Opinion

State v. Miller

2024 Ohio 5032

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed: Oct 18, 2024
Status: Published
On the bench: Osowik
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 33.0%

The opinion

[Cite as State v. Miller, 2024-Ohio-5032.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

FULTON COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. F-23-006

Appellee Trial Court No. 23CR001

Quinten R. Miller DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: October 18, 2024

*****

Karin L. Coble, for appellant.

*****

OSOWIK, J.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal of an April 12, 2023 judgment of the Fulton County Court

of Common Pleas, acquitting appellant of one count of domestic violence, in violation of

R.C. 2919.25(A), a felony of the third degree, and one count of the disruption of public

services, in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), a felony of the fourth degree, while finding

appellant guilty on the related count of abduction, in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2), a

felony of the third degree. On May 24, 2023, appellant was sentenced to a 30-month

term of incarceration. For the reasons set forth below, this court reverses the judgment of

the trial court and vacates appellant’s conviction for abduction.

{¶ 2} Appellant, Quinten Miller, sets forth the following two assignments of error:

“One: The evidence was both legally insufficient and [the conviction was] against

the manifest weight of the evidence, rendering the conviction a violation of Mr. Miller’s

right to a fair trial in violation of the Ohio Constitution and the U.S. Constitution.

“Two: The sentence [] is clearly and convincingly unsupported by the record.”

{¶ 3} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. In December of

2021, appellant began a relationship with T.C., the victim in this case. Several months

into the relationship, appellant moved in with T.C. and her minor daughter in their

Wauseon apartment. Approximately one year later, following a period of tumult in the

relationship, appellant moved out of T.C.’s apartment, but the pair remained in touch and

on amicable terms.

{¶ 4} Shortly after moving out of T.C.’s apartment, appellant became homeless

and began living in a motor vehicle owned by an acquaintance. Appellant parked the

vehicle in the local Walmart parking lot. On December 3, 2022, appellant contacted T.C.

via text message and asked for permission to spend the night in her apartment, as he was

ill and quite cold given the combination of December weather and living in a parked

vehicle. T.C. consented and advised appellant that he could come to her apartment for

the night in order to get in out of the cold. This appeal arises from the events that

occurred upon appellant’s arrival at T.C.’s apartment that night.

{¶ 5} Upon admitting appellant into her apartment, T.C. did not speak to him.

Rather, she silently walked down the hall and went into her bedroom, closed the door,

and locked it. Appellant, by his own admission, became agitated and temperamental in

response to this reception.

{¶ 6} Appellant went down the hall, loudly spoke at T.C. through the closed door,

demanded to know what the issue was, and then damaged the door while attempting to

open it. Following appellant’s outburst, T.C. opened the door, told appellant that she was

going to call the police, and advised him that he needed to leave her apartment.

{¶ 7} At this juncture, T.C. began to walk down the hallway back towards the

living room. Appellant followed. Once they were in the living room, appellant grabbed

or pulled at T.C.’s arms, she pulled away and fell to the floor. T.C. got up. Appellant

again grabbed or pulled at T.C.’s arms and she fell to the floor a second time. T.C. got up

again, exited her apartment, and went to a neighbor’s apartment. T.C.’s minor daughter

was asleep in her bedroom in the apartment during these events and remained in the

apartment alone with appellant upon T.C. exiting and going to her neighbor’s apartment.

{¶ 8} For clarity on these events, the record is devoid of evidence that appellant

physically detained T.C. prior to her exit from her apartment, physically blocked the door

to impede or prevent T.C.’s exit from her apartment, verbally threatened T.C. to not leave

her apartment, or was aware that T.C. planned on leaving her apartment.

{¶ 9} After T.C. exited and went next door, her neighbor called the Wauseon

Police Department and reported the incident. The Wauseon Police Department responded

to the scene, but appellant had left the location in the interim. The responding officers

interviewed T.C., the neighbor, and subsequently contacted appellant to obtain his

statement on what had transpired.

{¶ 10} On January 10, 2023, following the conclusion of the police investigation,

appellant was indicted on one count of abduction, in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2), a

felony of the third degree, one count of domestic violence, in violation of R.C.

2919.25(A), a felony of the third degree, and one count of the disruption of public

services, in violation of R.C. 2909.04(A)(3), a felony of the fourth degree.

{¶ 11} On April 11, 2023, a two-day jury trial was conducted. T.C. was the first

witness called to testify at trial. T.C. testified that on December 3, 2022, she was at home

in her apartment recovering from the flu. T.C. stated that appellant contacted her to ask if

he could spend the night at her apartment due to the cold weather conditions outside.

T.C. agreed. T.C. testified, “[Appellant] showed up after texting and calling and asking to

come in [out of the cold] and I ended up letting him in. We had [previously] discussed

that he could sleep on the couch * * * I wanted to go back to my room and lay back down

and rest.”

{¶ 12} T.C. next testified that upon admitting appellant into her apartment, she did

not speak, went directly back into her bedroom, closed the door, and locked it. T.C.

testified that appellant became agitated at the perceived slight, yelled through the door,

and then kicked the door, damaging it. In response, T.C. testified that, “I ended up

opening the door and asking him to leave * * * I told him that I was going to be calling

the police.”

{¶ 13} T.C. then testified that she followed appellant down the hallway and into

the living room, and that appellant, “[G]rabbed me * * * [the motion was] like a push and

a pull.” T.C. relayed that she fell, got up, and then, “It happened again [appellant grabbed

her arm, causing her to fall a second time].” T.C. testified that she had no recollection of

what, if anything, was said between the two during this time.

{¶ 14} T.C. next testified that she got up, exited her apartment, went to her

neighbor’s apartment, and her neighbor called the police to report the incident. T.C.

testified, “I was able to make it out of my front door and that [is] when I ran to my

neighbor’s home.” The record shows that T.C.’s minor daughter was asleep in her

bedroom in T.C.’s apartment during these events. The record further shows that T.C. did

not retrieve her daughter before leaving the apartment, but rather left her daughter inside

the apartment with appellant. T.C. testified, “I did not want her to be in the middle of it

or witness anything.”

{¶ 15} T.C. then read into evidence the text message sent to her by appellant

shortly after the incident. Appellant texted T.C., in relevant part, “I was going to try to

calm you down when I went to grab you * * * I didn’t mean to make you fall. I really

don’t feel good babe I’ve been [living] in this fucking car.” (Emphasis added).

{¶ 16} T.C.’s neighbor next gave testimony to the trial court. The neighbor

testified, in relevant part, “[W]e weren’t sure what was going on -- it was hard to get what

was going on [from T.C.] -- but she was very apologetic and saying that she was sorry to

interrupt our evening and sorry that she came over sick.” (Emphasis added).

{¶ 17} Officer Mitchell Huner (“Huner”) of the Wauseon Police Department, one

of the responding officers, next testified to the trial court. Huner testified, in relevant

part, “She explained that her boyfriend [appellant] had come over, they had gotten into an

argument * * * I believe she stated that she said [to appellant that] she was going to call

the cops[,] at that point she advised me that [appellant] had pushed her down.”

(Emphasis added).

{¶ 18} During closing arguments, as pertains to the sole conviction of abduction,

appellee argued, “She told him you need to leave, I’m calling the police * * * he throws

her to the ground twice so that she can’t leave. That is restraint, and he did so by force.”

(Emphasis added). Discordant with this characterization, we reiterate that the record is

devoid of evidence that T.C. intended to leave the apartment such that appellant’s acts

could arguably be construed as demonstrative of restraint.

{¶ 19} On April 12, 2023, the jury acquitted appellant of domestic violence and

the disruption of public services, but convicted appellant of abduction. On May 24, 2023,

appellant was sentenced to a 30-month term of incarceration. This appeal ensued.

{¶ 20} In the first assignment of error, appellant alleges that the abduction

conviction was not supported by a sufficiency of the evidence and against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Upon review, we find that after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found the restraint

element of appellant’s R.C. 2905.02 (A)(2) crime conviction proven beyond a reasonable

doubt. Because we find appellant’s conviction for abduction is based upon insufficient

evidence, we need not address appellant’s manifest weight of the evidence argument.

{¶ 21} In our review of this case, the crux of our consideration centers upon

whether appellee furnished sufficient evidence in support of the restraint element of the

offense of abduction, so as to have properly convicted appellant of abduction.

{¶ 22} R.C. 2905.02(A)(2) establishes that, “No person, without privilege to do so,

shall do any of the following: By force or threat, restrain the liberty of another person

under circumstances that creates a risk of physical harm to the victim or place the other

person in fear.” (Emphasis added).

{¶ 23} As held by this court in State v. Stevens, 232 N.E.3d 343, 2023-Ohio-343, ¶

118, 131,

In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, the relevant inquiry is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61

Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

Relatedly, this court held in State v. Tajblik, 2016-Ohio-977, ¶ 17-19 (6th Dist.),

Restraint of liberty has been construed by Ohio courts to mean to limit

one’s freedom of movement in any fashion for any period of time, whether

under a charge of kidnapping or abduction * * * The restraint need not be

actual confinement, but may be merely compelling the victim to stay where

she is. State v. Mosely, 178 Ohio App.3d 631, 2008-Ohio-5483, 899 N.E.2d

1021 (8th Dist.) * * * In this case, the victim testified that appellant

threatened her for hours. At one point, she tried to get out of the bedroom

but appellant stood between her in the doorway and would not let her

leave. (Emphasis added).

{¶ 24} Accordingly, in Tajblik, this court found the element of restraint satisfied

for purposes of an abduction conviction based upon the verbal threats, in conjunction

with the physical blockage of the defendant of the doorway, precluding the victim from

departing the location.

{¶ 25} Similarly, in In re L.S., 2023-Ohio-4122, ¶43 (8th Dist.), the Eighth District

Court of Appeals recently held, “S.C. testified that she pushed [appellant’s] hand away

and told him no probably like 15 times. She also pressed against his chest during the act

but was unable to get up [due to being physically held down by appellant] which

constitutes restraint * * * Thus, the elements of force and restraint were substantiated.”

(Emphasis added).

{¶ 26} By contrast, the record in the instant case is devoid of any evidence that

appellant physically held or otherwise detained T.C., physically blocked her from exiting

her apartment, verbally threatened her from leaving her apartment, or that she was

impeded in an intention to exit her apartment. Rather, the record shows that T.C. asked

appellant to leave her apartment following a dispute between the two and appellant

subsequently grabbed or pulled on T.C.’s arms in an apparent effort to talk with her. The

record shows that T.C. has no recollection of what, if anything, was said between the two

at this time. The record shows that T.C. then exited her apartment without impediment.

{¶ 27} Accordingly, we find that the record in this case lacks sufficent evidence in

support of the R.C. 2905.02(A)(2) restraint element of the offense of abduction and,

therefore, the abduction conviction is not supported by a sufficiency of the evidence, such

that a rational trier of fact, even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, could have found the restraint element of the offense proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. Given these facts and circumstances, we find appellant’s first

assignment of error well-taken.

{¶ 28} In the second assignment of error, appellant alleges that the trial court’s

imposition of a 30-month term of incarceration on the abduction conviction is clearly and

convincingly unsupported by the record. Given our determination above, in response to

appellant’s first assignment of error, finding that the sole conviction of abduction was not

supported by a sufficiency of the evidence, thereby vacating the sentence imposed from

that erroneous conviction as a matter of law, we find the second assignment of error

moot.

{¶ 29} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Fulton County Court of

Common Pleas is hereby reversed, and appellant’s conviction is vacated. Appellee is

ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

Judgment reversed

and vacated.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.