The opinion
FILED
November 30, 1999
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
RICHARD L. NORTHCOTT, ) C/A NO. M1999-01223-COA-R3-CV
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
)
)
v. )
)
)
) APPEAL AS OF RIGHT FROM THE
TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF ) DAVIDSON COUNTY CHANCERY
COURT
CORRECTION; DONAL CAMPBELL, )
Commissioner; BILL KEELING, )
Sentence Management Services, )
Department of Correction; FAYE )
CLAUD, Sentence Management )
Services, Department of Correction;)
SHIRLEY PLUNKETT, Records Clerk, )
Turney Center, )
) HONORABLE ELLEN HOBBS LYLE,
Defendants-Appellees. ) CHANCELLOR
For Appellant For Appellees
RICHARD L. NORTHCOTT PAUL G. SUMMERS
Pro Se Attorney General and
Reporter
Only, Tennessee Nashville, Tennessee
JOHN R. MILES
Counsel
Civil Rights and Claims
Division
Office of Attorney General
and
Reporter
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Nashville, Tennessee
OPINION
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED Susano, J.
The plaintiff, Richard L. Northcott (“Northcott”),
is a prisoner in state custody. He sued the Tennessee
Department of Correction (“the Department”) and others,
claiming that he is entitled to “good conduct”1and “prisoner
performance”2sentence credits allegedly earned by him prior to
March 1, 1986. 3 The trial court granted the Department
summary judgment, and Northcott appealed. He raises issues
that present the following questions.
1. Did the trial court err in determining
that Northcott is not entitled to any
sentence reduction credits for periods of
time prior to March 1, 1986?
2. Did the trial court err in failing to
address Northcott’s eligibility for “good
conduct” and “prisoner performance”
sentence credits?
3. Did the trial court err in failing to
address the constitutionality of Rule
Page 2
55.01, Tenn.R.Civ.P.?
I.
This is the second time that the plaintiff’s claim
has been before us. 4 In our first opinion, we recited the
pertinent facts:
On July 16, 1981, Richard L. Northcott was
convicted of criminal sexual conduct in
the first degree, and was given a
determinate life sentence. The act for
which he was convicted occurred in the
summer of 1978. He claims that after he
began his sentence, he was informed that
he was not entitled to any sentence
reduction credits.
In 1985, the Legislature changed the law
pertaining to sentence reduction credits.
Inmates sentenced under the old law,
including the petitioner, were told that
they could begin to earn sentence credits
under the new provisions if they signed a
waiver of their right to serve their
sentences under the law in effect at the
time they were sentenced. 5 Mr. Northcott,
who felt he had nothing to lose, signed
the waiver on March 1, 1986, and began
receiving sentence reduction credits at
the rate prescribed by law.
Mr. Northcott subsequently came to believe
that he had been misinformed as to his
right to accumulate sentence credits
before he signed the waiver, and that he
was therefore entitled to have his
sentence reduced by a greater number of
days than the Department was willing to
grant. He attempted to correct the
purported error through a long course of
administrative appeals, which concluded on
July 31, 1996 with a final denial of his
contentions by the legal assistant for the
Department of Correction. Having thus
exhausted his administrative remedies, Mr.
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Northcott filed a Petition for Declaratory
Judgment under the Uniform Administrative
Procedures Act (UAPA) in the Chancery
Court of Davidson County on September 27,
1996.
Northcott v. Tennessee Department of Correction, C/A No.
01A01-9707-CH-00355, 1998 WL 205224 at *1-2 (Tenn.Ct.App.
M.S., filed April 29, 1998).
II.
We measure the propriety of the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment against the standard of Rule 56.04,
Tenn.R.Civ.P., which provides that summary judgment is
appropriate where
the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate court
must decide anew if judgment in summary fashion is
appropriate. Cowden v. Sovran Bank/Central South, 816 S.W.2d
741, 744 (Tenn. 1991); Gonzalez v. Alman Constr. Co., 857
S.W.2d 42, 44-45 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1993). Since this
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determination involves a question of law, there is no
presumption of correctness as to the trial court’s judgment.
Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn. 1997); Hembree v.
State, 925 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Tenn. 1996). In making our
determination, we must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, and we must draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of that party. Byrd v. Hall,
847 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tenn. 1993). Summary judgment is
appropriate only if no genuine issues of material fact exist
and if the undisputed material facts entitle the moving party
to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56.04, Tenn.R.Civ.P.;
Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 211. A “material fact” has been defined
as a fact “that must be decided in order to resolve the
substantive claim or defense at which the motion is directed.”
Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 211.
Northcott claims that there are factual disputes
that make summary judgment inappropriate. We disagree. While
the parties differ as to certain facts, these disputes are not
material to our determination in this case. The question
before us -- whether Northcott is entitled to sentence
reduction credits allegedly earned by him prior to March 1,
1986 -- is a question of law. See Byrd v. Bradley, 913 S.W.2d
181, 183 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995). We do not have to resolve any
factual disputes in order to reach this question of law.
III.
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In 1985, the General Assembly enacted a new sentence
reduction program for state prisoners. 6 The new legislation
broadly defined its ambit with respect to then-serving
prisoners. The following were eligible:
Any person who committed a felony,
including any Class X felony, prior to
December 11, 1985,...
T.C.A. § 41-21-236(c)(3)(1997) (Emphasis added). The parties
to this litigation agree that Northcott was and is eligible to
participate in this new “prisoner sentence reduction credits”
program. T.C.A. § 41-21-236(b) (1997). They also agree that
he exercised his right to opt into this new program when he
signed a waiver on March 1, 1986, pursuant to the following
statutory provision:
Any person who committed a felony, including
any Class X felony, prior to December 11, 1985,
may become eligible for the sentence reduction
credits authorized by this section by signing a
written waiver waiving the right to serve the
sentence under the law in effect at the time
the crime was committed....
T.C.A. § 41-21-236(c)(3)(1997). Northcott does not claim that
he has been deprived of any prisoner sentence reduction
credits to which he is entitled for his behavior and
performance from and after the effective date of his March 1,
1986, waiver; but it is clear that the new program operates
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prospectively only:
However, sentence reduction credits
authorized by this section may be awarded
only for conduct and/or performance from
and after the date a person becomes
eligible under this subsection.
T.C.A. § 41-21-236(c)(3) (1997). Since this statute does not
operate retroactively, it is of no help in addressing the main
issue before us. Thus, the issue remains: Is Northcott
entitled to any sentence reduction credits for periods prior
to March 1, 1986?
IV.
The primary issue now before us was also before us
in the case of Byrd v. Bradley, 913 S.W.2d 181 (Tenn.Ct.App.
1995). There are remarkable similarities between the two
cases. In Byrd, the defendant, on April 1, 1976, “was given a
life sentence on [a] murder conviction.” Id. At 183. In the
instant case, Northcott was convicted on July 16, 1981, of
criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and was sentenced
to life imprisonment. In both cases, the prisoner signed a
waiver pursuant to T.C.A. § 41-21-236(c)(3) (1997). Each
signed the waiver on March 1, 1986. Both Byrd and Northcott
claim that they are entitled to sentence reduction credits for
periods of time prior to March 1, 1986.
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In Byrd, we held that a defendant who received a
life sentence at a time when T.C.A. § 40-3613 (later
designated as T.C.A. § 40-28-116) was in effect was not
eligible to receive sentence reduction credits for periods of
time prior to the time they opted into the new system of
sentence reduction credits authorized under the 1985
legislation. As pertinent here, T.C.A. § 40-3613 (later
designated § 40-28-116) provided as follows:
...any person who shall have been
convicted and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment in the state penitentiary for
a period or term of sixty-five (65) years
or more, or life, may become eligible for
parole provided such person shall have
been confined or served a term in the
state penitentiary of not less than thirty
(30) full calendar years after receiving
credit for probationary parole as
authorized in § 40-3612. 7
In Byrd, we concluded that the statutes in Title 41 of the
Code dealing with sentence reduction credits did not apply “
where the question presented is one of parole eligibility”
under T.C.A. § 40-3613. Id. At 184.
It must be remembered that T.C.A. § 40-3613 made an
absolute statement with respect to prisoners such as Byrd and
Northcott who were sentenced to determinate life sentences:
such persons “may become eligible for parole provided such
person[s] shall have been confined or served a term in the
state penitentiary of not less than thirty (30) full calendar
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years.” Id. (Emphasis added). Interpreting this statute,
the Supreme Court has pointed out that
[p]arole eligibility on a life sentence
can only occur in 30 years. Good and
honor time do not reduce it. It is
extinguished solely by the death of the
prisoner or pardon.
Howell v. State, 569 S.W.2d 428, 434 n.10 (Tenn. 1978).
(Emphasis added). See also McFadden v. State, 532 S.W.2d 944,
945-46 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1975). It is clear that service of “
thirty (30) full calendar years,” see T.C.A. § 40-3613
(emphasis added), means exactly that, “full calendar years,”
and not years made up of calendar years actually served and
time “served” by the earning of behavior and/or performance
credits.
We recognize that Northcott seeks credits under
T.C.A. § 41-21-229 and T.C.A. § 41-21-230, two statutes that
were not specifically mentioned in the Byrd opinion. We do
not find this to be material. T.C.A. § 41-21-229 and -230
are successor statutes to the statutes mentioned in Byrd, i.e.,
T.C.A. §§ 41-332, -334, and -358. Just as the Title 41
statutes mentioned in Byrd did not override T.C.A. § 40-3613,
there is nothing in the language of T.C.A. §§ 41-21-229 and
-230 to indicate that they were intended to modify the import
of T.C.A. § 40-3613.
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The 1985 legislation pertaining to sentence
reduction credits was the first legislation enacted after
Northcott’s conviction that was clearly applicable, if
accepted by execution of a waiver, to pre-December 11, 1985,
imposed life sentences. Northcott is receiving the benefit of
that 1985 legislation. As a prisoner serving a life sentence,
he is not entitled to any sentence reduction credits for any
periods of time prior to the effective date of his execution
of the opt-in waiver on March 1, 1986.
Northcott relies heavily on an unreported case
authored by Judge Koch of the Middle Section of this Court.
See Jones v. Reynolds, 01A01-9510-CH-00484, 1997 WL 36 7661
(Tenn.App. M.S., filed July 2, 1997). He puts particular
emphasis on the following excerpt from the opinion in that
case:
In 1980 the General Assembly enacted new
sentence credit statutes that were
intended to completely replace Tenn.Code
Ann. §§ 41-332 and 41-334 beginning on
July 1, 1981. TENN.CODE ANN. § 41-359
(later designated as Tenn.Code Ann. §
41-21-229) established a system of “good
conduct sentence credits” that prisoners
could earn by proper behavior, and
Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-361 (later designated
as Tenn.Code Ann. § 41-21-231) provided a
mechanism for converting Tenn.Code Ann. §§
41-332 and 41-334 credits earned prior to
July 1, 1981 to “good conduct sentence
credits.” The General Assembly envisioned
that the new good conduct sentence credit
program would apply across-the-board to
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all prisoners and thus did not provide a
waiver or opt-in system to prisoners who
committed crimes prior to July 1, 1981.
Id. 1997 WL 367661 at * 3. (Emphasis added).
We believe Northcott is reading the above-quoted
italicized statement out of context. In saying that the new
good conduct sentence credit program embodied in T.C.A. §
41-21-229 and -231 was “envisioned” by the General Assembly to
“apply across-the board to all prisoners,” the Court was
merely explaining why there was no need to have a specific
opt-in provision to make these statutory provisions applicable
to prisoners who were sentenced prior to the effective date of
the new good conduct credit program. Jones does not
explicitly state that the credits described in T.C.A. §
41-21-229 and T.C.A. § 41-21-230 could be earned by prisoners,
such as Northcott, who were serving life sentences. We
believe it is also significant that the Court in Jones did not
explicitly disagree with or distinguish the holding in Byrd.
In fact, the Byrd decision is not even mentioned in Jones.
Northcott’s reliance on Jones is misplaced.
V.
Northcott argues that the trial court failed to
specifically address whether he was entitled to “good conduct”
or “prisoner performance” credits other than to say that he
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was not entitled to any sentence reduction credits prior to
his signing of the waiver. Northcott claims that he is
entitled to 5,291 days of good conduct credits and to 1,776
days for performance credits. Nothing more needs to be said;
if Northcott is not entitled to credits for any periods,
pre-waiver, it is not necessary to specifically discuss the
terms of T.C.A. §§ 41-21-229 and -230 beyond that which we
have already said.
VI.
Northcott also argues that the trial court did not
address the issue of the constitutionality of Rule 55.01,
Tenn.R.Civ.P. 8 Northcott raises this issue in order to attack
the trial court’s setting aside of the default judgment
granted to him in the initial proceeding. In the first
appeal, this Court reviewed and affirmed the trial court’s
setting aside of the default judgment in Northcott’s favor. “
Under the law of the case doctrine, an appellate court’s
decision on an issue of law becomes binding precedent to be
followed in later trials and appeals of the same case
involving the same issues and facts.” Ladd v. Honda Motor Co.,
939 S.W.2d 83, 90 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1996). Thus, we decline to
address this issue further.
VII.
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For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed to the
appellant. This case is remanded to the trial court for
collection of costs assessed below, all pursuant to applicable
law.
__________________________
Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.
CONCUR:
________________________
Houston M. Goddard, P.J.
________________________
D. Michael Swiney, J.
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