finding defendants’ sale of products to forum state 25 residents to be an intentional act
How later courts described this case
- finding defendants’ sale of products to forum state 25 residents to be an intentional act
- finding prong met 21 where plaintiff alleged defendant “engaged in a scheme to register [plaintiff’s] trademarks . . . for the 22 purpose of extorting money from” plaintiff
- concluding personal jurisdiction analysis after finding plaintiff failed to satisfy 19 || first prong
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
O
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8 United States District Court
9 Central District of California
10
11 TIPPSY, INC. et al., Case № 2:24-cv-04025-ODW (SKx)
12 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING
13 v. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS FOR LACK OF
14 TIPSY, LLC et al., PERSONAL JURISDICTION [16]
15
Defendants.
16
17
18 I. INTRODUCTION
19 Plaintiffs Tippsy, Inc. (“Tippsy California”) and Genki Ito filed this action
20 against Defendants Tipsy, LLC (“Tipsy New York”) and Amanda L. Neville to resolve
21 a trademark dispute. (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Defendants now move to dismiss this action
22 for lack of personal jurisdiction. (Mot. Dismiss (“Motion” or “Mot.”), ECF No. 16-1.)
23 For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.1
24
25
26
27
28 1 After considering the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter
appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.
1 II. BACKGROUND2
2 Tippsy California, a Delaware Corporation with its principal place of business in
3 California, specializes in the sale of Japanese alcoholic beverages, including sake and
4 sake-related goods, such as sake glasses, cups, carafes, snacks, and warmer bottles.
5 (Compl. ¶¶ 1–2.) Tippsy California has offered these beverages and goods in its store
6 and on its website since November 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3.) Ito is Tippsy California’s Chief
7 Executive Officer and owner. (Id. ¶ 1.)
8 Tipsy New York, a New York limited liability company, has operated a wine
9 store in New York since 2013. (Decl. Amanda L. Neville ISO Mot. (“Neville Decl.”)
10 ¶¶ 1, 5, 8, ECF No. 16-1; see Compl. ¶¶ 4–5.) Tipsy New York also hosts a website,
11 where it offers wines and other goods in specified U.S. states. (Neville Decl. ¶ 11.)
12 Neville, who resides in New York, is Tipsy New York’s owner, operator, and founder.
13 (Compl. ¶ 5; Neville Decl. ¶¶ 1, 5.) According to Neville, from 2014 to 2020, Tipsy
14 New York averaged roughly 19,600 transactions each year. (Neville Decl. ¶ 20.) On
15 average, nineteen of these yearly sales—representing less than one-tenth of one percent
16 of sales—were to California residents. (Id.) Per Neville, Tipsy New York made two
17 sales to California residents in 2021, and since 2022, has made zero such sales, except
18 for one gift card sale to a California resident for a New York resident. (Id. ¶ 21.) Tipsy
19 New York’s website previously listed California as one of six U.S. states and territories
20 to which it shipped wine. (See Decl. R. Joseph Trokan ISO Opp’n (“Trokan Decl.”)
21 Ex. 1, ECF Nos. 20-1 to 20-2; Decl. Amanda L. Neville ISO Reply (“Neville Reply
22 Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 21.) However, Neville declares that in 2023 she removed
23 California as a shipping option from Tipsy New York’s website after she learned that
24 FedEx prohibits wine shipments to California. (Neville Decl. ¶ 22; Neville Reply Decl.
25 ¶¶ 4–5.)
26
27
2 All factual references derive from Tippsy California and Ito’s Complaint or attached exhibits, unless
28 otherwise noted, and well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true for purposes of this Motion.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
1 In 2023 and 2024, Tipsy New York, Neville, and their counsel sent cease-and-
2 desist letters to Tippsy California and Ito, alleging that they were infringing Tipsy New
3 York and Neville’s trademarks. (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 14, 21, 35, 49; Neville Decl. ¶¶ 25–26.)
4 Later, Tippsy California and Ito filed this action in the Central District of California.
5 (See Compl.) They assert five causes of action: three seeking declaratory relief of
6 trademark non-infringement, (id. ¶¶ 10–46), one seeking declaratory relief of trademark
7 concurrent use rights, (id. ¶¶ 47–53), and one alleging trademark infringement, (id.
8 ¶¶ 54–57). Tipsy New York and Neville moved to dismiss this case for lack of personal
9 jurisdiction. (Mot. 6.) The Motion is fully briefed. (Opp’n Mot. (“Opp’n”), ECF
10 No. 20; Reply ISO Mot. (“Reply”), ECF No. 21.)
11 III. LEGAL STANDARD
12 Pursuant to Federal Rule (“Rule”) of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a party may seek
13 dismissal of an action for lack of personal jurisdiction. Once a party seeks dismissal
14 under Rule 12(b)(2), the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that the court’s
15 exercise of personal jurisdiction is proper. Menken v. Emm, 503 F.3d 1050, 1056
16 (9th Cir. 2007). Where the motion is based on written materials rather than an
17 evidentiary hearing, as here, “the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of
18 jurisdictional facts.” Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir. 1990).
19 Accordingly, a court only “inquire[s] into whether [the plaintiff’s] pleadings and
20 affidavits make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.” Caruth v. Int’l
21 Psychoanalytical Ass’n, 59 F.3d 126, 128 (9th Cir. 1995).
22 Although a plaintiff cannot “simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint,”
23 Amba Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Jobar Int’l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977),
24 “uncontroverted allegations in [the] complaint must be taken as true,” AT&T v.
25 Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996). Courts resolve factual
26 disputes in the plaintiff’s favor. Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154
27 (9th Cir. 2006).
28
1 A federal district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
2 defendant if the defendant has “at least ‘minimum contacts’ with the relevant forum
3 such that the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
4 substantial justice.’” Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2002)
5 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). A district court “may
6 exercise either general or specific personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.”
7 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. British-Am. Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1987).
8 IV. DISCUSSION
9 Tippsy California and Ito do not contend that this Court has general personal
10 jurisdiction over Tipsy New York and Neville. (See Opp’n; see also Mot. 13–14;
11 Reply 1); Star Fabrics, Inc. v. Ross Stores, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-05877-PA (PLAx),
12 2017 WL 10439691, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2017) (“Where a party fails to oppose
13 arguments made in a motion, a court may find that the party has conceded those
14 arguments . . . .”). Instead, the parties dispute whether the Court has specific personal
15 jurisdiction over Tipsy New York and Neville. (See Mot. 14–16; Opp’n 1–8; Reply 1.)
16 The Ninth Circuit has formulated three requirements for establishing specific
17 jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant:
18 (1) the defendant must either purposefully direct his activities toward the
19 forum or purposefully avail himself of the privileges of conducting
activities in the forum; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or
20
relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of
21 jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must
be reasonable.
22
23 Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017) (cleaned
24 up). While “[t]he plaintiff bears the burden on the first two prongs,” once these prongs
25 are met, “the defendant must come forward with a ‘compelling case’ that the exercise
26 of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Ayla, LLC v. Alya Skin Pty. Ltd., 11 F.4th
27 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2021). The Court begins with the first prong.
28
1] A. Purposeful Direction and Purposeful Availment
2 Under the first prong, “to be subject to specific jurisdiction the defendant must
3 || purposefully direct its activities toward the forum state, purposefully avail itself of the
4|| privileges of conducting activities there, or engage in some combination thereof.”
5 || Impossible Foods Inc. v. Impossible X LLC, 80 F 4th 1079, 1088 (9th Cir. 2023)
6 || (anternal quotation marks omitted), cert denied, 144 S. Ct. 2561 (2024). Whether a
7 || court evaluates “‘a defendant’s contacts under the purposeful direction or purposeful
8 | availment test turns on the nature of the underlying claims.” J/d. (internal quotation
9 || marks omitted). “Outside the declaratory judgment context,” the Ninth Circuit has
10 | found “the purposeful direction framework is most applicable” for trademark
11 || infringement claims. /d. (collecting cases).
12 Recently, the Ninth Circuit commented that the “doctrinal dichotomy” created by
13 || these two tests “could be an ill-fit for evaluating a declaratory judgment case in which
14 || the traditional roles of plaintiff and defendant are reversed.” /d. at 1089. In Impossible
15 || Foods, the Ninth Circuit noted that this 1s “especially” the case where “the defendant’s
16 || actions were largely taken from within the state.” Jd. Therefore, in that case—where
17 || the defendant company had operated out of the forum state for years and its sole member
18 || maintained a residence and workspace and conducted his business activities on behalf
19 | of the company in the forum state—the Ninth Circuit collapsed the purposeful
20 || availment and purposeful direction tests to inquire into the defendant’s “purposefulness
21 || vis-a-vis the forum state, ensuring that defendants are not haled into a jurisdiction solely
22 || as aresult of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.” /d. (internal quotation marks
23 || omitted).
24 However, this case is unlike Impossible Foods, and the Court finds it appropriate
25 || to use the traditionally applied purposeful direction test for trademark infringement.
26 || See, e.g., San Diego Cnty. Credit Union v. Citizens Equity First Credit Union, 65 F.4th
27 || 1012, 1035 (9th Cir. 2023); Herbal Brands, Inc. vy. Photoplaza, Inc., 72 F.4th 1085,
28 || 1090-91 (9th Cir. 2023). First, this case does not solely concern trademark
1 non-infringement, but also a claim for trademark infringement. (See Compl. ¶¶ 54–57.)
2 Second, the parties agree that the purposeful direction test applies. (See Mot. 12–13;
3 Opp’n 1.) Finally, this case is distinct from the unique circumstances of Impossible
4 Foods, where the Ninth Circuit found the “doctrinal dichotomy” was “especially”
5 unhelpful: where “the defendant’s actions were largely taken from within the state.”
6 Impossible Foods, 80 F.4th at 1089. While Tipsy New York’s past sales and shipments
7 to California are relevant, Tippsy California and Ito do not allege that Tipsy New York
8 and Neville sold their products from within California or ever held their headquarters
9 or residences there. (See Compl.); Impossible Foods, 80 F.4th at 1089, 1091
10 (concluding that defendant’s “trademark building activities” in the forum state “are
11 sufficient to satisfy” the first prong). Accordingly, as the Ninth Circuit has done in
12 some declaratory judgment trademark cases, the Court applies the purposeful direction
13 test. Cf. San Diego Cnty. Credit Union, 65 F.4th at 1035 (analyzing purposeful
14 direction in declaratory judgment non-infringement action).
15 To determine whether a defendant “purposefully directed” its activities toward
16 the forum, courts apply the “effects” test derived from Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783
17 (1984). Herbal Brands, 72 F.4th at 1091. That “test asks whether the defendant:
18 (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing
19 harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Id. (internal
20 quotation marks omitted).
21 1. Intentional Act
22 In their Complaint, Tippsy California and Ito identify at least one intentional act
23 by Tippsy New York and Neville: Tipsy New York’s California sales. (Compl. ¶ 8);
24 see Herbal Brands, 72 F.4th at 1091 (finding defendants’ sale of products to forum state
25 residents to be an intentional act).
26
27
28
1 2. Expressly Aiming
2 Tipsy New York and Neville argue that they “did not expressly aim their conduct
3 at” California through their website. (Reply 4; see Mot. 14–16.) Tippsy California and
4 Ito disagree.3 (Opp’n 1–4.)
5 The Ninth Circuit has said that “operation of an interactive website does not, by
6 itself, establish express aiming.” Herbal Brands, 72 F.4th at 1091. However,
7 “operating a website in conjunction with something more—conduct directly targeting
8 the forum—is sufficient to satisfy the express aiming prong.” Id. at 1092 (internal
9 quotation marks omitted). Therefore, in Herbal Brands, the Ninth Circuit held “that if
10 a defendant, in its regular course of business, sells a physical product via an interactive
11 website and causes that product to be delivered to the forum, the defendant ‘expressly
12 aimed’ its conduct at that forum.” Id. at 1093. Whether a sale is in “the defendant’s
13 regular course of business instead of being random, isolated, or fortuitous,” is a “case-
14 specific question” based on “factors such as the seller’s identity (individual or a business
15 entity), the nature of the website used, the defendant’s total volume of online sales
16 including sales outside the forum, the number or variety of products offered on the
17 defendant’s website, and the defendant’s online advertising.” Id. at 1094 (internal
18 quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “the defendant must exercise some level of
19 control over the ultimate distribution of its products beyond simply placing its products
20 into the stream of commerce.” Id. The Court evaluates both factors.
21
22
23 3 In the Complaint, Tippsy California and Ito also allege that this Court has personal jurisdiction over
Tipsy New York and Neville, in part, “because they have made accusations of infringement directed
24
at [Tippsy California and Ito] within this judicial district.” (Compl. ¶ 8.) In the Motion, Tipsy New
25 York and Neville contend that sending cease-and-desist letters to Tippsy California and Ito does not
establish personal jurisdiction. (Mot. 14–16.) Tippsy California and Ito do not argue otherwise. (See
26 Opp’n.) Therefore, the Court finds these letters do not establish personal jurisdiction. See Impossible
Foods, 80 F.4th at 1091 (noting “that in the usual case, a cease and desist letter is not in and of itself
27
sufficient to establishing personal jurisdiction over the sender of the letter” (alteration and internal
28 quotation marks omitted)); Star Fabrics, Inc., 2017 WL 10439691, at *3 (holding that courts may
deem unopposed arguments waived).
1 a. Regular Course of Business
2 The parties disagree about the implications of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Herbal
3 Brands and the relevance of Tipsy New York ’s wine sales and shipments to California
4 before 2022. (See Mot. 16–17; Opp’n 1–6; Reply 3–7.) First, the parties dispute the
5 relevance of the “the volume of sales” from the express aiming analysis. (See Opp’n 5–
6 6; Reply 3–4.) Second, Tippsy California and Ito assert that Tipsy New York’s
7 pre-2022 California sales support express aiming, while Tipsy New York and Neville
8 highlight Tipsy New York’s lack of sales since 2022. (See Opp’n 4–5; Reply 4–5.)
9 In Herbal Brands, one factor the Ninth Circuit identified as relevant to the regular
10 course of business analysis is “the defendant’s total volume of online sales including
11 sales outside the forum.” Herbal Brands, 72 F.4th at 1094. Elsewhere in that case, the
12 Ninth Circuit stated that “the outcome of the express-aiming inquiry does not depend
13 on the number of sales made to customers in the forum,” and “[i]nstead of taking on an
14 arbitrary line-drawing task,” the inquiry “require[s] only that the sale must occur in the
15 defendant’s regular course of business.” Id. at 1095. Thus, courts look to the total
16 volume of online sales of the business as a whole—not those solely made in the forum
17 state—to determine whether the type of sales made in the forum state are in the regular
18 course of business. See Oceanside Health Prods., LLC v. Dvir Deri, LLC, No. 23-
19 55481, 2024 WL 2269270, at *2 (9th Cir. May 20, 2024) (rejecting argument that
20 personal jurisdiction does not exist where plaintiff “does not allege Defendants’
21 sales . . . into California occurred in their regular course of business . . . . because the
22 relevant inquiry for express aiming is whether selling these products . . . occurred as
23 part of Defendants’ regular course of business—that is, the total volume of online sales,
24 both in and out of the forum”); Airhawk Int’l, LLC v. Air Seat Innovations LLC,
25 No. 3:23-CV-1068-AGS-BLM, 2024 WL 4048863, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2024)
26 (holding that defendants only having sold nineteen products, representing 0.175% of
27 total sales in the forum state, “is irrelevant” because the “‘number of sales made to
28
1 customers in the forum’ does not matter for” the regular course of business analysis
2 (quoting Herbal Brands, 72 F.4th at 1095)).
3 Here, there can be no dispute that sales of wine and related products are part of
4 Tipsy New York’s regular course of business. (See Neville Decl. ¶ 11 (stating Tipsy
5 New York “has a website, Shoptipsy.com, which offers various wines, gifts, spirits, and
6 sake for purchase and shipment all over the United States depending on the regulation
7 of a particular state”).) Tipsy New York also does not contest that it made California
8 sales before 2022. (Neville Decl. ¶¶ 20–21.) Instead, Tipsy New York and Neville
9 argue that the relevant time period is from 2022 to the present—when Tipsy New York
10 made zero such transactions with California residents—and that it should be credited
11 with taking “an extra step and intentionally avoid[ing] sales from Californians by telling
12 them they do not ship wines in California.” (Mot. 17.) While potentially relevant to
13 other factors within the personal jurisdiction inquiry, see Impossible Foods, 80 F.4th
14 at 1098, this does not alter the express aiming analysis. Tipsy New York and Neville
15 offer no case law to support a contrary conclusion. (See Mot.; Reply.) Tipsy New York
16 sells wine and other goods (including on its website) as part of its regular course of
17 business and made such sales to California residents. Therefore, Tipsy New York’s
18 California sales satisfy the regular course of business requirement. See Airhawk Int’l,
19 2024 WL 4048863, at *3 (“If anything, these California transactions over multiple years
20 show that the online sales were not truly isolated and thus were in the regular course of
21 business.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
22 b. Control
23 The parties also dispute whether Tipsy New York and Neville exercised “some
24 level of control over the ultimate distribution of its products beyond simply placing its
25 products into the stream of commerce.” Herbal Brands, 72 F.4th at 1094. Tipsy New
26 York and Neville assert that they “exercise[d] control to avoid shipments to California”
27 starting in 2023. (Mot. 17.) If true, then the converse is as well: prior to 2023, Tipsy
28 New York and Neville exercised control by permitting sales and shipments to California
1 and using a third-party processing system to effectuate such sales and shipment.
2 (Neville Decl. ¶ 19); see Herbal Brands, 72 F.4th at 1094–95 (“Defendants exercised
3 control over distribution: they created and maintained a distribution network that
4 reached the relevant forum by choosing to operate on a universally accessible website
5 that accepts orders from residents of all fifty states and delivers products to all fifty
6 states.”). Tipsy New York and Neville need not have personally delivered the goods
7 themselves. Herbal Brands, 72 F.4th at 1092 n.4 (“Although Defendants are removed
8 from the process of handling orders, the use of [third-party] fulfillment service to handle
9 shipping logistics does not alter our jurisdictional analysis any more than a seller’s use
10 of the post office to ship its products would affect the inquiry.”).
11 Having found that Tipsy New York “sold products to [California] residents via
12 an interactive website in their regular course of business and causes those products to
13 be delivered to the forum,” the Court finds that Tipsy New York expressly aimed its
14 conduct at California.4 Id. at 1095.
15 3. Harm Suffered in California
16 The purposeful direction test’s third prong “asks whether the intentional acts
17 caused harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” In re
18 W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 744 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d
19 sub nom. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373 (2015). In the trademark
20 infringement context, courts typically find this prong satisfied where a plaintiff alleges
21 that a defendant knew of a potential dispute connected to the forum state. For example,
22
23
24
25
26
27
4 As Tippsy California and Ito ultimately fail to show specific personal jurisdiction exists over Tipsy
28 New York, the Court need not—and does not—decide whether Tipsy New York’s California activities
would be sufficient to support this Court’s personal jurisdiction over Neville.
1 where a defendant knew a plaintiff resided in the forum state and intentionally infringed
2 on their trademark,5 or had notice of potential dispute from a cease-and-desist letter.6
3 Tippsy California and Ito make no such allegations here. While Tippsy
4 California and Ito assert a cause of action for trademark infringement, they do not allege
5 that Tipsy New York and Neville’s infringement was done intentionally, willfully, or
6 knowingly. (See Compl. ¶¶ 54–57.) Tippsy California and Ito’s Complaint contains no
7 allegations that Tipsy New York and Neville even knew of the existence of Tippsy
8 California, Ito, and their trademark when Tipsy New York and Neville were still selling
9 goods to California residents. (See Compl.; Neville Decl. ¶ 25 (declaring that Neville
10 received a call regarding Tippsy California in November 2023, after Tipsy New York
11 and Neville had ceased California wine sales).) And Tippsy California and Ito have not
12 alleged they made Tipsy New York and Neville aware of potential infringement through
13 cease-and-desist letters. (See Compl.) While Tipsy New York and Neville sent such
14 letters to Tippsy California and Ito, (Neville Decl. ¶¶ 25–26), Tipsy New York and
15 Neville did so only after they had ceased California wine sales. As the Ninth Circuit
16 has explained, “[W]ithout the letters Defendants might not have known that Plaintiff[s]
17 would be harmed in” the forum state. Herbal Brands, 72 F.4th at 1091 n.2. Here, Tipsy
18 New York and Neville had no such notice.
19
20
5 See, e.g., Panavision Int’l., L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding prong met
21
where plaintiff alleged defendant “engaged in a scheme to register [plaintiff’s] trademarks . . . for the
22 purpose of extorting money from” plaintiff); Proximo Spirits, Inc. v. Green Lake Brewing Co., LLC,
No. 2:22-cv-02879-SPG (SKx), 2022 WL 17224545, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2022) (finding prong
23 met where defendant was familiar with plaintiff and plaintiff alleged defendant “willfully infringed
Plaintiff’s mark in California by intentionally selling the alleged infringing beer product in the forum
24
state”); Activision Publ’g Inc. v. Activision TV Inc., No. 2:12-cv-08964-SVW (JEMx), 2013 WL
25 1003546, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013) (“[I]t was foreseeable that such harm would be exacted in
California, the place where Plaintiff was known by Defendants to reside.”).
26 6 See, e.g., Herbal Brands, 72 F.4th at 1091 & n.2 (finding cease-and-desist letters provided notice to
defendants that their actions were causing harm in the forum state); San Diego Cnty. Credit Union,
27
65 F.4th at 1035 (defendant’s filing of a cancellation petition with the Trademark Trial and Appeal
28 Board alleging the registration for the mark (used solely in the forum state) must be cancelled satisfied
the first prong).
1 This case is unlike Jmpossible Foods. There, in the declaratory judgment context,
2 || the Ninth Circuit stated that “there is no further requirement that the defendant have
3 || specific knowledge that its in-state conduct would eventually cause harm in that
4 || jurisdiction” where “defendant’s conduct indisputably occurred in the forum state—and
5 || where the defendant was in fact based there.” Impossible Foods, 80 F Ath at 1090.
6 || Here, Tippsy California and Ito do not allege that Tipsy New York and Neville’s
7 || conduct occurred in California or that Tipsy New York and Neville were based in
8 | California. Because Tipsy New York and Neville have not “operated from within”
9 | California, the Court does not focus on their “entire course of dealing” to “establish
10 || sufficient minimum contacts.” Jd. As the Ninth Circuit noted, “[I]t is hardly novel to
11 || say that a company that operated from California for years availed itself of that state’s
12 || privileges.” Jd. Tippsy California and Ito make no such allegation. Jmpossible Foods
13 || is thus inapplicable here.
14 The Court finds that Tippsy California and Ito have not alleged that Tipsy New
15 || York and Neville caused harm that they knew was likely to be suffered in California.
16 || Thus, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the Ca/der effects test, and this Court lacks personal
17 || jurisdiction. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 807 (9th Cir.
18 || 2004) (concluding personal jurisdiction analysis after finding plaintiff failed to satisfy
19 || first prong).
20| B. Jurisdictional Discovery
21 Tippsy California and Ito seek discovery “if the Court is considering granting the
22 || motion.” (Opp’n 8.) In particular, they identify the following fact issues:
23 e The identity of Tipsy New York’s California licenses importer;
24 e Whether Tipsy New York’s California sales were “single bottles, cases of wine,
25 or truck loads;”
26 e Whether California consumers made purchases as part of the Tipsy New York
27 wine club; and
28
1 e The extent of Tipsy New York’s marketing to California customers who were
2 part of Tipsy New York’s wine club. (Ud. at 8-9.)
3 | Whether to grant jurisdictional discovery is subject to the Court’s discretion. Wells
4|| Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 430 n.24 (9th Cir. 1977)
5 || (‘[R]efusal [to grant discovery] is not an abuse of discretion when it is clear that further
6 || discovery would not demonstrate facts sufficient to constitute a basis for jurisdiction.”).
“Where a plaintiff's claim of personal jurisdiction appears to be both attenuated and
8 | based on bare allegations in the face of specific denials made by defendants, the Court
9 || need not permit even limited discovery.” Terracom v. Valley Nat’l Bank, 49 F.3d 555,
10 || 562 (9th Cir. 1995) (alterations omitted).
11 Here, discovery is unnecessary because none of the identified facts would alter
12 | the fatal flaw in the personal jurisdiction analysis: Tippsy California and Ito fail to
13 | allege that Tipsy New York and Neville’s conduct caused foreseeable harm in
14|| California. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Tippsy California and Ito’s request for
15 || jurisdictional discovery.
16 Vv. CONCLUSION
17 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion. (ECF
18 || No. 16.) The action is dismissed without prejudice.
19
20 IT IS SO ORDERED.
21
22 November 14, 2024 N .
23 3
24 Udi
5 OTIS WRIGHT, II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
27
28