deciding both types of claims under different standards
How later courts described this case
- deciding both types of claims under different standards
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
J-A02036-21
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: CECILIA F. BALOGH, AN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ADULT : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: ROBERT F. BALOGH :
:
:
:
: No. 717 WDA 2020
Appeal from the Order Entered June 18, 2020
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 02-19-05069
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: July 29, 2021
Robert F. Balogh (“Son”) appeals from the order requiring him to return
certain inter vivos transfers made to him by his Mother, Cecilia Balogh
(“Mother”). We affirm.
Mother initiated this action by filing a petition to require Son to file an
accounting as Mother’s agent pursuant to a power of attorney she executed
in June of 2018. By consent, Son did file an accounting in December 2019, for
the period from June 10, 2018 through March 4, 2019. The court conducted a
hearing on March 3, 2020, at which the underlying matter under consideration
was whether Son had exerted undue influence over Mother. In addition to the
testimony of both Mother and Son, Son presented the testimony of First
National Bank Vice-President Joann James, who testified regarding her
interaction with Mother and Son, during a transaction in which Mother
redeemed savings bonds and Son deposited the proceeds into his First
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National Bank account. James reported that she did not observe any behavior
between the pair that caused her any concern or that would prompt her to
halt the transaction. N.T. 3/3/20 at 37-38.
Approximately three months later, the Orphans’ Court issued a
memorandum opinion and order, which included the following findings of fact:
1. [Mother] moved from her residence in Swissvale to [Son’s]
residence in Canonsburg in June 2018. (N.T. 03/03/20, p. 7)
2. In [Mother’s] Swissvale residence, the sum of approximately
$136,000 in cash was found. (N.T. 03103/20, p. 8)
3. On June 9, 2018, [Mother] and [Son] executed a Loan
Agreement and Promissory Note [“Loan Agreement”], which was
prepared by Gary L. Sweat, Esquire, who is [Son’s] attorney.
(Exhibit 1) The document provided for [Mother] to lend [Son] the
sum of $136,400 for the purpose of constructing a residence in
which [Mother], her Husband (Robert C. Balogh), [Son], and
[Son’s] wife (Diane Balogh) would reside. [Mother] would have a
life estate in the residence and the loan would be forgiven upon
her death. The document did not contain any repayment terms.
[Mother] did not have separate legal representation. (N.T.
03/03/20, p. 8-10)[1]
4. On June 21, 2018, Son and his Wife opened a Money Market
account at First National Bank []. On that date, the sum of
$136,400 was deposited into said account (Exhibits 2 and 3) (N.T.
03/03/20, p. 10-12)
5. On November 27, 2018, Son and his Wife purchased vacant
real property in North Strabane Township, Washington County, for
the sum of $42,600. The funds for said purchase were taken from
the First National Bank Account [] in the amount of $51,412.48.
(Exhibits 4 and 5) (N.T. 03/03/20, p. 12-14)
____________________________________________
1 The Loan Agreement contained the following provision, “This Note shall be
governed by the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and jurisdiction
shall be vested in the Washington County Court of Common Pleas.”
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6. [Son’s] attorney, Mr. Sweat, prepared a Power of Attorney
(POA) for [Mother]. She did not meet with the attorney prior to
executing the POA, which was prepared at the direction of [Son],
and which [Son] explained to [Mother]. She executed the POA,
which names [Son] as the Agent, on June 10, 2018. (Exhibit 6)
(N.T. 03/03/20, p. 15)
7. On June 30, 2018, [Son] and [Mother] opened a joint bank
account at PNC Bank []. [Son] did not deposit any of his own funds
in said account. On August 9, 2018, the sum of $6,000 was
deposited into the account, which was a check written to
[Mother’s] Husband from Prudential Annuities. The check was
endorsed by [Son], even though it was made payable to his
Father. The ending balance of the account was $84,162.29 on
November 16, 2018. (Exhibits 16, 17, 18, and 19) (N.T. 03/03/20,
p. 16-19)
8. Check [] from PNC Bank Account [] was written to Wilson
Architecture for $6,500. The check was for the purpose of
obtaining architectural drawings for the residence to be
constructed on the North Strabane property. (Exhibits 11) (N.T.
03/03/20, p. 20)
9. On August 17, 2018, [Son] assisted [Mother] with redeeming
359 US Savings Bonds at First National Bank, which was the bank
that he used routinely. The funds from the redeemed bonds, with
a value of approximately $65,000, were deposited into [Son] and
his Wife's First National Bank Account []. (Exhibits 12 and A) (N.T.
03/03/20, p. 20-21).
10. [Mother’s] Husband, who is [Son’s] Father, passed away on
August 19, 2018.
11. [Mother] transferred her vehicle to [Son’s] Wife. (N.T.
03/03/20, p. 21)
12. [Son] arranged for his attorney, Mr. Sweat, to prepare a new
Will for [Mother]. The Will provides for [Son] to receive one
hundred percent (100%) of the residuary estate and for him to be
the Executor. (Exhibit 13) (N.T. 03/03/20, p. 22)
13. [Mother] agreed to move in with [Son], as her daughters did
not agree for her to live with them. (N.T. 03/03/20, p. 25)
14. [Mother] does not recall discussing the loan document with
[Son]. (N.T. 03/03120, p. 27)
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15. [Mother] did not give the US Savings Bonds to [Son] as a gift.
She gave them to him ‘to hold.’ (N.T. 03/03/20, p. 27)
16. The residence being built on the North Strabane Township land
is not complete. (N.T. 03/03/20, p. 46)
17. [Mother] has moved from [Son’s] residence to Beatty Pointe
Independent Living. (N.T. 03/03/20, p. 46)
18. [Mother] never had an account at First National Bank.
(Stipulation) (N.T. 03/03120, p. 51)
Orphans’ Ct. Memorandum Op. (“Mem. Op.”), 6/18/20, at 1-4.
In light of the foregoing, the court found that Son exerted undue
influence over Mother because the parties had a “confidential relationship”,
Mother had given a significant amount of her net worth to Son and Mother
suffered a “weakened intellect” due to her circumstances after the loss of her
husband. Accordingly, in its June 18, 2020 order, the court directed:
(1) The Loan Agreement and Promissory Note dated June 9, 2018
is deemed void;
(2) [Son] shall remit to [Mother] the sum of $136,400 within sixty
(60) days;
(3) [Son] shall remit to [Mother] the total sum deposited into First
National Bank Account in the approximate amount of $65,000,
from the redemption of US Savings Bonds on August 17, 2018,
within sixty (60) days;
(4) Any funds remaining in PNC Bank Account or withdrawn by
[Mother] shall be the sole and separate property of [Mother];
(5) The vehicle transferred by [Mother] to [Son’s] wife is not void;
and
(6) [Son] and his wife shall retain the real property, including the
partial construction, located in North Strabane Township, per
Deed dated November 27, 2018.
Orphans Ct. Order, 6/18/20.
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Son filed the instant timely appeal and both Son and the Orphans’ Court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Son raises the following issues for review:
1) Whether the trial court erred when it failed to consider whether
[Mother], proved by clear and convincing evidence, that she suffered
from a weakened intellect and therefore experienced undue
influence?
2) Whether the trial court erred in considering [Mother’s] lack of
memory while testifying at trial when determining whether [Mother]
suffered from a weakened intellect for events that transpired 20 to
22 months earlier and after [Mother] had suffered an intervening
head injury?
3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it weighed the
evidence in favor of [Mother] when determining that [Mother] and
[Son] satisfied their respective burdens of proof under the law?
4) Whether the trial court erred in precluding testimony from Joann
James, the Vice-President and Branch Manager of First National Bank
at the time in question, who witnessed and interacted with [Mother]
and [Son] on the day [Mother] negotiated the savings bonds at First
National Bank, when Ms. James testified regarding her observations
of [Mother] and [Son] on the day in question?
5) Whether the Trial Court erred and/or abused its discretion when it
failed to enforce the forum selection clause in the loan agreement
and promissory note, overruling [Son’s] counsel’s objection, after the
legitimacy of the loan agreement and promissory note was first called
into question and the issue was raised at trial?
Son’s Br. at 5-6.
Son’s first three issues all concern his underlying contention that the
Orphans’ Court erroneously found that Mother established a prima facie case
of undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. We will consider these
issues together. Son takes specific exception with the court’s finding that
Mother suffered from a weakened intellect. He argues that Mother executed
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the Loan Agreement prior to moving in with him and his wife and that no other
evidence, medical or otherwise, was presented regarding Mother’s alleged
weakened intellect. According to Son, Mother’s forgetfulness at trial cannot
reflect on her intellect at the relevant time because in the intervening months
she suffered a head injury. To the contrary, Son asserts that his rebuttal
evidence showed that Mother was clear-headed. He further points out that
Bank Vice-President James testified that she suspected nothing amiss between
Mother and Son, and if she had, she would have stopped the transaction
immediately.
Conversely, Mother asserts that the court erroneously applied a more
stringent standard for undue influence than required. She explains that the
court improperly applied the standard for testamentary transfers but the
transfers at issue here consisted of alleged inter vivos gifts. Hence, according
to Mother, in order to make a prima facie case for undue influence she only
needed to establish that a confidential relationship existed between herself
and Son, and upon that showing, the burden should have shifted to Son to
prove that Mother was of sound mind and not subject to undue influence.
Mother emphasizes that she properly established that a confidential
relationship existed between herself and Son because she lived with Son, Son
was her agent under her POA, and she generally depended on Son to manage
her financial affairs.
Furthermore, Mother maintains that Son failed to carry his burden of
proving that no undue influence occurred. According to Mother, Son failed to
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present any testimony that Mother intended to give him the majority of her
net worth, except for his own self-serving testimony. She avers that the court
properly concluded that Vice-President James’ testimony regarding her single
limited interaction with Mother and Son could not establish that Son did not
exert undue influence over Mother. Mother also points out that Son’s own
attorney was the sole author of the documents at issue and she was
unrepresented when she executed the documents.
We review the Orphans’ Court’s factual findings for an abuse of
discretion, and its legal conclusions for an error of law. Owens v. Mazzei,
847 A.2d 700, 706 (Pa.Super. 2004). “Because the Orphans’ Court sits as the
fact-finder, it determines the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, we
will not reverse its credibility determinations absent an abuse of discretion.”
Id. (quoting In re Estate of Harrison, 745 A.2d 676, 678 (Pa.Super. 2000))
(brackets omitted). “If the court’s findings are properly supported, we may
reverse its decision only if the rules of law on which it relied are palpably
wrong or clearly inapplicable.” Id. (quoting Harrison, 745 A.2d at 678-79).
First, Mother is correct that the undue influence standard the Orphans’
Court applied was erroneous because it is applicable to testamentary rather
than inter vivos transfers. The testamentary standard requires the contestant
to a will first to present a prima facie case showing three things: (1) the
testator and defendant were in a confidential relationship; (2) the testator
bequeathed the defendant a substantial portion of his or her estate; and (3)
the testator was of weakened intellect. In re Clark’s Estate, 334 A.2d 628,
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632 (Pa. 1975) (“Clark’s I”); Estate of Lakatosh, 656 A.2d 1378, 1383
(Pa.Super. 1995). Once the contestant has presented a prima facie case of
these elements, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the will provision was not the product of undue
influence. Clark’s I, 334 A.2d at 632; Lakatosh, 656 A.2d at 1383.
However, a challenge to a transfer made during an individual’s lifetime,
such as the transfers at issue here, is subject to a different standard. The
challenger need only establish, by clear and convincing evidence, a single
thing: that the donor and donee were in a confidential relationship. If the
challenger carries that burden, the burden then shifts to the donee to “prove
affirmatively that it is unaffected by any taint of undue influence, imposition,
or deception.” McCown v. Fraser, 192 A. 674, 676 (Pa. 1937).2 The donee
must carry this burden to disprove undue influence with clear and convincing
evidence. See In re Novosielski, 992 A.2d 89, 94 n.4 (Pa. 2010) (citing
Estate of Buriak v. Sperl, 492 A.2d 1166, 1168 (Pa.Super. 1985)).
A challenger to an inter vivos gift claiming undue influence bears no
burden of showing that the donor had a weakened intellect. Rather, an inter
vivos gift to one in a confidential relationship with the donee “will be
condemned, even in the absence of evidence of actual fraud, or of mental
____________________________________________
2 Accord Banko v. Malanecki, 451 A.2d 1008, 1010 (Pa. 1982); Hera v.
McCormick, 625 A.2d 682, 690 (Pa.Super. 1993); see also In r Clark’s
Estate, 359 A.2d 777, 781 (Pa. 1976) (“Clark’s II”) (stating burden shifts to
donee to “affirmatively show that the gift was the free, voluntary and
intelligent act of” the donor).
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incapacity on the part of the donor, unless there is full and satisfactory
proof that it was the free and intelligent act of the donor, fully explained to
him, and done with a knowledge of its consequences.” McCown, 192 A. at
676-77 (emphasis added); see also Burns v. Kabboul, 595 A.2d 1153,
1162-64, 1171 (Pa.Super. 1991) (deciding both types of claims under
different standards). The reason that a party contesting a will must prove the
testator suffered from weakened intellect in order to assert undue influence
claim is that “[a] testator’s interest in his property necessarily terminates at
death,” and therefore “the law does not view a testamentary disposition with
so suspicious an eye.” McCown, 192 A. at 677. In contrast, one challenging
an inter vivos gift need not establish weakened intellect because “it is opposed
to the common experience of mankind for one yet alive and able to enjoy his
property to divest himself of a substantial part of his estate voluntarily and
without consideration.” Id.
A confidential relationship exists where “the circumstances make it
certain the parties do not deal on equal terms, but, on the one side there is
an overmastering influence, or, on the other, weakness, dependence or trust,
justifiably reposed.” Owens, 847 A.2d at 709. “[I]t is marked by such a
disparity in position that the inferior party places complete trust in the superior
party’s advice and seeks no other counsel, so as to give rise to a potential
abuse of power.” Wisniski v. Brown & Brown Ins. Co. of PA, 906 A.2d
571, 577 (Pa.Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Certain types of relationships,
such those involving a power of attorney, are indicative, but not dispositive,
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of the existence of a confidential relationship, which is a question of fact. See
In re Estate of Smaling, 80 A.3d 485, 498-99 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc);
In re Estate of Fritts, 906 A.2d 601, 608-609 (Pa.Super. 2006).
In this case, the Orphans’ Court properly concluded that a “confidential
relationship” existed between Mother and Son at the time of the transfers at
issue. Mother moved in with Son when her husband was very ill. She had
depended on her husband entirely financially, having had not worked outside
the home. Further, Mother never drove a vehicle. Thus, Mother depended on
Son for housing, financial guidance, and for transportation. Furthermore,
Mother executed a POA in June 2018 naming Son as her agent. The record
thus amply supports the court’s finding that Mother and Son had a confidential
relationship. See Wisniski, 906 A.2d at 577; McCown, 192 A. at 676;
Smaling, 80 A.3d at 498-99; Fritts, 906 A.2d at 608-609.
Accordingly, under the inter vivos undue influence analysis, which was
properly applicable here, the burden fell on Son to demonstrate a lack of
undue influence. See McCown, 192 A. at 676-77; Clark’s II, 359 A.2d at
780. Son claims that his testimony regarding Mother’s alleged upset with her
daughters should have been sufficient to establish that Mother gifted a
significant portion of her assets to him in light of that upset, rather than due
to any undue influence on his part. Son also points to Bank Vice-President
James’ testimony, wherein she explained that she did not notice anything
amiss between Mother and Son while she assisted Mother in the redemption
of saving bonds.
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However, the court did not find that the testimony of either Son or
James credibly established that Son did not exert undue influence on Mother.
The court specifically found as facts that Mother suffered from a weakened
intellect due to the trauma she experienced by moving away from her
husband, who had always handled her finances, and away from her long-time
residence. See Orphans’ Ct. Memorandum Op., at 5; Orphans’ Ct. Rule
1925(a) Op., at 6.
The court thus found that the parties were in a confidential relationship
and rejected Son’s rebuttal evidence that the transactions were not the result
of undue influence. See Mem. Op. at 6-7. We discern no abuse of discretion.
See Owens, 847 A.2d at 706. In his reply brief, Son argues that if this Court
applies the inter vivos standard of analysis for undue influence, we should
then remand this matter to the Orphans’ Court to provide him with the
opportunity to meet his burden of proving that Mother’s transfers were not
the result of any undue influence. However, Son already had that opportunity.
Although the orphans’ court applied the testamentary standard, both that
standard and the inter vivos standard afford the party charged with exerting
undue influence the opportunity to prove that there was no undue influence,
by clear and convincing evidence. The orphans’ court here gave Son such a
chance but found that Son had failed to carry his burden. Hence, Son’s first
three issues warrant no relief.
We respectfully disagree with the Concurring and Dissenting
Memorandum that the evidence did not establish a confidential relationship at
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the time Mother signed the Loan Agreement because she had not yet signed
the POA. We are reviewing for an abuse of discretion and whether the parties
had a “confidential relationship” is fact-sensitive and subject to the trial court’s
weight and credibility determinations. Smaling, 80 A.3d at 498-99; Fritts,
906 A.2d at 608-609. While it is true that Mother signed the Loan Agreement
before she executed the POA, the POA is simply not dispositive of this issue,
but rather is just one piece of evidence that a court may use to find, as a
question of fact, that there was (or was not) a confidential relationship. In
point of fact, Mother executed the Loan Agreement only one day before the
POA and she moved into Son’s home only a short while later. The other events
at issue, which the Concurring and Dissenting Memorandum agrees were
subject to Son’s undue influence, occurred within approximately two months
of Mother’s execution of the Loan Agreement. What is more, the only
testimony Son offered to rebut the undue influence claim regarding the Loan
Agreement was his own self-serving testimony, which the trial court did not
credit. See Owens, 847 A.2d at 706. We do not think that, under these facts,
the court abused its discretion in concluding that the confidential relationship
did not spring to life when Mother executed the POA, but rather existed the
day before.
Turning to Son’s fourth issue, Son contends that the Orphans’ Court
erred by not allowing Bank Vice-President James to testify as an expert. He
argues the court should have permitted her to do so, given her training and
experience with the mental capacity of banking customers. In the alternative,
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Son maintains that the court erred by failing to delineate the portion of James’
testimony that constituted permissible opinion testimony. Son points to the
following exchange during the March 3, 2020 hearing:
[Son’s counsel] Do you recall how long it took to process all those
bonds that day?
[James] My best estimate would be an hour to an hour and a half.
[Son’s counsel] As a branch manager do you receive training in
assessing capacity, undue influence, duress, anything like that in
a transaction of this type?
[James] Yes. We would receive training yearly.
[Son’s counsel] If you detected that something was off in the
transaction, what would you do?
[James] We would end the transaction. I probably would have
separated [Mother] from [Son] and had a private conversation
with her on how she wanted to proceed.
[Son’s counsel] During this transaction is it safe to say that you
never had any indication, based on your training, that there was
a dynamic at play other than [Mother] acting on her own behalf?
[James] Yes. I did not detect anything going on.
[Mother’s counsel] Your Honor, I'm going to object because we're
getting into an area of expert [testimony], and I don't think that
the bank manager's an expert on capacity.
THE COURT: All right. I'll sustain the objection. This is one of the
recommendations by the Elder Law Task Force, by the way, that
the entire banking business participate in a meaningful way with
the detection of people who are being taken advantage of. And
the bank business industry – I guess bank industry business is the
way to go -- chose not to participate. They did not want to go
anywhere near this issue, but they did concede that individual
managers could talk to people they know and see if there's some
overt thing. But she can’t testify as an expert.
[Son’s counsel]: And I’m not asking –
THE COURT: I understand, but we’re drifting in and out.
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N.T., 3/3/2020, at 37-38.
“The law is well settled that decisions regarding admission of expert
testimony, like other evidentiary decisions, are within the sound discretion of
the trial court. We may reverse only if we find an abuse of discretion.” Renna
v. Schadt, 64 A.3d 658, 664 (Pa.Super. 2013) (citations omitted). “In
addition, [t]o constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling must not only
be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the complaining party.”
Jacobs v. Chatwani, 922 A.2d 950, 960 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provide that “[i]f a witness is not
testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one
that is (a) rationally based on a witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly
understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge...”
Pa.R.E. 701. Moreover, an expert’s testimony must be “based on more than
mere personal belief,” and “must be supported by reference to facts,
testimony or empirical data.” Snizavich v. Rohm & Haas, Company, 83
A.3d 191, 195 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
In the instant case, the Orphans’ Court concluded that Bank Vice-
President James was not qualified to offer expert testimony regarding Son’s
relationship with Mother, especially considering the single, limited interaction
James observed. Once again, we discern no abuse of discretion. See
Snizavich, 83 A.3d at 195; Renna, 64 A.3d at 664. Moreover, the court did
allow James to provide lay testimony regarding her personal observations and
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impressions of Mother. See Pa.R.E. 701. James explained that she did not
observe anything amiss between Mother and Son and therefore did not
preclude Mother from redeeming her bonds in favor of Son. Thus, even if the
court’s decision to preclude James from testifying as an expert was error, Son
was not prejudiced as James did testify regarding her observations and
impressions of the relationship between Mother and Son. See Jacobs, 922
A.2d at 960. Therefore, Son’s fourth issue also lacks merit.
Turning to Son’s final issue, he asserts that the Orphans’ Court erred by
failing to enforce a forum selection clause set forth in the Loan Agreement.
Son argues that the court erroneously failed to sustain his objection at trial
challenging the court’s jurisdiction to hear any matter regarding the Loan
Agreement given the document’s forum selection clause, which designated
Washington County as the proper venue. Son maintains that he did not raise
his objection to venue via preliminary objection because he believed that
Mother’s action only sounded in conversion and did not involve the Loan
Agreement specifically. However, the court concluded that Son waived his
objection to venue by failing to raise it prior to trial.
A court with jurisdiction, and in which venue is proper, should decline to
entertain a suit if the parties have freely agreed to conduct litigation in another
forum, so long as the agreement to do so is not unreasonable. Autochoice
Unlimited, Inc. v. Avangard Auto Fin., Inc., 9 A.3d 1207, 1215 (Pa.Super.
2010) (citation omitted). However, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
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state that “[i]mproper venue shall be raised by preliminary objection and if
not so raised shall be waived.” Pa.R.C.P. 1006(e).
In this case, the court properly found Son’s claim regarding improper
venue to be waived because Son failed to raise his contention in a preliminary
objection. See Pa.R.C.P. 1006(e). Moreover, Son’s claim that he did not
anticipate the Loan Agreement being at issue in this case prior to trial is belied
by the record. In his initial filing, Son presented argument regarding the Loan
Agreement and attached the document to his filing. See Son’s Answer and
New Matter, dated 9/13/19. Further, Son admits that Mother raised the
“legitimacy” of the Loan Agreement in a pretrial statement. See Son’s Br. at
45. Thus, contrary to the reasoning set forth in the dissent, we conclude that
Son had reason to know that the Loan Agreement was at issue in this case
and was thereby required to file a preliminary objection to alert the trial court
to any objection to venue prior to the start of trial. Pa.R.C.P. 1006(e). Hence,
we conclude that the court did not err by finding Son’s venue claim waived for
failure to raise it in a preliminary objection. In any event, son’s alleged
misunderstanding of Mother’s claim would not excuse waiver here. We affirm
the Orphans’ Court’s order.
Order affirmed.
Judge Nichols joins the memorandum.
Judge Bowes files a concurring/dissenting memorandum.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/29/2021
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