In the Int. of: A.M.L.M., Appeal of: E.M.

J-A13012-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.L.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: E.M., FATHER :

:

:

:

: No. 92 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered December 23, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000766-2019

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: E.M., FATHER :

:

:

:

: No. 93 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered December 23, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000466-2018

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 29, 2021

E.M. (“Father”) appeals from the orders entered on December 23, 2020,

which granted the petitions filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human

Services (“DHS”), to involuntarily terminate his parental rights to minor

daughter, A.M.L.M. a/k/a A.M. (“Child”) (born in October of 2013), pursuant

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

J-A13012-21

to sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.

§§ 2101-2938, and to change the permanency goal for Child from reunification

with Father to adoption.1, 2 After careful review, we affirm.

We glean the following facts and procedural history from the record.

DHS became involved with this family on March 4, 2018, after receiving notice

that Mother had given birth to Child’s younger sibling, S.M., and that S.M. had

tested positive for heroin at birth. Father and Mother were not in a relationship

or residing together at the time, as Mother was residing with the father of S.M.

On March 5, 2018, DHS obtained an order of protective custody and placed

Child with her maternal grandmother (“MGM”). On March 16, 2018, Child was

adjudicated dependent. Father’s whereabouts were unknown at the time;

thus, a parent locator search was ordered by the court. Additionally, the court

ordered that, once Father was found, he must forthwith submit to drug

screens, random urine screens, a dual diagnosis assessment, and relevant

programs at the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”). Father was granted

supervised visits with Child.

After the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) case-management team

reported that it had been unsuccessful in locating Father, and Father failed to

____________________________________________

1 By per curiam order entered on March 8, 2021, this Court consolidated the

appeals at Nos. 92 and 93 EDA 2021, sua sponte, as the appeals involve

related parties and issues.

2 Mother signed a petition to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights to Child

on September 26, 2019. Said petition was confirmed by the court on

December 23, 2020. Mother is not a party to this appeal.

-2-

J-A13012-21

appear at the first three permanency review hearings held on June 11, 2018,

September 10, 2018, and December 7, 2018, the court further ordered Father

to sign releases and to provide employment verification, in addition to his

previously stated goals. At the next hearing, on March 5, 2019, Father was

in attendance. He was reported to be in substantial compliance with his

reunification goals at that time. Again, drug screens, supervised visitation,

and re-referral for appropriate ARC services were ordered, in addition to an

assessment of Father’s home and the option to modify visits between Father

and Child prior to the next court date. Father was also in attendance at the

review hearing on May 28, 2019, at which the court directed all prior orders

were to stand.

Another review hearing was held on August 23, 2019, but Father did not

attend. The court took notice of the urine screens submitted by Father since

the last court date, which were all negative. The court further noted that

Father was in moderate compliance with his goals, and it ordered that Father

could have unsupervised visits with Child should he become fully compliant.

On October 15, 2019, DHS filed petitions for the involuntary termination of

Father’s parental rights and to change Child’s permanency goal from

reunification to adoption. Due to COVID-19 restrictions, the hearing on these

petitions was not held until December 23, 2020.

In the meantime, another permanency review hearing was conducted

on November 15, 2019, at which Father was deemed to be in moderate

compliance with his goals. The court expanded Father’s visits with Child to

-3-

J-A13012-21

liberal, unsupervised visits in the community. In addition, the court ordered

an assessment of Father’s residence, where he resided with his mother

(Child’s paternal grandmother), as well as appropriate clearances. The court

further ordered Father to provide a work schedule to the case-manager and

to obtain a notarized letter from his mother indicating that she permitted

Father and Child to reside in her home. At the next review hearing, on

September 9, 2020, Father was deemed to be in minimal compliance of his

goals. A January 23, 2020 urine screen was reported as negative to the court.

The court directed CUA to supervise visits once per month, ordered Father to

provide additional drug screens, and scheduled a review hearing for November

5, 2020. On November 5, 2020, the trial court granted Father’s request for a

continuance.

At a joint termination and goal change hearing on December 23, 2020,

the court heard testimony virtually from DHS’s witnesses, Naima Barnett, the

assigned CUA case manager from Turning Points for Children, and Desiree

Hodge, the permanency specialist assigned to the case, also from Turning

Points. Attorney Daniel Kurland represented Child’s legal interest and stated

on the record that Child informed him she wished to remain in her current

placement with MGM. Finally, Father testified on his own behalf. Following

the testimony, submission of exhibits, and argument by counsel, the trial court

granted the petitions and entered orders terminating Father’s parental rights

and changing Child’s goal to adoption.

-4-

J-A13012-21

On January 4, 2021, Father filed timely notices of appeal. Herein, he

presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it

determined that there was sufficient evidence exhibited to rise

to the level of clear and convincing to support the finding that

there was an insufficient father-child bond and that changing

the goal to adoption would not cause irreparable harm to …

[C]hild[,] despite the evidence that there was a strong bond

between [F]ather and [C]hild and the only evidence in support

[of the finding] that it was [not] a parent-child bond was that

Father was not the one to be providing for her daily needs[?]

2. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it

determined that there was sufficient evidence exhibited to rise

to the level of clear and convincing to support the finding that

… [C]hild could not safely be reunified with … [F]ather[,]

presently or in the near future, with or without assistance to

remedy any dependent issues that may (or may not) exist

despite testimony that Father’s home was appropriate and

there were no specifically articulable safety concerns

preventing reunification[?]

3. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it

determined that there was sufficient evidence exhibited to rise

to the level of clear and convincing to support the finding that

… [C]hild’s current placement is the least restrictive placement

that meets the needs of … [C]hild and there is no less

restrictive alternative available, in light of the fact that

[F]ather’s own residence would meet those needs[?]

4. Whether under the Juvenile Act,[3] 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 6351, and 55

Pa.Code § 3130.74, in accordance with the provisions of the

Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 U.S.C. § 671 et

seq., the goal change to adoption was the disposition best

suited to the safety, protection, and physical, mental, and

moral welfare of … [C]hild, despite the strong bond between

Father and [C]hild and the ever-growing relationship between

… [C]hild and her half-brother in [F]ather’s custody[?]

____________________________________________

3 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301- 6375.

-5-

J-A13012-21

5. Whether the trial court made reversible error in its

determination that [the] presented evidence satisfied the clear

and convincing standard to support termination of parental

rights insofar as, pursuant to:

a. 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1), Father maintained his visitation

and interaction with … [C]hild and efforts towards his goals,

[and] evidenced to the trial court a settled purpose to

maintain and foster an ongoing relationship with … [C]hild;

b. 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(2), no evidence presented

suggested that Father could not or would not remedy any

and all causes for … [C]hild’s placement;

c. 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(5), … [C]hild was not removed from

Father’s care, but that of … Mother’s; and

d. 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(8), … [C]hild was not removed from

Father’s care, but that of … Mother’s.

6. Whether the trial court erred in finding that there was not a

sufficient father-child bond and that … [C]hild would suffer no

irreparable harm upon termination of [F]ather’s parental rights

pursuant to the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(b)[?]

Father’s Brief at 4-5.4

First, we address Father’s issues 5 and 6, concerning the trial court’s

involuntary termination of his parental rights. In doing so, we are mindful of

the following:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental

rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the

trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse

of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support

for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial

court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental

rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision the

same deference that we would give to a jury verdict. We must

employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to

____________________________________________

4 We address Father’s issues out of order for ease of disposition.

-6-

J-A13012-21

determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported by

competent evidence.

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879

A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Moreover, we have explained that:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts

in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). If

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if

the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B.,

835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003).

We are also mindful that termination of parental rights is governed by

section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Our case law has made clear that under [s]ection 2511, the court

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds

for termination delineated in [s]ection 2511(a). Only if the court

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of

the analysis pursuant to [s]ection 2511(b): determination of the

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child

of permanently severing any such bond.

-7-

J-A13012-21

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511,

other citations omitted). The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of

parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276.

With regard to section 2511(b), we direct our analysis to the facts

relating to that section. This Court has explained that:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we

instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect

on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in

cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S.,

946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent

of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the

circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Instantly, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to

sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with the trial

court as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), as well as section 2511(b),

in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en

banc). Herein, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under section

2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows:

-8-

J-A13012-21

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the

following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at

least six months immediately preceding the filing of

the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused

or failed to perform parental duties.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1).

To satisfy [s]ection 2511(a)(1), the moving party must produce

clear and convincing evidence of conduct sustained for at least the

six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which

reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a

refusal or failure to perform parental duties.

In re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 461 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quoting Matter of

Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)). In C.M.S.,

we further acknowledged the following statement by our Supreme Court:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child

needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs,

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive

-9-

J-A13012-21

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this [C]ourt has

held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires

affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a

genuine effort to maintain communication and association with

the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty

requires that a parent ‘exert himself to take and maintain a place

of importance in the child’s life[.’]

C.M.S., 832 A.2d at 462 (quoting In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa.

1977)).

Instantly, Father claims the trial court erred in terminating his parental

rights under section 2511(a)(1). He argues that the evidence presented at

trial demonstrated he had completed many of his goals, continued to regularly

visit and engage with Child, and actively sought reunification with her in his

residence. Father’s Brief at 15. More specifically, Father asserts that he was

deemed moderately complaint with his objectives during the six months prior

to the filing of DHS’s petition, and he points to his completion of a drug and

alcohol program in July of 2019. Id. at 20. He avers that once he became

aware of Child’s involvement with DHS and made contact with CUA, he never

stopped engaging with Child. Id. While Father acknowledges that he had

“continued communication breakdowns” with CUA, he states that there is no

evidence to suggest a settled purpose to relinquish his parental rights. Id.

Additionally, Father argues that DHS was unsuccessful in establishing that he

failed to perform his parental duties during the period of time in question, as

he claims that he maintained contact with Child and “even purchased a phone

- 10 -

J-A13012-21

for her[.]” Id. at 20-21. Father adds that “[h]is need to maintain employment

was a constant barrier to the hoops in which he was asked to jump through,

but at no time does the record reflect that he shirked parental duties as

defined by the law.” Id. at 21.

In response to Father’s claim, DHS correctly notes that while the six-

month look-back period provided for in section 2511(a)(1) is most essential

to the court’s analysis, it is not mechanically applied. DHS’s Brief at 14. The

court must consider the entire history of the case. See In re I.J., 972 A.2d

5 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“The trial court must examine the individual

circumstances of each case and consider all of the explanations of the parent

to decide if the evidence, under the totality of the circumstances, requires

involuntary termination.”). In response to Father’s assertion that DHS failed

to establish that he relinquished his parental claim to Child, DHS further notes

that the trial court’s termination under section 2511(a)(1) is predicated on

Father’s failure to perform parental duties—not necessarily on his having

evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish his claim to Child. DHS’s Brief at

14-15. As DHS aptly states, “Father failed to perform the most fundamental

and essential duties of a parent whose child is in foster care, which are to

cooperate with the agency, work toward … reunification, remedy the

conditions that led to the child’s continued placement, and [to] do so in a

timely manner.” Id. at 15. DHS adds that Father’s reference to “jumping

through hoops” is telling as to his lack of commitment to remedying the

conditions that led to Child’s placement and to work toward reunification. Id.

- 11 -

J-A13012-21

The record establishes that Child was initially removed from Mother’s

care as a result of her inability to provide Child with safety and security, as

well as her inability to meet Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional

needs, due to her heroin use and mental health issues. See N.T. Hearing,

12/23/20, at 11. Although Father had been involved in Child’s life prior to her

removal from Mother’s care, he never had custody of Child and had lost

contact with Child by the time of her removal. DHS’s Brief at 15-16. Once he

became aware that Child had been removed from Mother’s care, Father made

little effort to locate and reestablish contact with her. Id. at 16. Moreover,

after his release from incarceration in December of 2018, Father was given

the opportunity to prove to the court that he could provide Child with proper

parental care; however, he did not meaningfully engage with his plan

objectives or cooperate with CUA. Id. Ms. Barnett testified that she

attempted to work with Father to accommodate his work schedule, but that

he failed to provide her with dates and times he would be available to meet

with her. Additionally, Father failed to appear at the appointed time for

random drug screens. Instead, he would show up days after his scheduled

appointment, evading the court’s efforts to ascertain he status of his

substance abuse. Id. at 16-17, 19.

Father’s lack of seriousness in working toward reunification with Child

was further demonstrated by his delay in an assessment of his home, which

was not completed until just seven weeks before the termination hearing. At

this point, Child had already been in MGM’s care for 32 months. DHS’s Brief

- 12 -

J-A13012-21

at 17. Father also waited until the day before the September 9, 2020

permanency review hearing to complete a parenting class, which had been a

court-ordered plan objective since the outset of the case. Id. See also N.T.

Hearing at 15. The successful completion of his plan objectives was essential

in demonstrating to the court that Child could safely be reunified with Father.

However, Father’s failure to “act affirmatively, with good faith interest and

effort, to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his … ability fully

supports the trial court’s decree of involuntary termination of his parental

rights pursuant to [s]ection 2511(a)(1).” Id. at 17 (citing In re G.P.-R., 851

A.2d 967, 977 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

After taking into consideration all the evidence presented at the

termination hearing, the trial court concluded:

[F]ather hasn’t done assessments[,] nor [has he] submitted to

random[ drug screens], as [the] court ordered, and there’s still no

documentation as to his sobriety. Despite additional support from

the permanency specialist, [F]ather has failed to meet his single

case plan objectives and progressed [sic] to the point that [Child]

should be reunited with him. The testimony also reflects that

[F]ather made attempts to comply with the single case plan

objectives … pretty recently, but that’s after the termination

petitions were filed. These efforts cannot be considered.[5]

N.T. Hearing at 110 (paragraph break omitted). Accordingly, the court

terminated Father’s parental rights to Child under section 2511(a)(1).

____________________________________________

5 “With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8),

the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice

of the filing of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b) (emphasis added).

- 13 -

J-A13012-21

We deem the trial court’s ruling to be further supported by the following,

as stated by DHS:

As this [C]ourt noted in In re Adoption of A.M.B., 812 A.2d

659[, 675] (Pa. Super. 2002), “[a] child’s life, happiness[,] and

vitality cannot be put on hold until a parent finds it convenient to

perform parental duties.” Accordingly, this [C]ourt should affirm

the involuntary termination of [Father’s] parental rights so that

the 33-month “hold” that Father has placed on Child’s life may be

lifted, and Child [may be] freed for adoption and permanency in

the care of MGM.

Father claims that [he] had fulfilled his parental duties because he

had housing, employment[,] and the means to care for his

daughter; however, Father ignores his ongoing failure to timely

and meaningfully address the issues that kept Child in care and

prevented her safe reunification. Instead, Father claims that there

is the absence of a nexus between his failure to comply with

[single case plan (“SCP”)] objectives and the existence of a risk

to Child’s safety. However, the evidence clearly established that

Father failed to meet his duty to provide safety for Child by

knowingly leaving her in the care of Mother, who was an active

drug user, by failing to search for her after her whereabouts

became unknown to him, and by failing to inquire as to her safety

and wellbeing after she had been placed in kinship care with MGM.

The evidence further established that after he became involved in

this matter in March [of] 2019, he failed to meet Child’s day-to-

day needs, such as … by attending routine medical appointments

and school meetings with her, which he utterly failed to do.

Further, Father’s failure to comply with the court[-]ordered

assessment and random drug screens prevented DHS, CUA[,] and

the court from ruling out that Father had a substance abuse

problem, which was a serious concern since Father had reported

that he had been through at least one substance treatment

program.

Next, Father points to the unsupervised community visitation he

had with Child to challenge the trial court’s well[-]supported

findings that he had not completed assessments and random drug

screens[] and[,] therefore[,] lacked documentation as to his

sobriety. Father argues that the trial court impermissibly shifted

to him the burden concerning his sobriety; however, the burden

never shifted…. [T]he evidence established that Father never

- 14 -

J-A13012-21

attended the court-ordered assessment[,] despite several

referrals having been made by the court, and that he evaded

every random drug screen that he was ordered to attend, by

showing up days after the appointed time for the screen. In short,

the evidence established that Father willfully evaded the efforts of

the court and CUA to ascertain the status of his substance abuse.

DHS’s Brief at 18-19 (citations to record omitted). After careful review, we

conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding of clear and

convincing evidence that Father failed or refused to perform his parental

duties for the statutory period provided in section 2511(a)(1). As such, we

discern no abuse of discretion or error of law in the court’s termination of

Father’s parental rights under this section.

As for the court’s analysis under section 2511(b), Father argues that the

trial court failed to consider the bond between him and Child. Father asserts

that Child recognized him, that she saw him as her father, and that a bond

existed between them. Father’s Brief at 17. Moreover, he claims that Ms.

Barnett’s testimony regarding the nature of his relationship with Child is

“wholly incompetent” as a basis to support the severing of their bond. Id.

Finally, he states that “[j]ust because [C]hild’s needs could be met in her

kinship home does not in anyway speak to whether … [C]hild would suffer

irreparable harm by the termination of her bond with Father.” Id. at 25.

DHS counters that Father has never provided for Child’s day-to-day

needs, nor has he ever attended any of her medical appointments or school

meetings. DHS’s Brief at 25. “While Child knows who Father is, ‘she doesn’t

look to him to provide nurturing or to provide all her needs.’” Id. (internal

brackets and citation omitted). Rather, Ms. Burnett testified that Child’s

- 15 -

J-A13012-21

primary bond is with MGM, to whom Child looks for nurturing, comforting, and

for “providing all her needs, medical care, and … things like that.” N.T.

Hearing at 28, 30-31. Additionally, DHS proffers that, even if we assume that

Father has a strong, loving bond with Child,

the law is clear a bond alone does not override the best interests

of a child. As noted in [In re] K.M., “the mere existence of an

emotional bond does not preclude the termination of parental

rights.” [In re K.M.,] 53 A.3d [781,] 791 [Pa. Super. 2012)]. In

determining whether to terminate parental rights,

The trial court can equally emphasize the safety needs of

the child, and should consider the intangibles, such as the

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might have

with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated that

the trial court should consider the importance of continuity

of relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond

can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

Id. Here, the trial court properly emphasized Child’s safety needs

and her relationship with MGM in determining that Father’s

parental right should be involuntarily terminated in accordance

with section 2511(b). Based on the evidence, it is clear that Child

will not suffer irreparable harm from the involuntary termination

of Father’s parental rights and that it is in her best interest to

terminate his parental rights so that she may achieve permanency

and stability in a loving, supportive and caring adoptive home.

Id. at 25-26. Moreover, counsel for Child reported that Child expressed a

desire to remain with MGM. Child’s Brief at 16 (citing N.T. Hearing at 73).6

The trial court concluded that Child has been provided love, support,

and safety under MGM’s care, and that all of Child’s needs are being met. N.T.

____________________________________________

6 We acknowledge Father’s testimony that Child wants to live with him. See

N.T. Hearing at 100 (“[S]he tells me right off the bat she wants to live with

me.”). We defer, however, to the trial courts determination regarding the

credibility of witnesses. See In re M.G., supra.

- 16 -

J-A13012-21

Hearing at 110. On the other hand, while Father visited Child when he could,

the court found him to be merely “a visitation resource, not someone to whom

[Child] turns for love, care, and subsistence.” Id. Based on the foregoing,

we deem the trial court’s decision to terminate Father’s parental rights under

section 2511(b) to be supported by the record, and we discern no abuse of

discretion or error of law.

Having determined that the trial court did not err in terminating Father’s

parental rights, we proceed with addressing the merits of Father’s issues 1

through 4, pertaining to the permanency goal change.7 In reviewing these

claims, we are guided by the following:

In cases involving a court’s order changing the placement goal …

to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. In re

N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa. Super. 2006). To hold that the trial

court abused its discretion, we must determine its judgment was

“manifestly unreasonable,” that the court disregarded the law, or

that its action was “a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.”

Id. (quoting In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d 967, 973 (Pa. Super. 2004)).

While this Court is bound by the facts determined in the trial court,

we are not tied to the court’s inferences, deductions and

conclusions; we have a “responsibility to ensure that the record

represents a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge

has applied the appropriate legal principles to that record.” In re

____________________________________________

7 We admonish Father’s counsel for failing to comply with the requirements of

the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure regarding the organization of

the appellate brief. Rule 2119(a) provides that the argument section of the

brief is to be divided into as many sections as there are questions to be

resolved. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Here, Father lists four issues in his

Statement of Questions Involved concerning the permanency goal change.

The argument section of his brief, however, only contains one section of

argument pertaining to the goal change. We will nonetheless address Father’s

issues on the merits, because the violation does not fatally impede our review.

See Lemenestrel v. Warden, 964 A.2d 902, 910 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2008).

- 17 -

J-A13012-21

A.K., 906 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. 2006). Therefore, our scope

of review is broad. Id.

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Furthermore, this Court has stated:

Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent children

are controlled by the Juvenile Act[, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-65], which

was amended in 1998 to conform to the federal Adoption and Safe

Families Act (“ASFA”). The policy underlying these statutes is to

prevent children from languishing indefinitely in foster care, with

its inherent lack of permanency, normalcy, and long-term parental

commitment. Consistent with this underlying policy, the 1998

amendments to the Juvenile Act, as required by the ASFA, place

the focus of dependency proceedings, including change of goal

proceedings, on the child. Safety, permanency, and well-being of

the child must take precedence over all other considerations,

including the rights of the parents.

In re N.C., 909 A.2d at 823 (citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis in

original). Additionally, we recognize that “the agency has the burden to show

a goal change would serve the child’s best interest….” In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d

339, 347 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Specifically, section 6351 of the Juvenile Act provides direction to the

court for the disposition of dependent children, stating in pertinent part:

§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child

…

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.—At

each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the

following:

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of

the placement.

- 18 -

J-A13012-21

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of

compliance with the permanency plan developed for

the child.

(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the

circumstances which necessitated the original

placement.

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current

placement goal for the child.

(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the

child might be achieved.

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the

permanency plan in effect.

(6) Whether the child is safe.

***

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of

the last 22 months or the court has determined that

aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable

efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove

the child from the child’s parent, guardian or

custodian or to preserve and reunify the family need

not be made or continue to be made, whether the

county agency has filed or sought to join a petition to

terminate parental rights and to identify, recruit,

process and approve a qualified family to adopt the

child unless:

(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best

suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare

of the child;

(ii) the county agency has documented a

compelling reason for determining that filing a

petition to terminate parental rights would not

serve the needs and welfare of the child; or

(iii) the child’s family has not been provided with

necessary services to achieve the safe return to

the child's parent, guardian or custodian within

- 19 -

J-A13012-21

the time frames set forth in the permanency

plan.

***

(f.1) Additional determination. — Based upon the

determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant

evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one

of the following:

(1) If and when the child will be returned to the child’s parent,

guardian or custodian in cases where the return of the child

is best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental

and moral welfare of the child.

(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and the

county agency will file for termination of parental rights in

cases where return to the child’s parent, guardian or

custodian is not best suited to the safety, protection and

physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

(3) If and when the child will be placed with a legal custodian in

cases where the return to the child’s parent, guardian or

custodian or being placed for adoption is not best suited to

the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral

welfare of the child.

(4) If and when the child will be placed with a fit and willing

relative in cases where return to the child’s parent, guardian

or custodian, being placed for adoption or being placed with

a legal custodian is not best suited to the safety, protection

and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

***

(f.2) Evidence.—Evidence of conduct by the parent that places

the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, including evidence

of the use of alcohol or a controlled substance that places the

health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, shall be presented to

the court by the county agency or any other party at any

disposition or permanency hearing whether or not the conduct was

the basis for the determination of dependency.

- 20 -

J-A13012-21

(g) Court order.—On the basis of the determination made under

subsection (f.1), the court shall order the continuation,

modification or termination of placement or other disposition

which is best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental

and moral welfare of the child.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f), (f.1), (f.2), (g).

Moreover, this Court has provided further considerations that apply in

goal change situations, stating:

Because the focus is on the child’s best interests, a goal change

to adoption might be appropriate, even when a parent

substantially complies with a reunification plan. In re N.C.,

supra [at] 826-27. Where a parent’s “skills, including her

judgment with regard to the emotional well-being of her children,

remain problematic[,]” a goal change to adoption might be

appropriate, regardless of the parent’s compliance with a

permanency plan. Id. at 825. The agency is not required to offer

services indefinitely, where a parent is unable to properly apply

the instruction provided. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.

Super. 2002). See also In re S.B., supra at 981 (giving priority

to child’s safety and stability, despite parent’s substantial

compliance with permanency plan); In re A.P., 728 A.2d 375,

379 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, … 743 A.2d 912 ([Pa.]

1999) (holding where, despite willingness, parent cannot meet

“irreducible minimum parental responsibilities, the needs of the

child must prevail over the rights of the parent”). Thus, even

where the parent makes earnest efforts, the “court cannot and will

not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and

stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.”

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).

In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d at 347.

Here, Father argues the trial court erred in ruling that Child could not

be safely reunified with him and that changing the permanency goal to

adoption was in Child’s best interest. Father’s Brief at 26. To the contrary,

he suggests that “no specific dependency issues with Father or his home

- 21 -

J-A13012-21

existed to prevent reunification, aside from [his] failure to follow court orders.”

Id. He avers that DHS failed to provide any evidence suggesting that Child

“would be anything other than safe in his care[,]” and proffers that “[m]uch

was made about [his] failure to comply to the letter with court orders[.]”

Father insists that his home is “without question … safe and appropriate[,]”

and accuses DHS and the court of failing to consider whether he could provide

appropriately for Child. Id. at 26-27. Instead, Father suggests that “the

question became one of whether [he] would jump through their hoops.” Id.

at 27.

Interestingly, what Father dismissively calls “hoops” are, in fact, the

very court-ordered objectives that were designed with the intention of

permitting Child to be reunified safely with Father. It is Father’s continued

lack of cooperation with DHS and CUA, as well as his failure to complete these

objectives, which prevented DHS from being able to evaluate the safety of his

home or his ability to provide for Child, and which convinced the court that

reunification was no longer a viable outcome. The court’s decision to change

the goal to adoption is supported by DHS’s reports that Father failed to avail

himself of the services that were necessary for there to be a safe reunification.

See DHS’s Brief at 23 (“As Ms. Barnett … testified, she could not conclude that

Father would or could provide safety for Child due to his consistent lack of

cooperation with CUA and engagement with his SCP objectives throughout the

life of the case.”).

- 22 -

J-A13012-21

Moreover, Child had been placed with MGM for 33 months. Our review

of the record reveals that, at each of the permanency review hearings, the

trial court addressed the appropriate matters as set forth in section 6351(f)

of the Juvenile Act. Specifically, the court found that Father has not been able

to develop a bond with Child, that he has generally been only “moderately

compliant” with his SCP objectives, and most recently at the September 9,

2020 review hearing, he was deemed to be in “minimal compliance” of his

goals. Furthermore, the trial court found at every permanency review hearing

that DHS made reasonable efforts to finalize Child’s permanency goal of

reunification. Despite these efforts, reunification had not occurred due to

Father’s lack of progress. Again, we emphasize that DHS is not required to

offer services indefinitely where a parent fails to avail himself of the assistance

provided, and “the court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s

need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope

for the future.” See In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d at 347 (citing In re A.L.D., 797

A.2d at 340; In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 513).

We determine that there is competent evidence in the record to support

the trial court’s conclusion that, despite his attempts, Father made insufficient

progress toward alleviating the circumstances that necessitated Child’s

original placement, nor did he establish that he is best suited to provide Child

with safety, protection, and physical and moral welfare. Accordingly, we agree

with the lower court’s determination that Child’s best interests are served by

- 23 -

J-A13012-21

changing her permanency placement goal from reunification to adoption, and

we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in so ordering.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the December 20, 2020 orders

involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights and changing the

permanency goal to adoption.

Orders affirmed.

Judge Dubow did not participate in the consideration or decision of this

case.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/29/2021

- 24 -