Wilson v. Saint Helens School Dist. 29J

No. 762 October 30, 2024 695

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of the Compensation of

Krista L. Wilson, Claimant.

Krista L. WILSON,

Petitioner,

v.

SAINT HELENS SCHOOL DISTRICT 29J,

Respondent.

Workers’ Compensation Board

1906100; A177389

Argued and submitted July 12, 2023.

Philip M. Lebenbaum argued the cause for petitioner.

Also on the briefs was Hollander Lebenbaum Gannicott &

Patrick.

Brian M. Solodky argued the cause for and filed the brief

for respondent.

Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and

Hellman, Judge.

POWERS, J.

Affirmed.

696 Wilson v. Saint Helens School Dist. 29J

POWERS, J.

Claimant seeks review of an order of the Workers’

Compensation Board affirming employer’s denial of her

claim for left wrist conditions. In a single assignment of

error, she argues that the board’s order is not supported by

substantial evidence or reason. We have reviewed the record

and conclude that, although there was more than one way to

view the evidence, the board’s order was supported by sub-

stantial evidence and reason. Accordingly, we affirm.

In this case, which involves a typical “battle of the

experts” where doctors disagree as to whether a work inci-

dent was a material cause of the claimant’s injuries, we

briefly summarize the material facts in a manner consistent

with the unchallenged factual findings of the board. See

SAIF v. Maldonado, 294 Or App 252, 253, 430 P3d 580 (2018)

(so stating). In October 2017, claimant was working for the

St. Helens School District as a special education parapro-

fessional that focused on children with significant academic

deficits. During an incident between students in claimant’s

classroom, claimant ended up against a door, pulling on the

door to close it while a student grabbed claimant’s left wrist

and turned and twisted it to attempt to get claimant’s arm

off the door. Following the incident, claimant sought medi-

cal care, and employer accepted an injury claim for cervical

strain and left trapezius strain. In December 2017, claim-

ant reported to her primary care practitioner that her wrist

had been hurting since she originally went to urgent care in

October 2017 and that her wrist was feeling more painful

again with lifting and from using her arm more. Claimant

mentioned her wrist pain to providers several more times.

In June 2018, claimant told her providers that her wrist was

the main issue, and subsequent examinations indicated that

claimant had an ulnar positive variant, which is a congeni-

tal abnormality. In December 2019, Dr. Mirarchi performed

wrist surgery, and he noted several findings, including a tri-

angular fibrocartilage complex (TFCC) tear and cartilage

loss resulting from ulnar/carpal compaction syndrome.

Mirarchi opined that the cartilage loss and TFCC

tear had been caused by claimant’s work injury, because

those injuries typically occur when there is compression on

Cite as 335 Or App 695 (2024) 697

the wrist or a twisting type of injury. Mirarchi acknowl-

edged that there was a significant delay between the work

incident and claimant’s complaints of left wrist symptoms,

and he reasoned that claimant may have been “distracted”

by the pain from her other injuries and that her TFCC tear

probably advanced over time, which made it more painful.

Conversely, Dr. Vu, who had examined claimant in November

2018, prior to the surgery, and reviewed Mirarchi’s report

following the surgery, opined that claimant’s left wrist con-

ditions were more likely caused by her ulnar positive vari-

ant causing the cartilage loss and TFCC tear gradually

over time rather than by an acute injury. Vu explained that

it was not plausible that claimant was “distracted” by her

other injuries because of the significant pain that she would

have experienced due to an acute TFCC tear. Thus, Vu con-

cluded that the wrist conditions were unrelated to the work

incident. Employer ultimately denied claimant’s claim for

her left wrist conditions.

Claimant appealed to the board, which adopted the

administrative law judge’s factual findings and issued an

order affirming the denial of claimant’s claim for her left

wrist conditions. The board concluded that Mirarchi’s opin-

ion that the work injury was the major contributing cause of

claimant’s left wrist conditions was “conclusory and not well

explained and, thus, unpersuasive.” Moreover, the board

explained that Mirarchi’s opinion did not adequately rebut

Vu’s opinion regarding the cause of the tear and the delay

in the onset of left wrist symptoms. The board, therefore,

concluded that the record lacked a persuasive medical opin-

ion establishing the compensability of claimant’s left wrist

conditions.

On review, claimant argues that the board’s conclu-

sion that Mirarchi’s opinion was “conclusory and not well

explained” is not supported by substantial evidence or rea-

son. Specifically, claimant asserts that the conclusion ignores

Mirarchi’s detailed explanation of the well-accepted mecha-

nism of TFCC tears and that those mechanisms occurred in

this case. Moreover, claimant contends that the board’s defer-

ence to Vu’s opinion is not supported by substantial evidence

or reason, because Vu provided unexplained, contradictory

698 Wilson v. Saint Helens School Dist. 29J

histories regarding the onset of symptoms and because she

never discussed whether the mechanisms of the work injury

could have caused the TFCC tear. Employer remonstrates

that the board’s findings and conclusions were supported by

substantial evidence and reason.

We review the board’s order for errors of law and

substantial evidence. ORS 183.482(7), (8); Armstrong v.

Asten-Hill Co., 90 Or App 200, 205, 752 P2d 312 (1988).

Substantial evidence exists to support a factual finding

“when the record, viewed as a whole, would permit a rea-

sonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.482(8)(c).

Moreover, a board order must be supported by “substantial

reason.” Taylor v. SAIF, 295 Or App 199, 203, 433 P3d 419

(2018), rev den, 365 Or 194 (2019). If a board order articu-

lates the reasoning that leads from the facts found to the

conclusions drawn, then it is supported by substantial rea-

son. Id.

On review, claimant argues that our decision in

Sullivan v. SAIF, 319 Or App 14, 510 P3d 255, rev den, 370

Or 212 (2022), created a “rigorous” standard for reviewing

a board’s order when there is competing medical evidence,

viz., a “battle of the experts.” We disagree that Sullivan

altered the well-established standard of review. In Sullivan,

we determined that the board’s determinations, including

its rejection of the treating physician’s opinion, were not

supported by substantial evidence or reason. Id. at 23-24.

Importantly, however, we do not understand Sullivan to

have changed or altered the standard of review in cases

where there are competing expert opinions. Rather, in our

view, Sullivan represents a case where, in applying our stan-

dard of review, we concluded that the board’s order lacked

substantial evidence and reason in the particular circum-

stances presented by the case. Thus, we apply the oft-cited

standard of review to the undisputed facts in this case.

In applying our standard of review, we conclude

in this case that the board’s order is supported by sub-

stantial evidence and reason. Both Mirarchi and Vu pro-

vided detailed medical reports and opinions regarding the

cause of the TFCC tear and cartilage loss. In particular, Vu

reviewed claimant’s medical history, examined claimant,

Cite as 335 Or App 695 (2024) 699

and opined that the wrist conditions were caused gradu-

ally over time rather than by an acute injury. Moreover, the

board explained that it found Mirarchi’s opinion unpersua-

sive, because Mirarchi acknowledged the delay in the onset

and reporting of symptoms but failed to rebut Vu’s opinion

that an acute tear would have caused significant pain such

that claimant would not have been “distracted” by her other

pain. Thus, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to

support the board’s findings and that the board articulated

its reasoning as to why it was persuaded by Vu’s rather than

Mirarchi’s opinion. We disagree with claimant’s contention

that the board was required to credit Mirarchi’s opinion; the

record did not compel that conclusion as a matter of law.

Although the board could have viewed the evidence in more

than one way, the board’s findings and conclusions are sup-

ported by substantial evidence and reason.

Affirmed.