State of Tennessee v. Claude W. Cheeks

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

January 23, 2002 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. CLAUDE W. CHEEKS

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Hamilton County

Nos. 222245, 222283, and 223379 Rebecca J. Stern, Judge

No. E2001-00198-CCA-R3-CD

July 22, 2002

The appellant, Claude W. Cheeks, was convicted by a jury in the Hamilton County Criminal Court

of one count of especially aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated assault. The trial court

sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of twenty-five years incarceration in the

Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant specifically raises the following

issues: (1) “whether the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider the evidence where the

State’s doctors all supported the insanity defense and there was no sufficient lay testimony, nor other

testimony that contradicted the insanity defense,” and (2) “whether it is permissible for the State to

seek the assistance of expert witnesses in the field of psychiatry, then to provide the experts the

information on which to base their opinion, and then at trial to reject the State’s experts and attack

their results and offer no proof.” Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the

judgments of the trial court on all three counts, institute verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity

on each count, and remand for proceedings pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-7-303 (2001).

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court are Reversed,

Modified, and Remanded.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GARY R. WADE, P.J., joined.

JOSEPH M. TIPTON, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Bryan Henry Hoss, C. Leland Davis, and David W. Wallace, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the

appellant, Claude W. Cheeks.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Angele M. Gregory, Assistant Attorney General;

William H. Cox, District Attorney General; and Dean Ferraro and Mary Sullivan Moore, Assistant

District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background

On the morning of June 24, 1998, at approximately 10:30 a.m. or 11:00 a.m., the

victim, Frederick Stuart Newman, and his son, Christopher, walked from Newman’s restaurant to

AmSouth Bank in downtown Chattanooga to get change for the restaurant. At trial, Newman

testified that he and eight-year-old Christopher walked into the bank, talked with some people they

knew, and then requested the change from the teller. He placed the change in a blue AmSouth

deposit bag and picked up the bags from the previous day’s deposit. Newman noted that, after

collecting money from the bank, his normal procedure was to walk into the outer lobby of the bank,

look around for anything that might be of concern, and light a cigarette before leaving the building.

As Newman and Christopher walked into the outer lobby of the bank, the appellant

approached and asked Newman for a cigarette. Newman replied that he was sorry, but the cigarette

in his hand was his last. Newman recalled at trial that the appellant did not appear angry or agitated

by his response, and Newman and Christopher continued to walk out of the building. Newman

further testified that he has no memory of leaving the bank, but he does remember falling onto the

pavement outside the bank, explaining that “I was you know, thinking, you know, ‘What a dummy,

you just tripped over your shoelaces.’” He recounted that he had “tunnel vision” and then felt

himself hit the pavement. He heard Christopher scream but was unable to get up. Newman related

that he next remembers being dragged into the bank where he drifted in and out of consciousness

while his wife, a nurse who was called to the scene, worked to stabilize him until an ambulance

arrived.

When Newman regained consciousness, neither he nor his son had possession of the

deposit bag. He explained that he received lacerations to the back of his skull, which injuries

required thirty to forty stitches, and his skull was fractured. He also had “a brain hemorrhage,” as

well as additional fractures. Newman stated that he continues to have pain, mobility problems, and

memory problems. Specifically, he estimated that he has “about 70 percent of my abilities back, and

that [is] probably about as far as I [can] go.”

Christopher Newman testified that he was with his dad on the day of the offenses.

He saw the appellant as they walked out of the bank. As they left, he saw his dad fall to the ground,

and the appellant started beating his dad on the head with a cinder block. Christopher screamed and

ran into the bank for help. When he ran back to his dad, he saw a man named Ron Hines stop his car

and attempt to assist Newman. The appellant then attacked Hines. Christopher noted that the

appellant took the bag of change from his dad.

Teresa Bailey, an employee of AmSouth Bank, was working at the bank’s downtown

branch on June 24, 1998. She testified that, on the morning of the offenses, she observed the

appellant come into the bank on two separate occasions and was informed that he withdrew two

dollars ($2) from his account on each visit. Bailey recounted that she had known the appellant “years

ago” when she worked at the Freight Depot office where the appellant had an account. She recalled

that the appellant frequently came into the Freight Depot office to cash checks or make deposits. She

did not know if the appellant was a frequent customer at the downtown AmSouth Bank because she

had “just been back to that bank.” Although she did not assist the appellant on the morning of the

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offenses, she did observe him walk across the lobby of the bank during both visits. Bailey concluded

that the appellant appeared to act normally and seemed to be in control of his physical and mental

facilities. She contended that two withdrawals of two dollars ($2) each within a two-hour period was

not abnormal banking procedure. Bailey conceded that she was in a separate room and did not

witness the assault on Newman.

Kimberly Needham Day testified that, on the day of the offenses, she was walking

out of a building next to AmSouth Bank in downtown Chattanooga when she saw the appellant walk

behind Newman and Christopher, raise a cinder block, and hit Newman on the head two or three

times. She asserted that the appellant quickly walked away holding a blue deposit bag. The area was

busy because of the lunchtime crowd, and the appellant was followed by several people who

attempted to detain him. She did not see the arrest and was unable to say whether the appellant

resisted arrest. Day acknowledged that she observed the appellant for only ten or fifteen seconds

from a distance of forty feet. However, she positively identified the appellant as the perpetrator.

Ronald Hines testified that, on June 24, 1998, he was driving through downtown

Chattanooga when he saw the appellant standing over Newman, beating Newman on the back of the

head. Hines jumped from his vehicle and ran toward the appellant, ordering the appellant to stop.

The appellant stopped, looked up at Hines with his hand raised, snatched the deposit bag, and ran

down the street. Hines continued shouting, demanding that the appellant stop. The appellant

stopped in a crowd of people, turned to Hines, and said, “Oh, you want some of this?” The appellant

then lunged at Hines and struck him in the head with the cinder block. The two men “tussled,” and

Hines forced the appellant against a tree. The appellant hit Hines in the shoulder with the cinder

block, and Hines struck the appellant in the groin. When the appellant dropped to his knees, Hines

ran to the nearby Justice Building to obtain assistance. The appellant was eventually apprehended

by police. As a result of the altercation, Hines sustained a bruise on his shoulder and received eleven

stitches in his head.

Officer James T. Chapin of the Chattanooga Police Department testified that he was

having lunch at a restaurant in the area when he received a report of a robbery in progress. As he

stepped outside the restaurant, he looked across the street and saw the appellant walking on the

sidewalk. The appellant was being followed by a crowd of people who were pointing at him and also

by a truck whose driver was honking the horn. The appellant was not running or fleeing but

appeared to be “just walking.” Officer Chapin approached the appellant and told him to stop. The

appellant complied, offering no resistance. Officer Chapin then placed the appellant under arrest.

Officer Chapin testified that, at the time of the arrest, he was in uniform and visibly armed. A

deposit bag was in the appellant’s hand, and a piece of cinder block was found in the appellant’s

jacket pocket.

Following the appellant’s arrest, Officer Chapin transported him to the police station.

The appellant remained mostly uncommunicative and sat on a bench with a “blank look on his face.”

When Officer Chapin asked the appellant why he had committed the crime, the appellant replied,

“I was hungry,” asked “When is lunch?” and began laughing. Officer Chapin conceded that,

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immediately upon encountering the appellant, it was apparent that “there was something wrong with

this guy.” The appellant’s eyes were vacant and emotionless, he had been followed by a vocal crowd

without seeming to notice, and he laughed and smiled inappropriately during the booking procedure.

Dr. David Ciraulo, a trauma critical care surgeon at Erlanger Medical Center, treated

Newman following the assault. He reported that Newman was hospitalized for three to four days

following his injuries. As a result of the injuries, including a closed head injury, Newman suffered

extreme pain and extensive blood loss. At the time of discharge, Newman had problems maintaining

his gait and was sent home with a walker. Newman also complained of headaches and memory

problems. Dr. Ciraulo opined that such an injury poses a substantial risk of death.

After presenting the foregoing proof, the State rested. The defense moved for

judgments of acquittal, which motions were denied. Thereafter, the defense presented the testimony

of two mental health professionals, Dr. Bob Brown and Dr. Madhusudham Mudiam.

Dr. Brown testified that he is a psychologist and is employed by the State of

Tennessee at Moccasin Bend Mental Health Institute (MBMHI). In 1998, in response to a request

by the trial court, an evaluation team at MBMHI performed a forensic evaluation of the appellant for

the court. Dr. Brown, a member of the team, explained that, when the court requests a forensic

evaluation, typically the questions to be answered are: whether the individual is competent to stand

trial, whether the individual can defend himself against the charges in a court of law, and whether

there is support for the insanity defense. Accordingly, the evaluator must determine the mental state

of the individual at the time of the crime as well as at the time of trial. Dr. Brown stated that, of all

cases referred by the courts in a given year, only four percent (4%) to six percent (6%) can support

an insanity defense. Dr. Brown stated that a finding of incompetency to stand trial is also rare.

In October 1998, following the forensic evaluation at MBMHI, the evaluation team

deemed the appellant incompetent to stand trial due to his confusion and paranoia. Dr. Brown

explained that the appellant was unable to understand the charges against him, was unable to

cooperate with his attorney, did not understand a court proceeding, and “could not even manage his

behavior appropriately in a courtroom setting.” Notably, during a meeting with the evaluation team,

the appellant claimed that “Dr. Nickerson is the judicial judge.” Dr. Brown concluded that the

appellant was in need of “extensive, intensive, inpatient psychiatric services.”

Dr. Brown further related that the appellant has a history of treatment for mental

illness, which history began in April 1980 when the appellant was admitted to MBMHI and was

diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, a diagnosis that was reiterated in later years. Dr. Brown

explained that schizophrenia is, “in the opinion of most mental health clinicians, probably the most

severe form of mental illness.” Specifically addressing the appellant’s mental condition in 1998, Dr.

Brown noted that

[he] had the disorganized behavior, which is one of the prominent

features [of paranoid schizophrenia]. He could not adequately

monitor his behavior, behave himself adequately the first time we

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wanted to meet with him and the second time, we had to terminate

because he was so agitated, and we felt that the [evaluation] team was

at risk of being harmed by his behavior.

Dr. Brown observed, however, that someone suffering from paranoid schizophrenia could also

appear superficially normal.

Dr. Brown additionally recalled that, during an interview on November 3, 1998, the

appellant told the evaluation team that he attacked Newman because he was chosen by the Lord to

intervene in Newman’s life. Additionally, the appellant stated that “Satan saved my life. I read the

Bible through twice, took three years. God asked me to rule the world.” Dr. Brown reported that

the appellant then began to stare at the members of the team and laugh inappropriately. It was on

this occasion that the interview was terminated due to concern that the team was at “risk of harm”

from the appellant. Dr. Brown reported that, following this interview, the appellant responded well

to antipsychotic medication, and, on November 12, 1998, he was discharged. At that time, the

appellant was deemed competent to stand trial. However, Dr. Brown asserted that the forensic team

unanimously concluded that an insanity defense could be supported. Following his discharge, the

appellant was returned to jail, and his treatment was monitored through the Sheriff’s Department by

Johnson Mental Health Center.

In early 2000, the trial court ordered a reevaluation of the appellant. The appellant

was readmitted to MBMHI on February 16, 2000, and an evaluation team was again assembled to

assess the appellant.1 The team once again concluded that the appellant was competent to stand trial

but noted that

[i]t has been determined that a defense of insanity on the charges of

aggravated assault and aggravated robbery can be supported on the

basis of a severe mental illness as a result of a psychotic spectrum

disorder, in [the appellant’s] case, schizoaffective disorder.

Specifically, Dr. Brown explained that “[t]he conclusion in ‘98 and in 2000 are the same. And in

probably the most basic terms, the [appellant] could not appreciate the rightfulness or the

wrongfulness of his conduct” because “[all] the data that we have available indicates that he was

suffering from the acute phase of schizophrenia at the time of the alleged offenses.”

On cross-examination, Dr. Brown conceded that there were some inconsistencies in

the appellant’s version of events. Dr. Brown also acknowledged that, on the day of the offenses, the

appellant was in sufficient control of his behavior to go into the bank where he had an account,

withdraw funds from his account, and, after the offenses, submit to an armed, uniformed police

officer. Finally, Dr. Brown admitted that, during the 2000 evaluation, two tests showed that the

appellant was malingering to gain support for his insanity defense and to show his innocence of the

crimes charged. Nevertheless, Dr. Brown maintained that the malingering was taken into account

1

The “attending members of the forensic team” for the 2000 evaluation were Dr. Bob Brown, Wilbert Bunch,

Dr. Madhusudham Mudiam, Dr. John Lowe, Dr. Willis Marshall, John Hartman, Ed Rocca, Do nald Bailey , Ursu la Bell,

and Patricia Alverson.

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by the team in their evaluation, and Dr. Brown unwaveringly asserted that an insanity defense could

be supported.

The second witness to testify for the defense was Dr. Mudiam, a psychiatrist who

worked at MBMHI and was a member of the forensic team that evaluated the appellant in 2000. At

the time of Dr. Mudiam’s evaluation, the appellant was receiving antipsychotic medication. Dr.

Mudiam testified that the appellant was diagnosed with

Schizoaffective Disorder and what that means is a person sometimes

in the course of the mental illness, in addition to the symptoms that

are primarily associated with schizophrenia, which are like hearing

the voices that are not there or feeling like people are out to get them.

The patients also suffer from associated symptoms of what we call as

either mania or depression.

According to Dr. Mudiam, the appellant exhibited the features of mania, namely elation and excess

energy. He opined that the appellant was “suffering from severe mental illness at the time of the

alleged events,” and, based upon the information he obtained, the appellant “was not able to

appreciate the nature of the wrongfulness of the alleged act.”

Dr. Mudiam noted that, in addition to the facts regarding the appellant’s account of

his offenses, the forensic team also strongly considered the statements of the arresting officer.

Specifically, the psychological report noted Officer Chapin’s comments that he recognized that the

appellant was suffering from a mental illness and that he knew “right away that this was going to be

one of those cases.” The report also noted that, prior to the offenses, the appellant had two previous

admissions to MBMHI. The admissions followed two incidents in which the appellant was

apparently “acting bizarre on the streets” and was picked up by police after threatening to kill people.

The appellant also reported hearing voices that only he could hear. Although Dr. Mudiam conceded

that the appellant gave conflicting reports in 1998 and 2000 as to whether he heard voices at the time

of the offenses, Dr. Mudiam reiterated his belief that an insanity defense could be supported.

On cross-examination, Dr. Mudiam admitted that he did not meet the appellant until

the 2000 evaluation, almost two years after the offenses. He agreed that assessing an individual’s

mental state so long after the offenses is more difficult. He also noted that he received most of the

information regarding the offenses from the District Attorney General’s Office. Additionally, in

response to the State’s question concerning whether the appellant knew the difference between right

and wrong, Dr. Mudiam testified that “[a]t the time he was seen in the forensic team [in 2000] he

knew but not on the day of the alleged crime.” Dr. Mudiam explained that, at the time of trial, the

appellant knew right from wrong and could control his behavior because, unlike the day of the

offenses, the appellant was taking his medication and receiving mental health treatment.

After considering the foregoing evidence, the jury found the appellant guilty of the

aggravated assault of Hines, the aggravated assault of Newman, and the especially aggravated

robbery of Newman. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a Range I offender to three years

incarceration for the aggravated assault of Hines, four years for the aggravated assault of Newman,

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and twenty-one years for the especially aggravated robbery of Newman. The trial court ordered that

the sentences for aggravated assault be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to the

especially aggravated robbery sentence for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years

incarceration. On appeal, the appellant alleges that the trial court erred by denying his motions for

judgments of acquittal because there was no evidence to contradict the insanity defense and because

he contends that “it is [im]permissible for the State to seek the assistance of expert witnesses in the

field of psychiatry, then to provide the experts the information on which to base their opinion, and

then at trial to reject the State’s experts and attack their results and offer no proof.” 2

II. Analysis

Although the appellant outlines his argument as two separate issues, the heart of the

appellant’s challenge is whether the trial court erred in failing to grant his motions for judgments of

acquittal at the conclusion of all of the proof.3 The standard employed by the trial court in ruling

upon a motion for judgment of acquittal is essentially the same standard utilized by this court on

appeal when examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Carroll, 36 S.W.3d

854, 869 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). Accordingly, before granting a judgment of acquittal, the State

is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which may

be drawn therefrom. State v. Price, 46 S.W.3d 785, 818 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000), perm. to appeal

denied, (Tenn. 2001). Additionally, we note that “[t]he weight and credibility of the witnesses’

testimony are matters entrusted exclusively to the jury as the triers of fact.” State v. Manning, 909

S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). The appellant bears the burden of establishing that no

reasonable trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offenses in question beyond

a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Price,

46 S.W.3d at 818; Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).

The appellant was indicted for the aggravated assault of Hines, the aggravated assault

of Newman, and the especially aggravated robbery of Newman. Based upon our review of the

record, we conclude that the evidence clearly demonstrates that the appellant committed the alleged

crimes. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-102(a)(1) and -403(a) (1997). Moreover, at trial and on

appeal, the appellant concedes that he committed each of the charged offenses. However, the

appellant contends that he established the defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence, and,

therefore, he should have been found not guilty by reason of insanity.

2

Although the appellant’s brief states his issues in these terms, his argument focuses on the trial court’s denial

of his mo tion fo r judg me nts of acqu ittal.

3

We note that, because the State no longer bears the burden of establishing the appellant’s sanity as an element

of the offenses, see State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn. Crim. App. 199 9), and the appellant conceded that he

comm itted the offenses, the appropriate time for the motions for judgments of acquittal was at the conclusion of the

defense proof. In the instant case, the appe llant m ove d for judg me nts of acquittal at the conclusion of the State’s proof

and at the conclusion of the defense pro of.

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The insanity defense became an affirmative defense on July 1, 1995.4 The statute

codifying the defense, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-501(a) (1997), provides:

It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the

commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a

result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate

the nature or wrongfulness of such defendant’s acts. Mental disease

or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. The defendant has

the burden of proving the defense of insanity by clear and convincing

evidence.

Evidence is clear and convincing when “there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness

of the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence.” State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 912 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1999). Such a burden is higher than “preponderance of the evidence,” and lesser than

“beyond a reasonable doubt.” O’Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 188 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

Moreover, this court recently explained that,

[i]n determining the issue of insanity, the trier of fact may consider

both lay and expert testimony and may discount expert testimony

which it finds to be in conflict with the facts of the case. Where there

is a conflict between expert testimony and testimony as to the facts,

the trier of fact is not required to accept expert testimony over other

testimony and must determine the weight and credibility of each in

light of all the facts and circumstances of the case. In determining the

defendant’s mental status at the time of the alleged crime, the trier of

fact may look to the evidence of his actions and words before, at, and

immediately after the commission of the offense.

Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 912 (citations omitted). We further note that, given the nature of the question

to be answered by the jury, cases involving the insanity defense are particularly fact-specific.

In the instant case, the lay witnesses who testified on behalf of the State had

extremely limited contact with the appellant at the time of the offenses and had little or no contact

with him prior to the offenses. Specifically, Bailey had known the appellant “years ago” but had no

recent contact with the appellant other than to observe him from a distance as he walked across the

lobby of the bank on the morning of the offenses.5 Day had never seen the appellant prior to the day

4

Prior to July 1, 19 95, th e defend ant bore th e initial bu rden of proof regarding his or he r insan ity. State v.

Sparks, 891 S.W.2d 607, 615 (Ten n. 19 95); see also Ten n. Co de A nn. § 39-11-501 (1991); Gra ham v. State , 547 S.W.2d

531, 544 (Tenn. 1977). Then, if the proof raised a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s sanity, the burden shifted to

the State to prove the defendant’s sanity as an element of the offense. Sparks, 891 S.W .2d at 615 -616; see also

Wilcoxson v. State , 22 S.W.3d 289, 314 -15 (Tenn . Crim. App. 19 99).

5

We note that, prior to the chan ge in the insa nity defen se in 1995, this court stated that “lay testimon y of a

defendant’s normal behavior, in and of itself, is insufficient to rebut the testimony o f expert witnesses when the mental

illness or de fect inv olved is of su ch a n ature that the appellant w ould behave normally and would not exhibit any signs

of mental illness unless specifically questioned as to that defect.” State v. Laura Ann Hudson, No. 01C01-9608-CC-

(con tinued...)

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of the offenses and only observed him for ten or fifteen seconds from a distance of approximately

forty feet. Notably absent is the testimony of any witness who had any relationship with, contact

with, or extended knowledge of the appellant. See State v. Christopher M. Flake, No. W2000-

01131-CCA-MR3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 517, at *15 (Jackson, July 13, 2001), perm.

to appeal granted, (Tenn. 2001); cf. State v. Sparks, 891 S.W.2d 607, 617 (Tenn. 1995); State v.

James Morrow, No. 02C01-9810-CR-00333, 1999 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 1326, at **8-9

(Jackson, December 29, 1999). Other than Officer Chapin and a brief comment to Hines (“Do you

want a piece of this?”), no witness even had a conversation with the appellant. Moreover, the State’s

witness Officer Chapin clearly recognized that the appellant was suffering from a mental health

problem. In sum, the sparse lay testimony offered by the State is simply inadequate to refute the

testimony of the expert witnesses that the appellant could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his

conduct. See Flake, No. W2000-01131-CCA-MR3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 517, at *13;

cf. State v. Brian Val Kelley, No. M2001-00461-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 424,

at **61-69 (Nashville, May 7, 2002).

Significantly, the mental health experts who testified at trial evaluated the appellant

at the request of the trial court. Moreover, these experts testified that they routinely perform

evaluations on behalf of the State. The experts initially found the appellant incompetent to stand

trial; yet, through treatment and medication, his condition improved, and he was eventually deemed

competent to stand trial. However, for more than two years after the offenses, the experts

consistently and unanimously concluded that an insanity defense could be supported in the

appellant’s case. Specifically, as we earlier noted, both mental health experts, after extensively

evaluating the appellant, vehemently testified that the appellant was suffering from a severe mental

illness at the time of the offenses and could not appreciate the wrongfulness of his acts. See Flake,

No. W2000-01131-CCA-MR3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 517, at *14; cf. Kelley, No.

M2001-00461-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 424, at *63; State v. Charles Edward

Overby, No. E1999-00253-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 179, at *19 (Knoxville,

March 6, 2000), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 2000) (recommended for publication). While we

acknowledge that the State thoroughly cross-examined the appellant’s experts, the appellant’s

witnesses did not waiver in their assessment that the appellant could not appreciate the wrongfulness

of his conduct at the time of the offenses. Accordingly, “[t]he testimony of state witnesses . . . did

not create an issue for the jury.” Flake, No. W2000-01131-CCA-MR3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App.

LEXIS 517, at *14. Notably, the expert testimony was not “in conflict with the facts of the case.”

Sparks, 891 S.W.2d at 616. We recognize that, generally, if there is any evidence to support the

jury’s rejection of the insanity defense, this court must defer to the findings of the triers of fact. State

v. Perry, 13 S.W.3d 724, 734 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). However, “our review of the record does

not reveal sufficient lay testimony, nor expert testimony, concerning the defendant’s mental state at

or near the time of the [offenses] that would justify rejection of the insanity defense.” Flake, No.

W2000-01131-CCA-MR3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 517, at *16. Therefore,

5

(...continued)

00270 , 1999 Ten n. Crim. App . LEX IS 144, at **21 -22 (Nashv ille, February 19 , 1999).

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[a]fter a [thorough] review of the evidence, we reach the following

inescapable conclusion: a rational trier of fact could only find that

there is no serious or substantial doubt that the defendant, at the time

of the [offenses], was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his

act[s] as a result of a severe mental disease.

Id. at *15.

We emphasize in closing that there are two recent cases authored by this court

regarding the insanity defense. In the most recent case, Kelley, No. M2001-00461-CCA-R3-CD,

2002 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 424, at *61, this court explained that

[t]he insanity defense has two prongs, both of which must be

satisfied: (1) a severe mental disease or defect must exist at the time

of the crime, and (2) the disease or defect must have resulted in the

defendant’s inability to appreciate the nature or wrongfulness of his

criminal actions.

Upon review of the record in Kelley, we concluded that, “[w]ith regard to the first prong, whether

Defendant suffered from a severe mental disease or defect, the proof overwhelmingly supports

Defendant’s position.” Id. However, because the experts were “less decisive” on the issue of

whether Kelley appreciated the wrongfulness of his actions and because there was proof in the record

that Kelley had repeatedly recognized that his actions were wrong, Kelley failed to establish the

second prong of the insanity defense by clear and convincing evidence.6 Id. at **62-63; see also

Holder, 15 S.W.3d at 909-10.

In the second case, Flake, No. W2000-01131-CCA-MR3-CD, 2001 Tenn. Crim. App.

LEXIS 517, at **13-14 (footnote and citation omitted),

[b]oth evaluating psychiatrists and all evaluating clinical

psychologists testified that the defendant, at the time of the offense,

suffered from a severe mental disease and was unable to appreciate

the wrongfulness of his act. The medical testimony consistently

supported the statutory elements of the insanity defense. Even the

two non-evaluating physicians called by the state in rebuttal agreed

that the defendant suffered from a severe mental disease.

Accordingly, this court found that Flake had established the insanity defense by clear and convincing

evidence, requiring the judgment against Flake to be modified to “Not Guilty By Reason of

Insanity.” Id. at *17. Of the two cases, we conclude that the facts of the instant case are

distinguishable from those in Kelley and are more closely aligned with those in Flake. Accordingly,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we can only conclude that the

6

Kelley often acknowledged that “‘What I did according to the laws of this country, yes, sir, it was wrong.

But I don’t go by the laws of this land, I go by the laws of God.’” Kelley, No. M 2001-00 461-CC A-R3-CD , 2002 T enn.

Crim. App. LEXIS 424, at **62-63.

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appellant established by clear and convincing evidence that he was insane at the time of the offenses.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the judgments of the trial court, modify the

judgments to reflect that the appellant is found “not guilty by reason of insanity” on all three counts,

and remand for further proceedings. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-7-303 (2001).

___________________________________

NORMA McGEE OGLE, JUDGE

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