Martinez v. University of San Diego

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 HALEY MARTINEZ, et al., Case No.: 3:20-cv-01946-RBM-VET

Plaintiffs,

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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’

v.

13 MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO, APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION

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Defendant. SETTLEMENT AND NOTICE PLAN

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[Doc. 220]

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18 Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs1 Edgar Chavarria, Catherine Holden, and

19 Matthew Sheridan’s (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”) Motion for Preliminary Approval of

20 Class Action Settlement and Notice Plan (“Motion for Preliminary Approval”), which was

21 filed on May 16, 2024. (Doc. 220.)

22 In their Motion for Preliminary Approval, Plaintiffs move this Court pursuant to

23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for an order (i) preliminarily approving the proposed

24 settlement agreement, including the exhibits attached thereto (“Settlement Agreement”);

25 (ii) appointing the named plaintiffs as class representatives; (iii) appointing Plaintiffs’

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1 counsel—Leeds Brown Law, P.C.; The Sultzer Law Group, P.C.; The Golan Firm PLLC;

2 Shegerian & Associates, Inc.; and Francis Mailman Soumilas, P.C.—as class counsel; (iv)

3 approving the notice plan and forms of notice to the class; and (v) setting all future dates

4 and procedures for opt-outs, objections, and a final approval hearing. (Id. at 2.2)

5 On September 23, 2024, the Court ordered supplemental briefing “regarding

6 certification of the class defined in the proposed Settlement Agreement.” (Doc. 221 at 4.)

7 On October 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Further

8 Support of Preliminary Approval (“Supplemental Briefing”). (Doc. 228.)

9 To date, Defendant University of San Diego (“Defendant” or “USD”) has not filed

10 any opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval or their Supplemental

11 Briefing.

12 The Court finds this matter suitable for determination without oral argument

13 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motion

14 for Preliminary Approval is GRANTED subject to the guidance and conditions set forth

15 below.

16 I. BACKGROUND

17 The Court summarizes all filings relevant to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary

18 Approval below.

19 A. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification

20 On March 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification. (See Docs.

21 108, 116.) Plaintiffs sought certification of the following class:

22 All students enrolled at the University of San Diego during the Spring 2020

semester who (i) were registered for at least one on-site course, and (ii) who

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paid tuition, course fees, and/or Student Wellness fees, or on whose behalf

24 tuition, course fees, and/or Student Wellness fees were paid.

25 (Doc. 116-1 at 7.)

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1 In this motion, Plaintiffs argued that the proposed class meets the four requirements

2 set forth in Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of

3 representation. (Doc. 116-1 at 14–18.) First, Plaintiffs argued that the proposed class is

4 so numerous that joinder of all members would be impracticable. (Id. at 14–15.) Second,

5 Plaintiffs asserted that there are questions of law and facts common to the proposed class,

6 e.g., whether Defendants failed to provide the in-person classes and services promised and

7 whether USD’s past performance created an implied-in-fact contract to provide in-person

8 educational services. (Id. at 15–16.) Third, Plaintiffs argued that their claims are typical

9 of the proposed class’s claims because the damages calculation is the same for Plaintiffs as

10 it would be for the proposed class. (Id. at 16–17.) Finally, Plaintiffs asserted that their

11 representation of the proposed class is adequate because they have engaged experienced

12 counsel, they have the same claims and interests as the proposed class members, and they

13 have dedicated significant time and energy to this lawsuit. (Id. at 17–18.)

14 Plaintiffs also argued that the proposed class meets the requirements of Rule

15 23(b)(3). (Id. at 18–26.) First, Plaintiffs argued that issues common to the proposed class,

16 e.g., whether USD promised students in-person education and whether USD breached that

17 promise, predominate over any individual issues. (Id. at 19–21.) Second, Plaintiffs

18 asserted that damages will be calculated the same for every member of the proposed class

19 and need not account for individual circumstances. (Id. at 21–23.) Finally, Plaintiffs

20 contended that the proposed class is the best method for adjudicating the proposed class

21 members’ claims because a single class action achieves “significant economies of time,

22 effort, expense, and promote uniformity of decision.” (Id. at 24–26 (internal quotation

23 omitted).)

24 Plaintiffs concluded that the Court should appoint Plaintiffs’ counsel as class counsel

25 pursuant to Rule 23(g)(1).3

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3 On May 8, 2023, Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class

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1 In its Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiffs’ Rule 72 Motion to

2 Overturn Magistrate Judge Gallo’s May 23 Order Striking Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Expert

3 Report (“Rule 72 Order”) dated February 7, 2024, the Court ordered that discovery be

4 reopened for 60 days, allowed Plaintiffs to refile their Motion for Class Certification 30

5 days after the close of discovery, and therefore denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class

6 Certification without prejudice. (See Doc. 209 at 23.) Plaintiffs did not refile a Motion for

7 Class Certification.

8 B. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval

9 In their Motion for Preliminary Approval, Plaintiffs seek the Court’s preliminary

10 approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement. (Doc. 220.) In the proposed Settlement

11 Agreement, the Parties define the class as “all enrolled students at USD who paid tuition,

12 the Student Wellness fee and/or course fees to USD, or who were credited with having paid

13 such tuition and/or Mandatory Fees to USD for the Spring 2020 term/semester.” (Doc.

14 220-5 [Settlement Agreement] § 1.29.) This definition differs from the class definition in

15 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification.

16 Plaintiffs then argue the proposed Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and

17 adequate under Rule 23(e)(2). (Doc. 220 at 6, 13–14.) Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that

18 the Rule 23(e)(2) factors weigh in favor of preliminary approval because (1) the class

19 representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the class; (2) the proposed

20 settlement was negotiated at arm’s length; (3) the relief provided to the class is adequate

21 considering the costs, risks, and delay of trial, the effectiveness of the class notice and

22 processing of claims, and the proposed attorneys’ fees; and (4) the proposal treats members

23 of the class equitably. (Id. at 13–22.) Plaintiffs also assert that the proposed Settlement

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Supplemental Authority in Support of their Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class

27 Certification. (Doc. 155.) On June 1, 2023, September 12, 2023, and October 5, 2023,

Plaintiffs filed three Notices of Supplemental Authority in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion

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1 Agreement satisfies the factors set forth in Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d

2 566 (9th Cir.2004) (id. at 22–24) and that the views of counsel should be given substantial

3 weight (id. at 24–25). Finally, Plaintiffs contend that their proposed notice plan provides

4 class members the best notice practicable under the circumstances and adequately informs

5 class members of the settlement and their right to object or opt-out. (Id. at 25–27.)

6 Although Plaintiffs reference their prior Motion for Class Certification (see id. at 6, 8, 15)

7 and request the Court confirm certification of the class (id. at 27), Plaintiffs did not re-brief

8 class certification for the newly defined class.

9 C. Settlement Terms

10 Plaintiffs attach the proposed Settlement Agreement to the Declaration of Michael

11 A. Tompkins, Esq. in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval (“Tompkins

12 Decl.”) as Exhibit D. (See Doc. 220-1 [Tompkins Decl.] ¶ 23, Ex. D; Doc. 220-5

13 [Settlement Agreement].) The Court summarizes the relevant provisions here.

14 1. The Class, the Class Representatives, and the Parties

15 “Settlement Class, Class or Class Members means: all enrolled students at USD who

16 paid tuition, the Student Wellness fee and/or course fees to USD, or who were credited

17 with having paid such tuition and/or Mandatory Fees to USD for the Spring 2020

18 term/semester.” (Doc. 220-5 [Settlement Agreement] § 1.29.) Plaintiffs are the “Class

19 Representatives” or “Named Plaintiffs.” (Id. at 1, § 1.15.)

20 “Class Counsel” means Yvette Golan of The Golan Firm PLLC; Carney R.

21 Shegerian and Anthony Nguyen of Shegerian & Associates, Inc.; James Francis of Francis

22 Mailman Soumilas, P.C.; Jason Sultzer of The Sultzer Law Group, P.C.; and Michael A.

23 Tompkins of Leeds Brown Law, P.C. (Id. § 1.4.)

24 Plaintiffs and Defendant are referred to collectively as the “Parties.” (Id. at 1.)

25 2. Monetary Relief

26 In the proposed Settlement Agreement, “Defendant agrees to pay an additional One

27 Million Four Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,400,000.00) to fully satisfy any and all current

28 cash benefits to be paid to all Class Members, any Court-approved Costs and Fees, and all

1 costs and fees associated with the Settlement Claims Administrator.” (Settlement

2 Agreement § 3.1.4) “Defendant shall make payments into the [Qualified Settlement Fund

3 (“QSF”)] as follows: (i) on or before 14 days after Preliminary Approval, Defendant shall

4 pay $35,000 for the primary purpose of funding the Settlement Claims Administrator and

5 paying the costs associated with effectuating notice; and (ii) on or before 10 days after the

6 Final Effective Date, Defendant shall fund the remainder of the Gross Settlement Fund into

7 the QSF.” (Id. §§ 1.23, 3.1.1.)

8 Additionally, “Class Counsel will petition the Court for an award of no more than

9 Two Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($275,000.00) for attorneys’ fees and will

10 additionally petition the Court for reimbursement of reasonable litigation costs, and

11 expenses not to exceed $300,000.” (Id. § 3.3.1.) “Named Plaintiffs may [also] apply to

12 the Court to receive a Service Award of no more than Fifteen Thousand Dollars total

13 ($15,000).” (Id. § 3.4.1.) “The sum of all calculated amounts is expected to be $750,000,

14 after payment of Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Service Award, and costs of the Settlement

15 Claims Administrator.”5 (Id. § 3.5.2.)

16 “The Settlement Claims Administrator shall prepare calculations to be approved by

17 the Parties, and the Net Settlement Fund shall be distributed proportionately to all Class

18 Members based on the following terms and criteria: … Students who enrolled for online

19 only classes at the beginning of the Spring 2020 Semester, who paid no tuition or fees, or

20 who left USD prior to March 16, 2020, are not eligible to collect any proceeds. … The

21 remainder of the Net Settlement Fund shall be allocated to Class Members on a prorated

22 basis based on a percentage of tuition and fees paid to USD during the Spring 2020

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4 This section provides for the payment of “an additional” $1.4 million; however, the Court

27 is not certain from the context of the Settlement Agreement what this payment is “in

addition” to.

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1 Semester, taking into account any USD-funded amounts that did not require repayment.”

2 (Id. § 3.5.1.)

3 3. The Release

4 “Releasing Parties means Named Plaintiffs [and] those Class Members who do not

5 timely opt out of the Settlement Class ….” (Id. § 1.26.) “Released Parties means USD

6 ….” (Id. § 1.25.)

7 “Released Claims means any and all actual, potential, filed, known or unknown,

8 fixed or contingent, claimed or unclaimed, suspected or unsuspected, claims, demands,

9 liabilities, rights, causes of action, contracts or agreements, extra contractual claims,

10 damages, punitive, exemplary or multiplied damages, expenses, costs, attorneys’ fees and

11 or obligations … regarding USD’s actions, inactions, decisions, and/or indecisions with

12 respect to COVID-19 during the Spring 2020 Semester, including transitioning in-person

13 instruction, educational services, campus events, and other USD services to a remote

14 format during the Spring 2020 Semester, including but not limited to all claims that were

15 brought or could have been brought in the Action by Releasing Parties relating to any and

16 all of the Released Parties.” (Id. § 1.24.)

17 “Upon the Final Effective Date, the Releasing Parties … shall be deemed to have …

18 released, relinquished, and discharged all Released Claims.” (Id. § 3.6.1.)

19 4. Settlement Administration and Notice Procedures

20 “Settlement Claims Administrator means a qualified third-party administrator

21 agreed upon by the Parties and retained by Plaintiffs, including the following pre-approved

22 list: CPT Group, Epiq, Apex, and Simpluris.” (Id. § 1.28.) “The Settlement Claims

23 Administrator shall be paid out of the QSF.” (Id. § 2.1.1.)

24 The responsibilities of the Settlement Claims Administrator include, but are not

25 limited to, the following: “(i) printing and disseminating, via mail and/or e-mail to the

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6 The Court notes that the subsections under Settlement Agreement § 3.5.1 are incorrectly

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1 Settlement Class the Notice and Election Forms; … (v) promptly furnishing to counsel for

2 the Parties copies of any requests for exclusion, objections or other written or electronic

3 communications from each Class Member that the Settlement Claims Administrator

4 receives; (vi) receiving, retaining and reviewing the Election Forms submitted by each

5 Class Member; (vii) keeping track of requests for exclusion or objection, including

6 maintaining the original envelope in which the request or objection was mailed; (viii)

7 distributing the Settlement Checks to Class Members and/or Court-approved Costs and

8 Fees, as necessary; (ix) preparing, sending and/or wire-transferring Class Counsel’s

9 attorneys’ fees, expenses, and costs; (x) mailing Service Award and Settlement Checks in

10 accordance with this Agreement and the Approval Order; … (xx) obtaining, administering,

11 and maintaining a settlement website; … and (xxii) such other tasks as the Parties mutually

12 agree.” (Id. § 2.1.2.)

13 5. Opt-Outs and Objections

14 “Class Members who elect to opt-out of the settlement as set forth in this Agreement

15 must mail … a written, signed statement to the Settlement Claims Administrator that states

16 he or she is opting out of the settlement (‘Opt-out Statement’).” (Doc. 220-5 [Settlement

17 Agreement] § 2.4.1.) “Any Class Member who does not timely submit an Opt-out

18 Statement pursuant to this Agreement will be deemed to have accepted the settlement and

19 the terms of this Agreement, will be bound by the Approval Order, and will have any and

20 all Released Class Claims released and dismissed with prejudice.” (Id. § 2.4.4.)

21 “Class Members who wish to present objections to the proposed settlement must do

22 so in writing …. To be considered, such statement must be mailed to the Settlement Claims

23 Administrator ….” (Id. § 2.5.1.) “Any Class Member who has elected to opt-out may not

24 submit objections to the settlement.” (Id. § 2.5.2.)

25 “[T]he Settlement Claims Administrator shall certify jointly to Class Counsel and

26 Defendant’s Counsel: (a) a list of all Class Members, (b) a list of all Objectors, (c) a list of

27 all Class Members who timely submitted an Opt-out Statement, and (d) an estimated

28 calculation of the Settlement Proceeds to Class Members ….” (Id. § 2.6.)

1 D. Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Briefing

2 After the Court ordered supplemental briefing “regarding certification of the class

3 defined in the proposed Settlement Agreement” (Doc. 221 at 4), Plaintiffs filed their

4 Supplemental Briefing (Doc. 228). In their Supplemental Briefing, Plaintiffs modified “the

5 Settlement Class definition to more accurately reflect the intention of the Parties[.]” (Id.

6 at 7.) The new Settlement Class is defined as follows:

7 All enrolled students at USD who paid tuition, the Student Wellness fee and/or

course fees to USD, or who were credited with having paid such tuition and/or

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Mandatory Fees to USD for the Spring 2020 term/semester, subject to the

9 seven exclusions set forth below. Those seven categories of individuals are

excluded from the Settlement Class definition: (1) students who enrolled in

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online-only classes at the beginning of the Spring 2020 semester, (2) students

11 who paid no tuition or fees (i.e., students who received more in scholarships

or grants from USD than what was charges in tuition and/or Mandatory Fees),

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(3) students who left or withdrew from USD prior to March 16, 2020, (4) any

13 District Judge or Magistrate Judge presiding over this Action and members of

their families, (5) the defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parent companies,

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successors, predecessors, and nay entity in which the Defendant or its parents

15 have controlling interest and their current or former officers, directors, agents,

attorneys, and employees; (6) persons who properly execute and file a timely

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request for exclusion; and (7) the legal representatives, successors or assigns

17 of any such excluded person.

18 (Id. at 7–8; Doc. 228-14.) Plaintiffs explain that the revised Settlement Class intends to

19 exclude “(1) students that enrolled in online-only classes to begin the semester, (2) students

20 that paid no tuition or fees (i.e., students on full scholarship by USD backed scholarships

21 or grants), and (3) students who left USD prior to March 16, 2020.” (Doc. 228 at 7.)

22 Plaintiffs then argue that the newly defined Settlement Class meets the requirements

23 of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1)–(4). (Id. at 8–19.) First, Plaintiffs calculate

24 that the proposed Settlement Class size is approximately 7,323, which satisfies the

25 numerosity requirement under Rule 23(a)(1).7 (Id. at 11–13.) Second, Plaintiffs assert that

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7 In making this argument, Plaintiffs appear to express frustration with having to use

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1 Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement is satisfied because Plaintiffs and the prospective

2 class members share a common claim—that they signed up and paid for in-person classes

3 but only received in-person classes for half of the Spring 2020 semester—as well as

4 common questions of fact and law—e.g., whether students were entitled to receive access

5 to in-person, campus-based educational services when they paid main campus tuition and

6 fees. (Id. at 13–14.) Third, Plaintiffs contend that Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement

7 is satisfied because Plaintiffs claims are typical of the Settlement Class’s claims because,

8 among other things, the “[t]he implied-in-fact promise of in-person education is the same

9 for both Plaintiffs and the Class[,]” “Plaintiffs’ claimed breach is the same as the Settlement

10 Class’s claimed breach[,]” and Plaintiffs’ claimed damages are the same as the Settlement

11 Class’s claimed damages. (Id. at 14–16.) Fourth, Plaintiffs argue that Rule 23(a)(4)’s

12 adequacy requirement is satisfied because Plaintiffs’ counsel has decades of experience

13 prosecuting class actions, including similar tuition and fee refund actions, and Plaintiffs’

14 counsel has demonstrated their commitment to this action by filing extensive briefing. (Id.

15 at 16–18.) Plaintiffs also assert that the Named Plaintiffs’ interests are in line with those

16 of the proposed Settlement Class and that each Named Plaintiff has demonstrated their

17 commitment to this class litigation by preparing and appearing for depositions and before

18 the Court. (Id. at 18–19.)

19 Next, Plaintiffs argue that the newly defined Settlement Class meets the

20 predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). (Id. at 19–25.) First,

21 Plaintiffs assert that “the common issues (with common proof),” e.g. whether Defendant

22 promised the class members an in-person education and whether it breached that promise,

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25 (“While the Parties had not anticipated needing to apply the Section 3.5.1 Exclusions at

this stage of the action and had hoped to cost-effectively utilize the services of the third-

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party Settlement Administrator—rather than Plaintiff’s expert or USD’s resources—the

27 Parties have conferred to determine ….”).) Plaintiffs’ frustration is not well taken given

the Court’s obligation to evaluate class certification in light of the terms of the proposed

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1 “‘are more prevalent or important’ that any individual issues.” (Id. at 20–21.) Second,

2 Plaintiffs contend that the “common proof” consists of the same standardized documents

3 and the same representations because Defendant cancelled in-person instruction for all

4 class members and retained the tuition paid by all class members. (Id. at 21–22.) Third,

5 Plaintiffs assert that they can calculate damages and distribute settlement proceeds on a

6 class-wide basis and that the presence of individualized damages cannot defeat class

7 certification. (Id. at 22– 24.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue that there is no better method

8 available for adjudicating the claims. (Id. at 24–25.)

9 II. DISCUSSION

10 A. Class Certification—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)–(b)

11 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) provides, “[o]ne or more members of a class

12 may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class

13 is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable [i.e., numerosity]; (2) there are

14 questions of law or fact common to the class [i.e., commonality]; (3) the claims or defenses

15 of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [i.e.,

16 typicality]; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests

17 of the class [i.e., adequacy].”

18 Relatedly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) provides, “[a] class action may

19 be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: … the court finds that the questions of law

20 or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual

21 members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and

22 efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” “The matters pertinent to [Rule 23(b)(3)]

23 include: (A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or

24 defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the

25 controversy already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or

26 undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and (D)

27 the likely difficulties in managing a class action.” Id.

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1 Rule 23(e) regarding class action settlements, discussed below (see Section II.B),

2 “was designed to function as an additional requirement [to Rule 23(a)–(b)], not a

3 superseding direction … Subdivisions (a) and (b) focus court attention on whether a

4 proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by decisions

5 of class representatives. That dominant concern persists when settlement, rather than

6 trial, is proposed.” Amchem Prod., Inc., 521 U.S. at 621 (internal citation omitted)

7 (emphasis added). Additionally, the terms of the proposed settlements are relevant to class

8 certification. Id. at 619. For example, “[c]onfronted with a request for settlement-only

9 class certification, a district court need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present

10 intractable management problems … for the proposal is that there be no trial. But other

11 specifications of the Rule—those designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted

12 or overbroad class definitions—demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the

13 settlement context. Such attention is of vital importance, for a court asked to certify a

14 settlement class will lack the opportunity, present when a case is litigated, to adjust the

15 class, informed by the proceedings as they unfold.” Id. at 620; see also Hanlon v. Chrysler

16 Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e must pay ‘undiluted, even heightened,

17 attention’ to class certification requirements in a settlement context.”). Thus, in deciding

18 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Approval, the Court must first address whether Plaintiffs

19 have met the prerequisites for class certification under Rule 23(a)–(b). The Court addresses

20 each requirement in turn.

21 1. Rule 23(a)

22 “Our threshold task is to ascertain whether the proposed settlement class satisfies the

23 requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to all class

24 actions, namely: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of

25 representation.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019. “At the class certification stage, a court ‘is

26 required to examine the merits of an underlying claim … only inasmuch as it must

27 determine whether common questions exist; not to determine whether class members could

28 actually prevail on the merits of their claims.’” Arredondo v. Univ. of La Verne, 341 F.R.D.

1 47, 51 (C.D. Cal. 2022) (quoting Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983 n.8

2 (9th Cir. 2011)).

3 For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the proposed Settlement Class

4 of “students at USD who paid tuition, the Student Wellness fee and/or course fees to USD,

5 or who were credited with having paid such tuition and/or Mandatory Fees to USD for the

6 Spring 2020 term/semester” satisfies the requirements of Rule 23(a). (Doc. 228 at 7.) See

7 e.g., In re Univ. of S. Cal. Tuition & Fees COVID-19 Refund Litig., 695 F. Supp. 3d 1128,

8 1154–1162 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (certifying contested class of more than 40,000 “students who

9 paid or were obligated to pay tuition, fees, or other costs to [t]he University of Southern

10 California for the Spring 2020 academic term.”); Arredondo, 341 F.R.D. at 50–55

11 (certifying contested class of approximately 2,787 undergraduate students that were

12 enrolled at University of La Verne during the spring 2020 semester).

13 a) Numerosity

14 “The prerequisite of numerosity is discharged if ‘the class is so large that joinder of

15 all members is impracticable.’” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

16 23(a)(1)). Plaintiffs assert that the proposed Settlement Class size is approximately 7,323.

17 (See Doc. 228 at 11–13; see id., Ex. 6, Table 2.) The Court finds that the proposed class is

18 sufficiently numerous. See Arredondo, 341 F.R.D. at 51 (finding that a class size of

19 approximately 2,787 meets the numerosity requirement in a similar COVID tuition case);

20 In re Pepperdine Univ. Tuition & Fees Covid-19 Refund Litig., No. CV 20-4928-DMG

21 (KSx), 2023 WL 6373845, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2023) (“The proposed class contains

22 more than 7,000 class members. There is no dispute that numerosity is satisfied.”) (internal

23 citation omitted).

24 b) Commonality

25 Commonality is “the rule requiring a plaintiff to show that ‘there are questions of

26 law or fact common to the class.’” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349

27 (2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2)). “Commonality [also] requires the plaintiff to

28 demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury[.]’” Id. at 349–50

1 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). “The commonality

2 preconditions of Rule 23(a)(2) are less rigorous than the companion requirements of Rule

3 23(b)(3).” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1019.

4 Here, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs and the prospective class members share a

5 common claim—that they signed up and paid for in-person classes but only received in-

6 person classes for half of the Spring 2020 semester—as well as common questions of fact

7 and law—e.g., whether students were entitled to receive access to in-person, campus-based

8 educational services when they paid main campus tuition and fees. (See Doc. 228 at 13–

9 14.) The Court also finds that the prospective class members have suffered the same

10 economic injury—the overpayment of tuition. Therefore, the commonality requirement

11 has been met. See Arredondo, 341 F.R.D. at 51 (identifying “several common questions

12 that are capable of ‘a common answer’ across the class” in a similar COVID-19 tuition

13 refund case) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 564 U.S. at 352).

14 c) Typicality

15 Typicality requires a showing that “the claims or defenses of the representative

16 parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). The

17 purpose of this requirement “‘is to assure that the interest[s] of the named representative[s]

18 align[] with the interests of the class.’” Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617

19 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508

20 (9th Cir.1992)). “‘The test of typicality is whether other members have the same or similar

21 injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs,

22 and whether other class members have been injured by the same course of conduct.’” Id.

23 (quoting same). Typicality is a “permissive standard” and requires only that the

24 representative’s claims be “reasonably co-extensive with those of absent class members;

25 they need not be substantially identical.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020.

26 Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ argument that their claims are typical of the

27 Settlement Class’s claims because, among other things, the “[t]he implied-in-fact promise

28 of in-person education is the same for both Plaintiffs and the Class[,]” “Plaintiffs’ claimed

1 breach is the same as the Settlement Class’s claimed breach[,]” and Plaintiffs’ claimed

2 damages are the same as the Settlement Class’s claimed damages. (See Doc. 228 at 14–

3 16.) As the district court in In re University of Southern California Tuition and Fees Covid-

4 19 Refund Litigation explained, “there is no question that each USC student, and each

5 person in the United States, experienced the spring of 2020 in a different way. That does

6 not make their claim for a tuition refund atypical of the rest of the class. They paid the

7 same tuition and were subject to the same policies as the rest of the Proposed Class.” 695

8 F. Supp. 3d at 1160. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have satisfied the typicality

9 requirement. See Arredondo, 341 F.R.D. at 52 (finding “the harm, or lack thereof, caused

10 by restricting use of on-campus services is typical to the entire class” in a similar COVID-

11 19 tuition refund case).

12 d) Adequacy

13 “The named Plaintiffs must fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”

14 Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 985 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

15 23(a)(4)). “To determine whether named plaintiffs will adequately represent a class, courts

16 must resolve two questions: ‘(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any

17 conflicts of interest with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their

18 counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class?’” Id. (quoting Hanlon, 150

19 F.3d at 1020).

20 Here, the Court agrees that both the Named Plaintiffs and their counsel have

21 demonstrated a commitment to pursuing this class action litigation. (See Doc. 228 at 16–

22 19.) Specifically, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel has decades of experience

23 prosecuting class actions, including similar tuition and fee refund actions, and Plaintiffs’

24 counsel has demonstrated their commitment to this action by filing extensive briefing. (Id.

25 at 16–18.) Plaintiffs correctly note that Plaintiffs’ counsel has been appointed and

26 recognized as class counsel in other COVID-19 tuition and fee refund actions. (Id. at 17.)

27 See e.g., Arredondo, 341 F.R.D. at 54. The Court also agrees that the Named Plaintiffs’

28 interests align with those of the proposed class members and that each Named Plaintiff has

1 demonstrated their commitment to this class litigation by preparing and appearing for

2 depositions and settlement conferences. (Doc. 228 at 18–19.) Therefore, the Court finds

3 that the adequacy requirement has been met. See Arredondo, 341 F.R.D. at 52–53 (“[The

4 plaintiff] has already represented her willingness to vigorously prosecute the action

5 because she has sat for a deposition and worked with class counsel. … [C]lass counsel is

6 experienced and has decades of experience prosecuting class actions. … [The plaintiff] has

7 no conflicts with other class members. The Court accepts these representations as true

8 given the evidence supporting them. Thus, the proposed class satisfies the adequacy

9 requirement.”).

10 2. Rule 23 (b)(3)

11 As set forth above, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) requires [1] that

12 “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions

13 affecting only individual members, and [2] that a class action is superior to other available

14 methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” The Court addresses each

15 issue below.

16 a) Predominance

17 “The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are

18 sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods., Inc., 521

19 U.S. at 623. “This calls upon courts to give careful scrutiny to the relation between

20 common and individual questions in a case. An individual question is one where ‘members

21 of a proposed class will need to present evidence that varies from member to member,’

22 while a common question is one where ‘the same evidence will suffice for each member to

23 make a prima facie showing [or] the issue is susceptible to generalized, class-wide proof.’”

24 Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442, 453 (2016) (quoting 2 W. Rubenstein,

25 Newberg on Class Actions § 4:50, pp. 196–197 (5th ed. 2012)). “The predominance

26 inquiry ‘asks whether the common, aggregation-enabling, issues in the case are more

27 prevalent or important than the non-common, aggregation-defeating, individual issues.’”

28 Id. (quoting same). “When ‘one or more of the central issues in the action are common to

1 the class and can be said to predominate, the action may be considered proper under Rule

2 23(b)(3) even though other important matters will have to be tried separately, such as

3 damages or some affirmative defenses peculiar to some individual class members.’” Id. at

4 453–454 (quoting 7AA C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure

5 § 1778, pp. 123–124 (3d ed. 2005)).

6 As part of the predominance inquiry, “plaintiffs must show that ‘damages are

7 capable of measurement on a classwide basis,’ in the sense that the whole class suffered

8 damages traceable to the same injurious course of conduct underlying the plaintiffs’ legal

9 theory.” Just Film, Inc. v. Buono, 847 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2017). “The presence of

10 individualized damages calculations, however, does not defeat predominance.” Ruiz

11 Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc., 835 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Leyva v.

12 Medline Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 513–14 (9th Cir. 2013)). Thus, “‘Rule 23(b)(3)’s

13 predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule 23(a).’” Just Film, Inc., 847

14 F.3d at 1120 (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 34 (2013)).

15 As set forth above (see Section II.A.1.b (discussing the commonality requirement of

16 Rule 23(a))), the Court finds that the class members share common claims and common

17 questions of fact and law and that the class members have suffered the same economic

18 injury. Additionally, the Court finds that these common issues require common proof, e.g.,

19 the same documents and representations by Defendants, and are more prevalent and

20 important than any individual issues that could arise. Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiffs

21 demonstrated that damages can be calculated on a class-wide basis. In fact, the Settlement

22 Agreement accounts for the amount of tuition and fees paid by each individual student. It

23 provides:

24 Allocation. The Settlement Claims Administrator shall prepare calculations

to be approved by the Parties, and the Net Settlement Fund shall be distributed

25

proportionately to all Class Members based on the following terms and

26 criteria:

27 Students who enrolled for online only classes at the beginning of the

Spring 2020 Semester, who paid no tuition or fees, or who left USD

28

1 prior to March 16, 2020, are not eligible to collect any proceeds.

2 The remainder of the Net Settlement Fund shall be allocated to Class

Members on a prorated basis based on a percentage of tuition and fees

3

paid to USD during the Spring 2020 Semester, taking into account any

4 USD funded amounts that did not require repayment.

5

(Settlement Agreement § 3.5.1 (emphasis added).) Therefore, the predominance

6

requirement has been met.

7

b) Superiority

8

The superiority inquiry “involves a comparative evaluation of alternative

9

mechanisms of dispute resolution.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1023. “In determining superiority

10

of a class action to individual litigation, courts consider the interests of the individual

11

members in controlling their own litigation, the desirability of concentrating the litigation

12

in the particular forum, and the manageability of the class action.” Ballard v. Equifax

13

Check Servs., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 589, 600 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)

14

and Amchem Prod., Inc., 521 U.S. at 615). “The purpose of the superiority requirement is

15

to assure that the class action is the most efficient and effective means of resolving the

16

controversy.” Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir.

17

2010) (quotation omitted). “Where recovery on an individual basis would be dwarfed by

18

the cost of litigating on an individual basis, this factor weighs in favor of class

19

certification.” Id.

20

Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that litigating this case in a single class action

21

will save time, effort, and expense, and allow for a uniform decision across the class.

22

Additionally, the Court agrees that, without this representative class action, it is unlikely

23

that the class members would be able to seek relief. The Court finds that “recovery on an

24

individual basis would be dwarfed by the cost of litigating on an individual basis[.]” Wolin,

25

617 F.3d at 1175 (quotation omitted). Therefore, the superiority requirement is met.

26

27

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1 B. Preliminary Approval—Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)

2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides, “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of

3 a certified class—or a class proposed to be certified for purposes of settlement—may be

4 settled, voluntarily dismissed, or compromised only with the court’s approval.” There is a

5 “strong judicial policy that favors settlements, particularly where complex class action

6 litigation is concerned[.]” In re Hyundai & Kia Fuel Econ. Litig., 926 F.3d 539, 556 (9th

7 Cir. 2019) (quoting Allen v. Bedolla, 787 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2015)).

8 1. Rule 23(e)(2)

9 “If the proposal would bind class members, the court may approve it only after a

10 hearing and only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate after considering

11 whether:

12 (A) the class representatives and class counsel have adequately represented

the class; (B) the proposal was negotiated at arm’s length; (C) the relief

13

provided for the class is adequate, taking into account: (i) the costs, risks, and

14 delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the effectiveness of any proposed method of

distributing relief to the class, including the method of processing class-

15

member claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees,

16 including timing of payment; and (iv) any agreement required to be identified

under Rule 23(e)(3); and (D) the proposal treats class members equitably

17

relative to each other.

18

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (emphasis added).8 Courts may also consider:

19

(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and

20 likely duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action

status throughout the trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent

21

of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience

22 and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a governmental participant; and (8)

the reaction of the class members of the proposed settlement.

23

24

25

26

27

8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(3) states, “[t]he parties seeking approval must file

28

1 In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 946 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting

2 Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir.2004)).9 For the reasons

3 set forth below, the Court finds that the aforementioned factors weigh in favor of

4 preliminarily approving the Settlement Agreement.

5 First, Class Counsel and the Class Representatives have adequately represented the

6 Class throughout this litigation and in settlement negotiations. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

7 23(e)(2)(A)–(B) (requiring courts to consider “the class representatives and class counsel

8 have adequately represented the class” and that “the proposal was negotiated at arm’s

9 length”); In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d at 946 (allowing courts to

10 consider “the experience and views of counsel”). Plaintiffs’ counsel has experience

11 prosecuting class actions, including similar tuition and fee refund actions, and has

12 demonstrated their commitment to this action by litigating this matter through the close of

13 discovery and filing extensive pre-trial motions. The Named Plaintiffs have similarly

14 demonstrated their commitment to this class litigation by preparing and appearing for

15 depositions and settlement conferences. Additionally, the Court is persuaded that Class

16 Counsel negotiated the Settlement Agreement as arm’s length. The Settlement

17 Agreement’s provision for attorneys’ fees is not disproportionate to the Class award, and

18 any uncashed or unclaimed funds shall be distributed to scholarship and financial aid funds.

19 C.f. In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d at 947 (“[T]he settlement’s

20 provision for attorneys’ fees is apparently disproportionate to the class reward, which

21 includes no monetary distribution[.]”).

22 Second, the relief provided to the class is adequate. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

23 23(e)(2)(C)(i)–(iv) (requiring courts to consider whether “the relief provided for the class

24 is adequate”); In re Bluetooth Headset Prod. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d at 946 (allowing courts

25 to consider “the strength of the plaintiff’s case;” “the risk, expense, complexity, and likely

26

27

28

9

1 duration of further litigation;” “the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the

2 trial;” and “the amount offered in settlement[.]”). The Settlement Agreement states that

3 “[t]he sum of all calculated amounts is expected to be $750,000, after payment of

4 Attorneys’ Fees and Costs, Service Award, and costs of the Settlement Claims

5 Administrator.” Considering the unlikelihood that class members would otherwise obtain

6 relief, particularly given the risks, costs, and uncertainties of litigation, a sum of $750,000

7 is adequate.10

8 Finally, the Settlement Agreement treats each member of the class equitably. See

9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D) (requiring courts to consider whether the “proposal treats class

10 members equitably relative to each other”). The Settlement Agreement accounts for the

11 amount of tuition and fees paid by each individual student. It provides that “the Net

12 Settlement Fund shall be allocated to Class Members on a prorated basis based on a

13 percentage of tuition and fees paid to USD during the Spring 2020 Semester, taking into

14 account any USD funded amounts that did not require repayment.” (Settlement Agreement

15 § 3.5.1 (emphasis added).) In other words, each class member’s payment is based on the

16 amount of tuition he or she paid in tuition and fees. The Court finds this equitable.

17 Based on the foregoing analysis of the relevant factors, and evaluating the Settlement

18 Agreement as a whole, the Court preliminarily finds that the Settlement Agreement is fair,

19 reasonable, and adequate. Ruch v. AM Retail Grp., Inc., No. 14-cv-05352-MEJ, 2016 WL

20 1161453, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 24, 2016) (“‘[I]t is the settlement taken as a whole, rather

21 than the individual component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness.’”) (quoting

22 Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026).

23

24

25

26

27 10 As set forth above (see Section I.C.2), by the Court’s calculations, the total is expected

to be $745,000, not $750,000. Whether the total recovery is $750,000 or $745,000, the

28

1 2. Rule 23(e)(1)

2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(1) provides: “[t]he following procedures

3 apply to a proposed settlement …:

4 (1) Notice to the Class. (A) … The parties must provide the court with

information sufficient to enable it to determine whether to give notice of the

5

proposal to the class. (B) … The court must direct notice in a reasonable

6 manner to all class members who would be bound by the proposal if giving

notice is justified by the parties’ showing that the court will likely be able to:

7

(i) approve the proposal under Rule 23(e)(2); and (ii) certify the class for

8 purposes of judgment on the proposal.”

9 Relatedly, Rule 23(c)(2)(B) provides:

10 [U]pon ordering notice under Rule 23(e)(1) to a class proposed to be certified

for purposes of settlement under Rule 23(b)(3)—the court must direct to class

11

members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including

12 individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable

effort. The notice must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood

13

language: (i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of the class certified;

14 (iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that a class member may enter

an appearance through an attorney if the member so desires; (v) that the court

15

will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; (vi) the time

16 and manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class

judgment on members under Rule 23(c)(3).

17

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).

18

Having carefully reviewed the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Court finds

19

that it directs the best notice practicable in a “reasonable manner”—via physical mail or

20

email. (See Settlement Agreement §§ 1.5, 2.2.3, 2.3.5.) Likewise, having reviewed the

21

Proposed Notice of Class Action Settlement (“Notice”) (see Tompkins Decl., ¶ 23, Ex. B;

22

Doc. 220-3), the Court finds that it clearly and concisely explains in plain English what

23

this lawsuit is about, why it is a class action, why there is a settlement, who is in the

24

settlement class, and what class members’ options are (see Doc. 220-3 at 3–6). For

25

example, the Notice informs potential class members how to “opt out” or “object” to the

26

Settlement. (Id. at 5–6.) The Notice also explains what rights class members give up if

27

they choose to join the Settlement. (Id. at 6.)

28

1 However, the Court also notes that, as with the Settlement Agreement, the Notice

2 must be updated to reflect the class definition set forth in Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Briefing.

3 (See id. at 2, WHY DID I GET THIS NOTICE?, ¶ 2; id. at 4, WHO IS IN THE

4 SETTLEMENT CLASS?.) Additionally, the Court notes that there is a grammatical error

5 at the beginning of the notice. (See id. at 2 (“If you are an enrolled students at USD who

6 paid ….”) (emphasis in original).) As written, the language wrongly implies that class

7 members must currently be enrolled at USD.

8 III. CONCLUSION

9 In accordance with the Court’s guidance above, the Court ORDERS Plaintiffs to

10 submit revised versions of the proposed Settlement Agreement and the proposed Notice on

11 or before November 15, 2024. The revised documents must incorporate the class

12 definition set forth in Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Briefing and address any issues identified

13 by the Court above.

14 Subject to Plaintiffs’ compliant re-submission of the proposed Settlement

15 Agreement and the proposed Notice, the Court PRELIMINARILY APPROVES the

16 Settlement Agreement, including the exhibits attached thereto. The Court also

17 APPOINTS the Plaintiffs as the class representatives; APPOINTS Plaintiffs’ counsel—

18 Leeds Brown Law, P.C.; The Sultzer Law Group, P.C.; The Golan Firm PLLC; Shegerian

19 & Associates, Inc.; and Francis Mailman Soumilas, P.C.—as class counsel; and

20 APPROVES the notice plan and forms of notice.

21 The Parties and the Settlement Claims Administrator shall comply with all the dates

22 and deadlines set forth in the proposed Settlement Agreement, including the following:

23 1. Pursuant to the terms of the proposed Settlement Agreement, “[w]ithin ten

24 (10) days of [the Court’s approval of the revised Settlement Agreement and Notice],

25 Defendant shall provide the Settlement Claims Administrator and Class Counsel with the

26 Class List to allow for the distribution of Notice in the manner described in [the proposed

27 Settlement Agreement], including via email and physical mailing, as necessary.”

28 (Settlement Agreement § 2.3.1 (emphasis added).)

1 2. “Within fourteen (14) days after receipt of the Class List … the Settlement

2 Claims Administrator shall (l) email a copy of the Notice to all Class Members for whom

3 the Settlement Claims Administrator has a valid email address, then (2) shall wait seven

4 days for emails to be unopened or returned, and then (3) mail a copy of the Notice and

5 Election Form to all Class Members for whom the Settlement Claims Administrator does

6 not have a valid email address or an unopened email through regular U.S. Mail to such

7 students’ last known mailing address as listed in USD’s records (or as otherwise updated).”

8 (Settlement Agreement § 2.3.2 (emphasis added).)

9 3. “The Notice Response Deadline for Election Forms shall be (i) thirty (30)

10 days from the date of the initial mailing … and (ii) an additional fifteen (15) days later for

11 any Class Members who were unable to file a timely Election Form, due to factors such as

12 change of address, military service, hospitalization, or other extraordinary circumstances.”

13 (Settlement Agreement § 2.3.4 (emphasis added).)

14 4. “On the same date as initial mailing and/or e-mailing of Notices, notice shall

15 also be provided on a website at an available settlement URL including

16 https://www.USDTuitionFeeSettlement.com/, which shall be obtained, administered, and

17 maintained by the Settlement Claims Administrator.” (Settlement Agreement § 2.3.5

18 (emphasis added).)

19 5. “No later than thirty (30) days after the Notice Response Deadline, the

20 Settlement Claims Administrator shall certify jointly to Class Counsel and Defendant’s

21 Counsel: (a) a list of all Class Members, (b) a list of all Objectors, (c) a list of all Class

22 Members who timely submitted an Opt-out Statement, and (d) an estimated calculation of

23 the Settlement Proceeds to Class Members in accordance with [the terms of the Settlement

24 Agreement].” (Settlement Agreement § 2.6.2 (emphasis added).)

25 6. “No later than thirty (30) days after the Notice Response Deadline, or in

26 accordance with any orders set by the Court, Plaintiff shall move for Final Approval of the

27 Settlement, including dismissal of the claims with prejudice and approval of all procedures

28

1 || for effectuating the terms of the settlement.” (Settlement Agreement § 2.7.1 (emphasis

2 || added).)

3 7. The Court will hold a Final Approval Hearing on March 3, 2025 at 9 a.m..

4 8. “Within 15 days after Final Approval Order from the Court, the Settlement

5 ||Claims Administrator shall finalize calculations for allocation of the Settlement proceeds

6 || and provide a version to the Parties.” (Settlement Agreement § 2.7.2 (emphasis added).)

7 IT IS SO ORDERED.

8 || DATE: November 7, 2024

Rea ete

10 HON? RUTH BERMUBEZ MONTENEGRO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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