Williams v. Shapiro

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Devon Williams, - CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-cv-417

Plaintiff, : (JUDGE MANNION)

v.

Ralph J. Overpeck, et. al.',

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the court in this pro se civil rights lawsuit is the report

and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Susan E. Schwab, (Doc. 15),

dated July 29, 2024, and Plaintiffs request for default judgment, dated

August 1, 2024. (Doc. 16). Judge Schwab conducted the legally required

screening review of Plaintiffs amended complaint, (Doc. 12), and

recommends that it be dismissed without leave to amend. After multiple

deadline extensions, (Docs. 18, 20, 22), Defendant filed a timely objection to

Judge Schwab's report. (Doc. 23). However, based on the court’s review of

the record as described below, the court will overrule Plaintiffs objections

and adopt Judge Schwab's report and recommendation in its entirety. In turn,

Plaintiff's request for default judgment will be denied as moot.

' This case was originally styled Williams v. Shapiro et. al., but Defendant

Josh Shapiro was terminated from this case on May 17, 2024, because he

was not named in Plaintiff's amended complaint. (Doc. 12).

l. Background

Since the report correctly states the procedural and factual background

of this case, (Doc. 15 pp. 2-5), it will not be repeated fully herein. In short,

this is a pro se civil rights lawsuit against law enforcement officials involved

in Plaintiffs allegedly wrongful arrest following a vehicle and foot chase on

November 19, 2019. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Police Officer Ralph J.

Overpeck wrongfully arrested him without probable cause, Monroe County

District Attorney David E. Christine illegally authorized Assistant District

Attorney Chad A. Martinez to file charges against him without probable

cause, and Judge Stephen M. Higgins of the Monroe County Court of

Common Pleas falsely imprisoned him. In turn, Plaintiff brings Fourth

Amendment “police misconduct,” excessive force, and false arrest claims

against Officer Overpeck, malicious prosecution claims against Officer

Overpeck, District Attorney Christine, and Assistant District Attorney

Martinez, and false imprisonment claims against Judge Higgins all pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. §1983.

ll. Legal Standard

When objections are timely filed to the report and recommendation of

a magistrate judge, the district court must review de novo those portions of

-2-

the report to which objections are made. 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1); Brown v.

Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 195 (3d Cir. 2011). Although the standard of review is

de novo, the district court “may also, in the exercise of sound judicial

discretion, rely on the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and

recommendations.” Bynum v. Colvin, 198 F. Supp 3d 434, 437 (E.D. Pa.

2016) (citing United Stated v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980)).

District courts also have an on-going statutory obligation to

preliminarily review a pro se complaint to determine whether any claims are

frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

See 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)}(2)(B)\(ii}. This statutory text mirrors the language of

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a

complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In determining whether a complaint

states a claim for relief, a court must accept the factual allegations in the

complaint as true, Bel! Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007),

and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after

construing them in the light most favorable to the non-movant.” Jordan v.

Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” /d.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

_3-

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice’).

When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the

complaint liberally and draw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well

as from what is alleged. Diuhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir.

2003); Youse v. Carlucci, 867 F. Supp. 317, 318 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Such a

complaint “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, (1976)).

However, Rule 8 also plays an important role in pro se litigation, setting

minimal pleading thresholds which must be met in order to initially state a

claim. Therefore, dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 8 is appropriate

when a complaint is “illegible or incomprehensible,” Scibelli v. Lebanon

County, 219 F. App’x 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007), or when a complaint “is not

only of an unwieldy length, but it is also largely unintelligible.” Stephanatos

v. Cohen, 236 F. App’x 785, 787 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, a pro se plaintiff's

complaint must recite factual allegations that are sufficient to raise the

plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth

in a “short and plain” statement.

= 4

lil. Discussion

Judge Schwab reports that even liberally construing Plaintiffs

amended complaint, it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

because many of Plaintiff's claims are either time barred or barred by

Defendants’ immunity, and the rest are not adequately supported with factual

allegations. In turn Judge Schwab recommends that Plaintiff's amended

complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. Plaintiff objects arguing that

his claims are not time barred, are factually supported, and should not be

dismissed without leave to amend because Judge Schwab's

recommendation is an inappropriate “defense” to his request for default

judgment.

A. Plaintiff's Claims against only Officer Overpeck

Plaintiff brings “police misconduct,” false arrest, and excessive force

claims against only Officer Overpeck. As to Plaintiff's “police misconduct’

claim, Judge Schwab reports that no such claim exists. Plaintiff does not

object to this finding and the court otherwise agrees with Judge Schwab. As

to Plaintiffs excessive force and false arrest claims, those alleged

constitutional violations occurred on November 17, 2019, when Officer

Overpeck arrested Plaintiff. But Plaintiff did not initiate this lawsuit until March

8, 2024. “The statute of limitations applicable to §1983 claims in

Pennsylvania is two years.” Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir.

2017). Thus, Judge Schwab concluded that these claims are barred by the

statute of limitation because they accrued prior to March 8, 2022. See

Montanez v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir.

2014) (quoting Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009)) (“Under

federal law, a cause of action accrues ‘when the plaintiff knew or should have

known of the injury upon which the action is based.””)

Plaintiff objects to this finding arguing that he did not know to raise

these claims until March 3, 2023, when Judge Higgins granted Assistant

District Attorney Martinez leave to nofle presequi. However, a false arrest

claim does not accrue when charges are dropped. It is the “standard rule”

that accrual of a claim “commences when the plaintiff has a complete and

present cause of action,” Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Tr. Fund

v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997) (citation omitted), which

occurs for false arrest claims when a plaintiff “appear[s] before the examining

magistrate and [is] bound over for trial,” i.e., “once the victim becomes held

pursuant to [legal] process,” Wallace v. Kafo, 549 U.S. 384, 389, 391 (2007)

(emphasis omitted). According to Plaintiff's own amended complaint he was

held over for trial in March 2020, meaning his false arrest claim was rendered

time barred in March 2022, two years before he even initiated this lawsuit.

_6-

Likewise, the accrual of excessive force claims is not based on the

dropping of charges but begins on the date of arrest and alleged

mistreatment. See Large v. Cnty. of Montgomery, 307 F. App'x 606 (3d Cir.

2009). Since the alleged excessive force here occurred on November 17,

2019, that claim became time barred as of November 17, 2021. Therefore,

the court agrees with Judge Schwab and will overrule Plaintiffs objections

on this issue.

B. Plaintiff's Malicious Prosecution Claims

Plaintiff brings malicious prosecution claims against Officer Overpeck,

District Attorney Christine, and Assistant District Attorney Martinez. As to

District Attorney Christine and Assistant District Attorney Martinez, Judge

Schwab reports that both Defendants are entitled to prosecutorial immunity.

A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity from a claim based on them

‘initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case.” /mbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). Since Plaintiff's claims are based on

Defendants Christine and Martinez’s roles in initiating criminal charges

against him, Judge Schwab concluded that these Defendants are immune

from such claims. Plaintiff does not object to this finding and the court

otherwise agrees with Judge Schwab.

-7-

As to Officer Overpeck, Judge Schwab reports that Plaintiff has failed

to adequately plead facts to support his malicious prosecution claim against

him. Specifically, Judge Schwab found that Plaintiff summarily states that

Officer Overpeck lacked probable cause to arrest him but attaches Officer

Overpeck’s affidavit of probable cause, which he only cites selectively in his

amended complaint but does not dispute the veracity of the overall

assertions therein.

Plaintiff objects to this finding arguing that he did satisfy the elements

of a malicious prosecution claim. He also argues that the alleged fact Officer

Overpeck stated he lost sight of him between the vehicle and foot chase

preceding his arrest indicates a lack of probable cause. Still Plaintiff does not

challenge the overall veracity of Officer Overpeck’s affidavit of probable

cause. Moreover, Plaintiff still only baldly asserts that Officer Overpeck acted

maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing him to justice. Plaintiff does

not state how or why Officer Overbeck acted maliciously. He only claims that

Officer Overbeck lacked probable cause to arrest him. Even disregarding

Officer Overpeck’s affidavit, the mere lack of probable cause alone does not

support a malicious prosecution claim. Officer Overbeck needs to have acted

with some malicious intent. Therefore, the court agrees with Judge Schwab

and will overrule Plaintiffs objections on this issue.

-8-

C. Plaintiff's Claims against Judge Higgins

Plaintiff brings false imprisonment claims against Judge Higgins but

does not clarify whether he brings those claims against him in his individual

or official capacity. As to his official capacity Judge Schwab reports that

because Judge Higgins is a judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe

County, which is a Commonwealth entity, the claims against him in his official

capacity are really claims against the Commonwealth and, as such, are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa.,

426 F. 3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2005). Plaintiff does not object to this finding and

the court otherwise agrees with Judge Schwab.

As to his persona! capacity Judge Higgins is entitled to absolute judicial

immunity from §1983 claims. The Supreme Court long has recognized that

judges are immune from suit under §1983 for monetary damages arising

from their judicial acts. See Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211

F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30-31

(1991)). Judge Higgins acts are classic duties of presiding judicial officers

and there is no evidence he lacked jurisdiction to take these actions. Thus,

he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity from Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff also

does not object to this finding and the court otherwise agrees with Judge

Schwab.

_9-

D. Leave to Amend and Plaintiff's Request for Default Judgment

Judge Schwab recommends that Plaintiff's amended complaint be

dismissed without leave to amend because Plaintiff was already given an

opportunity to file an amended complaint, yet still failed to state a claim in

that amended complaint. Moreover, three of the four defendants named in

his amended complaint, District Attorney Christine, Assistant District

Attorney Martinez, and Judge Higgins are entitled to immunity from his

claims. As to the other Defendant, Officer Overpeck, Plaintiff's claims against

him are either time barred or despite prior leave to amend fail to state a claim.

Thus, Judge Schwab concluded that further leave to amend would be futile.

Plaintiff objects to this finding because that “recommended dismissal

appears to only be attempted as a defense to [his] August 1, 2024, request

for entry of default.” (Doc. 23 p. 3). Plaintiff argues he is entitled to default

judgment because Defendants have not responded to his amended

complaint despite it being filed on May 17, 2024. However, Defendants have

not responded to Plaintiff's amended complaint because they have not been

served with that complaint. Whereas here a Plaintiff is pro se the court has

a duty to screen a plaintiffs complaint before serving it on a defendant. Judge

Schwab conducted this legally required screening review of Plaintiff's

amended complaint and made the present recommendation that it be

-10-

dismissed, before it is even served on Defendants, on July 29, 2024. So,

although the court recognizes that Plaintiff may not have received the

present report and recommendation before he filed his request for default

judgement, on August 1, 2024, that report and recommendation still predates

his request for default judgment and is thus not a defense to it.

Plaintiff does not offer any other arguments to contravene Judge

Schwab's findings regarding the futility of giving him leave to further amend

his complaint. Even if he did, the court agrees with Judge Schwab. Plaintiff's

claims are time barred, immunity barred, or lacking in factual support despite

previous leave to amend. Accordingly, further leave to amend would be futile.

See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008) (“if a

complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit

a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or

futile.”)

Since the court will in turn dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint

without leave to amend, Plaintiff's request for default judgement must also

be denied as moot.’

2 Even if Plaintiff's request for default judgment was not moot, the court would

also have to deny that request on the previously explained basis that

Defendants have not been served with Plaintiffs amended complaint and are

therefore not in default.

-41-

IV. Conciusion

Based on the aforesaid, the court will overrule Plaintiff's objections and

adopt Judge Schwab's report and recommendation in its entirety. Plaintiff's

amended complaint will be dismissed without leave to amend and his request

for default judgment will be denied as moot. An appropriate order follows.

Pe ee

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: November 7, 2024

24-417-01

awe