In the Int. of: L.L., Appeal of: C.R.

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.L., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: CAITLYN ROGOWSKI, :

MOTHER :

:

:

:

: No. 2320 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 3, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Juvenile Division at

No(s): 7 OCA 2020

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.L., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: RICHARD LAWSON, :

FATHER :

:

:

:

: No. 2321 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered November 3, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Juvenile Division at

No(s): 7 OCA 2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JULY 20, 2021

C.R. (“Mother”) and R.L. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”), appeal the

decree dated and entered on November 3, 2020, which granted the petition

filed by the Monroe County Children and Youth Services (hereinafter, “CYS”

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

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or the “Agency”) to involuntarily terminate their parental rights with respect

to their dependent, male child, L.L., (born in September of 2018) (“Child”),

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b), and changed the

permanency goal for Child to adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 6351.1 We affirm.

On February 11, 2020, CYS filed a termination of parental rights (“TPR”)

petition seeking the involuntary termination of Parents’ rights to Child. On

October 21, 2020, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the petition,

at which Attorney Elizabeth Weekes represented CYS.2 Parents were present,

along with their counsel, Attorney Ashley A. Messoline. Child’s guardian ad

litem (“GAL”)/legal interest counsel, Brandie J. Belanger, was also present on

____________________________________________

1 In the same decree, dated and entered on November 3, 2020, the trial court

involuntarily terminated both Parents’ parental rights to Child pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b), and changed the permanency goal

for Child to adoption. We dispose of both Parents’ separate appeals from the

decree terminating their parental rights and from the goal change order in a

single memorandum for ease of disposition, as the trial court entered only one

decree and filed an identical opinion in each case, essentially disposing of them

together. Notably, as the court changed Child’s goal in the termination decree

that Parents have appealed, not in a separate order, we find this matter

distinguishable from In the Interest of S.D., 2021 WL 2521629 (filed June

21, 2021), in that there was not a separate goal change order for Parents to

appeal, and they are not challenging the goal change in any event.

2 The trial court explained that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and [c]ourt

protocols, and the availability of counsel, the trial court continued the matter

to October 21, 2020. Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/20, at 1.

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behalf of Child.3 CYS presented the testimony of its caseworker, Jennifer

Payne, who is assigned to the family. N.T., 10/21/20, at 6. Mother then

testified on her own behalf, as did Father. Id. at 67, 86.

Based upon the testimonial and documentary evidence entered into the

record, the trial court made the following findings of fact regarding the period

preceding Child’s birth.

1. [L.L.], DOB [September 2018] and two (2) years of age, is the

minor child subject to the TPR petition.

2. [C.R.] (“Mother”), age 32, is the natural mother of the minor

child[,] and she resides in East Stroudsburg, Monroe County, PA.

3. [R.L.] (“Father”), age 37, is the natural father of the minor

child[,] and he resides with Mother in East Stroudsburg, Monroe

County, PA.

4. The initial involvement by CYS with Mother and Father occurred

in July 2015, when an older child, [P.], was born. That child was

born positive for opioids. Other concerns included Mother having

her parental rights terminated in New Jersey as to four (4) other

children (three (3) voluntarily and one (1) involuntarily), and

unstable housing.

5. Mother gave birth shortly thereafter to another child, [E.], and

the same concerns still existed. Both children were found

dependent, with continued placement in the home.

6. Both [P.] and [E.] went into foster care in November 2016 due

to [parental loss of housing]. The [P]arents then moved to New

Jersey, where an Interstate Compact [on the Placement of

____________________________________________

3 On February 14, 2020, the trial court appointed Attorney Belanger as Child’s

GAL/legal interest counsel. See Trial Court Order, 2/14/20.

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Children, (“ICPC”),] was denied due to unstable housing and

Father being incarcerated for a period of time.

7. Mother and Father had no contact with [P.] and [E.] from

November 2016 until July 2018[,] when [Parents] returned to

Pennsylvania.

8. Visit coaching with Justice Works was then put in place.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/20, at 1-2.

Based upon the testimonial and documentary evidence entered into the

record, the trial court made the following findings regarding the facts which

lead CYS to file a dependency petition regarding Child.

9. On September [ ], 2018, [Child] was born positive for

Suboxone, which Mother was reportedly taking. It was later

revealed that Mother had been receiving Suboxone treatment

since at least July 2015[,] when CYS first became involved with

the family.

10. The minor child then went through withdrawal and had to be

placed in the NICU [Neo-Natal Intensive Care Unit] at the hospital.

11. EPC [Emergency Protective Custody] was taken and shelter

care was granted on October 2, 2018[,][ ] due to housing, the

minor child’s withdrawal symptoms, and no progress on the

[P]arents’ goals for the two older children.

12. As of October 2018, Mother and Father were living in a one[-

]room rental at the Paramount Motel in East Stroudsburg, PA.

13. At that time, Father was refusing drug screens and Mother

refused to sign releases of information for CYS.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/20, at 2-3 (footnote omitted).

Based upon the testimonial and documentary evidence in the record,

the trial court made the following findings regarding Child’s dependency.

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14. Dependency of the minor child was granted by [the trial court

on October 11, 2018,4] shortly after shelter care, and placement

was ordered to be with the [P]arents after the minor child was

released from the NICU, provided drug and alcohol screens were

given, no smoking in the home, and that the [P]arents sign

releases for CYS. [See N.T., 10/21/20, at 14]. The [c]ourt also

found aggravated circumstances existed due to Mother’s TPR of

her older children in New Jersey.

15. Mother again refused to sign releases[,] and both Mother and

Father refused drug and alcohol screens, which resulted in the

minor child going from the NICU to a foster home, instead of home

with the [P]arents.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/20, at 3.

The trial court made the following findings of fact regarding the period

extending from Child’s adjudication of dependency until CYS filed the TPR

petition in this case.

16. Despite Mother not signing releases or providing medical

records, CYS was able to confirm that Mother was treating with a

doctor for opioid dependency and that Mother had been taking

Suboxone for four years at that point. CYS was concerned

because Mother would not admit that her Suboxone use was for

an opioid dependency and she would not provide information on

her treatment.

17. A TPR petition was filed as to the older children [P.] and [E.],

and[,] on January 23, 2019, the parental rights of Mother and

Father as to those children were terminated. (See 54 and 55 OCA

____________________________________________

4 The notes of testimony from the hearing on October 21, 2020 appear to have

a typographical error, as it states that Child was adjudicated as dependent on

October 21, 2019, but the trial court states in its opinion that the court

adjudicated Child dependent on October 11, 2018, which appears to be the

correct date based on the record. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/20, at 17;

cf. N.T., 10/21/20, at 14.

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2018). The TPRs were upheld by the Superior Court by order

entered on November 11, 2019 at No. 634 E.D.A. 2019, which

became final thereafter. The older children were then adopted by

their foster parents on October 20, 2020.

18. Father became verbally abusive with the CYS caseworker after

entry of the TPR on the two older children, including incidents

where he called her a kidnapper, was loud and angry, and

slammed a door in her face.

19. Mother and Father continued visits with the minor child at CYS,

and then again at Justice Works when visits were moved there in

the summer of 2019.

20. The concerns at that time were still housing, Mother’s

continued use of Suboxone with a prior opioid addiction, lack of

consistent drug screens from Father, [P]arents’ excessive

smoking[,] and the abusive language and anger of Father toward

CYS caseworkers.

21. Following a review hearing in 2019, Father made threats of

punching the caseworker.

22. During the visits at Justice Works, the [P]arents smelled of

cigarette smoke and took excessive smoking breaks. Father also

brought a knife to one of the visits.

23. In the fall of 2019, Mother and Father moved to a two[-

]bedroom apartment [in] East Stroudsburg, PA[,] where they

continue to reside to the present time. The apartment is on the

same property with a motel located thereon.

24. In January 2020, the caseworker again discussed with Mother

about having a mental health evaluation done. Mother has never

provided one or supplied records on her mental health. Also at

that time, Father stated he was working at a restaurant in

Tannersville, PA, but provided no proof of employment.

25. Mother has been giving drug screens to Justice Works at visits

and has remained positive for Suboxone.

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26. A home visit was conducted on January 16, 2020. It had to

be scheduled at a [c]ourt hearing due to the [P]arents’ refusal to

respond to the caseworker’s earlier requests to see the home. The

[P]arents still have not provided a lease for the residence despite

numerous requests to do so.

27. The home was appropriate, [sic] but smelled heavily of

cigarette use. It is also noted that the [P]arents had an

overwhelming smell of cigarette smoke on them in [c]ourt at the

hearing held on October 21, 2020.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/20, at 3-5 (footnote omitted).

The trial court made the following findings of fact regarding the Parents’

conduct during the period following CYS’s filing of the TPR petition on February

11, 2020.

28. Mother and Father have submitted no proof of employment

nor any paystubs despite numerous requests by CYS. Both

parents were unemployed at the time of the hearing in this matter,

[sic] but claim to receive about $450 per week in unemployment

benefits. Their rent is $400 per week. Mother says she gets some

financial help from her stepfather.

29. The [P]arents do not have reliable transportation[,] as their

car broke down. As a result, they have been having virtual visits

with the minor child since August 2020 by Zoom. The [P]arents

claim they will be getting the car fixed with the help of [Child’s

paternal grandfather].

30. Father has remained verbally abusive toward CYS by making

comments and swearing in the background of the Zoom visits.

31. Mother has not provided any drug and alcohol records other

than confirmation she has been taking Suboxone. Mother claims

she had a drug and alcohol evaluation through Catholic Social

Services, but CYS did not have a record of it.

32. Mother does not appear to have engaged in any drug and

alcohol counseling other than continuing to take Suboxone.

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Mother stated she is trying to reduce the amount of Suboxone she

takes daily in an attempt to no longer use it. Mother denies any

impairment from the use of the Suboxone.

33. Mother claims she suffers from anxiety and that she had a

mental health evaluation done. However, she could not

remember the name of the doctor and she has not provided any

information about it to CYS.

34. Mother stated she completed parenting classes in the past,

but Father did not due to his incarceration in New Jersey.

35. Mother has had eight (8) total children, of which six (6) have

had parental rights terminated, (1) is deceased and the other is

the minor child in this case.

36. The [P]arents’ unemployment benefits will run out in

December 2020, and Mother admitted they have not really looked

for employment due to the COVID-19 pandemic, as she believes

no one is hiring.

37. Father stated that he refuses drug screens because he

believes there was a false positive for alcohol in a past screen.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/20, at 5-6.

The trial court made the following findings of fact regarding Child’s

relationship with the Parents.

38. The visits with the minor child show a good parent/child

relationship. The [P]arents have also brought snacks and toys to

the visits for the minor child.

39. The [P]arents have a bond with the minor child as his parents.

40. The minor child lives in the same foster home with his two

siblings, [P.] and [E.].

41. The minor child has as strong bond with his siblings and with

the foster parents.

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42. The foster parents want to adopt the minor child and have

already adopted his two older siblings.

43. The minor child’s attorney agrees with the request for TPR.

44. CYS is also seeking a goal change to adoption.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/20, at 6-7 (footnote in original).

In a decree dated and entered on November 3, 2020, the trial court

terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Child, pursuant to 23

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b), and changed Child’s permanency goal

to adoption, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351. On December 1, 2020, Mother

and Father each timely filed a notice of appeal, along with a concise statement

of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and

(b).

In their briefs on appeal, Mother and Father raise one identical issue:

1. Whether the court erred in finding that [CYS] proved the

elements of 23 Pa.C.S.A. section 2511(a)(2), (5) and (8) and 23

Pa.C.S.A. section 2511 (b) through clear and convincing evidence.

Mother’s Brief at 4; Father’s Brief at 4.5

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5 Mother and Father waived any challenge to the goal change by their failure

to preserve the challenge in their concise statements and statements of

questions involved on appeal. See Krebs v. United Refining Company of

Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that any issue

not set forth in or suggested by an appellate brief’s statement of questions

involved is deemed waived). See also In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa.

Super. 2011); In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017).

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Mother and Father argue that CYS failed to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that it satisfied the statutory grounds for termination

under Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5) and (8), and (b). Mother and Father

contend that the evidence was insufficient to support a decision to terminate

their parental rights, and that the trial court failed to properly consider that

they had remedied the original reasons for Child’s placement in foster care.

They also assert that the evidence was insufficient for the trial court to

conclude that termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of

Child. Accordingly, they urge that the trial court committed an error of law

and abuse of its discretion. Mother’s Brief at 8; Father’s Brief at 8.

In reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we

adhere to the following standard:

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d

1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported,

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an

error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [614 Pa. 275,

284,] 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has

been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely

because the reviewing court might have reached a different

conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors

America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371[, 455], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011);

Christianson v. Ely, [575 Pa. 647, 654-655], 838 A.2d 630, 634

(Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.

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As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying an

abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We

observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during the

relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at

28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could

support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the record

and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of

law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of Atencio, [539

Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 325-26, 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (2012).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

Moreover, we have explained, “[t]he standard of clear and convincing

evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id., quoting In re J.L.C.,

837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).

This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination

of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a). See

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In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). We will

address section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following

grounds:

***

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary

for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot

or will not be remedied by the parent.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party

must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following elements:

(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without essential

parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-

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being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot

or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272

(Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental rights under

section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, are

not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those grounds may

include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re

A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).

This Court has stated that the focus in terminating parental rights under

section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child pursuant to section

2511(b). See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super.

2008) (en banc).

Regarding section 2511(a)(2), Mother and Father argue:

Of significant importance in the instant case, [sic] is that none of

the conditions that led to placement continued to exist at the time

of filing for termination, and there is in no way a refusal or

incapacity by the [P]arents to perform parental duties. The

caseworker gave a vague answer when identifying the initial

concerns saying, “two other children being in foster care. . . and

[Parents’] current living arrangements at that time.” N.T.

10/21/2020 at 11. Despite these concerns, however, the minor

child did return home with [P]arents.

The caseworker then harped on the fact that [M]other did not

provide her medical records to the Agency. However, [M]other

did in fact provide records in a sense, and the Agency admits to

having received a letter, email, and phone call from [M]other’s

treating physician. The caseworker testified that this

correspondence documented that natural mother was under the

care of a physician, had a valid prescription for suboxone,

[M]other was compliant with treatment, and that her drug screens

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for her treating physician were always fine. Id[.] at 15. The

caseworker admitted she had no reason to question the

prescribing doctor or that [M]other was compliant with treatment

saying, “I do trust what he’s saying in the letter, yes.” Id[.] at

40. The caseworker further admitted that she was in no way a

medical professional qualified to decipher medical records. Yet

she still insisted on reading medical records of natural mother in

an attempt to somehow insert her lay opinion about [M]other’s

[S]uboxone use.

Also of importance in relation to the Agency’s concerns about drug

use are [M]other’s screens for the Agency as well as the drug and

alcohol evaluation from Catholic Social Services that confirmed no

treatment was necessary. Except for a couple positive screens for

marijuana in 2019, [M]other tested clean throughout 2020 and

provided consistent screens up until the time of the visits being

moved to [Z]oom. Id[.] at 43. Mother was never asked to

participate in any type of counseling for drug and alcohol and

never tested positive for an illegal opioid over almost two years of

testing. The caseworker not being able to read medical records

she isn’t qualified to decipher does not rise to the level of a

legitimate concern of an opioid addiction interfering with

[M]other’s ability to care for her son. If caseworkers are allowed

to substitute their opinions for professionals trained to address

drug and alcohol concerns, there’s no use in requiring parents to

engage in services in the first place.

Another concern identified by the Agency was the [P]arents’

housing. However, the caseworker testified that [P]arents

obtained a two-bedroom apartment that was appropriate for the

child. Even when the [P]arents resided in a hotel, the caseworker

noted that it was still acceptable and appropriate for the child.

Although the [P]arents were not currently working at the time of

the hearing, they had taken appropriate steps to maintain their

apartment like many other Americans by filing for unemployment

and seeking employment to the best of their ability during the

pandemic.

Finally, the [P]arents in this case in no way showed a refusal or

incapacity to parent as required under section 2511(a)(2). The

[P]arents actively participated in visitation, and visitation was

appropriate and positive. The [P]arents provided items for the

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child including meals and toys, and also maintained items for the

child within their home. They also demonstrated that reasons for

placement were in fact remedied as discussed at length above.

Natural mother’s testimony was credible and convincing and

established that the [P]arents did address the Agency’s concerns

and reasons for placement to the best of their ability. The

caseworker’s testimony was vague and often times contradictory

in regards to the drug and alcohol concerns and evaluation.

Although there is no dispute that the first prong under 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(5) and (8) is met, the Agency did not

establish by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that

led to placement still exist[,] nor did it prove by clear and

convincing evidence that any prongs under [§] 2511(a)(2) have

been met. The record and testimony are not enough to support

the [t]rial [c]ourt’s decision.

Mother’s Brief, at 11-13; Father’s Brief, at 11-13.

The trial court addressed the Parents’ issue regarding 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(a)(2), as follows:

[]The minor child has been in care since he was born over two

years ago[.]

We [ ] find that CYS has provided clear and convincing evidence

for granting the requested TPR. In this case, the minor child has

been removed from the [P]arents’ care more than one (1) year.

The minor child has resided in the same foster home for his entire

two[-]year lifetime. The conditions that led to removal continue

to exist, in that the [P]arents have no employment [and] they lack

transportation. Mother continues to take Suboxone without

providing a current drug and alcohol evaluation or proof of a

mental health evaluation, Mother has not released her medical

records or signed a release, Father refuses to give drug screens

and has not completed parenting classes, and questions remain

as to the stability of the [P]arents.

The [P]arents claim they have or will have transportation, but

their vehicle has not worked in over three months. Due to this,

visits have been by video, since they cannot get to Justice Works

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to see the minor child. The [P]arents claim it will be fixed soon.

But, [sic] their only income is unemployment benefits of $450.00

per week and their rent alone is $400.00 per week. The [P]arents

claim the minor child’s paternal grandfather will pay to have the

vehicle fixed, [sic] but offer no proof of that or why it was not

done sooner. It is unknown when the [P]arents will have

transportation again.

The [P]arents claim to be able to support themselves and the

minor child; however, they provide no proof of employment.

Father claims he has had all “cash” jobs in the restaurant

business, which ended due to COVID-19. Assuming the [P]arents

receive unemployment benefits as they stated, the weekly amount

barely covers their rent with only a few hundred dollars per month

left over for food, clothes, utilities, and transportation. They

clearly smoke a lot of cigarettes, which can be expensive. Their

unemployment benefits run out in December 2020 and neither

parent has actively sought out work, which they claim generally is

due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Mother claims her stepfather

helps them with expenses, but she provided no proof of that, or

even how much. It simply does not appear that the [P]arents can

support themselves, let alone the minor child. This situation is

concerning when considering the history of this case and that of

the [P]arents’ older children.

The [P]arents now live in a suitable residence[;] however, they

provided no proof of a lease to confirm stability at that address.

Housing was a primary concern when the minor child came into

care. The lack of employment and high cost of this residence

($400.00 per week) causes questions about the ability of the

parents to maintain it. The residence is also on the same property

as a motel, which raises separate concerns about a transient

population. The location of the residence also makes it difficult, if

not impossible, for the [P]arents to attend visits because they do

not have an operable vehicle.

Mother’s prior drug use and her continued use of Suboxone was a

concern when the minor child first went into care. Mother had

been on Suboxone for several years at that point, two other

children were born previously with opioid withdrawal, and the

minor child suffered from withdrawal after birth due to Mother’s

continued Suboxone use. That use continues to the present time.

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The concern is not that the Suboxone impairs Mother, rather it is

her continued choice of this treatment for an opioid addiction

without actually addressing her dependence on drugs. Mother

refuses to sign a release for CYS to get her medical records to

assess her prior drug and alcohol treatment. She has not provided

proof of a recent drug and alcohol evaluation and does not appear

to have received any drug and alcohol treatment. The continued

use of Suboxone for over five years is like a “crutch” for treating

Mother’s opioid addiction, rather than treating the cause and

ending an addiction. Counseling and tapering off of the Suboxone

is what CYS was looking for; otherwise, there is a concern that a

missed dose, or some other circumstance, could lead to a relapse

of opioid use. Mother says she can take one less pill each day

when she needs to do so. However, she misses the point of the

CYS goal[,] which is to eliminate her dependence on something in

order to lessen her chance of a relapse.

Mother has also failed to obtain and provide a mental health

evaluation to CYS for her noted anxiety issues. Mother has

continuously refused to provide CYS with her medical records or

sign a release for records. This dates back to this [c]ourt requiring

her to do so in order to have the minor child placed in the home

following the initial dependency hearing. Mother refused to follow

that court order and the minor child was placed in foster care as

a result. Despite that fact, Mother has still failed and refused to

provide her medical records, or a release for those records.

Mother claims she had a mental health evaluation done at some

point, but she cannot remember the provider, when she did it, or

what the recommendation was from it. Based upon that, we doubt

Mother had an evaluation done and do not find her credible in that

regard. Her failure to provide her medical records, or to sign a

release, or to engage in a mental health evaluation is troubling at

this point.

Father has not completed parenting classes, refuses to give drug

and alcohol screens, and has failed to provide proof of

employment despite various requests [by CYS throughout this

case] to do so. His reason for failing to complete parenting classes

was that he was incarcerated with only a week of classes left.

However, that was several years ago, before the minor child was

even born, and Father [has] done nothing since. He refuses to

give drug screens because he believes CYS recorded a false

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positive in the past. However, he presented no proof of that, has

been offered to give them at Justice Works instead, and he has

not done them there or through any other third party of his

choosing.

Father has never produced proof of employment. He claims he

has always received cash payment for work, but other than

supplying the name of the [] restaurant where he recently worked,

Father provided no details for CYS to be able to confirm prior

employment. Father is currently unemployed, which is somewhat

understandable during the current global pandemic, but his

unemployment runs out in less than two (2) months and he has

not offered any plan. It is also concerning that Father has blamed

the TPR of his older children on the CYS caseworker, and that he

has remained belligerent and threatening to CYS caseworkers,

both in person with them, and during video visits throughout the

dependency of the minor child. Father clearly has either mental

health or anger management issues which need to

be addressed.

[U]nder Section 2511(a)(2), parents are required to make diligent

efforts toward reasonably prompt assumption of full parental

responsibility. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326 (Pa. Super. 2002). In

two years, the parents have not remedied these conditions, other

than moving to a two[-]bedroom apartment. It also does not

seem likely that the parents will remedy the conditions in a

reasonable period of time. Mother continues to use Suboxone,

she will not provide medical records, she has not provided proof

of a drug and alcohol evaluation or mental health evaluation, and

she refuses to sign a release of information. Mother and Father

remain unemployed[,] and benefits run out soon. Their income

does not cover expenses and they have no transportation. Father

refuses to engage and complete parenting classes and refuses to

give drug and alcohol screens. The behavior of the [P]arents in

the past and their current testimony did nothing to reassure the

[c]ourt they will complete any of these things in the near future.

As such, the conditions that led to removal mostly still exist two

years later with no assurance it will be addressed in a reasonable

amount of time.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/20, at 11-16.

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After a careful review, we find that the trial court’s determination that

CYS satisfied the requirements of section 2511(a)(2) is supported by

competent, clear and convincing evidence in the record. In re Adoption of

S.P., 616 Pa. at 325-26, 47 A.3d at 826-27; In re: T.S.M., 620 Pa. at

628-629, 71 A.3d at 267. We adopt the discussion set forth in the trial court

opinion. There was sufficient evidence in the record from which the trial court

could have properly found that the Parents display parental incapacities that

have caused Child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence

necessary for his physical or mental well-being, as they lack stability, and that

they cannot or will not remedy the causes of their incapacities, the conditions

that led to Child’s placement. The evidence showed that the same conditions

that existed at Child’s birth existed at the time that their parental rights were

terminated with regard to Child’s two older siblings, P. and E., and continued

to exist at the time of the TPR hearing as to Child.

Regarding section 2511(b), Mother and Father argue that the trial court

erred in finding that CYS proved that termination was in Child’s best interest,

citing In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007). The Parents argue

that they had regular visits with Child throughout the life of the case, and that

Child shares a good bond with them, refers to them as his mom and dad, and

runs to them in excitement when seeing them at visits. Mother’s Brief at 14,

and Father’s Brief at 14, citing N.T. 10/21/2020 at 49, 53, and 76-78. The

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Parents also assert that the Justice Works notes CYS presented as CYS Exhibit

7 support the conclusion that Child had positive visits with them, and that

Child’s pre-adoptive foster parents did not note any concerns with the visits

between the Parents and Child when they facilitated the visits via Zoom.

Mother’s Brief at 14; Father’s Brief at 14. The Parents urge:

While [C]hild is placed with his siblings in his foster home,

there was no testimony or evidence to suggest that severing the

bond of the [C]hild and [P]arents would not be more detrimental

than beneficial to the child. [Child] and [P]arents clearly love each

other and [P]arents are in a position to care for their son.

Mother’s Brief at 15; Father’s Brief at 15.

In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section

2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows.

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love,

comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791

(Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [533 Pa. 115, 121, 620 A.2d

481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that the determination of

the child’s “needs and welfare” requires consideration of the

emotional bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost

attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of

permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at

791.

In re: T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628-629, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as

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well. Additionally, section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal

citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation and

make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some instances . . . where

direct observation of the interaction between the parent and the child is not

necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d

753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).

A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this analysis:

concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply

because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only

dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the

dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be

reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who,

after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through

the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent . . . Nor

are we of the opinion that the biological connection between [the

parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when

considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to

establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological

aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the

development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional

health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety needs

of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 763 (affirming involuntary

termination of parental rights, despite existence of some bond, where

placement with mother would be contrary to child’s best interests). “[A]

parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child

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is converted, upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s

right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a

permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856

(Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted).

This Court has explained that a parent’s own feelings of love and

affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights. In

re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. It is well-settled that “we will not toll the well-being

and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956

A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008)

(noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a

parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.”)).

The trial court discussed Parents’ argument concerning section 2511(b)

as follows:

Finally, an analysis of the minor child’s needs and welfare . . .,

as well as developmental, emotional and physical needs of the

minor child under Section 2511(b), weighs in favor of terminating

parental rights. The minor child is now two years old and has

been in foster care all of his life. He needs stability and

permanency. The minor child should not have to wait a long time

to see if the [P]arents can address goals of the family service plan

and concerns that still exist. The [P]arents still do not have

stability, as the same concerns and problems exist today as they

did at the minor child’s birth, and at the TPR of the two older

children. In contrast, the foster home is providing a stable home

with no concerns.

The foster family wants to adopt the minor child as they have with

the two older children. The minor child is bonded with the foster

parents, and with his siblings. Those siblings are now a

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permanent part of the minor child’s foster family. By granting the

TPR, the minor child would remain with his siblings and his foster

family permanently. This is of greater importance than if the

minor child were simply with a different family and had no siblings.

Furthermore, his young age, and need for continuity and

recognition of parental providers is extremely important. To

remove him at some point in the future to live with his parents,

when that time is uncertain, would be very difficult for the minor

child. He would also lose that connection, bond and comfort that

he has with his siblings and foster family. He has only ever known

a home with his foster parents and his siblings. As such, it is

important that the minor child continue living in the foster home

with his siblings.

The [P]arents do have a bond with the minor child. They have

stayed connected with the minor child and attend visits regularly.

The [P]arents are appropriate with the minor child and play with

him at visits. The CYS caseworker has observed this as well. The

[P]arents do appear to love the minor child and sincerely want to

be a part of his life. However, a great deal of time has passed,

and the [P]arents still have not addressed concerns, even with the

ability to do so. The uncertainty of their income, employment,

housing expenses, transportation, drug and alcohol issues and

mental health have not been resolved[,] and it appears will not be

resolved in a reasonable period of time based upon the [P]arents’

actions. The minor child should not have to wait indefinitely for

the [P]arents to address these issues. The minor child’s

placement with the foster family and his siblings weighs most

heavily in favor of granting TPR. It has been shown that the

welfare and needs, as well as the developmental, emotional and

physical needs of the minor child will be best served by granting

a termination. For all of these reasons, under Section 2511(a)(2),

(a)(5), (a)(8) and (b), we will grant the petition of CYS.

***

[ ] Termination of parental rights of the mother and father would

best serve the needs and welfare of [Child], and the statutory

criteria set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. 2511(a)(2) and (b) for such

termination has been established by clear and convincing

evidence.

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Trial Court Opinion, 11/3/20, at 16-17.

After a careful review, we find that the trial court’s determination that

CYS satisfied the requirements of section 2511(b) is supported by competent

evidence in the record. In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 325-26, 47 A.3d

at 826-27; In re: T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628-629, 71 A.3d at 267. We adopt the

discussion set forth in the trial court opinion. The trial court gave proper

consideration to Child’s placement with his two older siblings, P. and E., in a

pre-adoptive family who had adopted P. and E., and Child’s connection and a

bond with his siblings and foster family, which have provided him with

permanence. While the Child may be bonded with the Parents, Child is also

bonded with his foster parents, who have been constant and provided stability

for Child in his young life. The trial court found that the Parents’ bond with

Child is not more significant than the fact that they have had a parental

incapacity, and an inability or unwillingness to remedy their instability and

incapacity to provide proper parenting for Child. We agree that the

termination of the Parents’ parental rights to Child, and his adoption by the

same foster parents who adopted his siblings, P. and E., best serves his

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.

As we have determined that there was clear and convincing evidence to

support the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Child

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b), we find that the trial court did

not commit an error of law or an abuse of discretion in terminating their

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parental rights to the Child. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court decree.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/20/2021

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