In Re: T.L.H., Appeal of: D.L.W.

J-A12031-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: T.L.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: D.L.W., MOTHER :

:

:

:

:

: No. 1575 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered December 1, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s):

2019-0097A

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED AUGUST 02, 2021

D.L.W. (“Mother” or “Natural Mother”) appeals from the Decree granting

the Petition, filed by F.A.L. (“Father”) and his wife, A.J.L. (“Stepmother”)

(collectively, “Petitioners”), and involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental

rights with respect to her child, T.L.H. (“Child”) (a female born in October

2013), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A § 2511(a)(1) and (b), so that Stepmother

may adopt Child. We affirm.

This case has a protracted procedural and factual history. Child was

born in October 2013 to Mother, while Mother was incarcerated. Trial Court

Opinion, 12/1/20, at 2. Mother’s mother, D.M. (“Maternal Grandmother”),

assumed custody of Child until Mother was released from prison. Id. at 2-3.

Mother had originally named another man as Child’s father. However, upon

her release from prison, she contacted Father and informed him that he was

Child’s father, and genetic testing confirmed the same. Id. at 3. Mother and

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Father were able to co-parent Child amicably until 2017, when Father became

concerned about Mother’s stability. Id. In June 2017, Father commenced a

custody action regarding Child and initially, the trial court awarded Mother

primary physical custody. Id. at 2. In December 2017, following a custody

trial, primary physical custody was awarded to Father. Id. Father

subsequently filed an Emergency Petition for Special Relief in Custody, which

the trial court granted on December 21, 2017. Id. at 4. At that time, the

trial court ordered that Mother’s physical custodial periods be supervised at

the YWCA or other credible facility. Id. Issues arose regarding Mother’s

supervised custody, and the court entered another Order, dated February 9,

2018, directing that Mother’s weekly visits be supervised by Child First in

Harrisburg, and limited to one to two hours. Id. at 4-5.

On June 6, 2019, Petitioners filed a Petition seeking the involuntary

termination of Mother’s parental rights to Child, along with a Petition for

adoption, so that Stepmother may adopt Child. Petition for Adoption under

23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2701, 6/6/19; Petition for Involuntary Termination of

Parental Rights, 6/6/19. The custody action was stayed by Order dated

September 27, 2019, pending determination of the adoption proceedings.1

Trial Court Opinion, 12/1/20, at 5.

____________________________________________

1 Notably, Father filed a Notice of Relocation on June 12, 2020, stating his

intent to move to Plymouth, New Hampshire. Trial Court Opinion, 12/1/20,

at 5. Mother timely responded with a Counter-Affidavit that she did not object

to the relocation. Id.

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On September 12, 2019, the trial court appointed Leanne M. Miller,

Esquire (“Attorney Miller”), as counsel for Mother, and Laura Smith, Esquire

(“Attorney Smith”) as legal interest counsel for Child. Order Scheduling

Hearing and Appointing Counsel, 9/12/19. On December 30, 2019, the trial

court appointed Katherine Doucette, Esquire, to serve as the guardian ad litem

(“GAL”) for Child. Order Appointing Guardian for Minor, 12/30/19.

By way of further background, Father and Stepmother married in June

2017. N.T., 8/20/20, at 7. Mother married F.W. (“Stepfather”) in November

2017. Id. at 70. Mother and Stepfather’s relationship has had incidents of

physical abuse and violence. N.T., 1/16/20, at 40. Both Mother and

Stepfather have criminal records.2 Mother has five children in addition to

Child. N.T., 8/20/20, at 70.

The trial court held evidentiary hearings on the termination and

adoption Petitions on January 16, 2020, June 12, 2020, and August 20, 2020.

At the January 16, 2020, hearing, Petitioners were present, along with their

counsel, Kathryn Nonas-Hunter, Esquire. Mother was present with Attorney

Miller. Attorney Smith and Child’s GAL were also present, but the trial court

excused Child from the hearing. N.T., 1/16/20, at 7. At the commencement

of the proceeding, the trial court took judicial notice of the three pending York

____________________________________________

2 Mother has criminal convictions relating to drug possession and delivery,

robbery, and conspiracy. Stepfather has criminal convictions relating to

terroristic threats, simple assault, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Trial

Court Opinion, 12/1/20, at 5-6.

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County actions involving the parents: the termination/adoption matter; a

custody action, which was stayed; and a child support action. Id. Petitioners

first presented the testimony of Todd Ross (“Ross”), a licensed private

investigator with York County. Id. at 8. Father then testified on behalf of

himself and Stepmother. Id. at 24.

At the hearing on June 12, 2020, the parties were again present with

their respective counsel. Mother testified that she had knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily signed a consent to the termination of her

parental rights, and she acknowledged that she had a thirty-day period in

which to revoke her consent. N.T., 6/12/20, at 11-17; Consent to Termination

of Parental Rights, 6/12/20. Subsequently, on June 25, 2020, Mother filed a

revocation of her consent. Revocation of Consent, 6/25/20. Thus, the trial

court scheduled another day of hearing on the Petitions.

At the hearing on August 20, 2020, the Petitioners presented the

testimony of Stepmother. N.T., 8/20/20, at 6. Mother presented the

testimony of Father’s former landlord, D.S. N.T., 8/20/20, at 55-57. D.S.

owned the property previously leased by Father’s father (“Paternal

Grandfather”), where Paternal Grandfather, Paternal Grandmother, Father,

Stepmother and Child had resided. Id. at 15, 56-57. Mother then testified

on her own behalf. Id. at 69.

In its Opinion, the trial court made the following findings of fact from

the testimonial and documentary evidence at the hearings:

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1. The [] Parents never married. [] Child was born out of wedlock

with the Father neither knowing nor being informed about []

Child’s birth.

2. The Petitioners married in June [] 2017.

3. The Petitioners and [] Child have lived together full[ ]time as

an intact family since December 2017[,] when custody was

transferred by custody [O]rder dated December 8, 2017.

4. The six[-]month timeframe immediately preceding the filing of

the [P]etition [was] from December 6, 2018, to June 6, 2019, the

later date being when the [P]etition to terminate parental rights

was filed.

5. During the operative six[-]month timeframe, Natural Mother

had no contact whatsoever with Father or [] Child other than a

few phone calls. To the contrary, Natural Mother never provided

Father with her current residence address or a phone number

where she could be reached to discuss their legal custody rights

or in the event of an emergency[,] as the custody [O]rders

required. She did not even text Father to ask about [] Child’s

welfare.

6. There is no evidence that Natural Mother communicated with []

Child either directly via telephone, mail, or any other means since

at least May 2018. Similarly, there is no evidence that Natural

Mother sent [] Child any letters generally during the operative

timeframe, or presents or cards for Christmas 2017 or [] Child’s

fifth birthday in October 2018.

7. Likewise, there is no evidence Natural Mother performed any

parental duties during those six months. Rather, the Petitioners

performed all parental duties during that timeframe in the vacuum

left by Natural Mother’s absence, making all major decisions

concerning [] Child’s health, medical, dental and orthodontic

treatment, mental and emotional health treatment and needs,

education and religious training. The Petitioners[’] performance

of such parental duties included: a) engaging a pediatrician to

examine [] Child and update her lack of needed immunizations;

b) purchasing private health care insurance for [] Child upon

learning that Natural Mother allowed [] Child’s previous insurance

to lapse and had not obtained alternative coverage nor could

Father obtain such coverage without Natural Mother’s approval,

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which was not forthcoming; c) engaging a dentist to examine []

Child for the first time[,] who reported that [] Child has good

dental health; and d) undertaking all of the daily tasks of

childrearing, including wakeup and bedtime routines, cooking

breakfast, helping [] Child dress and get ready for school

(kindergarten), taking her to the bus stop and putting her on the

school bus, preparing and sharing family meals, attending all

medical and dental appointments, and making all decisions

concerning [] Child jointly.

8. The lack of communication and contact is confirmed by the

testimony of [] Ross, a licensed private investigator. Father was

constrained to hire [] Ross to locate Natural Mother, not knowing

her whereabouts or how to contact her. [] Ross performed an

exhaustive search after initial efforts to locate Natural Mother

proved fruitless[,] with current occupants of her last known

address in Williamstown, Pennsylvania[,] advising that she had

moved. [] Ross’[s] search efforts began on June 12, 2019 and

included using the TLO investigative research database (similar to

Accurint), social media and old fashioned in-person sleuthing. He

was ultimately able to locate and serve Natural Mother in

Wiconisco, Pennsylvania[,] on August 22, 2019, two months later.

Such lack of contact persisted until after Natural Mother was

served.

9. Other than failing to return phone calls from unknown phone

numbers and insisting that Natural Mother comply with the

custody [O]rders, the Petitioners never did anything to discourage

Natural Mother from being involved in [] Child’s life.

10. Natural Mother never provided any financial support for []

Child after primary physical custody was transferred to Father.

11. By way of explanation for her failure to perform parental

duties, Natural Mother contends she believed she had completed

all eight of the supervised visits by May 2018[,] and expected to

go back to custody conciliation in June[,] only to have the custody

action transferred to York County. She also expected to receive

notice of rescheduling upon transfer, but never did. She claims

she contacted Mid-Penn Legal Services[(“Mid-Penn”)] requesting

legal representation, but acknowledges Mid-Penn declined to

represent her since it was a custody action.

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12. The [c]ourt finds that [sic] such explanation and inaction to

be inconsistent with Natural Mother’s duty to remain actively

engaged in [] Child’s life. Natural Mother knew that Father was

not counting the YWCA visit toward completion of the eight

supervised visits requirement[,] as it was terminated due to

Natural Mother’s behavior. She was also well aware of the

Custody Conference Officer’s observations of the case set forth in

her Custody Conference Summary Report of May 7, 2018, which

were:

Mother refused to follow the December 8, 2017 [O]rder

and then failed to cooperate with the supervised visits.

She eventually liked the visits and found them beneficial.

Mother says she will now follow the [O]rder. Father doubts

this and reports that Mother has behavioral fluctuations.

He wants to keep supervised visits. Mother refused

supervised visits pending trial[,] even though Father

offered to pay.

It was, therefore, incumbent upon Mother to continue the

supervised visits until that condition was modified, which she

failed to do. It was also incumbent upon her to take active steps

to modify the custody [O]rder, which she did not initiate until after

being served with the pending [P]etition. Instead of pursuing a

course to maximize her active engagement with [] Child, Natural

Mother choose [sic] stasis instead [sic]. It is also notable that

there is another entry on the custody docket after entry of the

transfer [O]rder, that being an Order of July 31, 2018, advising

the parties that a pending Emergency Petition for Special Relief

was denied.FN6 Certainly, Natural Mother’s receipt of the July 31,

2018 [O]rder put her on notice that nothing further was going to

transpire in the custody action without her taking definitive action,

which she failed to do. Critically, there is no further docket activity

in the custody action until August 6, 2019, over a year later.

13. Mother called [D.S.] as a witness to testify on her behalf.

[D.S.] and her husband were the plaintiffs/landlords in an action

in ejectment they filed against Father, as tenant, in August 2019.

[D.S.] developed a personal friendship with Natural Mother,

primarily through phone conversations, which primarily focused

upon Natural Mother making inquiry about whether [D.S.] could

provide information about [] Child. [D.S.] eventually met Natural

Mother and observed her interacting favorably with her other

children. She admits she never observed either party interacting

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with [] Child. She admits Natural Mother changes her phones and

phone numbers frequently. Most critically, she never informed

Father of Natural Mother’s inquiries nor did Natural Mother ever

enlist her as a conduit to facilitate opportunity for Natural Mother

to have increased contact with [] Child.

14. Natural Mother testified she follows [] Child’s progress in

school by interacting on her own with school authorities, but there

is no evidence she ever did so in an interactive way involving []

Child[,] such as attending school events, parent/teacher

conferences or otherwise. Natural Mother also testified the “girls,”

[] Child and her two older female siblings, play well together. She

admitted that [] Child has never met her two younger siblings[,]

nor has she spoken with any of them by phone. [Stepmother]

reports [] Child never asks about or mentions her siblings.

15. While [] Child knows her Natural Mother and expressed a

preference to continue having telephone contact with her, she

does not consider her to be a source of comfort and security. The

[c]ourt finds that no meaningful bond currently exists between

Natural Mother and Child. Such bond may have begun formulating

after Natural Mother was paroled in July 2014, but it never

coalesced in a meaningful way. [] Child was raised from birth and

during infancy by her [Maternal Grandmother]. Upon Natural

Mother regaining custody of [] Child, she exposed [] Child to her

abusive relationship with [Stepfather]. [Stepmother] reports

Natural Mother’s behavior at custodial exchanges was

inappropriate.

Natural Mother made verbal threats to Father to have him arrested

and deported. [Stepmother] also observed seeing [] Child in fear

of Natural Mother. Upon placement of primary custody with

Petitioners, [] Child presented as very reserved, nervous, and

lacking a significant attachment with Natural Mother. [] Child

would experience separation anxiety when Father left her

company. She was timid and reluctant to talk about Natural

Mother, just calling her “[by name],” not mom, mommy, or any

other expression singling her out as being her mother.

Additionally, at a court ordered post-petition contact with Natural

Mother, [] Child became anxious and cautious, backed away from

close interaction and positioned herself within [Stepmother’s]

personal space as a protective umbrella.

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16. There has been minimal post-[P]etition contact. As noted

herein, Natural Mother’s efforts to process a petition to modify in

the custody action have been stayed pending the outcome of this

proceeding.

17. The Petitioners have provided [] Child with a safe and stable

environment that attends to her financial, emotional, educational

and physical needs.[FN7] They have provided stability, safety, and

security, regularly and consistently, for [] Child over an extended

period of time; that is, since late December 2018.

18. [] Child has established a significant and meaningful emotional

parent[-]child bond with the Petitioners. She calls [Stepmother]

“mom” or “mommy.” [] Child is now capable of expressing her

feelings, thriving in her educational process and blossoming

generally.

___________________________________________________

6 The Emergency Petition for Special Relief, which appears to have

been considered, is Natural Mother’s [P]etition dated January 12,

2018, in which she complains regarding lack of contact with []

Child.

7 Natural Mother introduced evidence to dispel this finding by way

of the aforementioned ejectment action seeking to evict

Petitioners from their home and disruption of utility service. The

[c]ourt accepts Petitioners’ explanation that these were short-

term inconveniences that were promptly remedied.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/1/20, at 7-13 (footnotes in original).

In the Decree entered on December 1, 2020, the trial court involuntarily

terminated Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(1) and (b). Mother timely filed a Notice of Appeal, along with a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b) Concise Statement of errors complained of on

appeal.

In her brief on appeal, Mother raises two issues:

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I. Did the orphans[’] court abuse its discretion because the facts

are insufficient to establish grounds for the involuntary

termination of [Mother’s] parental rights?

II. Did the orphans[’] court commit an error of law by failing to

consider the deliberate conduct of Father that prevented Mother

from communicating with [] Child when establishing grounds for

the involuntary termination of [Mother’s] parental rights?

Mother’s Brief at 4.

We will review Mother’s issues together, as they are interrelated.

Mother argues that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating her

parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), because the trial court did not

view the evidence in light of the totality of the circumstances and disregarded

Mother’s repeated attempts to contact Child, despite her limited resources,

and the fact that Father deliberately stymied her attempts. Id. at 13. Mother

asserts that she was unable to perform her parental rights, because Father

did not permit her to do so. Id. Mother also contends that Father’s deliberate

conduct prevented her from communicating and developing a bond with Child.

Id. at 22. Mother asserts that Petitioners admitted to creating obstacles to

Mother’s contact with Child, and refusing to facilitate any contact whatsoever

with Mother, or allowing Mother to remain in Child’s life. Id. at 19-20.

Specifically, Mother argues that

the trial court was incorrect in stating that “Natural Mother

never provided Father with her current residence address of a

phone number where she could be reached” and she “did not even

text Father to ask about [] Child's welfare.” See Appendix A, p.

7. [Trial Court Opinion, 12/1/20, at 7]. Again, testimony

established that the court’s recitation of the facts was incorrect.

[Mother] testified that she called and texted [] Father multiple

times a week to speak with her daughter and leaving her updated

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contact information. It was [] Father, in fact, that relocated and

did not tell [Mother] where he took their daughter. [] Father put

[Mother] in an unwinnable situation where she had no opportunity

whatsoever to parent her own child during the six[-]month period

as required by the Adoption Act.

[] Father’s conduct by disallowing any contact by [Mother]

with her daughter during the required six[-]month period is

contrary to the purpose of the law. [Mother] simply could not

parent her child because [] Father withheld [] Child from her,

despite [Mother’s] efforts. As the trial court misapplied the facts

of record and failed to apply the applicable law as set forth herein,

the trial court committed an error of law and[,] therefore, the trial

court’s [O]pinion must be reversed and remanded.

Mother’s Brief at 20-21.

In reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we

adhere to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion

standard when considering a trial court’s determination of a

petition for termination of parental rights. As in dependency

cases, our standard of review requires an appellate court to accept

the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court

if they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., [] 9 A.3d 1179,

1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law

or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011)

(plurality opinion)]. As has been often stated, an abuse of

discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court

might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel

Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., [], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa.

2011); Christianson v. Ely, [], 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003).

Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion

only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for

applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases.

We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the

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relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190.

Therefore, even where the facts could support an opposite result,

as is often the case in dependency and termination cases, an

appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the trial court

and impose its own credibility determinations and judgment;

instead we must defer to the trial judges so long as the factual

findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal

conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of

discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066

(Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing

evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (quoting In re J.L.C.,

837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination

of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a), along

with consideration of section 2511(b).3 See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384

____________________________________________

3 Although Mother does not specifically raise section 2511(b), we will address

it nonetheless. See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1010 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(addressing section 2511(b) although parent did not challenge the trial court’s

analysis under that section).

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(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We will address sections 2511(a)(1) and (b),

which provide as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing

parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform

parental duties.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

With respect to subsection 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held as

follows:

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties

or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court

must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation

for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between

parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination

of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 92 (1988).

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Further, this Court has stated,

the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case and

not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. The

court must examine the individual circumstances of each case and

consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination

of his or her parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light

of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the

involuntary termination.

In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

In Adoption of S.P., our Supreme Court reiterated the standard with

which a parent must comply in order to avoid a finding that he abandoned his

child.

[W]e noted that a parent “has an affirmative duty to love, protect

and support his child and to make an effort to maintain

communication and association with that child.” [McCray] at 655.

* * *

Where the parent does not exercise reasonable firmness in

declining to yield to obstacles, his other rights may be forfeited.

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 828 (footnotes and internal quotation marks

omitted).

This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under

section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to section

2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super.

2008) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under

section 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are

met, a court “shall give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the

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child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b). The emotional needs and

welfare of the child have been properly interpreted to include

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In

re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620

A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination

of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the

emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost

attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of

permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at

791.

In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use

expert testimony.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010).

“Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.”

Id. Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and make it part

of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances … where direct observation

of the interaction between the parent and the child is not necessary and may

even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762 (Pa. Super.

2008).

A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this analysis:

concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply

because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only

dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the

dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be

reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who,

after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through

the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent.… Nor

are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the

parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when

considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to

establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological

aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the

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development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional

health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs

of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763 (affirming involuntary

termination of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where

placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best interests). “[A]

parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of ... her child is

converted, upon the failure to fulfill ... her parental duties, to the child’s right

to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a

permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d at 856

(internal citations omitted).

This Court has explained that a parent’s own feelings of love and

affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights. In

re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. It is well-settled that “we will not toll the well-

being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of C.L.G.,

956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a

parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”)).

The trial court addressed Mother’s issues regarding section 2511(a)(1)

and (b), and Father’s obstruction of her communication and bonding with Child

as follows:

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1. Natural Mother’s minimal efforts of phone contact are not

sufficient to stop the six-month period from running under section

2511(a)(1). Since Natural Mother otherwise refused or failed to

perform her parental duties for six months, the requirements of

2511(a)(1) are met.

***

6. Natural Mother’s explanation for her conduct is inadequate.

She easily could have done more. The outcome of the custody

trial should have been a wakeup call that her parenting was

lacking[,] and she needed to realign her conduct to maintain a

proper place of importance in [] Child’s life. Instead of doing so,

she exacerbated the disconnect by withholding transfer of custody

and filing a Protection from Abuse [P]etition, resulting in the entry

of the February 9, 2018 [O]rder requiring that all of [] Child’s

future contact with Natural Mother be supervised. Thereafter,

Natural Mother did not have any contact with [] Child. Her post-

petition conduct was also effectively non-existent. While she did

have one isolated contact, she did not produce any other evidence

of having made attempts to repair the relationship.

7. With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), therefore, the [c]ourt

concludes that Natural Mother, by clear and convincing evidence

of conduct continuing for a period of at least six months

immediately preceding the filing of the [P]etition, has evidenced a

settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim to [] Child and

refused and failed to perform her parental duties and obligations.

8. The [c]ourt next considered, under Section 2511(b), whether

termination will meet the child’s needs and welfare. In re C.P.,

901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa. Super. 2006). “Intangibles such as love,

comfort, security, and stability are involved when inquiring about

the needs and welfare of the child. The court must also discern

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying close

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the

bond.” Id.

9. In this context, the court must take into account whether a

bond exists between child and parent, and whether termination

would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial relationship.

In Re Z.P., supra at 1121.

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10. The [c]ourt concludes that no substantial emotional bond still

exists between Natural Mother and [] Child for the reasons

enumerated in paragraph fifteen of our findings of fact.

11. The court next specifically considered whether [] Child has

developed a meaningful bond with the Petitioners.

12. The inevitable consequence of Natural Mother’s lack of contact

and involvement in [] Child’s life and [] Child’s lack of having

developed a significant emotional bond with Natural Mother has

naturally led to [] Child now having a strong attachment and

emotional bond with [Stepmother] as her maternal parent.

13. The [c]ourt, therefore, concludes that [] Child has established

a significant emotional parent-child bond with both Petitioners,

who have provided stability, safety, and security regularly and

consistently to [] Child over an extended period of time.

14. [] Child will not suffer any irreparable harm if Natural Mother’s

rights are terminated.

15. Based upon all of the foregoing, the [c]ourt concludes as a

matter of law that it is in the best interest of [] Child to terminate

the parental rights of Natural Mother.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/1/20, at 16-20 (footnote omitted).

The trial court’s determination that Petitioners satisfied the

requirements of section 2511(a)(1) and (b) is supported by competent, clear

and convincing evidence in the record. Indeed, the trial court considered

Mother’s failure to perform parental duties for the six-month period preceding

the Petitioners’ filing of the termination Petition, and the court considered (1)

Mother’s explanation for her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact

between Mother and Child; and (3) the effect of termination of parental rights

on Child pursuant to section 2511(b). Trial Court Opinion, 12/1/20, at 9, 16,

17, 18-19. The trial court considered the totality of the circumstances and

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the actions which Mother asserts prevented her from performing her parental

duties and developing any bond with Child and, rejected Mother’s contentions

as not credible and inadequate. Id. at 9, 17. Moreover, the record reveals

that the trial court credited and relied upon Father and Stepmother’s

testimony. We cannot overturn the credibility determinations of the trial

court. See In re: R.J.T., [] 9 A.3d at 1190 (requiring an appellate court to

accept the findings of credibility determinations of the trial court if they are

supported by the record).

Our review discloses sufficient evidence in the record from which the

trial court, considering Child’s needs and welfare, could have properly found

that Mother failed to perform her parental duties to Child during the six-month

period preceding the filing of the Petition; Mother’s explanation for her conduct

was unconvincing; there was no bond between Child and Mother because of

her own inaction to develop a bond with Child; and the termination of Mother’s

parental rights was in Child’s best interest. We will not disturb the trial court’s

Decree. In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27; In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d

at 267. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court Decree terminating Mother’s

parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).

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Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/2/2021

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