United States v. Rodolfo Maisonet

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13124

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RODOLFO MAISONET,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cr-00035-MW-MAF-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13124

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

BRASHER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal is about the process for assessing whether a de-

fendant should receive a mandatory minimum sentence for a drug

crime. A drug-crime defendant may be eligible to be sentenced

without regard to the mandatory minimum if he meets the require-

ments for the safety valve. One of those requirements is the “tell-

all” provision: a defendant must establish that, “not later than the

time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has truthfully pro-

vided to the Government all information and evidence the defend-

ant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the

same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(f). A defendant may satisfy this provision even if “the de-

fendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide

or . . . the Government is already aware of the information.” Id.

When a defendant establishes his eligibility for the safety valve, a

district court must sentence him by weighing the statutory fac-

tors—seriousness of the offense, need for deterrence, and the like.

See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The weight of these factors may justify a

sentence less than the mandatory minimum that would otherwise

be imposed.

Rodolfo Maisonet was arrested for a crime subject to a man-

datory minimum—conspiring to distribute cocaine. He proffered

with the government, but he continued committing drug offenses

that were part of the same common scheme until he was caught

again. Then, shortly before sentencing, he signed an affidavit that

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22-13124 Opinion of the Court 3

purported to provide additional information about the drug distri-

bution conspiracy. The district court held that Maisonet’s lies and

continuing criminal activity made him ineligible for the safety

valve as a matter of law. It also indicated that his affidavit continued

not to provide all information about the scheme. Accordingly, the

district court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence.

Maisonet argues that he should have been sentenced under

the safety valve, but we disagree. The district court was wrong that

Maisonet’s lies and continuing criminal activity made him ineligi-

ble as a matter of law. Under the plain text of the statute, a defend-

ant’s cooperation need not be disregarded because it was prompted

by a government investigation or because it was not provided all

at one time. Nonetheless, we believe the district court made a sep-

arate factual determination that is unaffected by its legal error—

that Maisonet’s proffer and affidavit did not disclose everything

about his drug distribution offense. Because this factual determina-

tion is firmly grounded in the record, we cannot say it was clearly

erroneous, and we affirm.

I.

In August 2020, law enforcement intercepted a package in

the mail containing nearly half a kilogram of cocaine. A couple of

days later, Maisonet called the post office to ask about the package

and when he would be able to retrieve it before driving with his

nephew to pick it up. After Maisonet identified the package as his

and took possession of it, two agents identified themselves as law

enforcement, read him his Miranda rights, and asked him about the

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13124

shipment. Maisonet reiterated that the package was his and shared

details about it. Specifically, he told the agents that he expected the

package to contain about half a kilogram of cocaine, that it was

shipped at his request from Puerto Rico, and that he received some-

where between ten and twelve packages shipped under similar cir-

cumstances since November of the previous year. Based on this in-

formation, Maisonet was charged with conspiring to distribute and

possess five kilograms or more of cocaine and possession with the

intent to distribute cocaine.

On October 22, 2021, Maisonet pleaded guilty to both

charges. As part of his plea, Maisonet agreed to fully cooperate with

law enforcement, and in exchange the government would file a

substantial-assistance motion if it determined that Maisonet had

been helpful. While cooperating with the government, Maisonet

shared details about the logistics and participants in the drug distri-

bution scheme, which the government independently verified and

used to indict another suspect.

Then on November 30, just weeks after Maisonet pleaded

guilty, he was arrested again. That day, federal agents conducting

a separate investigation intercepted another package shipped from

Puerto Rico containing about half a kilogram of cocaine. The gov-

ernment allowed the package to be delivered to its intended desti-

nation at a residence in Crawfordville, Florida while they surveilled

the scene to see who would retrieve it. A woman recovered the

package, and when confronted by law enforcement she revealed

that several packages had been delivered to the address over the

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22-13124 Opinion of the Court 5

previous months. Delivery records show that there were ten simi-

lar deliveries from August 2020 through November 2021, including

one just the week before. While the woman did not know what

these packages contained, she said her husband, J.A., knew of the

packages and that a man named Rodolfo Maisonet would pick

them up shortly after they were delivered. Additional witnesses

later corroborated this account. Officers then removed the woman

from the scene and waited to see if Maisonet would come to re-

cover the delivery.

Shortly thereafter, Maisonet arrived. As he approached the

driveway, he noticed the officers and drove away. The officers then

pursued and caught up with the car about a mile away where they

arrested him. Although the government did not charge Maisonet

with any additional offenses, he admitted to his involvement in

transporting two additional shipments of cocaine and acknowl-

edged that these shipments were part of the same scheme as his

original offense. Needless to say, Maisonet had not revealed any of

this information to law enforcement before he was caught.

At sentencing, Maisonet updated his proffer by attaching a

new statement to his sentencing memorandum. Although this

statement was written in Spanish, he submitted an English transla-

tion after sentencing. In this statement, he admitted that he ar-

ranged for the shipment of two packages of cocaine from Puerto

Rico and revealed the name of his supplier. Otherwise, he specifi-

cally denied involvement in any other shipments and insisted that

this statement described the extent of his involvement. Notably,

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Maisonet did not acknowledge the additional Crawfordville ship-

ments that law enforcement discovered and that witnesses claim

he retrieved, nor did he reveal any additional information he would

presumably know like J.A.’s role in the scheme, the names of pre-

vious cocaine buyers, or any details about the Crawfordville resi-

dence and deliveries.

At sentencing, the court determined that Maisonet did not

qualify for safety valve relief because he had not provided all the

information he knew about the crime to the government.

The court spent most of its analysis on a “legal issue.” In

reading the statute, the court drew a distinction between whether

a defendant “truthfully provide[s]” information and whether he

“answer[s] a question honestly when confronted.” According to

the court, the safety valve provision requires the former because

“provide” implies action rather than mere truthfulness.

“[A]cknowledging under oath you were caught doesn’t fix the

problem of the original material omission.” The court believed a

contrary reading “would completely turn [the] safety valve on its

head” because then a defendant could “lie to the government with

impunity, give them some facts but not others,” and so long as he

admits it, the safety valve still applies. Such a ruling would be “per-

verse” and contrary to “the whole point of the rule[.]”

The district court also discussed whether Maisonet had in

fact disclosed all of the relevant information about his crimes be-

fore sentencing. According to the court, Maisonet’s updated state-

ment “still [didn’t] account for all of the historic data that relates to

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22-13124 Opinion of the Court 7

information about historic transactions.” Specifically, the court ob-

served that Maisonet’s updated statement did not include infor-

mation about “any other historical drugs that were sent to that

same address,” “[the] quantity of any other drugs,” “historical data

about the scope and nature of the conspiracy,” or any information

regarding the duration, frequency, and contents of any shipments.

After it determined that Maisonet was not eligible for safety

valve relief, the court imposed the mandatory minimum 120-

month sentence.

Maisonet appeals his sentence.

II.

We review a district court’s factual findings about safety

valve relief for clear error and legal interpretations of the relevant

statute de novo. United States v. Johnson, 375 F.3d 1300, 1301 (11th

Cir. 2004).

III.

The safety valve provision allows district courts to sentence

defendants convicted of certain drug offenses “without regard to

any statutory minimum sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). “The intent,

clear from the face of the Act, is to provide a ‘safety valve’ so that

less culpable offenders are not subject to mandatory minimums.”

United States v. McFarlane, 81 F.3d 1013, 1014 (11th Cir. 1996). A de-

fendant qualifies for safety valve relief when five requirements are

met, only one of which—the tell-all provision—is relevant here. At

any point “not later than the time of the sentencing hearing,” a

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defendant must “truthfully provide[] to the Government all infor-

mation and evidence the defendant has” related to “the same

course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan” for which he

was charged. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). Notably, “the fact that the de-

fendant has no relevant or useful other information to provide or

that the Government is already aware of the information” does not

preclude a defendant from satisfying the tell-all provision. Id. A dis-

trict court may, but is not required to, delay a sentencing hearing

to allow a defendant an opportunity to debrief with the govern-

ment. See United States v. Garcia, 405 F.3d 1260, 1274–75 (11th Cir.

2005).

When determining whether a defendant should be sen-

tenced under the safety valve, a sentencing court must make three

assessments. First, it must determine the facts—as relevant here, a

court should ask what information the defendant provided the gov-

ernment and when it was provided. Second, a court must deter-

mine whether the facts it has found satisfy the statute’s legal re-

quirements—as relevant here, whether the defendant’s statements

to the government were complete and timely. And, third, a court

must determine whether an eligible defendant should be sentenced

below the mandatory minimum in the light of the sentencing fac-

tors and the unique circumstances of his case. See United States v.

Miles, 75 F.4th 1213, 1224 (11th Cir. 2023) (“district courts may use

their discretion to impose sentences that reflect the true facts of an

offender’s criminal history and personal circumstances, even if they

are unaccounted for in the mandatory minimums that would oth-

erwise apply”).

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Maisonet argues that the district court erred when it deter-

mined as a matter of law that he was not eligible for the safety valve

because he continued his criminal conduct. The government ar-

gues that the district court’s legal conclusion was correct. But the

government also contends that the district court made an alterna-

tive finding that, even if Maisonet were not disqualified as a matter

of law by his continuing criminal conduct, he did not as a factual

matter provide complete information to the government. Mai-

sonet insists that the court did not make a separate finding but that,

even if the court did make such a finding, it was infected by the

court’s legal error.

We will address each argument in turn.

A.

We will start with the district court’s legal ruling. At sentenc-

ing, the court recognized that the underlying facts were not in dis-

pute, and the “one issue” remaining was that it needed to “resolve

the legal issue, which is, if you acknowledge those facts prior to

sentencing, is that enough to satisfy [the tell-all provision]?” Ulti-

mately the court concluded that, if the defendant acknowledges rel-

evant information only after the government confronts him, then

that acknowledgment does not satisfy the tell-all provision. In

other words, the court concluded as a matter of law that “you don’t

remedy the material omission by simply reducing it to a sworn

statement after the fact.” We disagree.

The tell-all provision is not coextensive with acceptance of

responsibility or substantial assistance. See, e.g., United States v.

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10 Opinion of the Court 22-13124

Conde, 178 F.3d 616, 622 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing safety valve

from acceptance of responsibility under the guidelines). The stat-

ute does not condition a defendant’s eligibility for the safety valve

on whether he has been caught in a lie or whether he has continued

his criminal activity. The statute merely requires that the defendant

provide all the information he has “not later than the time of the

sentencing hearing.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). Nor is there any re-

quirement that a defendant provide all his information before the

government finds out on its own or while the information is still

useful. To the contrary, the statute specifies that a defendant may

satisfy the tell-all requirement even if “the defendant has no rele-

vant or useful other information to provide or that the Govern-

ment is already aware of the information.” Id.

The government argues that the word “provide” supports

the district court’s legal conclusion. Under the government’s the-

ory, “provide” is active and requires initiative from the defendant

that is undermined if the government must confront the defendant

about his lies or crimes. We disagree. True, the defendant has an

affirmative duty to come forward and prove his information. See

United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The bur-

den is on the defendant to come forward and to supply truthfully

to the government all the information that he possesses.”); United

States v. Johnson, 375 F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2004) (“The burden

is on the defendant to show that he has met all of the safety valve

factors.”). But neither the statute nor the ordinary meaning of “pro-

vide” suggests that cooperation may not be prompted by a govern-

ment investigation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); Provide, THE AMERICAN

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22-13124 Opinion of the Court 11

HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (5th ed. 2011)

(“to make available (something needed or desired); furnish”). In-

stead, the statute expressly contemplates that the government may

already be aware of the information that the defendant recounts.

Under the statute, so long as a full debriefing occurs by the time of

sentencing, the defendant may qualify for relief.

We held as much in United States v. Brownlee, 204 F.3d 1302

(11th Cir. 2000). In that case, Elliott Brownlee was arrested on var-

ious drug charges, and upon his arrest he gave a proffer to the gov-

ernment in which he “admitted to his involvement in the sale of

cocaine, but he did not truthfully disclose the source of the co-

caine.” Id. at 1303. Despite this deception, Brownlee asked to meet

with the prosecutor on the morning of sentencing and identified

his co-defendant as the source. Id. at 1303–04. We concluded that

he was eligible for the safety valve. We declined to adopt a good-

faith requirement for the tell-all provision and instead held that

“lies and omissions do not, as a matter of law, disqualify a defend-

ant from safety-valve relief so long as the defendant makes a com-

plete and truthful proffer not later than the commencement of the

sentencing hearing.” Id. at 1305. See also United States v. Schreiber,

191 F.3d 103, 108–09 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Tournier, 171

F.3d 645, 647 (8th Cir. 1999).

The government says Brownlee is distinguishable from the

present case because, unlike Brownlee, Maisonet came clean, if at

all, only after the government confronted him about his new crim-

inal conduct. We disagree. Brownlee stands for the proposition that,

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12 Opinion of the Court 22-13124

whatever a defendant may have done in the lead up to sentencing,

a defendant is not disqualified from safety valve relief as a matter

of law under the tell-all provision so long as he comes clean before

the start of sentencing. The same principle applies here just as

much as it applied in Brownlee.

The government also argues that allowing a defendant like

Maisonet to be eligible for the safety valve would lead to unjust or

incongruous results. Likewise, in the district court’s view, allowing

defendants to qualify for safety valve relief in this context would be

“perverse” because it would allow them to “gam[e] the system” by

misleading the government and then coming clean only when

caught.

These considerations are misplaced for two reasons.

First, we need not consider policy arguments like this one

when a statute is clear. “[I]f the text of a statute is unambiguous, it

should be applied by its terms without regard to policy arguments,

legislative history, or any other matter extraneous to the text—un-

less this application leads to an absurdity.” Antonin Scalia & Bryan

A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 436 (2012).

Here, as a matter of straightforward statutory text, the deadline for

disclosure is “not later than the time of the sentencing hearing” and

it doesn’t matter that “the Government is already aware of the in-

formation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). There is no requirement that the

defendant refrain from criminal activity or disclose without

prompting by the government’s investigation.

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Second, even though a defendant is not legally precluded

from safety valve relief by his continuing criminal conduct or a re-

luctant disclosure, those attributes may still be factored into his ul-

timate sentence. As we recognized in Brownlee, a defendant’s prior

attempt to mislead the government—or, here, to continue his

criminal activity—is relevant to whether the defendant’s later prof-

fer should be believed. See Brownlee, 204 F.3d at 1305. Likewise, a

court can consider a defendant’s post-offense conduct in assessing

the actual sentence that a defendant receives. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(1)–(2); United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 745 (11th Cir.

2007). After all, “safety valve eligibility does not guarantee [a de-

fendant] a below-statutory minimum sentence; it just gives the

court the opportunity to sentence below the minimum if it believes

it is appropriate.” United States v. Owens, 38 F.4th 1, 3 (8th Cir. 2022).

“[A] court compelled to disregard a mandatory minimum sentence

in favor of the guidelines range” by the safety valve “may vary up-

ward to and even past the mandatory minimum point after consid-

ering the § 3553(a) factors—so long as the final sentence is reason-

able.” United States v. Quirante, 486 F.3d 1273, 1275–76 (11th Cir.

2007).

B.

We now address whether we may affirm on another ra-

tionale. Throughout the district court’s oral ruling on the defend-

ant’s request for safety valve relief, it suggested that the defendant’s

final attempt to debrief—a Spanish language affidavit he filed with

his sentencing memorandum—had not fully and truthfully

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disclosed all the facts of his crimes. Specifically, the district court

noted that the statement did not include information about “any

other historical drugs that were sent to that same [Crawfordville]

address,” “[the] quantity of any other drugs,” “historical data about

the scope and nature of the conspiracy,” or information regarding

the duration, frequency, and contents of any shipments. Ulti-

mately, the district court said: “I find . . . that [Maisonet’s] state-

ment doesn’t fix [his previous omission], because it still doesn’t ac-

count for all of the historic data that relates to information about

historic transactions.”

The government argues that we should affirm based on this

alternative holding. Maisonet makes three arguments in response,

but none is persuasive.

First, Maisonet argues that the district court did not make an

alternative finding at all because the court—at one point—said this

finding was “not determinative” of its final decision. We disagree

with Maisonet’s reading of the record. The district court described

this issue as both “an argument in the alternative” and a “secondary

basis” by which it could deny safety valve relief. It said that its fact-

finding was “not determinative” because it had already con-

cluded—albeit erroneously—that Maisonet could not benefit from

the safety valve as a matter of law. By definition, an alternative

holding isn’t “determinative” because it is only one of several rea-

sons that independently compel the same outcome. Nonetheless,

“the sort of reasoning employed [here]—that a particular test

doesn’t apply but that, even if it does, it isn’t satisfied—constitutes

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22-13124 Opinion of the Court 15

a prototypical alternative holding.” United States v. Files, 63 F.4th

920, 926 (11th Cir. 2023).

Second, Maisonet says that this fact-specific determination

was affected by the district court’s legal error. Again, we disagree.

The district court’s first and primary rationale for rejecting Mai-

sonet’s argument for safety valve eligibility was its conclusion that

he was statutorily ineligible because of his continuing criminal con-

duct. But this secondary fact-specific rationale is independent of the

first rationale: the district court explained that, even if its first hold-

ing was wrong, it would still deny safety valve relief because it did

not believe Maisonet’s statement was complete.

To be sure, the district court’s first and second reasons are

related in that the district court may well have considered Mai-

sonet’s lies and continuing criminal conduct in evaluating the

truthfulness of his affidavit. But that doesn’t mean the district

court’s legal conclusion affected its factfinding. Although Mai-

sonet’s conduct did not disqualify him as a matter of law, his acts

are a “part of the total mix of evidence for the district court to con-

sider in evaluating the completeness and truthfulness of the defend-

ant’s proffer.” Brownlee, 204 F.3d at 1305 (quoting Schreiber, 191

F.3d at 108); see United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1325 (11th

Cir. 1997) (factfinder may consider “that [the witness] has consist-

ently lied in the past, engaged in various criminal activities, [and]

thought that his testimony would benefit him” in assessing credi-

bility (quoting United States v. Rivera, 775 F.2d 1559, 1561 (11th Cir.

1985) (alteration in original))). A district court may consider facts

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16 Opinion of the Court 22-13124

like these when determining whether, as a factual matter, a defend-

ant has truthfully provided all relevant information.

Third, Maisonet argues that the district court was wrong—

that his statement reflects the entirety of his involvement, and he

had nothing more to add. But we cannot say the district court

clearly erred in finding otherwise. The burden is on Maisonet to

prove he satisfied the provision, and the district court had reason

to doubt him. As the district court explained, Maisonet limited his

disclosure to his own conduct and did not discuss the entire scope

of the conspiracy to mail drugs from Puerto Rico to Florida. The

government further notes that Maisonet did not share J.A.’s role in

the scheme or the names of previous cocaine buyers. These omis-

sions are particularly noteworthy because the government discov-

ered postal records of additional drug shipments to J.A.’s Crawford-

ville residence that Maisonet had not acknowledged and that wit-

nesses saw him retrieve.

We think the district court reasonably found that Maisonet’s

updated statement lacks material information that he would be ex-

pected to provide to establish his eligibility for safety valve relief.

To satisfy this factor, Maisonet needed “to supply truthfully to the

government all the information that he possesses about his in-

volvement in the offense, including information relating to the in-

volvement of others and to the chain of the narcotics distribution.”

United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1997). In partic-

ular, we have previously affirmed the denial of safety valve relief

when a defendant refuses to “give law enforcement officers any

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22-13124 Opinion of the Court 17

information about the intended distribution of his” drugs. United

States v. Johnson, 375 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2004). See also United

States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1997) (defendant did not

satisfy the tell-all provision because he refused to disclose “who his

buyers were or the names of others connected to his operation.”).

We cannot say the district court clearly erred in finding that Mai-

sonet did not fully disclose all the information that he knew.

IV.

The district court is AFFIRMED.

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22-13124 NEWSOM, J., Concurring 1

NEWSOM, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the Court’s judgment and join its opinion, with

the exception of Part III.A. I don’t disagree with anything in Part

III.A, but to my mind its legal analysis of the “tell all” provision,

though cogent and persuasive, isn’t necessary to resolve the appeal.

It’s sufficient to hold, as Part III.B correctly does, that the district

court didn’t clearly err in finding, as a matter of fact, that Maisonet

failed to “tell all,” and thereby disqualified himself from safety-

valve relief. My preference—at least in opinions that embody the

Court’s judgment—is to say no more than is essential, so I would

leave it at that. Cf. United States v. Files, 63 F.4th 920, 933 (11th Cir.

2023) (Newsom, J., concurring).