The opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
FILED
October 18, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
JOHNNY J. CRASS, JR., )
) NO. 03A01-9810-BC-00343
Plaintiff/Appellant )
) Claims Commission No. 500545
vs. )
)
STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) Hon. Michael S. Lacy,
) Commissioner
Defendant/Appellee. )
For the Appellants: For the Appellee:
Johnny Joe Crass, Jr. Paul G. Summers
7204 Larkspur Lane Lot 47 Attorney General and Reporter
Powell, TN 37849
Arthur Crownover II
Assistant Attorney General
Civil Rights and Claims Division
Cordell Hull Building, 2nd Floor
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243-0488
VACATED AND REMANDED Swiney, J.
OPINION
This is an appeal from an Order of the Tennessee Claims Commission which dismissed
the Petitioner/Appellant's claim for false imprisonment. The dismissal by the Claims Commission was
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based upon its determination that Appellant had not stated a cause of action subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission, and that Appellant had failed to file his claim within the applicable one year statute of
limitations. Appellant appeals, raising the following issues, which we quote verbatim:
1. "Whether the State has conspired to deprive Appellant of his
constitutional rights for which they are liable."
2. "Whether Appellant has filed his claim within the applicable one-year statute of
limitations."
The Appellee says that “[t]he Tennessee Claims Commission correctly dismissed this
action on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitation; however, in any event, the Claims
Commission has no jurisdiction over a claim of false imprisonment."
We vacate the decision of the Claims Commission and remand the petition to the
Division of Claims Administration, Tennessee Claims Commission, for transfer to the Board of Claims,
for the reasons herein stated.
BACKGROUND
On September 22, 1989, Appellant was arrested and charged with first degree murder.
At trial, he was found guilty of second degree murder. He appealed the conviction, and in September
1992, he was granted a new trial based on a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel in the first trial.
The second trial was held December 9 - 11, 1994, and resulted in his acquittal by the jury.
On September 19, 1995, acting pro se, he filed a form styled "Claim for Damages
Against the State of Tennessee," on a pre-printed form bearing the heading "Board of Claims, 1206
Andrew Jackson State Office Building, Nashville, Tennessee 37219." The form is stamped
"Received Sep 19 1995 Division of Claims Administration." On this form, Appellant alleged that he was
falsely imprisoned for nearly six years and sought damages against the State of $500,000.
On September 22, 1995, the Division of Claims Administration filed a "Notice of
Potential Liability" with the "Correction Dept-Div of Admin," apparently notifying the department that the
Division of Claims Administration had received the claim. On December 20, 1995, the Tennessee
Claims Commission filed a "Notice of Transfer from Division of Claims Administration," notifying
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Appellant that "the Division of Claims Administration has been unable to act on your claim within ninety
(90) days and is transferring your claim to the Claims Commission pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated, Section 9-8-402(c)."
On May 15, 1996, Petitioner sent a letter to the Tennessee Claims Commission,
Volunteer Plaza Building, 500 James Robertson Parkway, Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0565, which
was stamped "Filed May 20 1996 Tennessee Claims Commission." The "To Whom It May Concern"
letter enclosed an affidavit, certificate of service, and 49 pages of attachments, in support of "the
aforementioned claim case no. 96500545, transferred to the Claims Commission on the 19th day of
December, 1996 [sic-1995] . . . Claimant trusts that this affidavit is received in the proper department
and if not that it will be returned to him with the appropriate mailing address for which to file."
On August 12, 1996, the State of Tennessee, by and through the Office of the State
Attorney General, filed, in the Claims Commission, an Answer, in which the State raised the affirmative
defenses that (1) claimant has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (2) this claim is
barred by the applicable statute of limitations; (3) the Commission lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
hear this claim; and (4) any damages suffered by claimant were not proximately caused by any negligence
on the part of any State employee. On August 27, 1996, the State filed a Motion to Dismiss under Tenn.
R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and Tenn. R. Civ. P.
12.02(1) for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, and because the claim was barred by the one
year statute of limitations in T.C.A. § 28-3-104(a)(1).
On November 13, 1996, the Claims Commission filed an Order Allowing Extension of
Time to Appellant, who had requested the extension of time to respond to the State's Motion to Dismiss.
On November 19, 1996, Petitioner filed a Response to State's Motion to Dismiss. He argued that
T.C.A. § 9-8-307 authorized the Commission to hear the claim, that his court-appointed counsel at trial,
Ron Smith, who was a private attorney, is not immune from suit, and that the one-year statute of
limitations did not begin to run on his claim until he was acquitted.
The Commissioner dismissed the claim on July 1, 1998, for failure to state a cause of
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action subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission and failure to file the claim within the applicable
one-year statute of limitations. This appeal was filed.
DISCUSSION
The standard of review of administrative agency decisions on appeal is found in T.C.A.
§ 4-5-322, which provides in pertinent part:
§ 4-5-322. Judicial review. -
(h) The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further
proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the petitioner
have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions or
decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(4) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion; or
(5) Unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material in light of the entire
record.
We find the issue of the jurisdiction of the Claims Commission to be dispositive. A brief
explanation of the jurisdiction of the Board of Claims and the Claims Commission is in order.
The Board of Claims is composed of five members: the Commissioner of Personnel,
Commissioner of Finance and Administration, State Treasurer, Comptroller of the Treasurer and
Secretary of State, or their designees. The Board hears claims arising after January 1, 1985 that do not
fall within the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Claims Commission. T.C.A. § 9-8-101(c). The jurisdiction of
the Board of Claims is set out in T. C. A. § 9-8-108, which provides, as pertinent:
(a) The board of claims shall:
(1) Have the authority, but is not required, to investigate and hear claims and
make awards when appropriate in cases based on acts or omissions of state
officers or employees where a claim does not fall within the jurisdiction of the
claims commission under § 9-8-307(a). The board of claims shall not have
jurisdiction over any claim arising under § 9-8-307(a) . . . . [Emphasis added]
* * *
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(7) [The board of claims shall] Hear claims for compensation by persons
wrongfully imprisoned and granted an exoneration or unconditional pardon due
to innocence;
The Tennessee Claims Commission is an administrative tribunal consisting of three
members, one from each grand division of the state, T.C.A. § 9-8-301. The Commission has
jurisdiction to hear only the claims specifically enumerated in T.C.A. § 9-8-307, which does not include
claims for false imprisonment. Accordingly, Appellee is correct in its argument that the Board of Claims,
and not the Claims Commission, has authority to hear Appellant’s claim.
Part 4 - Division of Claims Administration, T.C.A. § 9-8-402(a)(4) provides:
The notice to the division [of claims administration] is deemed to be
notice to the employer for workers’ compensation purposes. Claims
not within the jurisdiction of the claims commission shall be sent to
the board of claims. A copy of any claim filed with or transferred to
the claims commission must be served on the attorney general and
reporter and the division of claims administration by certified mail, return
receipt requested, or by such other method as the attorney general and
reporter deems appropriate. [Emphasis Added]
Appellee is correct in its argument that the Claims Commission had no jurisdiction over
Appellant’s claim of false imprisonment. Since the Claims Commission had no jurisdiction to hear
Appellant’s claim for false imprisonment, it did not have the power to determine whether or not Appellant
’s claim was timely filed. Appellant’s claim should have been sent to the Board of Claims, which does
have jurisdiction to hear Appellant’s claim of false imprisonment.
It is clear that the State can be sued only with its consent and by following the procedure
expressly authorized by the legislature. See Coffman v. City of Pulaski, 220 Tenn. 642, 422 S.W.
2d. 429 (Tenn. 1967); Watson v. Tenn. Dept. of Correction, 970 S.W. 2d 494 (Tenn. App. 1998);
Crowe v. John W. Harton Mem. Hosp., 579 S.W. 2d 888 (Tenn. App. 1979). The Tennessee
Legislature has determined that a claim for false imprisonment must be brought in the Board of Claims.
The Tennessee Legislature has also determined that a claim “. . .not within the jurisdiction of the Claims
Commission shall be sent to the Board of Claims.”
Since Appellant’s claim is not within the jurisdiction of the Claims Commission, the case
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must be sent to the Board of Claims, under T.C.A. § 9-8-402(a)(4), which may or may not decide to
hear Appellant’s claim. As explained by our Supreme Court in Shell v. State, 893 S.W.2d 416 (Tenn.
1995):
Although the Board of Claims does have residual jurisdiction over claims falling
outside the jurisdiction of the Claims Commission, Tenn. Code Ann. §
9-8-108(1), the Board of Claims is not required to hear any claim that is
presented to it; its authority to hear claims is purely discretionary. §
9-8-108(1). There is no statutory authority to appeal from the Board’s decision
not to hear a claim. Moreover, a decision on the merits of the claim rendered by
the Board of Claims is not appealable, § 9-8-108(1), whereas a final decision
rendered by the Claims Commission is appealable to the Court of Appeals.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-403(1). Therefore, it is clear that once the Claims
Commission is divested of jurisdiction over a particular claim, the plaintiff no
longer possesses an unqualified right to have a state administrative tribunal
determine the merits of the claim.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the Claims Commission is vacated and this case is remanded to the
Division of Claims Administration, Tennessee Claims Commission, for transfer to the Board of Claims for
all appropriate purposes consistent with this opinion. Costs of this appeal are taxed equally to the
Appellee and the Appellant.
_________________________________________
D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J.
CONCUR:
___________________________________
HOUSTON M. GODDARD, P.J.
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___________________________________
CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J.
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