Janczuk v. United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

WERONIKA E.K. JANCZUK,

Plaintiff,

24-CV-3426 (LTS)

-against-

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Weronika Janczuk, who is appearing pro se, filed this action invoking the court’s

federal question jurisdiction and seeking injunctive relief. By order dated May 9, 2024, the Court

granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of

fees. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses this action.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is

obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and

interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted,

emphasis in original).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this action naming as the defendant the United States of America. In the

fact section of the complaint, Plaintiff states:

No publicly-available standard for evaluation and litigation exists for any

procedural essential to the acquisition and publication of the book (as in,

standards related to the object itself, not to any form of proximate-to-it corporate

lifestyle, even as both might and/or do impact each other in all praxes).1

(ECF 1, at 3.) In the injury section of the complaint, Plaintiff states:

Personalities of a particular kind cannot find the voices they require or desire,

even as they cognize with mutual agreement the value of written art. . . . Persons

understanding themselves to have a skykiographic or cognitive authority--

especially in ever-instilled empathy with and for those industrially and commonly

understood as excellent--cannot be guaranteed proportionate skykiographic or

cognitive authorities. If partnerships like agenting and editorial work are like

marriage in some major-cognitive synonymytry, the industry doesn't guarantee

partnership.

(Id.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks:

For the USA to offer literary agents, their agencies, their software engineers and

similar, their editors and publishers a legal salary or stipend to operate

adjudicatively and to begin the process of constructing a legal infrastructure that

litigates unto published “staffolds”--positive statements containing within

themselves the entire thought, concept, notion, or otherwise—over the nature,

type, utility, or otherwise of the book product involved (i.e., “a lawsuit to litigate

constructively whether the pages here are generic relative to other books”(), etc.),

a model for an industry-wide language where none exists, for a framework of

transparency against which to litigate competencies (an innovation from a model

of ontological-reputation-like-infused purchase, a good always but one that

monopolizes a particular dimension of experimental and potency-unto-actuality

analyses in niche contexts, as the foundation and maintenance of a book

publishing company in a "saturated market" with bizarre and unique

contingencies is not necessarily a rational or proportionately-easy venture-seeking

phenomenon; time and distribution and algorithmic support of those things

generally understood to be valued and universally-agreed to be valued--to the

proportionate extant that publishers and corporations like Amazon persist and do

so with utility).

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation

are as in the original unless otherwise indicated.

(Id. at 3-4.)

DISCUSSION

A. Sovereign immunity

The Court must dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against the United States of America under the

doctrine of sovereign immunity. This doctrine bars federal courts from hearing all suits against

the federal government except where sovereign immunity has been waived. United States v.

Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586

(1941)).

Plaintiff alleges no facts or legal provisions that suggest that the doctrine of sovereign

immunity has been waived with respect to her claims against Defendant. The Court therefore

dismisses Plaintiff’s claims against the United States of America under the doctrine of sovereign

immunity, and consequently, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

B. Standing

Plaintiff has also failed to allege facts sufficient to show that she has standing to assert

her claims. Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts

“to the resolution of cases and controversies.” Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d

Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Standing to sue or defend is an

aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement.” Arizonians for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,

64 (1997). To demonstrate standing, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she has personally suffered

some actual or threatened injury as a result of the defendant’s alleged illegal conduct; (2) the

injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by

the requested relief. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church &

State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). The burden of establishing standing to sue rests with the

party bringing the action. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Moreover, “a

generalized grievance, no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer standing. A litigant raising

only a generally available grievance . . . and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly

benefits [her] than it does the public at large . . . does not state an Article III case or

controversy.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).“‘If [a] plaintiff[] lack[s] Article III standing, a [federal] court has no subject

matter jurisdiction to hear [her] claim.’” Mahon, 683 F.3d at 62 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted); see also Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456

U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction . . . is an Art. III as well as a statutory

requirement. . . .”).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that she has suffered a concrete and

particularized injury caused by Defendant. Rather, she seeks relief from Defendant for the

alleged harm caused by the book publishing industry. Accordingly, the Court also dismisses

Plaintiff’s claims for lack of standing and, consequently, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); Mahon, 683 F.3d at 62.

C. Plaintiff’s action is frivolous

Under the IFP statute, a court must dismiss an action if it determines that the action is

frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i). An action is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable

basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989), abrogated on other

grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 504

U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (holding that “a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts

alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”); Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437

(“An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . . ; or

(2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)).

Plaintiff, without any legal basis to do so, asks this Court to compel the United States to

adopt her recommendations regarding the book publishing industry. Because there is no legal

basis for these claims for relief, the Court further dismisses this action as frivolous. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

D. Leave to amend denied

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

Because it appears that the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured with an amendment,

the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and as frivolous.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). All other pending matters in this case

are terminated.

The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith and, therefore, IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter a judgment in this case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 14, 2024

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge