Com. v. Rookstool, R.

J-S06026-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

RUTH ROXY ROOKSTOOL :

:

Appellant : No. 227 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 25, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-09-CR-0001151-2019

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: Filed: September 30, 2021

Appellant Ruth Roxy Rookstool appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following her jury convictions for theft by unlawful taking, insurance

fraud, and conspiracy to commit insurance fraud.1 Appellant raises numerous

arguments that her convictions are constitutionally infirm. Appellant also

challenges the increase in her bail following her conviction and her sentence,

and her sentence. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part, vacate in

part, and remand for further proceedings to consider the trial court’s

restitution award.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3921(a), 4117(b)(4), and 903, respectively.

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The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of this

appeal.2 Briefly, we note that Appellant’s convictions concern her time as the

treasurer and bookkeeper for the Morrisville Borough Ambulance Squad (MAS)

and her interactions with her co-defendant, Brian Eckhart, between 2011 and

2018. Following her arrest, the magisterial district court released Appellant

on unsecured bail of $50,000.00. Appellant’s counsel, Brian M. Puricelli, Esq.,

entered his appearance.

On August 21, 2019, the parties litigated Appellant’s pre-trial motions,

which included claims that the Commonwealth failed to timely provide

discovery or disclose a list of proposed witnesses. After hearing arguments

from the parties, the trial court deferred its ruling and instructed Appellant’s

counsel to object to any undisclosed information during trial.

During jury selection, an issue arose concerning inconsistencies

between the potential jurors’ responses on their written questionnaires and

their in-court responses to the trial judge. Following additional questioning of

the jury pool and individual prospective jurors, the parties exercised their

peremptory strikes and selected a jury.

Following a four-day trial, at which Appellant testified on her own behalf,

the jury convicted Appellant of the above-mentioned offenses on August 27,

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2 The trial court also summarized the procedural and factual history of this

appeal in its supplemental Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. See Supplemental Trial

Ct. Op., 11/10/20, at 1-13.

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2019.3 Upon a motion by the Commonwealth at the conclusion of trial, the

trial court increased Appellant’s bail to $100,000.00. Appellant filed post-trial

motions, including a motion to modify bail, which the trial court denied

pending the completion of the pre-sentence investigation report (PSI).

On November 25, 2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to a

recidivism risk reduction incentive (RRRI) sentence of eleven and one-quarter

to thirty-six months’ incarceration and a consecutive sixty months’ probation.

See 61 Pa.C.S. §§ 4501-4512. The trial court also ordered Appellant to pay

$101,634.55 in restitution. Appellant did not file post-sentence motions.

On December 20, 2019, Appellant timely appealed and

contemporaneously filed a Rule 1925(b) statement.4 The trial court initially

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3 The trial court instructed the jury to determine whether the theft concerned

an amount over $2,000.00, and the jury found that Appellant’s theft conviction

involved an amount over $2,000.00. See Verdict, 8/27/19; 18 Pa.C.S. § 3903

(grading theft as a third-degree felony when “the amount involved exceeds

$2,000”).

4 The trial court did not order a Rule 1925(b) statement. This Court has held

that when an appellant files a Rule 1925(b) statement before the trial court

orders one, “there is no need for the trial court to request it.”

Commonwealth v. Nobles, 941 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. Super. 2008). As the

Nobles Court reasoned, this Court will not encourage “‘sandbagging’ by

counsel if they are allowed to quickly file a Rule 1925(b) statement and then

claim that nothing is waived because the Rule 1925(b) statement was not in

response to a formal request.” Id. (noting that the Commonwealth’s

voluntary filing of an unrequested Rule 1925(b) statement, which failed to

specify a challenge concerning the court’s error in considering a suppression

motion raised by the defendant in the middle of trial, required waiver of that

challenge).

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filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion finding waiver due to Appellant’s failure to order

the necessary transcripts.

On March 26, 2020, this Court remanded this matter for Appellant to

order the transcripts. During the remand, Appellant ordered the transcripts

and filed additional motions to compel production of documents concerning

restitution and jury selection. The trial court granted the motions to compel,

but later indicated that the jury pool’s written questionnaires were destroyed.

See Supplemental Trial Ct. Op. at 13. The trial court filed a supplemental

Rule 1925(a) opinion.

Appellant presents the following issues for review:

1. Whether the pre, post, and trial motion rulings, and for

objections, are singularly or collective reversible error, an

abuse of discretion, and/or manifest abuse of discretion that

denies [Appellant] of constitutional rights and requires

reversal of the conviction?

2. Whether the post-verdict but presentencing bail change is

error?

3. Whether the sentencing is a manifest abuse of discretion?

Appellant’s Brief at 1.

Issue 1—Singular or Collective Reversible Pre, Post, and

Trial Errors

In her first issue, Appellant states that “there are many prejudicial errors

and abuses of discretion that when viewed singularly or collectively denied

[her] a fair trial . . . .” Id. Appellant argues cumulative prejudice to her

constitutional rights to the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a

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reasonable doubt and, throughout her brief, cites individual claims concerning

(A) the sufficiency of the evidence, see id. at 14, 20, 30-31 (B) the failure to

strike the entire jury pool, see id. at 18-20, 26, (C) discovery violations, see

id. at 21, (D) the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, id. at 27-30, (E) improper

questions and comments by the prosecutor, id. at 31, and (F) the trial court’s

jury instructions, see id. at 20.

The Commonwealth responds that Appellant’s individual issues are

“quite difficult to discern” and argues that her “legal analysis following the

litany of issues touched upon throughout her brief is often entirely

undeveloped, if present at all.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 25. The

Commonwealth asserts that “the vast majority of claims . . . should be deemed

waived” due to Appellant’s non-compliance with the issue preservation and

briefing requirements in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id.

In any event, the Commonwealth contends that Appellant either failed to

preserve her individual claims in the trial court or raise any meritorious

appellate arguments. Id. at 29-34, 36-38, 41-43, 45-47, 49-51.

Initially, we note that while this Court has recognized that cumulative

errors may deprive an appellant of a fair trial, an appellant cannot bootstrap

a series of meritless claims into a claim of cumulative error. See

Commonwealth v. Rolan, 964 A.2d 398, 411 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that

“no number of failed claims may collectively attain merit if they could not do

so individually” (quotation marks omitted)); Commonwealth v. Scott, 212

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A.3d 1094, 1113 (Pa. Super. 2019), appeal denied, 222 A.3d 383 (Pa. 2019).

Therefore, we will review each of Appellant’s claims individually.

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Before considering Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claims, we

note the Commonwealth’s assertion that Appellant waived her arguments.

The Commonwealth correctly argues that Appellant’s brief lacks any citation

to the relevant standard of review and criminal statutes defining her conviction

for theft by unlawful taking, insurance fraud, and conspiracy to commit

insurance fraud. Commonwealth’s Brief at 28. Additionally, the

Commonwealth asserts that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was too

vague to preserve her arguments. Id. at 28.

As discussed below, we agree that certain claims are waived, but we will

consider Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claims that are appropriate for

our review.

Theft

We first address Appellant’s sufficiency argument concerning her theft

conviction. Our review reveals that she preserved this claim in her Rule

1925(b) statement and that the trial court addressed it in its Rule 1925(a)

opinion. Therefore, we will address the substantive merits of this claim.

Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish her

conviction for felony-three theft because she wrote checks for legitimate

reasons related to MAS, such as snow removal, food, supplies for fundraisers,

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and routine maintenance of vehicles and equipment. Appellant’s Brief at 15-

16. Appellant argues that the Commonwealth’s case was speculative because

the Commonwealth failed to prove “actual knowledge about the checks and

could not by the checks provide evidence for guilt or intent.” Id. at 15.

Appellant emphasizes that investigators initially believed that she stole money

because she was unable to provide documents but failed to consider those

documents were destroyed. Id. Appellant further asserts that the

Commonwealth failed to establish the value and ownership of the property

taken. Id. at 20.

The Commonwealth argues that there was overwhelming evidence to

convict Appellant of theft. Id. at 29. The Commonwealth, in part, notes that

it presented evidence that Appellant wrote MAS checks to reimburse herself

for payments that she personally made on behalf of MAS and that the

reimbursements exceeded the payments that she made. Id. at 33.

The principles governing our review of a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence are as follows:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh

the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth

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may sustain its burden of proof or proving every element of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly

circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test,

the entire record must be evaluated and all the evidence actually

received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing

upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence

produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 848 A.2d 977, 982 (Pa. Super. 2004)

Section 3921(a) of the Crimes Code defines theft by unlawful taking, in

relevant part as follows: “A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or

exercises unlawful control over, movable property of another with intent to

deprive him thereof.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a). Section 3903 provides that a

theft offense is graded as a third-degree felony “if the amount involved

exceeds $2,000,” but is less than $100,000. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3903(a.1);

see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 3903 (a)(5) (grading theft as a second-degree felony

if amount involved “is $100,000 or more but less than $500,000”).

Here, the trial court stated:

[T]he Commonwealth proved that Appellant unlawfully took

money of [MAS] with intent to deprive it and this amount

exceeded $2,000 but was less than $100,000. Through its

numerous witnesses, the Commonwealth introduced evidence

that Appellant exercised control over MAS’s checkbook and

accounts and enriched herself.

Through the testimony of Ms. Hoffer, MAS’s President, the

Commonwealth showed that Ms. Hoffer had the authority to sign

checks on behalf of MAS and two signatures were required for

each check. N.T. [Trial, 8/22/19, at 148]. In order to pay bills in

a timely manner, a signature stamp was created with Ms. Hoffer's

signature. Id. at 148-49. However, Appellant was only

authorized to use the signature stamp for business related to MAS.

Id. at 150.

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Through the testimony of Appellant's co-conspirator, Mr. Brian

Eckert, the Commonwealth showed that Appellant took money

from MAS with the intent to deprive MAS when Appellant paid for

a honeymoon with MAS’s funds and used a Home Depot credit

card to buy Appellant a dishwasher. Id. at 153, 155. Appellant

and Mr. Eckert paid $1,675.02 for the honeymoon and over $500

for the dishwasher. Id. at 201-02, 248. Additionally, Appellant

reimbursed herself [over $5,000.00] in excess of the amount

charged on her credit card for Stamps.com, as demonstrated

through the testimony of Detective Landamia.

Supplemental Trial Ct. Op. at 19-20.

On this record, we agree with the trial court’s reasoning that the

evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s convictions for theft.5

Accordingly, Appellant’s claim fails.

Waiver—Insurance Fraud

Appellant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her

conviction for insurance fraud. Appellant’s Brief 28, 31. Appellant essentially

argues that the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to establish the mens rea

element of insurance fraud, namely, that she acted knowingly and with the

intent to defraud MAS’s health insurance providers. See id.; see also 18

Pa.C.S. § 4117(b)(4) (defining insurance fraud, in part, as “[a] person may

not knowingly and with intent to defraud any insurance company, self-insured

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5 Appellant also contends that the jury’s verdict on the amount involved in her

theft conviction is suspect because the Commonwealth and the jury included

health care payments as a theft amount. However, the Commonwealth’s

evidence based on excess reimbursements for Stamps.com alone was

sufficient to establish a theft involving over $2,000.00. Therefore, we address

Appellant’s claim regarding the possible confusion in the jury’s calculation of

the amounts involved in greater detail when considering Appellant’s challenge

to the trial court’s jury instructions.

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or other person file an application for insurance containing any false

information or conceal for the purpose of misleading information concerning

any fact material thereto”).

It is well settled that a Rule 1925(b) statement must sufficiently identify

the errors complained of on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii), (vii);

Commonwealth v. Williams, 204 A.3d 489, 494-95 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(reiterating that “[w]hen the trial court has to guess what issues an appellant

is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review” (citation omitted).

Additionally, this Court has held that an Appellant may not raise a new theory

for relief for the first time in her appellate brief. Cf. Commonwealth v.

Jones, 191 A.3d 830, 834-35 (Pa. Super. 2018) (finding waiver of a weight

of the evidence argument that differed from the argument in a defendant’s

post-sentence motion and Rule 1925(b) statement).

Instantly, Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement raised the following issue

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying her insurance fraud

conviction:

Whether the conviction is constitutional firm, the court errs or

abuses discretion, and the accused is materially prejudiced, to

require the verdict vacated and a new trial granted, when for the

theft charged by the insurance claim payment?

Rule 1925(b) Statement, 12/20/19, at ¶ 6 (verbatim).

The trial court concluded that it was “unclear” what Appellant’s Rule

1925(b) statement meant. Supplemental Trial Ct. Op. at 23. Nevertheless,

when attempting to consider the statement, the trial court noted that

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Appellant’s theft conviction concerned her use of unauthorized MAS checks

and that her theft conviction did not relate to MAS’s payment of premiums for

her health insurance. Id.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)

statement did not preserve a challenge to the mens rea elements of insurance

fraud. Therefore, we are constrained to agree with the Commonwealth that

Appellant has waived her sufficiency issue concerning insurance fraud

pursuant to Rule 1925(b)(4)(ii) and (vii). See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii), (vii);

Jones, 191 A.3d at 834-35.

Waiver—Conspiracy

As to Appellant’s conspiracy conviction, our review of Appellant’s Rule

1925(b) statement and her brief reveals Appellant’s failure to raise a colorable

issue or argument that the evidence was insufficient to sustain this conviction.

Specifically, Appellant fails to identify any specific elements of the offense that

the Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we

will not address her sufficiency challenge to the conspiracy offense. See

Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010) (noting that

it is an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed

for our review [and] when defects in a brief impede our ability to conduct

meaningful appellate review, we may dismiss the appeal entirely or find

certain issues to be waived” (some citations omitted)).

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Appellant preserved a

single, meritless challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence sustaining her

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theft conviction and failed to preserve sufficiency issues concerning her

insurance fraud and conspiracy convictions. Accordingly, Appellant’s

challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence merit no relief.

B. Jury Selection

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion

to strike the entire jury pool. In support, Appellant refers to “significant

inconsistencies” between the prospective jurors’ answers on their written

questionnaires and their in-court answers during jury selection. Appellant’s

Brief at 18. Appellant concludes that a fair and impartial jury could not have

been seated. Id. The Commonwealth responds that this issue is waived

because Appellant did not move to strike the entire jury pool.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 36-37.

It is well settled that a party must raise a timely objection in the trial

court in order to preserve an issue for appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a);

Commonwealth. v. Philistin, 774 A.2d 741, 742 (Pa. 2001) (finding that an

appellant waived a challenge to the racial makeup of the jury by failing to

object during voir dire). Moreover, an appellate brief must contain citations

to the record demonstrating where she preserved an objection. See Pa.R.A.P.

2117(c)(2) & 2119(e).

Here, Appellant’s brief does not contain any citations to the record where

she preserved her objection to the entire jury panel. See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c)(2)

& 2119(e). Appellant’s reply brief, again without a specific citation to the

record, discusses the portion of the jury selection transcripts that refers to a

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sidebar conference discussing the prospective jurors’ inconsistent answers on

their questionnaires and during voir dire. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 11

(arguing that the “the issue was preserved through a side bar, which the

Commonwealth was present and spoke to oppose the disqualification of the

jury poll).

However, our review of the sidebar conference to which Appellant refers

to in her reply brief fails to substantiate Appellant’s assertion that she

specifically requested dismissal of the entire panel of prospective jurors. See

N.T. Voir Dire, 8/21/19, at 28-29. Specifically, the jury selection transcripts

lack any record of Appellant’s objection to the entire pool, the trial court’s

overruling of such an objection, and any follow-up objection to the trial court’s

ultimate remedy of questioning the jury pool regarding their inconsistent

answers on their questionnaires and in-court. See id. at 33-34 (indicating

that Appellant’s counsel only questioned the jury pool regarding their ability

to decide the matter impartially). Further, except for prospective juror

number 8, Appellant did not move to strike an individual juror for cause based

on the potential juror’s inconsistent answers during voir dire. See id. at 35-

38.

Under these circumstances, we are constrained to agree with the

Commonwealth. Although Appellant challenged an individual prospective

juror, she did not object and move to dismiss the entire jury pool. Therefore,

this issue is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Philistin, 774 A.2d at 742.

C. Discovery Violations

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Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in denying her pretrial

motions to preclude evidence or witnesses for the Commonwealth’s Brady6

violations and untimely responses to her requests for discovery.

By way of background, Appellant and the Commonwealth argued

discovery issues at a pre-trial hearing on August 21, 2019. N.T. Trial,

8/21/19, at 3-26. At the hearing, the parties’ discussion included references

to problems exchanging three flash drives due to Appellant’s counsel entering

his appearance using an old office address and Appellant’s inability to access

those drives because the Commonwealth protected them with a password.

Id. at 4-10. At least one of the flash drives prepared by the Commonwealth

was also empty, which the Commonwealth attributed to the size of the file

involved. Id. at 8. The parties also represented that on August 19, 2019,

two days before trial, Appellant’s counsel went to the District Attorney’s office

to review materials that could not be put on a flash drive. Id. at 9-10.

Appellant argued that she was entitled to a witness list and requested

that the trial court “preclude those people who were not disclosed by name

and what they would testify to” from testifying at trial. Id. at 18. According

to Appellant’s counsel, the Commonwealth had “to provide under Brady what

the witness is going to say” in order to prepare a defense. Id. at 21. The

Commonwealth responded that it did not believe that Appellant was entitled

a “full witness list” but attempted to email a list to Appellant’s counsel after

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6 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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their meeting on August 19, 2019. Id. at 10. The Commonwealth stated that

it mistakenly sent the list to a wrong email address. Id. On the evening

before trial, the Commonwealth re-sent its list to Appellant’s counsel. Id.

Additional arguments concerning the witness list focused on two witnesses—

Edward Manning, a financial investigator with Independence Blue Cross and

Jill Ruggiero, a business account manager with United Healthcare. Id. at 12-

14.

When asked by the trial court whether Appellant’s counsel had “all the

evidence,” counsel responded: “True. But I don’t know what the person is

going to say. . . . They may say nothing that hurts my client, but I can’t

prepare a defense on a maybe.” Id. at 22. When the court asked whether

Appellant’s counsel would need additional time for review, Appellant’s counsel

stated that he needed additional time to investigate to determine if the

witnesses would testify beyond the documents that he received in discovery.

Id. at 19.

The trial court ruled as follows:

All right. I think we’re going to go forward. Of course, if there is

any Brady material that comes to light that hasn’t been disclosed,

certainly I’ll entertain an appropriate motion at that time. But

certainly sounds like all the documents have been provided, and

all the discovery has been provided in one form or another.

You may not know all the witnesses’ names, but doesn’t sound

like they’re going to go outside the four corners of the documents

with a couple of them that concerned you. At least I don’t see any

prejudice at this point.

Id. at 26.

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Appellant renewed her Brady objections when the Commonwealth

called Manning and Ruggiero, N.T. Trial, 8/22/19, at 79, and when the

Commonwealth presented Detective Eric Landamia with exhibits including

documents obtained from TD Bank and M&T Bank pursuant search warrants.

Id. at 262-63. Appellant did not raise a Brady objection when Appellant’s co-

defendant, Brian Eckert, testified against her, but cross-examined him

regarding his plea agreement with the Commonwealth, including his plea to

reduced offenses. Id. at 226. Appellant also stipulated to the contents of an

audio recording, but she also preserved her right to argue her Brady issue

further at the close of the Commonwealth’s case. N.T. Trial, 8/26/19, at 3-5.

At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, Appellant revisited her Brady

objections, briefly arguing that she was not “provided certain things in

discovery” and focusing on Manning and Ruggerio. Id. at 144. The

Commonwealth responded that it provided all documents to Appellant in

discovery and that it identified Manning and Ruggerio as witnesses. The

Commonwealth added that Manning and Ruggerio essentially testified based

on documents and information that were in Appellant’s possession. Id. at

145.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court noted that Appellant’s counsel

“continually raised his objections to not being provided the witness list but did

not raise any Brady issues” during trial. Supplemental Trial Ct. Op. at 17.

The court continued: “Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(b) burdens the Commonwealth to

make mandatory disclosures. However, it is clear from the record that the

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Commonwealth simply did not violate this rule and this [c]ourt properly denied

Appellant’s pre-trial motion to preclude witnesses and evidence at trial.” Id.

Lastly, the court added that it found no prejudice resulting from Appellant’s

counsel’s “self-created delay.” Id.

On appeal, Appellant maintains that the problems during discovery

amounted to a Brady violation that prejudiced her ability to prepare a defense

and meaningful cross-examination of the Commonwealth’s witnesses.7

Appellant’s Brief at 22-23. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the

Commonwealth untimely disclosed the checks Appellant wrote from the MAS’s

bank accounts, various ledgers, and an audio recording of Appellant. Id. at

22-23, 28. Appellant also emphasizes that the Commonwealth previously

continued Appellant’s trial due to the unavailability of its witnesses but then

“substituted new witnesses” without timely disclosing their identities and their

statement. Id. at 23. Further, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth

failed to disclose a plea agreement with co-defendant, who testified at trial

against Appellant. Id. at 20, 24.

The Commonwealth responds that “Appellant’s claims are factually

inaccurate and meritless.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 48. The Commonwealth

contends that “there is simply no evidence of record to establish that [it]

withheld any discovery.” Id. at 50. As to the Appellant’s claim regarding the

identities of its witnesses, the Commonwealth argues that that the witnesses

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7 Appellant discusses Brady at length without any meaningful discussion of

Rule 573. See Appellant’s Brief at 22-23

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to whom Appellant objected “were primarily records custodians” and that it

disclosed their names before trial. Id.

As to Appellant’s argument that it failed to disclose co-defendant’s plea

agreement, the Commonwealth emphasizes that co-defendant testified that

the Commonwealth made no promises in exchange for his plea and was

awaiting sentencing at the time Appellant’s trial. Id. at 48 n.1. The

Commonwealth further notes that Appellant did not raise this argument before

the trial court, referenced it for the first time in her appellate brief, and failed

to adequately develop a meaningful argument in her brief. Id.

Our Supreme Court has explained that

Brady and subsequent precedent flowing therefrom imposes upon

a prosecutor the obligation to disclose all favorable evidence that

is material to the guilt or punishment of an accused, even in the

absence of a specific request by the accused. This Court has held

that, to establish a Brady violation, a defendant has the burden

to prove that: (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the

accused, either because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches;

(2) the prosecution has suppressed the evidence, either willfully

or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence was material, meaning that

prejudice must have ensued.

Commonwealth v. Bagnall, 235 A.3d 1075, 1085-86 (Pa. 2020) (citations

omitted).

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 573 states, in relevant part:

(2) Discretionary With the Court.

(a) In all court cases, except as otherwise provided in Rules

230 (Disclosure of Testimony Before Investigating Grand Jury)

and 556.10 (Secrecy; Disclosure), if the defendant files a

motion for pretrial discovery, the court may order the

Commonwealth to allow the defendant's attorney to inspect

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and copy or photograph any of the following requested items,

upon a showing that they are material to the preparation of the

defense, and that the request is reasonable:

(i) the names and addresses of eyewitnesses;

(ii) all written or recorded statements, and substantially

verbatim oral statements, of eyewitnesses the

Commonwealth intends to call at trial;

(iii) all written and recorded statements, and substantially

verbatim oral statements, made by co-defendants, and by

co-conspirators or accomplices, whether such individuals

have been charged or not; and

(iv) any other evidence specifically identified by the

defendant, provided the defendant can additionally establish

that its disclosure would be in the interests of justice.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B)(2)

Following our review, we conclude Appellant failed to establish Brady

violations concerning these claims. Initially, with respect to the documents to

which Appellant objected, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the

Commonwealth disclosed the challenged documents before trial. See N.T.

Trial, 8/21/19, at 22 (indicating that Appellant’s counsel responded, “True,”

when the trial court asked whether Appellant had “all the evidence”); see also

N.T. Trial, 8/22/19, at 262. Therefore, Appellant has not demonstrated that

the Commonwealth suppressed the documents. See Bagnall, 235 A.3d at

1085-86.

With respect to Appellant’s claims concerning the Commonwealth’s

witness list, Appellant cites no authority that Brady requires the

Commonwealth to provide a witness list to the defense under the

circumstances of this case. We note that our Supreme Court has held that

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Rule 573 governs a demand for a witness list, and if a party properly brings a

discovery dispute to the trial court, the court retains the discretion to grant or

deny the request. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 668 A.2d 491, 512 (Pa.

1995) (discussing former Rule 305 and reasoning that witness lists do not fall

under the mandatory disclosure rules of discovery); see also

Commonwealth v. Walter, 119 A.3d 255, 283 (Pa. 2015) (discussing

alleged discovery violation under Rule 573(B) and (D), the latter of which

requiring a continuing duty to disclose the identity of additional witnesses,

where the trial court previously entered an order compelling the parties to

submit witness lists). In sum, we agree with the trial court that Appellant has

not established the applicability of Brady to her claim concerning the

Commonwealth’s witness list.

With respect to Appellant’s Brady claim based on the Commonwealth’s

plea agreement with co-defendant, the record reveals that Appellant was

aware that co-defendant had pled guilty. Further, Appellant did not raise the

Commonwealth’s failure to disclose a plea agreement at any point before or

during trial, and therefore she has not preserved this argument before the

trial court. Lastly, as noted by the Commonwealth, Appellant’s co-defendant

testified that the Commonwealth made no promises in exchange for his plea,

and Appellant did not present any evidence to contradict the record evidence

before this Court. Based on this record, we conclude that because Appellant

has not preserved the instant claim, and it remains too speculative to merit

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any relief. See Bagnall, 235 A.3d at 1086 (discussing a Brady claim based

on evidence of a cooperation agreement with a witness).

D. Evidentiary Rulings

Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in admitting

spreadsheets of insurance claims amounts presented by the Commonwealth

that were irrelevant, immaterial, and prejudicial to Appellant. Appellant’s Brief

at 27-28. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred when it initially

determined that a defense exhibit, which she offered to show MAS’s prior

practices when submitting forms for coverage, was irrelevant, but then

permitted Appellant to admit the exhibit. Id. at 29.

The Commonwealth responds that Appellant’s challenge regarding her

exhibit is frivolous because the trial court “eventually admitted into evidence”

the document showing MAS’s past practices as Exhibit D-1. As to its own

spreadsheets, the Commonwealth argues that Appellant failed to identify her

precise claim in her appellate brief nor did she properly object at trial to

preserve her claim that the information in the exhibits were irrelevant and

prejudicial. Regardless, the Commonwealth also concludes that the trial court

properly admitted the exhibits as demonstrative materials that assisted in the

presentation of “voluminous financial information . . . to the jury throughout

trial.” Id. at 46.

It is well-settled that,

[w]ith regard to the admission of evidence, we give the trial

court broad discretion, and we will only reverse a trial

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court's decision to admit or deny evidence on a showing that

the trial court clearly abused its discretion. . . .

Relevance is the threshold for admissibility of evidence. “Evidence

is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less

probable than it would be without the evidence[,] and the fact is

of consequence in determining the action.”

“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is

outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . . ”

However, [e]vidence will not be prohibited merely because

it is harmful to the defendant. [E]xclusion is limited to

evidence so prejudicial that it would inflame the jury to

make a decision based on something other than the legal

propositions relevant to the case. . . . This Court has stated

that it is not required to sanitize the trial to eliminate all

unpleasant facts from the jury's consideration where those

facts are relevant to the issues at hand[.]

Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 539 (Pa. Super. 2015) (some

citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, as to Exhibit D-1, the record belies Appellant’s contention that the

trial court precluded the evidence due to relevance. The record shows that

Appellant initially offered Exhibit D-1 during cross-examination of a

Commonwealth’s witness. Although the Commonwealth objected based on

relevance, the trial court ruled that Appellant could admit the exhibit during

her case-in-chief. Appellant’s counsel stated that he would recall the witness

during the defense’s case, but he did not do so. Further, when Appellant’s

counsel offered the exhibit before closing arguments, the trial court admitted

the exhibit. Accordingly, the record supports the trial court’s opinion that it

did not preclude Exhibit D-1 based on relevance, and Appellant’s claim fails.

See Supplemental Trial Ct. Op. at 17-18.

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As to the Commonwealth’s exhibits, a review of the record establishes

that the Commonwealth proffered and the trial court admitted the challenged

exhibits as demonstrative evidence that summarized the documents that

Detective Landamia obtained during his investigation and that the

Commonwealth disclosed during an admittedly challenging discovery process,

which included the password protected flash drives and at least one empty

flash drive. However, Appellant’s arguments lack specific cites concerning the

admission of exhibits as demonstrative evidence. Therefore, we conclude that

this claim is waived. See Kane, 10 A.3d at 331.

E. Comments by the Prosecutor

Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth impermissibly shifted the

burden of proof and violated her right to the presumption of innocence.

Appellant’s Brief at 31. In support, Appellant refers to comments during cross-

examination and in closing argument when the prosecutor stated that

Appellant had opportunities to explain the discrepancies when she talked to

Detective Landamia. Appellant’s Brief at 31. According to Appellant, the

Commonwealth’s comments “inferred [she] had to clear her name and prove

her innocence.” Id. Additionally, Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth

improperly stated that the amount of the theft included benefits she received

from her insurance fraud conviction and improperly stated that Appellant stole

municipal funds. Id. at 32.

The Commonwealth contends that Appellant waived this issue by failing

to properly preserve it in her Rule 1925(b) statement. Commonwealth’s Brief

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at 39. The Commonwealth notes that while Appellant’s Rule 1925(b)

statement mentions the trial court’s denial of her motion for mistrial, she did

not specify the prosecutor’s comments as grounds for relief. Id. The

Commonwealth adds that the trial court did not address this issue in its

supplemental Rule 1925(a) opinion. Id. Nevertheless, the Commonwealth

asserts that its comment referring to Appellant’s opportunity to “clear her

name” was a proper rebuttal of Appellant’s evidence and was not so prejudicial

as to warrant a new trial. Id. at 41-42.

Following our review, we are constrained to agree with the

Commonwealth that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement did not preserve her

arguments concerning the prosecutor’s comments at trial. Specifically,

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement only raised the issue of a mistrial in the

following error complained of on appeal:

Whether the conviction is constitutional firm, the Court errs or

abuses discretion, the accused is materially prejudiced, to require

the verdict vacated and a new trial granted when the Court denies

the accused’s motion for a mistrial and judgment of acquittal, and

the Commonwealth introduces over the accuser’s sustained

objection documentary and oral testimony of the amount of

insurance payments for health coverage care?

Rule 1925(b) Statement at ¶ 5 (verbatim).

Based on the record, we conclude that this statement of the error

complained of was too vague to preserve an appellate challenge to the

comments by the prosecutor. Although Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement

mentioned her motion for mistrial, it omitted any reference to her claim

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concerning an infringement of her right to a presumption of innocence, the

Commonwealth’s shifting of the burden of proof, or improper comments by

the Commonwealth. Rather, her Rule 1925(b) statement specified a claim

regarding the admission of evidence. As noted by the Commonwealth, the

trial court did not address the prosecutor’s comments in its Rule 1925(a)

opinion, and we conclude that the trial court would have been forced to

speculate as to the precise nature of the claim Appellant raises in her appellate

brief. See Williams, 204 A.3d at 494-95. Therefore, we are constrained to

conclude that Appellant’s claim is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii), (vii).

F. Jury Instruction

In her final issue raised to support her argument that her convictions

were constitutionally infirm, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when

it denied her request for a jury instruction regarding amounts involved in the

theft. Appellant’s Brief at 20. Referencing her prior arguments regarding the

admission of evidence and the Commonwealth comments, Appellant asserts:

To test whether the Jury had become biased on the

Commonwealth’s inflated evidence, [Appellant] proposed a jury

interrogatory that required the jury to calculate the theft amount.

The trial judge disallowed the interrogatory and fashioned one that

merely had the Jury select among a range of values. Thus, the

Jury would not remove the medical claim values when it

determined the theft amount. [Appellant] objected to the charge,

she submits it was reversible error to deny her proposed jury

interrogatory, since the jury is the fact-finder of the theft amount,

and the amount must be determined from admissible relevant

evidence and not the inflated amounts the Commonwealth had

presented. The amount of the theft is used to grade a theft thus

properly sentence since the grade of the crime is needed by the

sentence guidelines to calculate a proposed sentence. The

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correct/proper amount is needed also for restitution[.] Ergo, the

issue over the claim payment amount greatly affects the validity

of [Appellant’s] sentence. The error here is prejudicial and

reversible error that singularly and combined with the other errors

denied [Appellant’s] of her Sixth Amend[ment] and Article I fair

trial right and warrant reversing and vacating the conviction.

Id. at 20-21.

Although Appellant raised this issue in her Rule 1925(b) statement, 8

neither the trial court nor the Commonwealth addressed the ruling on

Appellant’s proposed instruction.

It is well settled that this Court will “reverse a [trial] court’s decision

only when it abused its discretion or committed an error of law.”

Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1022 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation

omitted). When a trial court refuses to deliver a specific jury instruction, “it

is the function of this Court to determine whether the record supports the trial

court’s decision.” Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1257 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (en banc) (citation omitted).

As noted above, Section 3903 grades theft as a third-degree felony

when “if the amount involved exceeds $2,000.” See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3903(a.1).

____________________________________________

8 Specifically, Appellant’s Rule 1925 stated:

Whether the conviction is constitutional firm, the Court errs or

abuse discretion to require the verdict vacated and a new trial

granted when the Court does not require the jury during

deliberation to calculate and find beyond a reasonable doubt the

actual amount of the alleged theft and the name of the property

owner on the theft by unlawful taking charge?

Rule 1925(b) Statement at ¶ 4.

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Instantly, the trial court instructed the jury on theft as follows:

[Appellant], as I’ve told you, has been charged with theft of

movable property. Find [sic] [Appellant] guilty of this offense,

you must find the following elements have been proven beyond a

reasonable doubt:

First, that [Appellant] took moveable property from another,

namely monetary funds for U.S. currency, and in this case from

[MAS].

Secondly, those items are moveable property of another.

Moveable property is property, the location of which can be

changed.

Third, the taking was unlawful.

Fourth, that the taking was with the intent to deprive [MAS]

of its property.

A person acts with intent if it is his or her conscious object to

engage and such conduct were to cause such a result.

If you find [Appellant] guilty of theft by unlawful taking on the

basis of these instructions, it will be necessary for you to make a

further determination regarding the value of the property. There

will be a place on the verdict slip for you to record that

determination.

First, you should consider whether the [C]ommonwealth

has established, beyond a reasonable doubt, the value of

the property or other items is $2,000 or more. If you find

this, please indicate so on the verdict slip.

N.T. Trial, 8/27/20, at 155-57 (emphases added).

After Appellant objected to the trial court’s initial charge, the trial court

further instructed the jury as follows:

Now I want to make sure on the verdict slip you -- I know you

paid attention to everything that was said by the lawyers, this is

a guide. It’s only for reference so that you can keep things

straight. But I want to just remind you one last time you need to

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separate the theft from the insurance fraud charge. The theft is

what you have to decide the amount on.

The insurance fraud, while some of the evidence overlaps, I think

the lawyers argued that to you, from their respective positions,

understand that theft is a very -- you have to make a very specific

finding that something was taken and it has to be proven, beyond

a reasonable doubt, that whatever the -- and in this case it’s

the currency or cash from the ambulance company that

that’s what was taken, that’s what the theft was, and that it was

$2,000 or more. All right. So I think that clears up a couple of

points that the lawyers asked me to clarify. I believe that’s it.

Id. at 181-82 (emphasis added).

Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the trial court’s

instructions to the jury, or an abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision

to reject Appellant’s alternative instructions and special interrogatories for the

jury. See Baker, 24 A.3d at 1022. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to

relief.

G. Cumulative Error

To summarize, our review concludes that Appellant waived certain

individual claims and that her preserved claims lack merit as discussed at

length above. Because Appellant failed to establish any merit or prejudice

resulting from her preserved claims, we concluded that “there is no basis for

a claim of cumulative error.” See Commonwealth v. Bomar, 104 A.3d

1179, 1216 (Pa. 2014) (discussing cumulative error in the context of claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel). Accordingly, Appellant’s claim that the

individual errors resulted in the deprivation of her constitutional protections

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guaranteeing the presumption of innocence and that convictions be proven

beyond a reasonable doubt fails. See id.

Issue 2—Post-Verdict Bail

Appellant’s next issue concerns the trial court’s decision to increase her

bail after the verdict but before sentencing. Appellant contends that the

increase in bail from $50,000.00 to $100,000.00 was arbitrary and capricious

because the trial court failed to make appropriate findings under Rule 521,

and she requests a declaration that she was subjected to an unconstitutionally

excessive bail. Appellant’s Brief at 36.

In response, the Commonwealth asserts that the issue is moot.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 51-52. Alternatively, the Commonwealth argues

that Appellant’s claim lacks merit because the trial court ultimately explained

its reasons for increasing Appellant’s bail. Id. at 52.

This Court reviews a determination to change bail after a verdict for an

abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Abed, 989 A.2d 23, 29 (Pa.

Super. 2010); Commonwealth v. McDermott, 547 A.2d 1236, 1242 (Pa.

Super. 1988). Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 521 guides the trial

court’s exercise of discretion and provides, in relevant part:

(A) Before Sentencing

(2) Other Cases

* * *

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (A)(1) [concerning

capital and life imprisonment cases], when the aggregate of

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possible sentences to imprisonment on all outstanding

verdicts against the defendant within the same judicial

district can exceed 3 years, the defendant shall have the

same right to bail as before verdict unless the judge makes

a finding:

(i) that no one or more conditions of bail will reasonably

ensure that the defendant will appear and comply with

the conditions of the bail bond; or

(ii) that the defendant poses a danger to any other

person or to the community or to himself or herself.

* * *

(D) Modification of Bail Order After Verdict or After

Sentencing

(1) When a defendant is eligible for release on bail after verdict

or after sentencing pursuant to this rule, the existing bail order

may be modified by a judge of the court of common pleas, upon

the judge’s own motion or upon motion of counsel for either

party with notice to opposing counsel, in open court on the

record when all parties are present.

(2) The decision whether to change the type of release on bail

or what conditions of release to impose shall be based on the

judge’s evaluation of the information about the defendant as it

relates to the release criteria set forth in Rule 523. The judge

shall also consider whether there is an increased likelihood of

the defendant’s fleeing the jurisdiction or whether the

defendant is a danger to any other person or to the community

or to himself or herself.

(3) The judge may change the type of release on bail, impose

additional nonmonetary conditions as provided in Rule 527, or,

if appropriate, impose or increase a monetary condition as

provided in Rule 528.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 521.

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Rule 523, in turn, instructs a court to consider information relevant to

“the defendant’s appearance or nonappearance at subsequent proceedings”

including:

(1) the nature of the offense charged and any mitigating or

aggravating factors that may bear upon the likelihood of

conviction and possible penalty;

(2) the defendant’s employment status and history, and financial

condition;

(3) the nature of the defendant’s family relationships;

(4) the length and nature of the defendant’s residence in the

community, and any past residences;

(5) the defendant’s age, character, reputation, mental condition,

and whether addicted to alcohol or drugs;

(6) if the defendant has previously been released on bail, whether

he or she appeared as required and complied with the conditions

of the bail bond;

(7) whether the defendant has any record of flight to avoid arrest

or prosecution, or of escape or attempted escape;

(8) the defendant’s prior criminal record;

(9) any use of false identification; and

(10) any other factors relevant to whether the defendant will

appear as required and comply with the conditions of the bail

bond.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 523(A)(1)-(10).

Rule 528(A) also requires consideration of the following factors when

determining the amount of a monetary condition of bail: “(1) the release

criteria set forth in Rule 523; and (2) the financial ability of the defendant.”

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Pa.R.Crim.P. 528(A). Additionally, Rule 528 states that “[t]he amount of the

monetary condition shall be reasonable.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 528(B).

This Court has stated that an order revoking bail is interlocutory and

cannot be immediately appealed without following the appropriate Rule of

Appellate Procedure. Commonwealth v. Colleran, 469 A.2d 1130, 1131

(Pa. Super. 1983) (per curiam). Currently, the Pennsylvania Rules of

Appellate Procedure state:

Where the trial court enters an order under Pa.R.A.P. 1762(b)

granting or denying release or modifying the conditions of release

before sentence, a party may seek review of that order by filing a

petition for specialized review in the appellate court that would

have jurisdiction over the appeal from the judgment of sentence.

Pa.R.A.P. 1610.

Once sentence is imposed, however, issues of mootness arise because

this Court no longer can grant substantive relief. Compare Abed, 989 A.2d

at 28 (noting that post-verdict bail revocation issue “is technically moot as we

cannot grant relief), with Commonwealth v. Myers, 86 A.3d 286, 293 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (remanding case for a bail hearing, “unless [the appellant] has

completed his term of confinement). Nevertheless, this Court has addressed

post-verdict changes in bail because they are capable of repetition. See

Abed, 989 A.2d at 28; see also Myers, 86 A.3d at 293.

Instantly, we note that Appellant’s arguments lack any meaningful

discussion of the trial court’s statement, at the hearing denying Appellant’s

motion to modify bail, that the court increased bail because Appellant faced a

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maximum possible sentence of seventeen years and that the court deemed

Appellant to be “flight risk.” See N.T. Bail Modification Hr’g, 9/24/19, at 9-

10; see also Supplemental Trial Ct. Op. at 26. Moreover, although we are

mindful that the issue is capable of repetition, we conclude that Appellant’s

challenge to the increased bail between the verdict and sentencing is moot

where, as here, it is undisputed that Appellant is no longer incarcerated. Cf.

Myers, 86 A.3d at 293. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred in failing to

consider Rule 521 when it increased bail after trial, this Court has no basis to

grant any substantive relief.9 Therefore, Appellant’s claim is moot, and we

decline to address this claim and issue the declaration that Appellant seeks.

Issue 3—Sentencing Issues

In her third issue, Appellant challenges her sentence, and we reproduce

her argument verbatim:

Ms. Rookstool was in custody and incarcerated for 90 days before

sentencing. She was incarcerated the 90 days for conduct on

which she was charged or the charge based. This is undisputed

or disputable by the Commonwealth. As such, Ms. Rookstool was

entitled to a credit of 90 days for time served. She was not given

the credit albeit, it seems from the sentencing transcript that she

was to be given the credit (11/25/19 Sentencing Transcript at

33:11-16). Nonetheless, it remains that the DOC did not credit

Ms. Rookstool for 90 days. Ergo, Ms. Rookstool submits here

sentence was excessive, cruel, and unusual. She only faced two

and a half months incarceration time and has done 90 days of 15

day more than she faced. e. She was sentenced to three years

State Prison time, which was a cruel punishment, particularly

____________________________________________

9 Appellant concedes as much noting that “the bail issue seemingly cannot be

remedied except for the declaration that [she] requests.” Appellant’s Brief at

36 n.15.

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since co-defendant Eckert received less time and house arrest,

which again infers the sentence was punishment for exercising her

rights than for criminal conduct. Equally, the pre-sentence report

showed this to be Ms. Rookstool’s first brush with the law and that

she had a low IQ. Her financial status was poor with no ability to

pay fines, least the ordered $103,000.00 restitution. Jail time and

particularly State imprisonment was not a recommendation.

Under the circumstances, incarceration was and intended to be

cruel and unusual punishment and the restitution order is an

excessive fine. Accordingly, [Appellant] respectfully requests the

Court to reverse the restitution order.

Appellant’s Brief at 37.

The Commonwealth responds that Appellant waived any challenge to

the discretionary aspects of her sentence by failing to file a post-sentence

motion and including in her brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 54-55. The Commonwealth further notes that

Appellant’s allegation that the Department of Corrections failed to provide

appropriate sentencing credit based on the trial court’s sentencing order

should have been raised in the Commonwealth Court. Id. at 57. The

Commonwealth also asserts that Appellant failed to raise a substantial

question warranting appellate review of the discretionary aspects of her

sentence. Id. at 56. As to Appellant’s reference to the restitution award, the

Commonwealth notes that it is “unable to determine any reason why the

calculated restitution . . . was inaccurate or unlawful in any way.” Id. at 59.

Our Supreme Court recently provided the following guidance:

Where a claim concerns the sentencing court’s exercise of

discretion in fashioning a sentence, the defendant must

preserve and present the claim at trial by way of a

contemporaneous objection and/or a post-trial motion and

on appeal through the process provided by 42 Pa.C.S. §

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9781(b) and Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Where a claim concerns the

sentencing court’s authority to impose a sentence, it is

reviewable as of right on direct appeal, without regard to

preservation of the claim. “[A] determination that a claim

implicates the legality of a sentence ... operates to revive a

claim otherwise insufficiently preserved below,” and is

reviewable by this Court on permissive appeal.

Commonwealth v. Weir, 239 A.3d 25, 34 (Pa. 2020) (citation omitted).

A. Discretionary Aspects of Sentence

To the extent Appellant’s claims implicate the discretionary aspects of

her sentence, we agree with the Commonwealth that Appellant waived this

issue by failing to file post-sentence motions or include a Rule 2119(f)

statement in her brief. See generally id. Because Appellant’s challenge to

the excessive amount of restitution also relate to the discretionary aspects of

her sentence, that claim is also waived. See id. Accordingly, we decline to

consider Appellant’s discretionary aspects of sentencing claims. See id.; see

also Commonwealth v. Roser, 914 A.2d 447, 457 (Pa. Super. 2006);

Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745 (Pa. Super. 2004)

B. Legality of Sentence—Restitution

However, Appellant’s arguments, when read in their entirety, suggest

challenges to the trial court’s statutory authority to impose restitution. See

Appellant’s Brief at 21 (arguing, in the context of jury instruction that the

possibility of confusion over amounts involved in Appellant’s theft and

insurance fraud convictions), 37 (discussing the amount of restitution and her

ability to pay). Therefore, we will address these issues. See Weir, 239 A.3d

at 34.

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Currently, Section 1106 of the Crimes Code states:

(a) General rule.—Upon conviction for any crime wherein:

(1) property of a victim has been stolen, converted or

otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially

decreased as a direct result of the crime . . .

* * *

(c) Mandatory restitution.—

(1) The court shall order full restitution:

(i) Regardless of the current financial resources of the

defendant, so as to provide the victim with the fullest

compensation for the loss. . . .

(ii) If restitution to more than one victim is set at the same

time, the court shall set priorities of payment. However,

when establishing priorities, the court shall order payment

in the following order:

(A) Any individual.

(A.1) Any affected government agency.

* * *

(C) Any other government agency which has provided

reimbursement to the victim as a result of the

defendant’s criminal conduct.

(D) Any insurance company which has provided

reimbursement to the victim as a result of the

defendant’s criminal conduct.

* * *

(F) Any business entity organized as a nonprofit or

not-for-profit entity.

(G) Any other business entity.

* * *

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(3) The court may, at any time or upon the recommendation

of the district attorney that is based on information received

from the victim and the probation section of the county . . . .

(h) Definitions.—As used in this section, the following words and

phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:

“Affected government agency.” The Commonwealth, a political

subdivision or local authority that has sustained injury to

property.

“Business entity.” A domestic or foreign:

(1) business corporation;

(2) nonprofit corporation;

(3) general partnership;

(4) limited partnership;

(5) limited liability company;

(6) unincorporated nonprofit association;

(7) professional association; or

(8) business trust, common law business trust or statutory

trust.

* * *

“Victim.” As defined in section 103 of the act of November 24,

1998 (P.L. 882, No. 111), known as the Crime Victims Act. [10]

____________________________________________

10 Section 1106 also relies on the definition of a victim in the Crime Victims

Act (CVA), which, in turn, provides:

“Direct victim.” An individual against whom a crime has been

committed or attempted and who as a direct result of the criminal

act or attempt suffers physical or mental injury, death or the loss

of earnings under this act.

“Victim.” The term means the following:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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The term includes an affected government agency, the Crime

Victim’s Compensation Fund, if compensation has been paid by

the Crime Victim’s Compensation Fund to the victim, any

insurance company that has compensated the victim for loss

under an insurance contract and any business entity.

18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(a)(1), (c)(1), (h) (eff. Oct. 24, 2018) (emphases added).

Notably, the General Assembly included the references to “an affected

government agency,” “any business entity organized as a nonprofit or not-for-

profit entity,” and “other business entity” in Section 1106 in 2018. See 2018,

Oct. 24, P.L. 891, No. 145, § 1 (eff. immediately).

____________________________________________

(1) A direct victim.

(2) A parent or legal guardian of a child who is a direct victim,

except when the parent or legal guardian of the child is the

alleged offender.

(3) A minor child who is a material witness to any of the

following crimes and offenses under 18 Pa.C.S. (relating to

crimes and offenses) committed or attempted against a

member of the child’s family:

Chapter 25 (relating to criminal homicide).

Section 2702 (relating to aggravated assault).

Section 3121 (relating to rape).

(4) A family member of a homicide victim, including

stepbrothers or stepsisters, stepchildren, stepparents or a

fiance, one of whom is to be identified to receive

communication as provided for in this act, except where the

family member is the alleged offender.

18 P.S. § 11.103.

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Instantly, Appellant’s offenses occurred from 2011 to 2018.11 At the

November 25, 2019 sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth sought a total

amount of restitution of $101,634.55, as follows: (1) $29,628.78 to Morrisville

Borough and $4,783.27 to Falls Township for municipal funds given to MAS;

and (2) $20,639.23 to Independence Blue Cross, $45,902.47 to United

Healthcare, and $680.80 Guardian Life Insurance for benefits they paid to

Appellant. N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 11/25/19, at 2-3. The trial court accepted

the Commonwealth’s arguments and imposed the restitution requested by the

Commonwealth. Following this Court’s previous remand, and in response to

Appellant’s motions to compel production, the Commonwealth asserted that

its request for restitution to the municipalities included the amounts involved

in Appellant’s theft and Morrisville Borough’s direct payments of Appellant’s

insurance premiums.

At the outset, we note that Appellant’s passing reference to her ability

to pay restitution merits no relief because, since 1995, Section 1106 has

expressly provided that restitution shall be imposed regardless of her current

financial resources. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(c)(1) (eff. 1995);

Commonwealth v. Petrick, 217 A.3d 1217, 1225 (Pa. 2019) (noting that

the General Assembly “ability to pay as a prerequisite consideration” when

imposing sentence and “simply placed the consideration of a defendant’s

____________________________________________

11The record indicates that MAS formally ceased operations in October of

2018. N.T. Trial, 8/21/19, at 87.

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ability to pay at the more pertinent stage, when a sentence court must assess

a defendant’s compliance with the order” (footnote omitted)).

However, a review of the record reveals that neither the parties nor the

trial court discussed whether the post-2018 or preceding version of Section

1106 applied at the time of sentencing. This determination is critical to any

discussion of the legality of the restitution portion of Appellant’s sentence. 12

Specifically, applying the pre-2018 version of Section 1106, our

Supreme Court held that “to qualify for restitution under Subsection

1106(c)(1)(i), a Commonwealth agency either must be a victim as that term

is used in that subsection or must have reimbursed a victim as defined by

Section 11.103, directly or by paying a third party on behalf of the victim.”

Commonwealth v. Veon, 150 A.3d 435, 447, 454 (Pa. 2016) (holding that

the Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development

(DCED) was not entitled to be paid restitution when it provided funds to

organizations through which the defendant committed crimes). Applying

Veon, this Court further held that other governmental agencies and other

organizations, such as the United States Coast Guard, a Pennsylvania limited

liability company, and an insurance company, were not entitled to restitution

under the pre-2018 version of Section 1106 unless these entities were being

compensated for reimbursements to direct victims who had been harmed by

the offender. See e.g. Commonwealth v. LeClair, 236 A.3d 71, 86 (Pa.

____________________________________________

12 We note that the Commonwealth cites the current version of Section 1106

without further discussion.

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Super. 2020), appeal denied, 244 A.3d 1222 (Pa. 2021) (vacating a restitution

award to the United States Coast Guard as illegal); Commonwealth v. Hunt,

220 A.3d 582, 584, 591 (Pa. Super. 2019) (concluding that the definition of a

‘“direct victim’ under the CVA (and, consequently, the definition of ‘victim’

under the pre-[2018] amendment version of § 1106) does not include

corporate entities like [a limited liability corporation]” on whose account the

defendant wrote sham checks)); Commonwealth v. Tanner, 205 A.3d 388,

398 (Pa. Super. 2019) (concluding that a township and “an insurance

company is entitled to receive restitution only when it compensates a victim”

under the pre-2018 amendments to Section 1106).

Therefore, if the pre-2018 version of Section 1106 applies, it appears

that municipalities and organizations, such as MAS and insurance companies,

may not be entitled to mandatory restitution. While the post-2018 version of

Section 1106 appears to recognize “affected governmental entities” and

“business entities” as direct victims, see 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(h) (eff. Oct. 24,

2018), our courts have not yet expressly considered or held that the post-

2018 version of Section 1106 should apply if the criminal conduct occurred

before the effective date of the amendment. Compare Hunt, 220 A.3d at

586-87 & nn.3-5 (declining to apply the post-2018 version of Section 1106

when, in part, the General Assembly did not unambiguously give retroactive

effect to the 2018 amendment, and noting that the defendant’s conduct, and

the adjudication of guilt, sentencing, and restitution issues were resolved

before the effective date of the 2018 amendments), and Tanner, 205 A.3d

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at 396 n.7 (applying the pre-2018 version of Section 1106 when all “events

that led” to the “conviction occurred before October 24, 2018”), with LeClair,

236 A.3d at 82 (applying the pre-2018 version of Section 1106 when the 2018

amendment took effect after the defendant’s conduct but before sentencing),

and Commonwealth v. Lock, 233 A.3d 888, 890 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(same). But see Commonwealth v. Kline, 695 A.2d 872, 873 (Pa. Super.

1997) (permitting restitution to an insurance company that reimbursed the

victim based on a version of Section 1106 that took effect after the defendant’s

crimes but before sentencing and rejecting the defendant’s claim that

restitution violated ex post facto principles).

We acknowledge that this Court could find waiver based on Appellant’s

failure to develop this claim in the trial court or on appeal and affirm without

prejudice to Appellant’s rights to seek a modification of restitution in a

collateral proceeding. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(c)(3). However, as discussed

above, factual and legal issues remain unresolved as to the applicable version

of Section 1106 which instantly determines the trial court’s imposition of

restitution and therefore implicates non-waivable issues concerning the

legality of Appellant’s sentence. See Weir, 239 A.3d at 34. Moreover,

Appellant has served the incarceration portion of her sentence and remains

subject to a sentence of restitution as well as the remaining term of probation.

These circumstances compel us to conclude it is appropriate to vacate the

judgment of sentence in part and remand this matter to the trial court for an

evidentiary hearing and argument to determine the applicable version of

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Section 1106, including whether the Commonwealth intends to pursue

restitution for municipalities and insurance companies as a part of Appellant’s

sentence. Consistent with the applicable version of Section 1106 as

determined by the trial court, the court shall make findings of fact and

conclusions of law as to whether the individuals or entities to whom it grants

restitution is proper under the appropriate version of the statute.13

In sum, we affirm Appellant’s convictions and the discretionary aspects

of the trial court’s sentence, and we vacate the portion of the judgment of

sentence concerning the restitution and remand for further proceedings as

described herein.

Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case

remanded for resentencing consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/30/21

____________________________________________

13As the there is no indication that the trial court originally intended its

sentence to be a condition of probation, we will not discuss the

appropriateness of restitution as a matter of probation upon resentencing. Cf.

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9754, 9763.

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