Hamill v. Twin Cedars Senior Living, LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JEANNE M. HAMILL, : Civ. No. 3:20-CV-231

Individually and as Administratrix and :

Administratrix ad Prosequendum of the :

Estate of Eugene Hamill, Deceased, :

: (Judge Mehalchick)

:

Plaintiff, :

: (Magistrate Judge Carlson)

v. :

:

TWIN CEDARS SENIOR LIVING, LLC,:

d/b/a and a/k/a Twin Cedars :

Senior Living, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Statement of Facts and of the Case

This is a personal injury, wrongful death, and survival action brought by

Jeanne Hamill as administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Eugene Hamill.

This case now comes before us for consideration of two defense sanctions motions:

a motion for imposition of attorneys’ fees as a sanction for discovery defaults, (Doc.

187), and a separate Rule 11 sanctions motion based upon what the defendants

characterize as the pursuit of a frivolous fraudulent transfer claim by the plaintiff.

(Doc. 262).

These motions call upon us to revisit three recurring themes in this litigation.

First, we must examine the persistent efforts of the plaintiff to extend liability in this

case to parties who had no involvement in the events that allegedly resulted in

Eugene Hamill’s injuries and death through various fraudulent transfer claims.

Hamill has pursued these allegations of fraudulent asset transfers repeatedly

throughout this litigation, but with a dearth of proof to support her claims.

Second, we must reflect upon what have been a series of grave discovery

delinquencies by the plaintiff in the course of this litigation. These delinquencies and

shortcomings have involved neglect and failure to comply with court orders in a

timely fashion; unexcused failures to produce evidence; and an inexplicable and

potentially prejudicial neglect of expert witness disclosure deadlines. In considering

these discovery defaults we do not write upon a blank slate. Quite the contrary, we

have already found that: “These are grave errors that in our view warrant some

sanctions. However, we recognize that this case involves claims arising out of a

fatality, and we do not believe that the lawyer’s error should redound to the detriment

of the client.” (Doc. 182, at 1). Therefore, we denied the defendants’ request to

preclude expert testimony, but have granted the defendants leave to pursue monetary

sanctions against plaintiff’s counsel. (Id.)

Finally, these motions remind us that the parties’ pursuit of sanctions in this

case has, on occasion, delayed resolution of the important issues relating to the

underlying merits of the plaintiff’s claims, claims that involve a fatality. We have

previously decried the degree to which these sanctions disputes have delayed the

progress of this case. We firmly believe that all parties should in the first instance

give the highest priority to resolving the merits of this case.

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

In considering these two sanctions motions we do not write upon a blank slate.

Quite the contrary, as discussed below, the often tortured past of this case now sets

the stage for the current sanctions litigation.

A. Plaintiff’s Discovery Defaults

This is certainly true with respect to the defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees

as a discovery sanction, (Doc. 187), where we have already spoken and found a

dereliction of duty on the part of plaintiff’s counsel. Specifically, in November of

2022, we considered a defense sanctions motion which sought preclusion of

evidence as a discovery sanction. At that time, we found that:

[T]he plaintiff has defaulted on her discovery obligations by providing

inadequate responses to some discovery in November of 2020, by

failing to timely schedule depositions in March of 2022, and by failing

to make timely disclosures of expert witnesses by the June 2022

deadline prescribed by the court. (Doc. 142, at 2). While plaintiff's

counsel has some disputes regarding deposition scheduling and the

sufficiency of November 2020 discovery disclosures, with respect to

the failure to make timely disclosure of expert witnesses, it seems

undisputed that plaintiff's counsel did not comply with our scheduling

order.

This failure to provide timely expert discovery is potentially highly

prejudicial to the plaintiff's case.

Hamill v. Twin Cedars Senior Living, LLC, No. 3:20-CV-231, 2022 WL 16841289,

at *1–2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2022).

While we found that the plaintiff’s counsel had engaged in this potentially

prejudicial misconduct, we declined to impose the most drastic sanction of

preclusion of evidence. Instead, we indicated that attorneys’ fees may be the

appropriate sanction, noting that:

[W]e are mindful that “the exclusion of critical evidence is an ‘extreme’

sanction, not normally to be imposed absent a showing of willful

deception or ‘flagrant disregard’ of a court order by the proponent of

the evidence.” Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n,

559 F.2d 894, 905 (3d Cir. 1977). Therefore, the motion to preclude

testimony will be denied, but counsel are directed to prepare a revised

case management plan to allow for completion of expert discovery, and

the court will entertain a request by defense counsel to require plaintiff's

counsel “to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,

caused by the failure” to provide timely and fulsome discovery. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(d)(3).

Id., at *2.

Thus, our prior rulings have foreshadowed that monetary sanctions may well

be appropriate for this series of significant discovery defaults.

B. The Plaintiff’s Fraudulent Transfer Claim

The defendants have also filed a motion seeking Rule 11 sanctions against the

plaintiff’s counsel based upon what they describe as persistent and frivolous efforts

to assert a state law fraudulent transfer of assets claim in this case. (Doc. 262). With

respect to this motion, the past also serves as prologue for our consideration of this

sanctions request. As we observed in the Report and Recommendation which

recommended the dismissal of this claim, Hamill’s counsel has repeatedly pursued

a state law fraudulent transfer claim which was bereft of legal or factual support. At

that time, we recited the following tortured history of this legal claim:

Jeanne Hamill initially brought this case on behalf of her deceased

husband on February 10, 2020. (Doc. 1). Hamill filed an amended

complaint on March 17, 2020, (Doc. 17), and a second amended

complaint on December 31, 2021, which is currently the operative

pleading in this lawsuit. (Doc. 109).

This second amended complaint alleges that Eugene Hamill became a

resident of the defendant, Twin Cedars Senior Living, on July 6, 2018.

(Id., ¶ 24). Mr. Hamill had several serious medical diagnoses, including

hypertension, atrial fibrillation, and coronary artery disease, among

others, and was required to wear a cardiac life vest. (Id., ¶ 25). The

complaint further alleges that on September 11, 2018, Defendant

Tamara Singer, who owned and operated Twin Cedars, made

arrangements to discharge Mr. Hamill from that facility. (Id., ¶ 26).

These arrangements allegedly included a three-hour Uber ride from

Twin Cedars to Mr. Hamill's home in Toms River, New Jersey. (Id., ¶

27). The second amended complaint further alleges that Defendant

Singer was responsible for these arrangements, and that she was told it

was an unsafe discharge plan. (Id.) Nonetheless, Mr. Hamill was

discharged on September 11, 2018, and an Uber took him to his

residence in Toms River.

During the trip to Toms River, Mr. Hamill began vomiting in the Uber

and became unresponsive. As his condition deteriorated, Mr. Hamill

required an EMS transport to Barnabas Health Community Center

where he was intubated, put on a ventilator, and placed in the Intensive

Care Unit. (Id., ¶ 28). Mr. Hamill suffered a stroke and a heart attack.

(Id., ¶30) Following treatment in the ICU, Mr. Hamill was transferred

to a Skilled Nursing Facility, where he remained until he passed away

just over a year later on September 26, 2019. (Id., ¶¶ 29, 30).

While these allegations of medical neglect and negligence are set forth

in detail in the plaintiff's second amended complaint, (Id., ¶¶ 1-35),

notably the only defendants named as participants in these events are

Tamara Singer and Twin Cedars. (Id.) Indeed, the first factual averment

relating to the moving defendants in this case relates to Little Walker's

purchase of the Twin Cedars facility in December of 2019, long after

the events which inspired this lawsuit. (Id., ¶¶ 36, 83-88).

On the basis of these allegations of medical neglect and negligence

which allegedly resulted in the death of Eugene Hamill, the plaintiff's

second amended complaint brings claims of negligence, wrongful

death, and a survival action against Twin Cedars and Singer. (Id.,

Counts I-VI). In addition, the plaintiff's second amended complaint

brings a claim against Singer and Twin Cedars under Pennsylvania's

Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, 73 Pa.C.S. § 201-

1. (Id., Count VII).

However, the second amended complaint also sets forth in Count VIII

a claim naming all of the defendants, including defendants Gutman,

Rohinsky, Little Walker Holdings, LLC, and Shohola Realty, LLC.

(Id., Count VIII). In Count VIII of the second amended complaint, the

plaintiff seeks to void the December 2019 sale of the Twin Cedars

facility to Little Walker Holdings, LLC, and demands other sweeping

injunctive relief including the freezing of assets and an injunction

compelling the parties to place in escrow the proceeds from this

December 2019 real estate transaction pending the ultimate outcome of

this lawsuit. While it is not entirely clear from the second amended

complaint, it appears that the plaintiff asserts this fraudulent transfer

claim pursuant to Pennsylvania's Uniform Fraud Transfer Act

(“PUVTA”). 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5104.

We note that these averments in the plaintiff's second amended

complaint are but the latest in a series of persistent efforts by the

plaintiff to extend the scope of potential liability in this case to parties

who admittedly had no direct involvement in the matters which led to

the death of Eugene Hamill. These efforts began with Hamill's initial

and first amended complaints, both of which named Little Walker

Holdings, LLC, as a defendant based upon a successor corporate

liability theory due to Little Walker's purchase of Twin Cedars in

December of 2019. Upon review of this allegation, we recommended

that this claim be dismissed noting that:

In sum, Hamill has not alleged factual averments that are

sufficient to support an inference of successor liability

against Little Walker, either under a de facto merger

theory or a “mere continuation” theory. Rather, the

complaint solely alleges that Twin Cedars continues to

operate a senior living facility following Little Walker's

purchase of its assets. This is simply not enough to state a

claim for successor liability against Little Walker.

Hamill v. Twin Cedars Senior Living Ctr., No. 3:20-CV-231, 2020 WL

7329228, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 2020), report and recommendation

adopted sub nom. Hamill v. Twin Cedars Senior Living, LLC, No.

3:20-CV-231, 2020 WL 7323870 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2020). In

December of 2020, the district court adopted this recommendation, and

Little Walker Holdings, LLC was dismissed as a defendant.

Undeterred, the plaintiff sought to renew claims against Little Walker

and others under a slightly different garb. Specifically, in June of 2021,

Hamill filed a motion for preliminary injunction and a second motion

to amend her complaint. (Docs. 75, 76). In these pleadings, Hamill

sought to join Little Walker Holdings, LLC, Shohola Realty, LLC,

Jacob Gutman, and Gary Rohinsky as defendants. Hamill also

requested that we grant her sweeping prayer for preliminary injunctive

relief, requesting that the court void the December 2019 transfer of the

assets and real property of Twin Cedars, order an accounting of the

proceeds of any sales or transfers, and direct that the proceeds from the

transfer of Twin Cedars or sale of real property be held in escrow. (Doc.

76).

Upon consideration, we recommended that Hamill's motion for

preliminary injunction be denied, finding that:

Here, at this early stage in the litigation where the plaintiff

has not yet prevailed on any of her claims, we cannot

conclude that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if

the preliminary injunction is not granted. The plaintiff has

not shown that absent a court order to place the proceeds

of these sales or transfers in escrow, there will be

insufficient funds to pay a future money judgment if she

prevails on her claims. Additionally, as we have noted,

Twin Cedars currently has an insurance policy with limits

of $1 million dollars. While the plaintiff has demanded

$15 million in damages, we are unaware of any similar

cases in this district where such a high verdict has been

awarded. Moreover, we are constrained to note the

possible hurdles the plaintiff may face in terms of proving

causation, as the decedent died more than one year after

his discharge from Twin Cedars.

In sum, as part of her irreparable injury showing Hamill

invites us to make a series of speculative inferences: first,

that she will prevail; second, that an award will far

exce[ed] $1,000,000 and will almost certainly entail up to

$15,000,000; and third, that the defendants will be unable

to satisfy such a judgment, when and if this judgment is

incurred. On the spare factual record presently before us

we cannot conclude that the plaintiff has shown she will

be subject to irreparable harm if the injunction is not

granted. The plaintiff has provided no evidence at this

juncture that absent the injunction, the defendants will be

unable to pay any monetary judgment she may be awarded

in the future. Accordingly, because the plaintiff has failed

to meet the two threshold elements for a preliminary

injunction, we recommend that the motion for preliminary

injunction be denied.

(Doc. 107, at 11-12).

In rejecting Hamill's request for this far-reaching preliminary injunctive

relief, we also noted that it appeared that the plaintiff was inviting us to

draw an inference that the sale of this property was a fraudulent transfer

based solely upon the timing of the transfer, which took place four

months after plaintiff's counsel served a $15,000,000 demand letter

upon Tamara Singer and Twin Cedars. We concluded, however, that

other, uncontested evidence largely undermined this causal inference

since:

[W]hile these transfers were finalized after the demand

letter was received, the process of selling Twin Cedars’

assets and property began in December of 2018, well

before the demand letter was received. (Doc. 86-2, at 3).

Indeed, Singer contends that she contacted a real estate

attorney in November of 2018; hired a market professional

to analyze feasibility in February of 2019; signed a listing

agreement with a brokerage firm and contacted an

environmental impact group in March of 2019; entered

into a listing agreement with a general business broker in

June of 2019; and on August 15, 2019—two weeks before

the demand letter was received—executed a Letter of

Intent with the buyers of Twin Cedars, Jacob Gutman and

Gary Rohinsky. (Id.) Accordingly, given the current state

of the evidence this factor does not weigh in favor of

finding that this transfer was fraudulent.

(Id., at 9).

However, in recognition of the policy embodied in Rule 15 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring liberal amendment of

pleadings, we recommended that Hamill be given leave to amend her

complaint in order to try to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. (Id., at 20). The district court adopted this recommendation.

(Doc. 108). On December 13, 2021, Hamill complied with this

instruction and filed her second amended complaint in this case. (Doc.

109).

With respect to the fraudulent transfer of assets claim against

defendants Little Walker, Shohola, Gutman, and Rohinsky, the factual

narrative set forth in this pleading remains threadbare. In her second

amended complaint, Hamill identified the corporate defendants, Little

Walker and Shohola, and stated that Mr. Gutman and Mr. Rohinsky

were the owners and organizers of these two companies. (Id., ¶¶16-18).

The plaintiff then alleges in a cursory fashion that on August 19, 2019,

Tamara Singer and Twin Cedars received a $15,000,000 demand letter

from plaintiff's counsel. (Id., ¶84). According to Hamill, four months

later, in December of 2019, Little Walker acquired ownership of the

Twin Cedars facility. (Id., ¶¶ 85, 86).

Notably missing from Count VIII of this second amended complaint

was any reference to Pennsylvania's Uniform Fraud Transfer Act

(“PUVTA”). 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5104. Moreover, this count of the

second amended complaint did not even directly allege any fraud on the

part of the defendants. Instead, it simply averred that Defendants Little

Walker, Shohola, Gutman, and Rohinsky acquired this property “with

knowledge, actual or constructive, of the Plaintiff's pending claim and

potential legal action.” (Id., ¶ 88). It is upon these thin reeds that the

plaintiff once again attempted to assert legal claims against these parties

who had absolutely no involvement in the seminal events giving rise to

this lawsuit.

Hamill v. Twin Cedars Senior Living, LLC, No. 3:20-CV-231, 2023 WL 10991318,

at *4 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2023), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.

Hamill v. Twin Cedars Senior Living, LLC., No. 3:20-CV-00231, 2024 WL

4100874 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2024) (footnote omitted).

Noting that, with respect to this fraudulent transfer claim, “Hamill insists that

she is proceeding on a claim of actual, rather than constructive, fraud, stating that

the plaintiff is ‘alleging that this transfer was done with the actual intent to defraud,’”

we found that “this claim fails both in its pleading and in its proof.” Id., at *7. First,

we found this claim to be legally deficient in terms of its pleading, noting that:

In the instant case, we conclude that Hamill's second amended

complaint has not met Rule 9’s particularity requirement with respect

to these fraud allegations. Indeed, Count VIII of the second amended

complaint does not even directly assert that the defendants acted with

fraudulent intent. Further, many of § 5104(b)’s “badges of fraud” seem

to have no application here since there are no allegations that this was

an illicit insider transaction involving highly suspicious timing or

extensive evidence of flight and concealment.

Quite the contrary, it is evident from Hamill's pleadings that the

plaintiff was aware of Little Walker's acquisition of Twin Cedars from

the inception of this litigation since Hamill alluded to this fact in her

initial complaint filed in February of 2020. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 35, 36).

Instead, the plaintiff simply alleges that Little Walker acquired these

assets some four months after the plaintiff's counsel issued a demand

letter to Tamara Singer and Twin Cedars, and suggests that the

defendants should have had actual or constructive knowledge of

Hamill's demand when these acquired this property. In our view, the

plaintiff may not rely upon this tenuous chronology of events to satisfy

her obligation to plead fraud with particularity. Moreover, given the

plaintiff's insistence that this claim proceeds solely upon an actual fraud

theory, a claim of constructive knowledge of Hamill's claims, standing

alone, is insufficient to establish fraudulent intent. In light of Rule 9’s

heightened pleading requirements, more is needed here in order to state

a plausible claim of fraudulent transfer against defendants.

Furthermore, with respect to the individual defendants, Mr. Gutman

and Mr. Rohinsky, there is yet another obstacle to Hamill maintaining

this fraudulent transfer claim. The well-pleaded facts in the second

amended complaint simply allege that the Twin Cedars property was

sold to a separate corporation, Little Walker Holdings, LLC, in

December of 2019. Mr. Gutman and Mr. Rohinsky, in turn, are merely

alleged to be the owners of Little Walker. Therefore, in order to sustain

this claim against the individual defendants Hamill's second amended

complaint seems to invite us to pierce the corporate veil in order to hold

these individuals liable.

This we cannot do based upon the threadbare allegations in the second

amended complaint.

Id., at *8–9.

We then concluded that the claim was factually bankrupt, finding that:

Aside from this failure of pleading, Hamill's fraudulent transfer claim

encounters insurmountable problems of proof. On this score, notably,

Hamill appeared to have engaged in virtually no discovery to support

these claims, despite having been put on notice by the court that there

was a paucity of proof with respect to these fraudulent transfer of asset

claims.

Instead, the undisputed evidence undermines this claim of fraud. For

example, the apparent premise of Hamill's fraudulent transfer claim is

her contention that Singer moved to sell Twin Cedars after she learned

of this potential litigation. This premise, which is the lynchpin of this

fraudulent transfer claim, is completely refuted by the evidence that

shows that Tamara Singer was actively engaged in the marketing of

Twin Cedars long before she first received notice of this potential

litigation in September of 2019. On this score, the evidence shows that

Singer contacted a real estate attorney in November of 2018; hired a

market professional to analyze feasibility in February of 2019; signed

a listing agreement with a brokerage firm and contacted an

environmental impact group in March of 2019; entered into a listing

agreement with a general business broker in June of 2019; and on

August 15, 2019—two weeks before the demand letter was received—

executed a Letter of Intent with the buyers of Twin Cedars, Jacob

Gutman and Gary Rohinsky.

Further, the undisputed evidence reveals this transaction has none of

the “badges of fraud” that are typically required to sustain a fraudulent

transfer claim. The record before us reflects nothing more than a valid

arms’ length transaction between unrelated parties that was supported

by adequate consideration. Thus, there is no evidence that Singer

engaged in a collusive transfer of Twin Cedars to Little Walker,

Gutman, or Rohinsky. Quite the contrary, the transaction was an open

one, openly arrived at, and openly consummated between these parties

in December of 2019. (Doc. 150-2 ¶¶ 21-35). Moreover, Singer, who

by this time had received an initial communication from plaintiff's

counsel regarding Hamill's potential claim which had not yet ripened

into litigation, was completely transparent about this fact in her

disclosures made in connection with this sale. Simply put, the evidence

does not permit a reasonable inference of fraudulent collusion in this

transaction.

Further, the fact that more than $5,000,000 was exchanged by the

parties in consideration for the sale of this business and property is a

clear indication that this was a legitimate arms’ length transaction and

not some fictitious or fraudulent transaction. In addition, it is

abundantly clear that these defendants have had no other ongoing

business dealings that would be suggestive of some subterfuge or fraud.

Thus, there is no indication that Singer plays an active role in the

current operations of this business. Finally, there is no showing that the

defendants have engaged in some calculated effort to become judgment

proof in anticipation of this litigation. Instead, it is undisputed that the

defendants have, at a minimum, $1,000,000 in insurance coverage to

address any judgments that might arise out of this litigation.

At this juncture, it is incumbent upon Hamill to plead and point to some

evidence of fraud to sustain this claim which seeks extraordinary

injunctive relief. We have over the course of this lawsuit provided

Hamill ample opportunity to do so, despite her discovery defaults.

Despite being afforded these opportunities, Hamill has failed to

adequately plead or prove these claims. This failure has consequences

and now compels the dismissal of this fraudulent transfer claim.

Id., at *10–11 (footnote omitted). We therefore recommended the dismissal of this

claim, a recommendation that the district court adopted on September 6, 2024,

holding that:

As the Report correctly concludes, the record indicates that Plaintiff has

failed to engage in meaningful discovery to support her fraudulent

transfer claim, having deposed no member of the defense other than

Singer and having been consistently recalcitrant regarding discovery

deadlines, including submissions of expert medical opinions. (Doc.

240, at 28). Plaintiff's response to Singer, Twin Cedars, and Blaire

Realty's motion for summary judgment as to the fraudulent asset

transfer claim and their accompanying statement of undisputed facts

fails to provide any citations to the record indicating a dispute related

to the equivalent value exchanged in the asset transfer or evidence of

actual fraud or intent to defraud. (Doc. 171-1, at 9-12); see 12 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. § 5104.

Plaintiff fails to point to record evidence that the more than $5,000,000

exchanged in the transaction was not a reasonably equivalent exchange

value for the transaction. (Doc. 150-13, at 6; Doc. 240, at 25; Doc. 173-

1, at 11). In her response to Singer, Twin Cedars, and Blaire Realty's

statement of undisputed facts, Plaintiff does not deny that Little Walker

Defendants “paid reasonably equivalent value for the real property.”

(Doc. 173-1, ¶ 31). See In re Burke, 523 B.R. 765, 772 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.

2015) (granting summary judgment to defendants in a fraudulent asset

transfer claim plaintiff did not “come forward with proof, (e.g.,

affidavits or an expert report) in support of the factual contentions

underlying his claim (i.e., that the Debtors own assets that they did not

disclose or undervalued disclosed assets or transferred assets pre-

petition without disclosing those transfers)”). Accordingly, for the

purpose of the instant motions, this Court accepts as true that the

$5,000,000 exchanged in the transaction was reasonable. See In re

Burke, 523 B.R. at 772.

Further, Plaintiff has not directed this Court to any evidence in the

record of “actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the

debtor.” 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104. In fact, Plaintiff acknowledges

that Singer maintains an insurance plan that provides coverage for up

to $1,000,000 in damages resulting from this suit. This indicates the

security of a judgment in Plaintiff's favor. (Doc. 173-1, ¶¶ 31, 36).

Plaintiff also has not pointed to any support in the record for her claim

that the timing of the transaction suggests the presence of fraud. (Doc.

86-2, at 3; Doc. 240, at 8). Singer began the sale process for Twin

Cedars in 2018, long before Mr. Hamill's death, Plaintiff's demand

latter, or the filing of Plaintiff's claims. (Doc. 86-2, at 3; Doc. 240, at

8). Plaintiff has not indicated support for a different timeline that would

create a dispute about the start of the sale process. (Doc. 240, at 8). The

timing thus indicates that the transaction was not executed to escape

liability for these claims. See Su v. Comprehensive Healthcare Mgmt.

Servs., LLC, No. 2:18-CV-1608, 2023 WL 6518955, at *6 (W.D. Pa.

Oct. 5, 2023) (“[t]o determine an actor's ‘actual intent[ under § 5104],

a court considers the circumstances of the transaction, such as whether

the transfer was to an insider and the timing of the transfer, particularly

as related to any legal action pending against the transacting party as

well as any impending liabilities or obligations.”)(citing 12 Pa. Cons.

Stat. Ann. § 5104(b)). This Court agrees that Plaintiff's assertion that

the transaction was fraudulent and that Singer remained in control of

Twin Cedars is unsupported by the record. (Doc. 227-1). Plaintiff's

evidence that Singer remained in control of Twin Cedars is entirely

based upon a report by a third-party unauthenticated website

“Whois.com” that claimed that Singer still owned Twin Cedars. (Doc.

227-1). This is not sufficient for this Court to find a genuine material

fact in dispute related to intent to defraud or a finding of prejudice.

(Doc. 227-1); see In re Burke, 523 B.R. at 772 (“[h]aving failed to place

any evidentiary matter in the summary judgment record, the [p]laintiff

has not met the burden necessary to defeat the [summary judgment

m]otion” on plaintiff's fraudulent transfer claim); In re May, 661 B.R.

40, 54 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2024) (granting summary judgment because

“[the plaintiff] facing a motion for summary judgment, offers no

evidence to support [her claims]; her [r]esponse is devoid of any

documentary or testamentary evidence [...], causing the court to

conclude that the [she] has no such evidence.”) (quoting In re Polichuk,

506 B.R. 405, 423 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2014) (emphasis added); 12 Pa.

Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104.

These responses, or lack thereof, to Singer, Twin Cedars, and Blaire

Realty's statement of undisputed facts show that there is no dispute as

to (1) the reasonable value exchanged in the transaction or (2) the

existence of an insurance policy proving liability coverage for these

claims, supporting the inference that the transaction was not an effort

to avoid judgment on the matter. See 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104;

see also Eddystone Rail Co., LLC v. Bridger Logistics, LLC, No. 2:17-

CV-00495-JDW, 2024 WL 3090882, at *36 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2024)

(holding that a plaintiff must show the elements of a fraudulent asset

transfer claim, (1) evidence that reasonable value was not exchanged in

the transaction and (2) evidence of actual intent to hinder, delay or

defraud a creditor, such as an effort to avoid judgment or liability). The

Court agrees with Judge Carlson's conclusion that “the undisputed

evidence reveals this transaction has none of the ‘badges of fraud’ that

are typically required to sustain a fraudulent transfer claim.” (Doc. 240,

at 24); see 12 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5104. Accordingly, Singer, Twin

Cedars, and Blaire Realty's motion for summary judgment as to

Plaintiff's fraudulent asset transfer claim is GRANTED. See In re

Burke, 523 B.R. at 772 (granting summary judgment on a fraudulent

asset transfer claim because “a nonmoving party may not rely on bare

assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions, nor rest on the

allegations in the pleadings. Rather, the nonmoving party must go

beyond the pleadings and either by affidavits, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, or admissions on file, designate specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.”). Plaintiff's fraudulent asset

transfer claim is hereby DISMISSED

Hamill v. Twin Cedars Senior Living, LLC., No. 3:20-CV-00231, 2024 WL

4100874, at *5–6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2024).

It is against this factual and procedural backdrop that we consider these

sanctions motions.

III. Discussion

A. The Motion for Attorneys’ Fees as a Discovery Sanction Should Be

Granted.

Turning first to the defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees as a discovery

sanction, (Doc. 187), it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37

discovery sanction motions are “committed to the sound discretion of the district

court.” Cartagena v. Serv. Source, Inc., 328 F.R.D. 139, 142 (M.D. Pa. 2018)

(quoting DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974)).

This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. For

example, Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

“If a party.... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery,

including an order under Rule 26(f), 35, or 37(a), the court where the

action is pending may issue further just orders,” and specifies an array

of available sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). In addition to these

specifically identified sanctions, the rule also provides that: “Instead of

or in addition to these sanctions, the court must require the party failing

to act, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable

expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the

failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an

award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3)(emphasis added).

Likewise Rule 37(a)(5) calls for payment of attorney's fees relating to

compelled discovery practice, and provides that the party whose non-

disclosure or incomplete disclosure required litigation of a motion to

compel:

[M]ust ... pay the movant's reasonable expenses incurred

in making the motion, including attorney's fees. But the

court must not order this payment if:

(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good

faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court

action;

(ii) the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or

objection was substantially justified; or

(iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses

unjust.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5).

Thus, by its terms Rule 37 seems to call for the imposition of attorney's

fees in discovery litigation, unless the position of the party who failed

to make discovery was “substantially justified.” Therefore, as a

threshold matter in ruling on this sanctions matter, we must make a

determination regarding: (1) whether there was a failure of discovery

and (2) whether the conduct of a party that is alleged to have failed in

some discovery obligation was substantially justified.

Id. at 143.

Guided by these legal standards, we conclude that attorneys’ fees are an

appropriate sanction for plaintiff counsel’s discovery defaults. At the outset, it is

clear that there was a multi-facetted, culpable failure to make discovery in this case.

Indeed, we have previously found that:

[T]he plaintiff has defaulted on her discovery obligations by providing

inadequate responses to some discovery in November of 2020, by

failing to timely schedule depositions in March of 2022, and by failing

to make timely disclosures of expert witnesses by the June 2022

deadline prescribed by the court. (Doc. 142, at 2). While plaintiff's

counsel has some disputes regarding deposition scheduling and the

sufficiency of November 2020 discovery disclosures, with respect to

the failure to make timely disclosure of expert witnesses, it seems

undisputed that plaintiff's counsel did not comply with our scheduling

order.

Hamill, 2022 WL 16841289, at *1–2. Further, this failure to provide timely

disclosures was prejudicial to all parties in that it led to needless delay and expense

as well as potentially prejudicing the presentation of these claims.

Moreover, Hamill’s counsel does not seriously contend that he was

substantially justified in failing to make timely and proper discovery. (Doc. 190).

Instead, plaintiff’s counsel simply urges us to limit the scope of recoverable fees,

consider counsel’s ability to pay when making a fees award, and defer imposition of

these fees pending the completion of merits litigation. Therefore, we also find that

the failure to make discovery in this case was not substantially justified. Concluding

that (1) there was a failure of discovery; and (2) the conduct of a party that is alleged

to have failed in some discovery obligation was not substantially justified,

Cartagena, 328 F.R.D. at 143, we will GRANT this motion for attorneys’ fees, with

respect to legal fees incurred directly as a result of the discovery defaults identified

in our November 2022 ruling, and will prescribe below the time and manner in which

this sanction will be calculated and assessed.

B. The Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions Will Be Granted, in Part.

We also conclude that some Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate here. Several

basic guiding principles inform our resolution of the instant sanctions motion. By its

terms, Rule 11 imposes an obligation upon litigants to refrain from frivolous and

vexatious litigation, and specifically provides that:

By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper--

whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it--an

attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's

knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable

under the circumstances:

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,

cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by

existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying,

or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically

so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable

opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,

if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of

information.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).

Having imposed this duty of forthrightness, candor, and good faith upon

litigants, Rule 11(c) then provides for sanctions against parties who indulge in

baseless and frivolous litigation, stating that:

(c) Sanctions.

(1) In General. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,

the court determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may

impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that

violated the rule or is responsible for the violation. Absent exceptional

circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a

violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee.

(2) Motion for Sanctions. A motion for sanctions must be made

separately from any other motion and must describe the specific

conduct that allegedly violates Rule 11(b). The motion must be served

under Rule 5, but it must not be filed or be presented to the court if the

challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or denial is withdrawn or

appropriately corrected within 21 days after service or within another

time the court sets. If warranted, the court may award to the prevailing

party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred for

the motion.

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(4) Nature of a Sanction. A sanction imposed under this rule must be

limited to what suffices to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable

conduct by others similarly situated. The sanction may include

nonmonetary directives; an order to pay a penalty into court; or, if

imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order

directing payment to the movant of part or all of the reasonable

attorney's fees and other expenses directly resulting from the violation.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).

“A filing is ‘frivolous’ for Rule 11 purposes if it is both baseless and made

without a reasonable inquiry.” Zion v. Nassan, 727 F. Supp. 2d 388, 413 (W.D. Pa.

2010) (citing Holgate v. Baldwin, 425 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir.2005)). On this score:

An attorney must conduct a reasonable inquiry before filing a lawsuit,

and cannot pursue the action unless he or she reasonably believes that

facts exist to support the allegations. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3); see

Chandler v. Norwest Bank Minn., Nat'l Ass'n, 137 F.3d 1053, 1057

(10th Cir.1998) (holding that, although the attorney may have

reasonably believed a claim would have evidentiary support, the

attorney failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry). The allegations in the

complaint must be likely to have evidentiary support following

“investigations or discovery,” or, if so identified, “are reasonably based

on a lack of information or belief.” 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT &

ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

§ 1334 at 539 (3d ed. 2004). A court must consider six factors in

evaluating what constitutes a reasonable inquiry under the

circumstances:

(1) the amount of time available to the signer for

conducting a factual and legal investigation; (2) the

necessity of relying on a client for the underlying factual

information; (3) the plausibility of the legal position

advocated; (4) the complexity of the legal and factual

issues implicated; (5) whether the signer depended on

forwarding counsel or another member of the bar; and (6)

whether the signer was in a position to know or acquire the

relevant factual details.

Zion, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 411 (citing Hanoverian. Inc. v. Pa. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,

No. 1:07–CV–00658, 2008 WL 906545, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2008); CTC

Imps. & Exps. v. Nigerian Petroleum Corp., 951 F.2d 573, 578 (3d Cir.1991)).

Further, in determining whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions in a given case,

we are cautioned that:

The standard developed by courts for imposition

of sanctions under Rule 11 is stringent because such sanctions 1) are

“in derogation of the general American policy of encouraging resort to

the courts for peaceful resolution of disputes,” Eastway Construction

Corp. v. City of New York, 637 F.Supp. 558, 564 (E.D.N.Y.

1986), modified and remanded, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 484

U.S. 918, 108 S.Ct. 269, 98 L.Ed.2d 226 (1987); 2) tend to “spawn

satellite litigation counter-productive to efficient disposition of

cases,” Gaiardo, 835 F.2d at 482; and 3) “increase tensions among the

litigating bar and between [the] bench and [the] bar.” Eastway

Construction Corp., 637 F.Supp. at 564. This Court and others have

interpreted its language to prescribe sanctions, including fees, only in

the “exceptional circumstance”, Gaiardo, 835 F.2d at 483, where a

claim or motion is patently unmeritorious or frivolous. See, e.g., Lieb

v. Topstone Industries, Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986)

(“Rule 11 therefore is intended to discourage pleadings that are

‘frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation, even

though the paper was not filed in subjective bad faith.’”)

(quoting Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir.

1986)); Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986)

(“[R]ule 11 is violated only when it is ‘patently clear that a claim has

absolutely no chance of success.’”) (quoting Eastway Construction

Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985)), cert.

denied sub nom. County of Suffolk v. Graseck, 480 U.S. 918, 107 S.Ct.

1373, 94 L.Ed.2d 689 (1987).

Doering v. Union Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir. 1988).

Consistent with this stringent view of Rule 11 sanctions, it is also clear that:

Rule 11 sanctions are based on “ ‘an objective standard of

reasonableness under the circumstances.’ ” Id. at 453 n. 3 (quoting

Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir.1988)). Bad

faith is not required. Id.; Jones, 899 F.2d at 1358.” Martin v. Brown, 63

F.3d 1252, 1264 (3d Cir.1995). Furthermore, it is well-settled under

Rule 11 that: “Sanctions are to be applied only ‘in the “exceptional

circumstance” where a claim or motion is patently unmeritorious or

frivolous.’ Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857

F.2d 191, 194 (3d Cir.1988) (citation omitted). Rule 11's ‘primary

purpose is not “wholesale fee shifting but [rather] correction of

litigation abuse .’ ” Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). It ‘must

not be used as an automatic penalty against an attorney or party

advocating the losing side of a dispute,’ and it ‘should not be applied to

adventuresome, though responsible, lawyering which advocates

creative legal theories.’ Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d

90, 94 (3d Cir.1988) (citation omitted).” Ario v. Underwriting

Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d

277, 297 (3d Cir.2010).

United States v. Bogart, No. 4:12-CV-347, 2014 WL 7466598, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec.

8, 2014). “Moreover, the guiding purpose in fixing Rule 11 sanctions is fashioning

a sanction adequate to deter undesirable future conduct.” DiPaolo v. Moran, 407

F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). Therefore, when considering a sanctions motion, it is

clear that “the main purpose of Rule 11 is to deter, not to compensate.” Zuk v. E.

Pennsylvania Psychiatric Inst. of the Med. Coll. of Pennsylvania, 103 F.3d 294, 301

(3d Cir. 1996). Further, “[t]he language of Rule 11 evidences the critical role of

judicial discretion’ in making sanctions determination.” DiPaolo, 407 F.3d at 145.

This discretion extends both to the decision to impose sanctions, and the

determination of what an appropriate sanction may be. Id.

While these are exacting standards, in this case we find that the imposition of

some Rule 11 sanctions is warranted. At the outset, giving plaintiff’s counsel the

benefit of every reasonable doubt, we conclude that counsel’s initial efforts to

establish some form of successor liability through a fraudulent asset transfer claim

can be viewed as adventuresome, though responsible, lawyering which advocates

creative legal theories. However, by the time that plaintiff’s counsel was called upon

to file the second amended complaint in this case, Hamill’s initial theories for

successor liability based upon a fraudulent asset transfer had been wholly

undermined both legally and factually. Therefore, before he filed this thoroughly

discredited claim once again in the face of evidence rebutting the claim, counsel had

a legal and ethical obligation to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the continued

viability of this claim.

This counsel failed to do. Thus, there is no indication that plaintiff’s counsel

engaged in any discovery in order to factually bolster this claim before filing the

second amended complaint, and the allegations set forth in the second amended

complaint were woefully inadequate to state a claim of actual fraud by the

defendants. At this juncture, counsel’s conduct fell far below what Rule 11 demands.

And at this point counsel’s actions were no longer adventuresome, though

responsible, lawyering which advocates creative legal theories. Rather, counsel’s

behavior had devolved into the assertion of frivolous claims advanced without a

reasonable basis in law or fact. Further, by this juncture, plaintiff’s counsel knew

better than to engage in ethically problematic behavior. Accordingly, the defendants’

motion for Rule 11 sanctions will be GRANTED with respect to the defense costs

of litigation of this fraudulent transfer claim once that discredited claim was restated

by plaintiff’s counsel in the second amended complaint.

Having made these findings, we will prescribe the manner in which these

sanctions will be calculated and assessed.

C. The Calculation of These Sanctions Will Be Deferred Pending

Resolution of the Merits of This Case.

In considering the path we should follow in calculating and assessing these

sanctions, we begin with a familiar proposition: At its best, litigation should be a

process of creative conflict, which reveals truth, and leads to justice. However, on

occasion this clash of ideas can devolve into a more parochial and venal form of

conflict. When this occurs, sanctions practice frequently follows. Thus, on occasion,

the enmity between counsel which inspires sanctions litigation can threaten to

overshadow the ultimate goal of all federal litigation which is “to secure the just,

speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 1.

We can ensure that the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the

merits of Mrs. Hamill’s claims, and the defenses to those claims, remains the highest

priority in this lawsuit through the exercise of our discretion. We retain the broad

discretion to “adopt a scheduling approach to these sanctions issues that will compel

counsels' attention to first principles-resolution of the merits of this dispute between

the parties.” Breslin v. Dickinson Twp., No. 1:09-CV-1396, 2012 WL 715258, at

*11 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2012). We can achieve this goal by directing that further

litigation of the amount of any sanctions be deferred until 30 days following the

conclusion of the merits litigation in this matter. Id. Indeed, adopting this course

guarantees that we do not “place the sanctions cart before the merits horse.” Abney

v. Younker, No. 1:13-CV-1418, 2016 WL 1535860, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2016).1

This is the path we will follow in the instant case. However, even as we set a

schedule for the litigation of the appropriate amount of any sanctions following the

completion of merits litigation, we commend to all counsel the following guidance

regarding how parties should proceed in calculating and assessing attorneys’ fees:

“The starting point for a determination of attorney's fees, the lodestar

calculation, is the product of the number of hours reasonably expended

in responding to the frivolous paper times an hourly fee based on the

prevailing market rate.” Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen

Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 195 (3d Cir.1988); see also Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983).

The party seeking fees bears the burden of producing “sufficient

evidence of what constitutes a reasonable market rate for the essential

character and complexity of the legal services rendered ....” Knight v.

Drye, 2009 WL 2928899, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82369 (M.D.Pa. Sept.

10, 2009) (quoting McCutcheon v. America's Servicing Co., 560 F.3d

143, 150 (3d Cir.1990)). See also Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley

Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 564, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92

L.Ed.2d 439 (1986) (party seeking fees has the initial burden of

presenting evidence that the claimed rates and time expended are

reasonable).

In the more familiar setting of fee-shifting awards, the Third Circuit has

instructed that determining a reasonable hourly rate generally “is

calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant

community.” Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 260 F.3d 173, 180 (3d

Cir.2001); see also Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426

F.3d 694, 705 (3d Cir.2005) (in most cases, the relevant market rate is

1 Further as a practical matter, choosing this path may have a benefit for all parties

since plaintiff’s counsel has suggested that he may lack the ability to pay any

proposed monetary sanction; an impediment which could be relieved depending

upon the outcome of the plaintiff’s case.

the prevailing rate in the forum of the litigation). A court must not make

a finding of reasonableness based on its own “generalized sense” of

appropriateness, but instead “must rely on the record.” Evans v. Port

Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 273 F.3d 346, 361 (3d Cir.2001) (quoting Smith

v. City of Phila. Housing Auth., 107 F.3d 223, 225 (3d Cir.1997)).

Courts are to “assess the experience and skill of the prevailing party's

attorneys and compare their rates to the rates prevailing in the

community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable

skill, experience, and reputation.” Maldonado v. Houstoun, 256 F.3d

181, 184 (3d Cir.2001); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d

Cir.1990). The party seeking fees “bears the burden of establishing by

way of satisfactory evidence, ‘in addition to [the] attorney's own

affidavits,’ ... that the requested hourly rates meet this standard.”

Washington v. Philadelphia Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031,

1035 (3d Cir.1996) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11,

104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984)). The petitioning attorney's

usual billing rate is typically a starting point in this calculation, but it is

not dispositive. Loughner, 260 F.3d at 180. Although the petitioning

party has the burden of demonstrating that the requested hourly rates

are reasonable, where the party opposing the asserted rate “has not

produced contradictory evidence, the district court may not exercise its

discretion to adjust the requested rate downward.” Ridley v. Costco

Wholesale Corp., 217 Fed.Appx. 130 (3d Cir.2007) (quoting

Washington, 89 F.3d at 1036); see also Black Grievance Committee v.

Philadelphia Elec. Co., 802 F.2d 648, 652–53 (district court not free to

disregard attorney's affidavit regarding reasonableness of hourly rate

where the opposing party “filed no affidavit and offered no testimony

contesting the accuracy of [the attorney's] statement with respect to

charges by comparable practitioners”).

With respect to calculating the number of hours reasonably expended,

the court “should review the time charged, decide whether the hours set

out were reasonably expended for each of the particular purposes

described and then exclude those that are ‘excessive, redundant, or

otherwise unnecessary.’ ” Public Int. Research Group of N.J., Inc. v.

Windall, 51 F.3d 1179, 1188 (3d Cir.1995) (internal citation omitted);

see also Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d at 1183 (“The district court should

exclude hours that are not reasonably calculated.”). In general, hours

are not considered to have been reasonably expended “if they are

excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Id. The court may

permissibly deduct hours from the fee award if the attorney

inadequately documents the hours claimed. Id.

Once the petitioning party has made the preliminary showing described

above, “the resulting product is presumed to be the reasonable fee to

which counsel is entitled.” Id. The burden then shifts to the party

opposing the claimed fees by making specific objections to the

proposed fee by way of an affidavit or brief. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892

F.2d 1177, 1183 (3d Cir.1990). Upon consideration of the opposing

party's objections, the court enjoys substantial discretion to adjust the

lodestar and ultimate fee downward. Id.

In addition to the traditional lodestar analysis, we note that in the

context of Rule 11 sanctions—unlike in the more familiar fee-shifting

context where a party is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs

as a prevailing party—the court may only impose a sanction that

represents “the minimum that will serve to adequately deter the

undesirable behavior” that precipitated the sanction. Doering, 857 F.2d

at 194 (citation omitted).

Lease v. Fishel, 712 F. Supp. 2d 359, 378–79 (M.D. Pa. 2010), aff'd, No. 1:07-CV-

0003, 2010 WL 4318833 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 22, 2010). Consistent with the deterrent

rationale behind Rule 11 sanctions it is also well-settled that: “One particularly

important consideration in determining an appropriate fee charged for Rule 11

violations is the violating party's ability to pay.” Id. at 379.

An appropriate order follows.

/s/ Martin C. Carlson

Martin C. Carlson

United States Magistrate Judge

DATED: November 8, 2024