Zambelli v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 19-551V

************************* *

*

ANGELA ZAMBELLI, parent of S.R., *

* UNPUBLISHED

a minor, *

Petitioner, *

* Special Master Katherine E. Oler

v. *

*

*

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND * Filed: March 6, 2024

HUMAN SERVICES, *

*

*

Respondent. *

*

*

************************* *

Edward Kraus, Kraus Law Group, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Petitioner

Mark Hellie, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent

DECISION AWARDING INTERIM ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND COSTS1

Oler, Special Master:

On April 15, 2019, Angela Zambelli (“Petitioner”) filed a petition, on behalf of S.R., a

minor, for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §

300aa-10, et seq.2 (the “Vaccine Act” or “Program”). ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). The petition alleges

S.R. developed Guillain-Barré syndrome as a result of the MMR and Hib vaccinations she received

on August 31, 2017. Pet. at 1.

1

Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, it must be made publicly

accessible and will be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, and/or

at https://www.govinfo.gov/app/collection/uscourts/national/cofc, in accordance with the E-Government

Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2018) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government

Services). This means the Decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance

with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information,

the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that

the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access.

2

The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L.

No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10–34 (2012)) (hereinafter

“Vaccine Act” or “the Act”). All subsequent references to sections of the Vaccine Act shall be to the

pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa.

1

Petitioner filed a motion for interim attorneys’ fees and costs on September 28, 2023,

requesting a total of $162,200.61. ECF No. 76 (hereinafter “Fees Application”). Respondent filed

a response on October 12, 2023, deferring to me as to whether Petitioner has met the legal standard

for an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs. ECF No. 82 (“Fees Resp.”) at 2. Petitioner did

not file a reply.

I hereby GRANT IN PART Petitioner’s application and award a total of $160,200.61 in

interim attorneys’ fees and costs.

I. Legal Standard

A. Interim Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

The Federal Circuit has held that an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs is

permissible under the Vaccine Act. Shaw v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 609 F.3d 1372 (Fed.

Cir. 2010); Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In Cloer, the

Federal Circuit noted that “Congress [has] made clear that denying interim attorneys' fees under

the Vaccine Act is contrary to an underlying purpose of the Vaccine Act.” Cloer v. Sec’y of Health

& Hum. Servs., 675 F.3d 1358, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2012).

In Avera, the Federal Circuit stated, “[i]nterim fees are particularly appropriate in cases

where proceedings are protracted, and costly experts must be retained.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352.

Likewise, in Shaw, the Federal Circuit held that “where the claimant establishes that the cost of

litigation has imposed an undue hardship and there exists a good faith basis for the claim, it is

proper for the special master to award interim attorneys' fees.” 609 F.3d at 1375. Avera did not,

however, define when interim fees are appropriate; rather, it has been interpreted to allow special

masters discretion. See Avera, 515 F.3d; Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 08-241V,

2009 WL 775396, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 13, 2009); Bear v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., No. 11-362V, 2013 WL 691963, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 4, 2013). Even though it

has been argued that a petitioner must meet the three Avera criteria -- protracted proceedings,

costly expert testimony, and undue hardship -- special masters have instead treated these criteria

as possible factors in a flexible balancing test. Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; see Al-Uffi v. Sec’y of

Health & Hum. Servs., No. 13-956V, 2015 WL 6181669, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 30,

2015).

A petitioner is eligible for an interim award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs if the

special master finds that a petitioner has brought his petition in good faith and with a reasonable

basis. §15(e)(1); Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352; Shaw, 609 F.3d at 1372; Woods v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs, 105 Fed. Cl. 148 (2012), at 154; Friedman v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 94 Fed.

Cl. 323, 334 (2010); Doe 21 v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 89 Fed. Cl. 661, 668 (2009); Bear,

2013 WL 691963, at *5; Lumsden v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 97-588V, 2012 WL

1450520, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 28, 2012). The undue hardship inquiry looks at more

than just financial involvement of a petitioner; it also looks at any money expended by a

petitioner’s counsel. Kirk, 2009 WL 775396, at *2. Referring to Avera, former Chief Special

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Master Golkiewicz in Kirk found that “the general principle underlying an award of interim fees

[is] clear: avoid working a substantial financial hardship on petitioners and their counsel.” Id.

B. Good Faith

The good faith requirement is met through a subjective inquiry. Di Roma v. Sec’y of Health

& Hum. Servs., No. 90-3277V, 1993 WL 496981, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 18, 1993). Such

a requirement is a “subjective standard that focuses upon whether [P]etitioner honestly believed

he had a legitimate claim for compensation.” Turner v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-

544V, 2007 WL 4410030, at *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 30, 2007). Without evidence of bad

faith, “petitioners are entitled to a presumption of good faith.” Grice v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., 36 Fed. Cl. 114, 121 (1996). Thus, so long as Petitioner had an honest belief that his claim

could succeed, the good faith requirement is satisfied. See Riley v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

No. 09-276V, 2011 WL 2036976, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 29, 2011) (citing Di Roma, 1993

WL 496981, at *1); Turner, 2007 WL 4410030, at *5.

C. Reasonable Basis

Unlike the good-faith inquiry, an analysis of reasonable basis requires more than just a

petitioner’s belief in his claim. Turner, 2007 WL 4410030, at *6-7. Instead, the claim must at least

be supported by objective evidence -- medical records or medical opinion. Sharp-Roundtree v.

Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 14-804V, 2015 WL 12600336, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.

Nov. 3, 2015).

While the statute does not define the quantum of proof needed to establish reasonable basis,

it is “something less than the preponderant evidence ultimately required to prevail on one’s

vaccine-injury claim.” Chuisano v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 276, 283 (2014). The Court of

Federal Claims affirmed in Chuisano that “[a]t the most basic level, a petitioner who submits no

evidence would not be found to have reasonable basis….” Id. at 286. The Court in Chuisano found

that a petition which relies on temporal proximity and a petitioner’s affidavit is not sufficient to

establish reasonable basis. Id. at 290; see also Turpin v. Sec'y Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-564V,

2005 WL 1026714, *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Feb. 10, 2005) (finding no reasonable basis when

petitioner submitted an affidavit and no other records); Brown v. Sec'y Health & Hum. Servs., No.

99-539V, 2005 WL 1026713, *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 11, 2005) (finding no reasonable basis

when petitioner presented only e-mails between her and her attorney). The Federal Circuit has

affirmed that “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of proof could provide

sufficient grounds for a special master to find reasonable basis.” Cottingham v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., No. 2019-1596, 971 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (finding Petitioner submitted

objective evidence supporting causation when she submitted medical records and a vaccine

package insert); see also James-Cornelius v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 984 F.3d 1374, 1380

(Fed. Cir. 2021) (finding that “the lack of an express medical opinion on causation did not by itself

negate the claim's reasonable basis.”).

Temporal proximity between vaccination and onset of symptoms is a necessary component

in establishing causation in non-Table cases, but without more, temporal proximity alone “fails to

establish a reasonable basis for a vaccine claim.” Chuisano, 116 Fed. Cl. at 291.

3

The Federal Circuit has stated that reasonable basis “is an objective inquiry” and concluded

that “counsel may not use [an] impending statute of limitations deadline to establish a reasonable

basis for [appellant’s] claim.” Simmons v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 875 F.3d 632, 636 (Fed.

Cir. 2017). Further, an impending statute of limitations should not even be one of several factors

the special master considers in her reasonable basis analysis. “[T]he Federal Circuit forbade,

altogether, the consideration of statutory limitations deadlines—and all conduct of counsel—in

determining whether there was a reasonable basis for a claim.” Amankwaa v. Sec’y of Health &

Hum. Servs., 138 Fed. Cl. 282, 289 (2018).

“[I]n deciding reasonable basis the [s]pecial [m]aster needs to focus on the requirements

for a petition under the Vaccine Act to determine if the elements have been asserted with sufficient

evidence to make a feasible claim for recovery.” Santacroce v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No.

15-555V, 2018 WL 405121, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 5, 2018). Special masters cannot award

compensation “based on the claims of petitioner alone, unsubstantiated by medical records or by

medical opinion.” 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1). Special masters and judges of the Court of Federal

Claims have interpreted this provision to mean that petitioners must submit medical records or

expert medical opinion in support of causation-in-fact claims. See Waterman v. Sec'y of Health &

Hum. Servs., 123 Fed. Cl. 564, 574 (2015) (citing Dickerson v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 35

Fed. Cl. 593, 599 (1996) (stating that medical opinion evidence is required to support an on-Table

theory where medical records fail to establish a Table injury).

When determining if a reasonable basis exists, many special masters and judges consider

a myriad of factors. The factors to be considered may include “the factual basis of the claim, the

medical and scientific support for the claim, the novelty of the vaccine, and the novelty of the

theory of causation.” Amankwaa, 138 Fed. Cl. at 289. This approach allows the special master to

look at each application for attorneys’ fees and costs on a case-by-case basis. Hamrick v. Sec’y of

Health & Hum. Servs., No. 99-683V, 2007 WL 4793152, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Nov. 19,

2007).

II. Discussion

A. Undue Financial Hardship

The undue hardship inquiry looks at more than just financial involvement of a petitioner;

it also looks at any money expended by petitioner’s counsel. Kirk, 2013 WL 775396, at *2 (finding

“the general principle underlying an award of interim fees was clear: avoid working a substantial

financial hardship on petitioners and their counsel.”). In this case, Petitioner’s attorney has been

working on this case since 2017. Fees App. at 1. Additionally, Petitioner’s attorney has hired two

well-qualified experts at a substantial cost. Id. at 4. The Federal Circuit has noted that interim fees

“are particularly appropriate in cases where proceedings are protracted, and costly experts must be

retained.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

I also note that the COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the United States

economy and such impact has been recognized by this court. See Monge-Landry v. Sec'y of Health

& Hum. Servs, No. 14-853V, 2020 WL 4219821 *5 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jun. 30, 2020)

4

(recognizing the COVID-19 pandemic's continued disruption of the airline industry in its

calculation of appropriate interim fees).

Given these unprecedented economic circumstances, and the time already spent litigating

this case, I find that the Petitioner would suffer undue hardship in the absence of an award of

interim attorneys’ fees and costs.

B. Good Faith and Reasonable Basis

Respondent has not raised any specific objection to the good faith or reasonable basis for

this claim and leaves such a determination to my discretion. See Fees Resp. at 2-4. I find that the

petition was filed in good faith.

With regard to reasonable basis, Petitioner submitted five expert reports, three reports from

Dr. M. Eric Gershwin, a board-certified rheumatologist, and two reports from Dr. Mahbubul Huq,

a board-certified neurologist. Exs. 18, 20, 102, 109, 113. Both experts also testified at the

entitlement hearing that took place on September 5-6, 2023.

This constitutes sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable basis for the claim. As there

is no other reason to deny an award of interim attorneys’ fees and costs, I will award Petitioner’s

reasonable fees and costs in this instance.

C. Attorneys’ Fees

Petitioner retained Mr. Edward Kraus to represent her in this matter. See generally, Fees

App. Petitioner requests a total of $107,675.10 in attorneys’ fees. Id. at 1.

1. Reasonable Hourly Rate

A reasonable hourly rate is defined as the rate “prevailing in the community for similar

services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Avera, 515 F.3d

at 1348 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). In general, this rate is based on “the forum rate for

the District of Columbia” rather than “the rate in the geographic area of the practice of [P]etitioner's

attorney.” Rodriguez v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2011)

(citing Avera, 515 F. 3d at 1349).

McCulloch provides the framework for determining the appropriate compensation for

attorneys' fees based upon the attorneys' experience. See McCulloch v. Sec'y of Health & Hum.

Servs., No. 09–293V, 2015 WL 5634323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015). The Office of

Special Masters has accepted the decision in McCulloch and has issued a Fee Schedule for

subsequent years.3

3

The 2018 Fee Schedule can be accessed at: http://www.cofc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Attorneys%

27%20Forum%20Rate%20Fee%20Schedule%202018.pdf.

The 2019 Fee Schedule can be accessed at: http://www.cofc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Attorneys%2

7%20Forum%20Rate%20Fee%20Schedule%202019.pdf.

The 2020 Fee Schedule can be accessed at: http://www.cofc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Attorneys%2

5

Petitioner requests compensation for her attorney, Edward Kraus, at the following hourly

rates: $418.00 per hour for work performed in 2019; $435.00 per hour for work performed in 2020;

$458.00 per hour for work performed in 2021; $472.00 per hour for work performed in 2022; and

$497.00 per hour for work performed in 2023. Fees App. at 1-2.

Mr. Kraus also requests compensation for some of his colleagues. He requests $318.00-

436.00 per hour for Ms. Amy Kraus, for work performed between 2017-2023; and for Ms. Brynna

Gang, $300.00-390.00 per hour for work performed 2020-2023. Fees App. at 1-2. Mr. Kraus also

requests compensation for paralegal work performed from 2018 to 2023 at hourly rates ranging

from $145.00 to $177.00. Id. at 25-26.

The requested rates are consistent with what Mr. Kraus and his associates have been

awarded in previous cases. See, e.g., Henkel v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 15-1048V,

2022 WL 370297 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 19, 2023); Piatek v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

No. 16-524V, 2021 WL 5755318, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 20, 2021); Cantu v. Sec'y of

Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-1600V, 2021 WL 5026902, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 29,

2021); Arranga v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 02-1616V, 2018 WL 2770820, at *2– 3

(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 16, 2018). Accordingly, no adjustment is warranted.

2. Hours Reasonably Expended

Attorneys’ fees are awarded for the “number of hours reasonably expended on the

litigation.” Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348. Ultimately, it is “well within the Special Master's discretion

to reduce the hours to a number that, in [her] experience and judgment, [is] reasonable for the work

done.” Saxton ex rel. Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

In exercising that discretion, special masters may reduce the number of hours submitted by a

percentage of the amount charged. See Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 102 Fed.

Cl. 719, 728-29 (2011) (affirming the special master's reduction of attorney and paralegal hours);

Guy v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 38 Fed. Cl. 403, 406 (1997) (affirming the special master’s

reduction of attorney and paralegal hours). Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the rates

charged, hours expended, and costs incurred are reasonable. Wasson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., 24 Cl. Ct. 482, 484 (1993). However, special masters may reduce awards sua sponte,

independent of enumerated objections from the respondent. Sabella v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 208-09 (Fed. Cl. 2009); Savin v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 85 Fed.

Cl. 313, 318 (Fed. Cl. 2008), aff’d No. 99-573V, 2008 WL 2066611 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 22,

2008).

7%20Forum%20Rate%20Fee%20Schedule%202020.PPI_OL.pdf

The 2021 Fee Schedule can be accessed at: http://www.cofc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Attorneys-Fo

rum-Rate-Fee-Schedule-2021-PPI-OL.pdf

The 2022 Fee Schedule can be accessed at: https://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Attorneys%

27-Forum-Rate-Fee-Schedule-2022-%28Final%29.pdf.

The 2023 Fee Schedule can be accessed at: https://www.cofc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/Attorneys-

Forum-Rate-Fee-Schedule-2023.pdf

The hourly rates contained within the schedules are updated from the decision in McCulloch, 2015 WL

5634323.

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A special master need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner’s fee application

when reducing fees. Broekelschen v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (Fed.

Cl. 2011). Special masters may look to their experience and judgment to reduce an award of fees

and costs to a level they find reasonable for the work performed. Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993). It is within a special master's discretion to instead make

a global reduction to the total amount of fees requested. See Hines v. Sec’y of Health & Hum.

Servs., 22 Cl. Ct. 750, 753 (1991) (“special masters have wide latitude in determining the

reasonableness of both attorneys’ fees and costs”); Hocraffer v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

No. 99-533V, 2011 WL 3705153 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 25, 2011), mot. for rev. denied, 2011

WL 6292218, at *13 (Fed. Cl. 2011) (denying review of the special master's decision and

endorsing “a global – rather than line-by-line – approach to determine the reasonable number of

hours expended in this case”).

Petitioner's counsel have provided a breakdown of hours billed and costs incurred. Fees

App., Tab A. I find the hours to be largely reasonable, however I must reduce for excessive time

billed by paralegals and attorneys for administrative tasks, such as creating and organizing exhibits

and processing payment for medical record requests. Mr. Kraus has been warned previously about

these billing practices. See, e.g., K.L. v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-645V, 2021 WL

852109 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 26, 2021); White v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 17-655V,

2020 WL 3619904 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jun. 24, 2020); Towpik v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

No. 15-1213V, 2019 WL 549144 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 9, 2019). Accordingly, I will deduct

$2,000.00 for the entries billed 4/15/2019, 6/17/2019 (2), 8/7/2023 (4), 8/16/2023, 8/24/2023 (2).

As a result, I award Petitioner a total of $105,675.10 in attorneys’ fees.

D. Reasonable Costs

Petitioner requests a total of $54,525.51: $52,625.00 for expert costs; $465.66 for medical

record requests; $5.05 for mailing costs; $1,029.80 for the entitlement hearing transcript; and

$400.00 for the Court’s filing fee. Petitioner provided documentation of the medical record requests,

the Court’s filing fee, and mailing cost. I find the costs for these items reasonable, and award them

in full. I discuss the costs for Petitioner’s experts below.

1. Petitioner’s Expert Costs for M. Eric Gershwin, M.D.

Petitioner requests $30,500.00 for Dr. Gershwin’s work on this case, reflecting 61 hours of

work at $500 per hour. This reflects the time that Dr. Gershwin spent drafting three expert reports

and testifying at the entitlement hearing. Dr. Gershwin has been awarded his requested hourly rate

and I see no reason to disturb his rate. See, e.g., Antalosky v. Sec’y v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs.,

No. 16-701V, 2022 WL 363916 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jan. 24, 2022); Svagdis v. Sec'y of Health &

Hum. Servs., No. 15-520V, 2020 WL 3969874 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jun. 4, 2020); Hoskins v. Sec'y

of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 15-071V, 2017 WL 3379270 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Jul. 12, 2017).

Further, the number of hours he worked on this case to be reasonable. Accordingly. I award Dr.

Gershwin’s costs in full.

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2. Petitioner’s Expert Costs for Mahbubul Huq, M.D., Ph.D.

Petitioner requests $22,125.00 for Dr. Huq’s two reports and time spent preparing and

testifying at the entitlement hearing, totaling 44.25 hours at an hourly rate of $500 per hour. Fees

App., Tab B at 62-63. Dr. Huq has previously been awarded his requested hourly rate. See, e.g.,

Ginn v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-1466V, 2020 WL 7774606 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr.

Dec. 4, 2020); Agarwal v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 16-191V, 2019 WL 2281744, at *4

(Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 23, 2019); Robinson v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 14-915V,

2018 WL 3987062 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. July 17, 2018); cf. Anderson v. Sec'y of Health & Hum.

Servs., No. 02-1314V, 2017 WL 2927044 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 24, 2017) (declining to award

more than $400.00 per hour for this expert). As Dr. Huq is well qualified and provided useful

testimony in this case, I award his requested costs in full.

I award Petitioner a total of $54,525.51 in attorneys’ costs.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, in the exercise of the discretion afforded to me in determining the propriety of

interim fee and cost awards, and based on the foregoing, I GRANT IN PART Petitioner’s

application, as follows:

• A lump sum in the amount of $160,200.61, representing reimbursement of Petitioner’s

interim attorneys’ fees and costs in the form of a check jointly payable to Petitioner and her

attorney, Mr. Edward Kraus.

In the absence of a motion for review filed pursuant to RCFC Appendix B, the Clerk of

Court SHALL ENTER JUDGMENT in accordance with this decision.4

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Katherine E. Oler

Katherine E. Oler

Special Master

4

Pursuant to Vaccine Rule 11(a), the parties may expedite entry of judgment by filing a joint notice

renouncing their right to seek review.

8