efendants . . . for racial profiling, false

arrest/imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and illegal search, municipal liability for these causes

of action must also be dismissed”). Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ motion with respect

to Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Lawrence Township.

C. Supervisory Liability Claim (Count XI)

Next, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claim for supervisory liability against “Lawrence John

Doe Defendant” pursuant to Rule 21, which states, in relevant part, that “parties may be dropped

or added by order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the

action and on such terms as are just.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. District Courts in this Circuit have used

this Rule to exclude John Doe parties from an action where appropriate. Adams v. City of Camden,

461 F. Supp. 2d 263, 271 (D.N.J. 2006) (citing Hightower v. Roman, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 740,

754 (D.N.J. 2002); see also Atlantic Used Auto Parts v. City of Pa., 957 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D.

Pa. 1997) (“[F]ictitious party names may be used ‘at least until reasonable discovery permits the

actual defendants to assume their places. . . ,’ however, . . . ‘[f]ictitious names must eventually be

dismissed, if discovery yields no identities.’”).

Here, the Complaint was filed on June 26, 2019, and Defendants answered on September

9, 2019. On October 20, 2020, the Magistrate Judge ordered fact discovery to be completed by

December 31, 2020. Since then, Plaintiff has not substituted the identity of the unnamed John Doe

Defendant in this action. Thus, the Court determines that the interests of justice permit dropping

this unnamed party from the suit. See, e.g., Jones, 2009 WL 10727989, at *7. Therefore, the Court

dismisses Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim against Lawrence John Doe Defendant (Count XI).

Lawrence John Doe is dismissed from this action.

D. State Law Claims (Counts XII, XIII, and XIV)

Plaintiff also asserts claims for false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and

violations of the NJCRA.

1. False Arrest and False Imprisonment

Under New Jersey law, “[a] basis for a suit for false arrest arises where the aggrieved party

is arrested without legal authority, as where he is arrested pursuant to process that is void. False

arrest, or false imprisonment, is the constraint of the person without legal justification.” Mesgleski

v. Oraboni, 748 A.2d 1130, 1138 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). False arrest “requires an arrest

or detention of the person against his or her will; and lack of proper legal authority or ‘legal

justification.’” Id. (quoting Barletta v. Golden Nugget Hotel Casino, 580 F. Supp. 614, 617 (D.N.J.

1984)). “[F]alse imprisonment requires (1) arrest or detention against a person’s will and (2) lack

of legal authority or justification.” Bernard v. Cosby, 648 F. Supp. 3d 558, 574 (D.N.J. 2023).

Because the Court has already determined that Plaintiff’s arrest and imprisonment was

justified based on her failure to appear, her state law claim for false arrest and false imprisonment

is also dismissed for the same reason.

2. Malicious Prosecution

The New Jersey Supreme Court has made clear that “malicious prosecution is not a favored

cause of action because citizens should not be inhibited in instituting prosecution of those

reasonably suspected of crime.” Brunson v. Affinity Credit Union, 972 A.2d 1112, 1119 (N.J.

2009) (quoting Lind v. Schmid, 337 A.2d 365, 368 (N.J. 1975)). A plaintiff may, however, succeed

on a malicious prosecution claim under New Jersey law if the following elements are met: “(1) a

criminal action was instituted by this defendant against this plaintiff; (2) the action was motivated

by malice; (3) there was an absence of probable cause to prosecute; and (4) the action was

terminated favorably to the plaintiff.” LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 970 A.2d 1007, 1023 (N.J. 2009).

Unlike a § 1983 claim, New Jersey law does not contain the “requirement that the plaintiff [be]

deprived of his or her liberty.” Roberts v. County of Essex, 648 F. Supp. 3d 519, 535 (D.N.J.

2022). A plaintiff can allege emotional distress, loss of employment, and the like, which would

be recoverable under state law. See, e.g., Rumbauskas v. Cantor, 649 A.2d 853, 856 (N.J. 1994)

(noting that in malicious prosecution cases “some of the major elements of damages are

humiliation, embarrassment, mental suffering, and wounded sensibilities”); Epperson v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc, 862 A.2d 1156, 1163 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (noting that damages related to

loss of present or prospective employment which can be proved with reasonable certainty to have

been caused by the prosecution are recoverable).

Nevertheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim fails as Detective Radlinsky had

probable cause to initiate the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff and obtain an arrest warrant.

See id. at 1121 (noting that courts will not “view the probable cause determination through the

harsh and unforgiving glare of hindsight”); see also Mitchell v. Obenski, 134 F. App’x 548, 551

(3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he mere fact that a police investigation could have been more thorough does

not vitiate probable cause.”).

“It is understood that ‘[t]he essence of the cause of action [for malicious prosecution] is

lack of probable cause[.]’” Brunson, 972 A.2d at 1119 (alteration in original) (quoting Lind, 337

A.2d at 368). Specifically, “‘[t]he plaintiff must establish a negative, namely, that probable cause

did not exist.’” Id. Under New Jersey law,

The probable cause standard is a well-grounded suspicion that a

crime has been or is being committed. Probable cause exists where

the facts and circumstances within . . . [the officers’] knowledge and

of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]

sufficient in themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution

in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. The

substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a reasonable

ground for belief of guilt.”

[Id. at 1121-22 (quoting State v. O’Neal, 921 A.2d 1079 (N.J. 2007)

(quoting State v. Moore, 853 A.2d 903 (N.J. 2004) (alterations in

original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted))).]

When applying that standard, courts must consider the totality of circumstances in determining

whether there is probable cause, and courts must make a “practical, common sense determination.”

Id. at 1122. Additionally, courts may look beyond the affidavit of probable cause when a party

challenges the validity of probable cause. See State of New Jersey v. Smith, 54 A.3d 772, 792 (N.J.

2012) (inserting additional evidence into the affidavit of probable cause to determine whether the

affidavit established probable cause).

Detective Radlinsky went to the South Brunswick Target and obtained surveillance footage

and two still images of the persons who had attempted three transactions using P.L.’s credit cards.

(Defs. SMF ¶ 10; Pl. SMF ¶ 10.) The still images taken from the Target surveillance video, (ECF

No. 32-2 Ex. G at 51-53), showed a Black female wearing a white baseball cap, a dark jacket, and

blue jeans. (Defs. SMF ¶ 11; Pl. SMF ¶ 11.) Subsequently, Detective Radlinsky viewed the online

bulletin posted by Officer Pepe, which identified Plaintiff as the suspect in a similar theft from the

same day as the Zoe’s Kitchen theft. (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. C at 42-43.) The bulletin contained a

photo of a Black female wearing a white baseball cap, a dark jacket, and blue jeans, clothes that

Detective Radlinsky believed matched the clothes of the same Black female suspect from the South

Brunswick Target surveillance video. (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. G at 57-62.) Because this information

came from another law enforcement agency, Detective Radlinsky had no reason to doubt its

accuracy. See also United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 385 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[I]nformation

received from other law enforcement officials during the course of an investigation is generally

presumed to be reliable.”); United States v. Hodges, 354 F.3d 305, 311 n.1 (4th Cir. 2004)

(“[S]tatements of other law enforcement officers ‘are plainly . . . reliable’ even without any special

showing.” (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111 (1965))); United States v.

Meade, 110 F.3d 190, 193 (1st Cir. 1997) (“[L]aw enforcement officials cooperating in an

investigation are entitled to rely upon each other’s knowledge of facts when forming the

conclusion that a suspect has committed or is committing a crime.”)

Detective Radlinsky also, independent of Officer Pepe’s findings, compared Plaintiff’s

driver’s license photo, (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. H at 63-64), to the surveillance video from the South

Brunswick Target, (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. E at 51-53), and believed that the female with the white

baseball cap was Plaintiff. (ECF No. 32-2 Ex. D at 106:10-15.) Detective Radlinsky testified that

his identification “was based on the shape of her face, the shape of her nose, her lips, anything that

I could see below the eyebrows because the brim of the hat comes down.” (Id. at 75:12-23.) Cf.

Schneider v. Simonini, 749 A.2d 336, 354 (N.J. 2000) (“There was no objective or reliable

evidence of a linkage between the plaintiff and the crime, except for the misfortune of having the

same name as the real hijacker. No positive identification was made; nor was his identity even

potentially confirmed through photographs. [The officer] was essentially acting on a hunch.”).

Finally, Detective Radlinsky met with P.L., the victim of the Zoe’s Kitchen theft, and

showed P.L. the still images from the South Brunswick Target’s surveillance video (ECF No. 32-

2 Ex. E at 51-53). (See ECF No. 32-2 at 57-63.) From those images, P.L. identified the Black

female wearing the white baseball cap as one of the Black female suspects that sat behind him at

Zoe’s Kitchen.11 (Id.) See Baynard v. Mona, Civ. No. 20-7723, 2021 WL 4473154, at *7 (D.N.J.

11 Even though Plaintiff objects to the identification procedures used with P.L., the Court

need not rely on P.L.’s identification to find that Detective Radlinsky had probable cause to initiate

the criminal proceeding against Plaintiff. Additionally, to the extent Detective Radlinsky made

misrepresentations before the grand jury as to P.L.’s identification, the Court finds that Plaintiff

has failed to show that such misrepresentation improperly influenced the grand jury that would

defeat a finding of probable cause. See also State of New Jersey v. Francis, 926 A.2d 305, 314

(N.J. 2007) (noting that there is no abuse of the grand jury process unless the government

improperly influences the grand jury’s determination). There was sufficient evidence in Detective

Radlinsky’s grand jury testimony to establish probable cause absent P.L.’s identification. (See

generally ECF No. 32-2 at 78-94.)

Sept. 30, 2021) (noting that identifications made by victims are usually sufficient to establish

probable cause).

Based on the totality of circumstances, and the record before this Court, the Court finds

that Detective Radlinsky had probable cause to initiate the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff

based on his reliance of Officer Pepe’s identification of Plaintiff, regardless of whether that

identification was correct or not. See Yusuf, 461 F.3d at 378, 396-97 (finding that even though the

affiant officer submitted an affidavit of probable cause to a court with incorrect information from

a sister governmental agency, the officer had no reason to doubt the accuracy of the supplied

information especially when information from other government entities is presumed to be

reliable); see also State of New Jersey v. MaClay, 2012 WL 635615, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.

Div. Feb. 22, 2012) (“Generally, where an officer relies on information provided by others the

question is the reasonableness of the officer’s reliance on that information under the totality of the

circumstances. However, when the source of information is another police officer, the reliability

may usually be presumed.”).12 Therefore, summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff’s state law

malicious prosecution claim.

3. NJCRA

In relevant part, the New Jersey Civil Rights Act provides:

Any person who has been deprived of any substantive due process

or equal protection rights, privileges or immunities secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States, or any substantive rights,

privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of this

State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights,

privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be

interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person

12 As outlined in this Court’s separate Opinion as to the Green Brook Defendants, the Court

has determined that a question of fact exists as to whether Officer Pepe’s identification of Plaintiff

was correct. (See ECF No. 83 at 18.)

acting under color of law, may bring a civil action for damages and

for other imjunctive or other appropriate relief.

[N.J. Stat. Ann, § 10:6-2(c).]

“The NJICRA ‘was modeled after 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and creates a private cause of action for

violations of civil rights secured under the New Jersey Constitution[ ].’” Greenman v. City of

Hackensack, 486 F, Supp. 3d 811, 837 (D.N.J. 2020) (quoting Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799

F. Supp. 2d 417, 443 (D.N.J. 2011)). “This district has repeatedly interpreted NJCRA analogously

to § 1983.” Hottenstein v. City of Sea Isle City, 977 FB. Supp. 353, 365 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting

Pettit v. New Jersey, 2011 WL 1325614, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2011)),

Because the “allegations under the separate constitutions are virtually identical, and federal

and New Jersey law governing these violations are substantially similar,” Middleton vy. City of

Ocean City, Civ. No. 2014 WL 2931046, at *5 (D.N.J. June 30, 2014) (citing Hedges v. Musco,

204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000)), summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff's NICRA claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, and other good cause shown, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. An appropriate Order will follow.

Date: November A /_, 2024

G gORGELTE CASTNER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

94