Bhuiyan v. Department of Treasury

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

YEASIN BHUIYAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:24-cv-3964

Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,

Defendant.

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Yeasin Bhuiyan, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of counsel,

has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 4.) The Court

GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render

services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF

No. 18) as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend

dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the

reasons below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS this action under

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In

doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) as part of the

statute, which provides:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

* * *

(B) the action or appeal—

(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading

that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not

“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).

Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial

plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The

plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the

strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504

(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,

614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient

treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim

asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff is a former employee of Defendant, the Department of Treasury. Plaintiff alleges

that his employment was wrongfully terminated during his probationary period on February 16,

2024; that his request for religious accommodations was denied from July 2023 through

February 2024; and that he was subject to incidents of harassment, including sexual harassment

on February 14, 2024, by his Lead Individual Taxpayer Advisory Specialist. Plaintiff alleges that

these incidents constitute discrimination and harassment based on his age (42), race (Asian),

color (Black), religion (Islam), sex (male), national origin (Bangladesh), and an unspecified

disability. (Compl. 3, ECF No. 18.) The Complaint contains no further factual allegations.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and reinstatement of his employment. (Id. at 4.)

The undersigned construes Plaintiff’ Complaint to advance claims for discrimination and

harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a), and the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 633a(a). All of Plaintiff’s claims must be

dismissed because his allegations are threadbare. Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to raise

a reasonable inference that any of Defendant’s alleged actions were unlawful. For instance, he

does not allege any facts concerning his termination, he does not identify the religious

accommodations he was seeking, and he does not describe the alleged sexual harassment by his

supervisor. Nor does he explain why he believes Defendant’s actions in terminating his

employment or denying his religious accommodations were taken on a discriminatory basis.

Plaintiff’s conclusory and unsupported allegations are precisely the kind of “naked assertion[s]

devoid of further factual enhancement” that do not suffice under Iqbal. See 556 U.S. at 678.

Plaintiff’s Complaint must therefore be dismissed.

III. DISPOSITION

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 4)

is GRANTED. The undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED

under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with

supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura

CHELSEY M. VASCURA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE