In the Int. of: T.S.C.L, Appeal of: T.L.

J-S16002-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.S.C.L., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

:

APPEAL OF: T.L., MOTHER :

:

:

:

: No. 260 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 7, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000447-2020

IN THE INTEREST OF: T.L., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: T.L., MOTHER :

:

:

:

:

: No. 261 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 7, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at

No(s): CP-51-DP-0000216-2019

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 09, 2021

T.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered on January 7, 2021,

which granted the petitions filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human

Services (“DHS”), to involuntarily terminate her parental rights to minor

daughter, T.S.C.L. a/k/a T.L. (“Child”) (born in January of 2019), pursuant to

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

J-S16002-21

sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§

2101-2938, and to change the permanency goal for Child from reunification

with Mother to adoption.1 After careful review, we affirm.

We glean the following facts and procedural history from the record. On

January 24, 2019, DHS received a report stating that Mother gave birth to

Child at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (“HUP”); that Mother

and Child tested positive for phencyclidine (“PCP”); that Child was born at

37.2 weeks gestation and weighed under five pounds; and that Child had been

admitted to the Intensive Care Unit (“ICU”) and was being monitored for

withdrawal symptoms. The report further indicated that Mother admitted to

smoking PCP during her pregnancy, and that she had a history of

incarceration. Child’s older siblings were not in Mother’s care, and it was

unknown if the alleged father2 would be involved in Child’s care.

DHS visited Mother and Child at HUP. When DHS spoke with Mother,

she admitted to using PCP a few days prior to giving birth to Child after a

verbal altercation with Child’s alleged father. DHS learned from HUP that

Mother spoke openly about her PCP use, and that she claimed that her drug

____________________________________________

1 By per curiam order entered on February 17, 2021, this Court consolidated

the appeals at Nos. 260 and 261 EDA 2021, sua sponte, as the appeals involve

related parties and issues.

2 On March 21, 2019, a paternity test confirmed that the alleged father was

not the biological father of Child. Another alleged father (“Putative Father”)

was identified on May 9, 2019, and paternity was confirmed on or around

March 11, 2020. The trial court terminated Putative Father’s parental rights

on January 7, 2021. Putative Father is not involved in this appeal.

-2-

J-S16002-21

use was not problematic. Hospital staff found Mother’s behavior to be odd.

DHS learned that Mother had previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder

and post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and that she was receiving

therapy at Community Council. She was prescribed Seroquel and Tramadol

for her mental health diagnoses. She was scheduled to be discharged from

HUP on January 26, 2019, while Child’s discharge date remained unknown.

On January 29, 2019, DHS spoke with a family friend (“Resource

Parent”) who stated that she was willing to care for Child upon her discharge

from HUP. Mother and Resource Parent agreed that Child would be discharged

to Resource Parent’s care with a safety plan in place. On January 30, 2019,

DHS received a phone call from a social worker from the HUP ICU. The social

worker stated that HUP staff met with Mother on January 29, 2019, but that

when Mother arrived, she indicated that she did not feel well. HUP staff sent

her for an evaluation, where Mother admitted that she had used PCP before

attending the meeting; thus, Mother would be recommended for the Mothers

Matter substance abuse treatment program. Her intake meeting was

scheduled for January 31, 2019. HUP staff was to notify DHS if Mother

successfully completed the program. On February 4, 2019, Child was

discharged from HUP into Resource Parent’s care.

On February 19, 2019, DHS filed an urgent dependency petition for

Child. After several deferments, on May 23, 2019, the trial court adjudicated

Child dependent, ordered Child to be placed in kinship care with the Resource

Parent, and referred Mother to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for drug

-3-

J-S16002-21

screens and assessment. Additionally, Mother was granted supervised visits

with Child and was referred to the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) for

parenting services. Her Single Case Plan (“SCP”) goals were to comply with

the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) Turning Points for Children (“TPC”)

and ARC services, to continue to attend Community Council for mental health

treatment, and to attend substance abuse treatment at NorthEast Treatment

Centers (“NET”).

Regular permanency review hearings were held. At each one, the trial

court found Child’s placement continued to be necessary and appropriate and

directed DHS to make reasonable efforts to finalize Child’s permanency plan.

At a permanency hearing on July 31, 2019, the trial court referred Mother to

the CEU for a dual diagnosis (substance use and mental health) assessment

and for random drug screens. The trial court found that aggravated

circumstances existed as to Mother, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302, due to a

prior involuntary termination; however, it ordered that DHS continue

reasonable efforts to preserve the family and reunify Mother and Child.

Supervised visitations were to continue.

On September 11, 2019, the SCP was revised. Mother participated in

this meeting via telephone. Child’s primary goal was identified as adoption

with a concurrent goal of reunification. Mother’s objectives remained the

same. On October 17, 2019, DHS received a progress report from the CEU,

which indicated that Mother had tested positive for PCP on July 31, 2019,

September 25, 2019, and October 3, 2019. Mother had informed the CEU on

-4-

J-S16002-21

July 31, 2019, that she was engaged in substance abuse treatment through

NET. As such, the CEU did not schedule an assessment but advised Mother

to sign releases so that it could monitor her treatment. On September 25,

2019, Mother informed the CEU that she was no longer enrolled in substance

abuse treatment through NET. Accordingly, the CEU scheduled an assessment

for Mother for October 8, 2019, but she was a no-show and failed to

reschedule.

Moreover, at the October 17, 2019 permanency review hearing, the trial

court took notice that Mother had completed anger management and

parenting services, and that she resided at a shelter. Mother reported that

she was engaged in mental health treatment through Community Council and

that she had successfully completed 30 days of inpatient substance abuse

treatment through the Kirkbride Center. The trial court ordered Child remain

as committed to DHS; referred Mother to the CEU for a dual diagnosis

assessment, monitoring, and random drug screens; directed Mother to comply

with the CEU’s recommendations; and ordered both Gaudenzia and

Community Council to provide the court with copies of Mother’s treatment plan

and progress notes.

On February 18, 2020, DHS received another progress report from the

CEU, indicating that Mother had again tested positive for PCP on January 13,

2020. Because Mother did not provide the CEU with consent to monitor her

treatment, it was unable to report on her treatment progress. At the

permanency hearing held on that same date, the trial court decreased

-5-

J-S16002-21

Mother’s visitations to one-hour supervised visits to occur once every two

weeks, and directed that Mother’s visits were to be cancelled in the event she

appeared to be under the influence of substances. Mother was again referred

to the CEU for drug screens and ordered to attend a substance abuse

assessment and to engage in any recommended treatment.

On August 13, 2020, the trial court found Mother to be “moderately

compliant” with the permanency plan, in that she had completed a parenting

and anger management course and reported to be engaged in mental health

treatment through Community Council, but that she had made “no progress”

towards reunification, as she had failed to alleviate the circumstances that

necessitated Child’s placement. See Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”), 3/4/21, at

4-5. The court referred Mother to the Behavioral Health System (“BHS”) for

monitoring, and to the CEU for drug and alcohol screens. It further ordered

Community Council to provide a full progress report and treatment plan as to

Mother, and directed DHS to explore Voluntary Relinquishments of Parental

Rights (“VOLS”) as to Mother.

Given that Child had been adjudicated dependent since May 29, 2019,

and that Mother continued to fail to consistently engage with her SCP

objectives and to comply with court orders, on December 4, 2019, DHS filed

petitions to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights and to change the

permanency goal to adoption. A hearing was conducted on these matters on

January 7, 2021. Mother was present at the hearing and testified on her own

behalf. DHS presented the testimony of CUA’s Shante Brown Atkins, who

-6-

J-S16002-21

began working with the family in December of 2019 and maintained regular

contact with Mother. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found

clear and convincing evidence to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), and to

change Child’s goal from reunification to adoption.

On January 28, 2021, Mother timely filed notices of appeal. Herein, she

presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court err in ruling that DHS met its burden of

proving that Mother’s parental rights to Child should be

terminated?

2. Did the trial court err in ruling that the termination of Mother’s

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of

Child?

3. Did the trial court err in finding that DHS met its burden of

proving that Child’s permanency goal should be changed to

adoption?

4. Did the trial court err in finding that it was in Child’s best

interest to change the permanency goal to adoption?

See Mother’s Brief at 4 (cleaned up).

We review a decree terminating parental rights in accordance with the

following standard:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental

rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the

trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse

of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support

for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial

court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental

rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s decision the

same deference that we would give to a jury verdict. We must

employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to

-7-

J-S16002-21

determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported by

competent evidence.

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879

A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Moreover, we have explained that:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”

Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts

in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). If

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if

the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B.,

835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003).

We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental rights

is governed by section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated

analysis.

Our case law has made clear that under [s]ection 2511, the court

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental

rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds

for termination delineated in [s]ection 2511(a). Only if the court

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of

the analysis pursuant to [s]ection 2511(b): determination of the

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between

-8-

J-S16002-21

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511,

other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear

and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination

of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276.

With regard to section 2511(b), we direct our analysis to the facts

relating to that section. This Court has explained that:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated, “Intangibles

such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we

instructed that the trial court must also discern the nature and

status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect

on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. However, in

cases where there is no evidence of a bond between a parent and

child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S.,

946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent

of the bond-effect analysis necessarily depends on the

circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Instantly, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to

sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with the trial

court as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), as well as section 2511(b),

in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en

banc). Herein, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under section

2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows:

-9-

J-S16002-21

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of

at least six months immediately preceding the filing of

the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused

or failed to perform parental duties.

***

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1).

To satisfy [s]ection 2511(a)(1), the moving party must produce

clear and convincing evidence of conduct sustained for at least the

six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which

reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a

refusal or failure to perform parental duties.

In re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 461 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quoting Matter of

Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)). In C.M.S.,

we further acknowledged the following statement by our Supreme Court:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child

- 10 -

J-S16002-21

needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs,

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this [C]ourt has

held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires

affirmative performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial

obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a

genuine effort to maintain communication and association with

the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty

requires that a parent ‘exert himself to take and maintain a place

of importance in the child’s life[.’]

C.M.S., 832 A.2d at 462 (quoting In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa.

1977)).

Mother claims that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights

under section 2511(a)(1). Mother avers that, contrary to the court’s finding,

she “was not relinquishing a claim to … [C]hild because she was engaged in

her [SCP] goals….” Mother’s Brief at 8. She maintains that at the time of the

termination hearing, she had completed the ARC parenting and anger

management classes and was attending mental health programs at

Community Council. Id. Regarding drug treatment, Mother avers that she

completed an inpatient drug program in the past and that she was enrolled in

a drug program at the time of the hearing. Id. at 9. Additionally, Mother

claims that she fulfilled her parenting duties by visiting Child and asserts that

she was trying to better herself economically for both herself and Child, e.g.,

she was taking online college classes for forensic studies. Id. at 10-11.

- 11 -

J-S16002-21

Mother has failed to convince us that she is entitled to any relief on this

claim. In support of its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights under

section 2511(a)(1), the trial court opined:

The petition for involuntary termination was filed on December 4,

2020. For the six months prior to the filing of the petition,

Mother’s SCP objectives were to comply with CUA and trial court

orders; housing; employment; education; drug and alcohol;

mental health; and visitation. Mother was regularly in contact

with CUA and she was aware of her objectives. [Her] objectives

in 2019 included parenting and anger management. Mother has

completed programs for both parenting and anger management.

[She] was referred to ARC for housing. [She] was discharged

from ARC on August 24, 2020, for noncompliance. Mother

informed CUA that she obtained housing in Upper Darby,

Pennsylvania[,] in October 2020 and showed CUA a copy of a

utility bill as proof. [She] did not provide CUA with a lease in her

name, although [she] informed CUA that she had a lease for the

home in her name and her husband’s name. CUA was unable to

verify if Mother’s name was on the lease as claimed. Mother needs

to provide an appropriate lease to satisfy her housing objective.

Mother was not employed. [She] receives social security disability

insurance (“SSDI”) for a mental health disability. Mother has

enrolled in online post[-]secondary education courses for forensic

studies. [She] provided proof of enrollment in October 2020 for

the fall semester[; however,] Mother has not verified that she was

enrolled for the upcoming spring semester.

Mother has failed to successfully complete a substance abuse

program, although [she] has attended numerous programs.

Mother has previously been enrolled in drug and alcohol programs

with NET, Gaudenzia, and Belmont, but did not complete any of

these programs successfully. Mother had enrolled in an inpatient

drug and alcohol program but was discharged from the program

after she was caught with PCP. [She] most recently enrolled in a

drug and alcohol program at Mirmont Treatment Center on

December 18, 2020, after the filing of the petitions. Mother

claimed that she attends her current program virtually three times

per week[,] and this program is supposed [to] come to her to

complete drug screens. At the time of the termination and goal

change trial, Mother had not completed a drug screen with

- 12 -

J-S16002-21

Mirmont. When [she] completed drug screens at the CEU, Mother

tested positive for PCP on multiple occasions between July 2019

and February 2020. The CEU had attempted to confirm [her]

enrollment in a treatment program on multiple occasions, but

[she] failed to provide the CEU with the appropriate consent

signatures. There are ongoing concerns regarding Mother’s

substance use, which poses a safety threat and a barrier to

reunification with Child. Mother admitted that she is still working

on maintaining her sobriety and last got high a “couple months”

prior.

Mother claimed that she was receiving mental health treatment

consistently through Community Council, but CUA has not

received any documentation verifying her enrollment or her

progress. Mother claimed that she receives therapy and

medication management for bipolar disorder, PTSD, and

postpartum depression. [She] also claims that she takes her

prescribed medication … consistently. CUA’s inability to verify

Mother’s mental health also remains an ongoing safety concern

and barrier for reunification with Child. CUA indicated that based

on interactions with Mother, [she] still needs to engage with

mental health services. The CUA case manager stated that Mother

has reached out on multiple occasions for emotional support. The

CUA case manager has reminded Mother on multiple occasions

that she needs to seek support from her therapist.

Mother’s visits with Child occur biweekly and are supervised at the

agency. Prior to March 2020, the visits were in person but were

switched to virtual visits due to the ongoing pandemic. Mother’s

visits with Child are appropriate. [Her] failure to progress with

her drug and alcohol objective has prevented Mother from

graduating beyond supervised visitation with Child. Mother has

been moderately compliant with her objectives. Throughout the

life of the case, [she] has struggled with consistently engaging

with her objectives. [She] attends some of her programs but does

not continue to follow through in order to successfully complete

the designated program objectives. Mother has made minimal

progress towards resolving the safety and dependency concerns

that brought Child into care. On July 13, 2019, the trial court

found aggravated circumstances as to Mother. Mother’s parental

rights were previously involuntarily terminated as to Child’s older

siblings. Child needs permanency, which Mother has refused to

provide by failing to consistently engage in her SCP objectives.

Mother has not taken all of the positive steps necessary to put

- 13 -

J-S16002-21

herself in a position to be reunified with Child, which [she] has the

affirmative duty to do…. For the entire six-month period prior to

the filing of the petition, Mother either failed or refused to

successfully complete her SCP objectives and place herself in a

position to parent. At the time of the termination trial, Child could

not be safely reunified with Mother. As a result, the trial court did

not err or abuse its discretion by finding clear and convincing

evidence that Mother, by her conduct, had refused and failed to

perform parental duties and has evidenced a settled purpose to

relinquish her parental claim to Child, so termination under 23

Pa.C.S.[] § 2511(a)(1) was proper.

TCO at 6-9 (citations to record and footnotes omitted; paragraph breaks

added). After careful review, we conclude that the trial court’s determinations

are well-supported by the record, and we discern no abuse of discretion.

As for the analysis under section 2511(b), Mother claims the trial court

erred in finding it was in Child’s best interest to terminate her parental rights.

Mother’s Brief at 22-23. Mother fails, however, to develop her argument.

Aside from reciting some caselaw regarding the court’s duty to consider the

effect of terminating parental rights where an emotional bond exists between

a parent and child, Mother merely states that she “was visiting … [C]hild” and

“acting appropriately with … [C]hild.” Id. at 23. She fails to argue that she

has an emotional bond with Child and fails to state how the termination of her

parental rights would negatively impact Child. Thus, we deem Mother’s claim

regarding the trial court’s findings under section 2511(b) to be waived. See

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b); Estate of Haiko v. McGinely, 799 A.2d 155, 161 (Pa.

Super. 2002) (“Without a reasoned discussion of the law … our ability to

provide appellate review is hampered. It is not this Court’s function or duty

to become an advocate for [Appellants].”).

- 14 -

J-S16002-21

Nevertheless, even if Mother had not waived this issue, we would

conclude that her claim is meritless. While the trial court agreed that Mother’s

visits with Child were “appropriate,” this simply was not enough to establish

that an emotional bond existed between Mother and Child or that terminating

Mother’s parental rights would be harmful to Child. In support of its decision

to terminate Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(b), the trial court

opined:

At the time of the termination trial, Mother’s visits with Child

occurred biweekly and were supervised at the agency. Prior to

March 2020, the visits were in person but were switched to virtual

visits due to the ongoing pandemic. Mother’s visits with Child are

appropriate, although Mother has not been able to develop a bond

with Child. Mother’s failure to progress with her drug and alcohol

objective has prevented [her] from graduating beyond supervised

visitation with Child and remains a barrier to reunification due to

safety concerns. Child is placed in a pre-adoptive kinship home

with Resource Parent. Child was placed in Resource Parent’s

home when she was less than one month old and has remained in

this placement for the life of the case. Child shares a parent-child

bond with Resource Parent. Child has previously received early

intervention services, but Resource Parent ensured that Child

completed those services. Child is now developmentally on target.

Resource Parent has ensured Child’s medical and dental needs are

met. CUA has observed Child in Resource Parent’s home and Child

has shown a strong bond with Resource Parent. When Child would

attend visits with Mother, Child would cry when Resource Parent

leaves [sic] and would try to run after her. It would be harmful if

Child were to be removed from her current placement with

Resource Parent. Child does not share a parent-child bond with

Mother. Child would not suffer any irreparable harm if Mother’s

parental rights were terminated. At the time of the termination

trial, Child could not be safely reunified with Mother. On July 13,

2019, the trial court found aggravated circumstances as to

Mother. Mother’s parental rights were previously involuntarily

terminated as to Child’s older siblings. The record establishes by

clear and convincing evidence that termination would not sever an

- 15 -

J-S16002-21

existing and beneficial relationship between Mother and Child.

The DHS witness was credible.

TCO at 18-19 (citations to record omitted).

Likewise, DHS observed that Child did not share a beneficial, parent-

child bond with Mother. DHS’s Brief at 29. It noted that Mother only saw

Child every other week, during supervised visits. Despite Mother’s efforts to

engage with Child during those visits, Ms. Atkins did not believe that Child was

bonded with Mother. Id. She testified that Child often cried and reached out

for the Resource Parent at visits. Thus, Ms. Atkins concluded that Child would

not suffer harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated. “She doesn’t

really know [Mother] in that capacity for her to feel any type of way.” Id. at

29-30 (quoting N.T. Hearing, 1/7/21, at 41). In contrast to Child’s superficial

relationship with Mother, DHS observed that Child shares a significant, parent-

child bond with her Resource Parent, with whom she has lived since she left

the hospital after birth. Id. at 30. Ms. Atkins stated that Child looks at the

Resource Parent as her parent and shared that she believed it would be

harmful to Child to be removed from the kinship home, as Child is thriving in

the Resource Parent’s care. Id.

As there is competent evidence in the record that supports the trial

court’s credibility and weight assessments regarding Child’s needs and

welfare, and the absence of any bond with Mother, we would conclude that

the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s parental rights

under section 2511(b). See In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27

(Pa. 2012) (stating that appellate courts must defer to the trial court regarding

- 16 -

J-S16002-21

credibility determinations and weight assessments, so long as the factual

findings are supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not

the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion).

Having determined that the trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s

parental rights, we proceed with addressing Mother’s issues regarding the

permanency goal change. In reviewing these claims, we are guided by the

following:

In cases involving a court’s order changing the placement goal …

to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. In re

N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa. Super. 2006). To hold that the trial

court abused its discretion, we must determine its judgment was

“manifestly unreasonable,” that the court disregarded the law, or

that its action was “a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.”

Id. (quoting In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d 967, 973 (Pa. Super. 2004)).

While this Court is bound by the facts determined in the trial court,

we are not tied to the court’s inferences, deductions and

conclusions; we have a “responsibility to ensure that the record

represents a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge

has applied the appropriate legal principles to that record.” In re

A.K., 906 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. 2006). Therefore, our scope

of review is broad. Id.

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Furthermore, this Court has stated:

Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent children

are controlled by the Juvenile Act[, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-65], which

was amended in 1998 to conform to the federal Adoption and Safe

Families Act (“ASFA”). The policy underlying these statutes is to

prevent children from languishing indefinitely in foster care, with

its inherent lack of permanency, normalcy, and long-term parental

commitment. Consistent with this underlying policy, the 1998

amendments to the Juvenile Act, as required by the ASFA, place

the focus of dependency proceedings, including change of goal

proceedings, on the child. Safety, permanency, and well-being of

- 17 -

J-S16002-21

the child must take precedence over all other considerations,

including the rights of the parents.

In re N.C., 909 A.2d at 823 (citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis in

original). Additionally, we recognize that “the agency has the burden to show

a goal change would serve the child’s best interest….” In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d

339, 347 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Specifically, section 6351 of the Juvenile Act provides direction to the

court for the disposition of dependent children, stating in pertinent part:

§ 6351. Disposition of dependent child

…

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.—At

each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the

following:

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of

the placement.

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of

compliance with the permanency plan developed for

the child.

(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the

circumstances which necessitated the original

placement.

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current

placement goal for the child.

(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the

child might be achieved.

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the

permanency plan in effect.

(6) Whether the child is safe.

…

- 18 -

J-S16002-21

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of

the last 22 months or the court has determined that

aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable

efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove

the child from the child’s parent, guardian or

custodian or to preserve and reunify the family need

not be made or continue to be made, whether the

county agency has filed or sought to join a petition to

terminate parental rights and to identify, recruit,

process and approve a qualified family to adopt the

child unless:

(i) the child is being cared for by a relative best

suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare

of the child;

(ii) the county agency has documented a

compelling reason for determining that filing a

petition to terminate parental rights would not

serve the needs and welfare of the child; or

(iii) the child’s family has not been provided with

necessary services to achieve the safe return to

the child's parent, guardian or custodian within

the time frames set forth in the permanency

plan.

***

(f.1) Additional determination. — Based upon the

determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant

evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one

of the following:

(1) If and when the child will be returned to the child’s parent,

guardian or custodian in cases where the return of the child

is best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental

and moral welfare of the child.

(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and the

county agency will file for termination of parental rights in

cases where return to the child’s parent, guardian or

custodian is not best suited to the safety, protection and

physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

- 19 -

J-S16002-21

(3) If and when the child will be placed with a legal custodian in

cases where the return to the child’s parent, guardian or

custodian or being placed for adoption is not best suited to

the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral

welfare of the child.

(4) If and when the child will be placed with a fit and willing

relative in cases where return to the child’s parent, guardian

or custodian, being placed for adoption or being placed with

a legal custodian is not best suited to the safety, protection

and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

***

(f.2) Evidence.—Evidence of conduct by the parent that places

the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, including evidence

of the use of alcohol or a controlled substance that places the

health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, shall be presented to

the court by the county agency or any other party at any

disposition or permanency hearing whether or not the conduct was

the basis for the determination of dependency.

(g) Court order.—On the basis of the determination made under

subsection (f.1), the court shall order the continuation,

modification or termination of placement or other disposition

which is best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental

and moral welfare of the child.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f), (f.1), (f.2), (g).

Moreover, this Court has provided further considerations that apply in

goal change situations, stating:

Because the focus is on the child’s best interests, a goal change

to adoption might be appropriate, even when a parent

substantially complies with a reunification plan. In re N.C.,

supra [at] 826-27. Where a parent’s “skills, including her

judgment with regard to the emotional well-being of her children,

remain problematic[,]” a goal change to adoption might be

appropriate, regardless of the parent’s compliance with a

permanency plan. Id. at 825. The agency is not required to offer

services indefinitely, where a parent is unable to properly apply

- 20 -

J-S16002-21

the instruction provided. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340 (Pa.

Super. 2002). See also In re S.B., supra at 981 (giving priority

to child’s safety and stability, despite parent’s substantial

compliance with permanency plan); In re A.P., 728 A.2d 375,

379 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, … 743 A.2d 912 ([Pa.]

1999) (holding where, despite willingness, parent cannot meet

“irreducible minimum parental responsibilities, the needs of the

child must prevail over the rights of the parent”). Thus, even

where the parent makes earnest efforts, the “court cannot and will

not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and

stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the future.”

In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).

In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d at 347.

Here, Mother argues that the trial court erred in ruling Child’s

permanency goal should be changed to adoption. Mother’s Brief at 24. In

support of her claim, Mother merely reiterates her arguments that she had

been meeting her SCP goals, that she attended “appropriate” visits with Child,

and that she was taking online classes in an effort to better herself

economically. Id. at 24-27. Additionally, Mother claims that the trial court

erred in determining that it was in Child’s best interest to change the

permanency goal to adoption. Id. at 27. Once again, Mother fails to establish

that an emotional bond exists between her and Child and simply states that it

would not be in Child’s best interest to change the goal to adoption, because

“Mother was visiting with … [C]hild and acting appropriately with … [C]hild.”

Id. at 28.

We emphasize that, in determining whether a goal change is

appropriate, the focus is on the child’s best interests. See In re N.C., 909

A.2d at 823 (noting that “[s]afety, permanency, and well-being of the child

- 21 -

J-S16002-21

must take precedence over all other considerations, including the rights of the

parents”) (emphasis in original). As so aptly stated by DHS, in the instant

matter,

Child had languished in care for 19 months, nearly her whole life,

clearly meeting ASFA timelines. Furthermore, the trial court found

at every permanency review hearing that DHS made reasonable

efforts to finalize Child’s permanency goal of reunification.

Despite these continual reasonable efforts by DHS and CUA, as

well as services provided by CEU, ARC, NET-West, Gaudenzia,

Belmont, Goldman Center, Kirkbride Center, and Maribaum,

reunification had not occurred due to Mother’s lack of progress.

The trial court properly relied on Ms. Atkin’s credible testimony

that it would be in Child’s best interest to change her permanency

goal to adoption because Child could not be safely reunified with

Mother. It follows that adoption would be her next best

permanency option.

By the [termination/goal change] hearing, Mother had not put

herself in a position, and did not seem likely to put herself in a

position, to parent Child on a full-time basis. There was no

indication that anything would change. Mother had been given

enough time.

DHS’s Brief at 32-33 (citations to record omitted).

Moreover, our review of the record reveals that the trial court thoroughly

addressed the appropriate matters as set forth in section 6351(f) of the

Juvenile Act. Specifically, the court found that Mother has not been able to

develop a bond with Child, that she has been only “moderately compliant”

with her SCP objections, and that she has made “minimal progress” towards

resolving the safety and dependency concerns that brought Child into care.

See TCO at 21 (citations to record omitted). The trial court further found that

Child does share a parent-child bond with Resource Parent, and that Child is

- 22 -

J-S16002-21

thriving under Resource Parent’s care. Id. At the time of the goal change

hearing, the court deemed Child could not safely be reunified with Mother and

that it was in Child’s best interest to be freed for adoption. Id. at 22.

We determine that there is competent evidence in the record to support

the trial court’s conclusion that, despite her attempts, Mother made

insufficient progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated

Child’s original placement. Accordingly, we agree with the lower court’s

determination that Child’s best interests are served by changing her

permanency placement goal from reunification to adoption, and we discern no

abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in so ordering.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the January 7, 2021 decrees

involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights and changing the

permanency goal to adoption.

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/9/2021

- 23 -